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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation exammes the relationship between the American conservative
movement and Richard Nixon between the late 1940s and the Watergate scandal, with a
particular emphasis on the latter's presidency. It complements the sizeable bodies ofliterature
about both Nixon himself and American conservatism, shedding new light on the former's
role in the collapse of the post-1945 liberal consensus. This thesis emphasises the part played
by Nixon in the slow march of American conservatism from the political margins in the
immediate post-war years to the centre of national politics by the late 1960s. The American
conservative movement is treated as a diverse epistemic community made up of six distinct
sub-groupings - National Review conservatives, Southern conservatives, classical liberals,
neoconservatives, American Enterprise Institute conservatives and the 'Young Turks' of the
New Right - which, although philosophically and behaviourally autonomous, remained
intimately associated under the overall leadership of the intellectuals who operated from the
National Review. Although for nearly three decades Richard Nixon and American
conservatives endured each other in a mutually frustrating and yet seemingly unbreakable
relationship, Nixon never became a fully-fledged member of the movement. Yet, from the
days of Alger Hiss to those of the' Silent Majority', he remained the political actor best able
to articulate and manipulate the conservative canon into a populist, electorally successful
message. During his presidency, the administration's behaviour played a crucial role - even if
not always deliberately - in the momentous transformation of the conservative movement
into a more diverse, better-organised, modernised and more efficient political force. In the
process, conservatives consciously and successfully used Nixon in their quest to gain
acceptance as the legitimate sparring partners of the liberalism that had hitherto dominated
post-1945 American politics.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of post-1945 conservatism and the political career of Richard Nixon are
surely two of the most dramatic tales of defeat and triumph delivered by the politics of the
United States in the last three-quarters of a century. During a period of over two decades,
both the conservative movement and Nixon himself ascended from a position at the margins
of national politics towards the very centre of executive power, an ascent that was punctuated
by what proved to be premature obituaries on the political 'deaths' of both parties: in Nixon's
case, after the fracas of his 1962 California gubernatorial race, and in conservatism's, during
the aftermath of Barry Goldwater's ill-fated presidential campaign two years later. This
doctoral dissertation evaluates the relationship between Nixon and the American conservative
movement, and examines how the bonds that tied both actors between the Califonian's entree
into national politics in the late 1940s and his accession to the presidency determined the
character of the relations between the president and conservatism during Nixon's term in
office. The following pages also demonstrate that the developments that took place during the
Nixon administration helped to bring about the greatest transformation of the post-war
conservative movement's make-up and behaviour since its inception during the 1950s, and
were therefore instrumental in the ascendancy of the modem conservatism that has dominated
American politics since the 1980s.
l.THE POST-WAR CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT ...
The American conservative movement has always been a fractious and diverse
epistemic community, one which plays host to a number of conservative sub-communities
and which has evolved significantly over time. As with its constituent elements, the
movement at large, was (and remains) made up of politicians, intellectuals and political
activists with very different backgrounds and interests, but who are nevertheless bound
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together by shared ideas and experiences as well as personal relationships.' As this thesis
focuses on the conservative movement during the 1960s and early 1970s, no less than seven
distinct sub-groups are particularly relevant. Three of these right-wing sub-communities were
already present as Richard Nixon's public persona emerged in the immediate post-war years:
the National Review or 'hard core' group, though the eponymous journal around which they
gathered actually began to be published in 1955; neoliberals or libertarians; and the
'organisational' conservatives, who run the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Such was
the importance of these groupings within American conservatism that throughout Richard
Nixon's career, the latter was compelled to build up a relationship, even if distant, with each
one of them. Two other subgroups - the 'New Right' or 'Young Turk' conservatives and the
neoconservatives - emerged during the Californian's tenure in the White House, and his
trajectory as president was detenninant in shaping the form in which they did so. A seventh
and final group, Southern conservatives, had also been part of the movement since the time
Nixon entered politics. As a consequence of the 1964 presidential election, they also became
a force of political nature within the GOP in 1968, and it was thanks to the travails of the
Republican conservative South that Richard Nixon ever became the Republican nominee for
president.
This VIew of conservatism as constituted by these distinct groupings is embedded
within a well-established academic consensus, but of course conservatism does not
necessarily need to be understood or approached in these terms. If anything, each one of these
groups emerged at a different time, was driven by particular interests, possessed different
behavioural patterns and built a distinct relationship with the other conservative sub-families,
I There is a significant and coherent body of literature examining the rise of the early conservative movement. See
Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1996); Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to
Political Power (New York: Times Books, 1986); Jose Maria Marco, La Nueva Revolucion Americana (Madrid:
Ciudadela, 2007); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America
(New York: Penguin, 2004); Jerome L.Himmelstein, To The Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism
(Berkeley: University of Califomi a Press, 1990). For a useful, succinct overview see James A. Hijiya, 'The
Conservative 1960s', Journal of American Studies, 37, no. 2 (2003), pp. 201-227. The existing literature has also been
enriched by 'in-house' conservative accounts, such as Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement
That Remade America (New York: Free Press, 1999); William Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985).
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as well as with political actors beyond the conservative community such as the Nixon
administration itself. On the other hand, the American 'right' was an even larger, even more
diverse entity encompassing not only the groups included in this analysis, but also others of a
more moderate quality such as the 'Eastern' Republicans of Nelson Rockefeller, Dwight
Eisenhower and the Ripon Society, as well as groupings on the extremist fringes ranging
from the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi party to the John Birch Society and
Alabama's demagogic governor George Corley Wallace. Some scholars have contemplated
the entire right-wing as a single unit. For instance, Sara Diamond's helpful, all-inclusive
Roads to Dominion does offer a highly informative account, and one rich in detail.' Yet such
an all-encompassing narrative tends to lump together groupings - such as the National
Review types and the Klan - which actually actively opposed each other and/or never had any
sort of relationship. The resulting narrative therefore, even if illuminating from a descriptive
viewpoint, tends to be confusing and thus loses explicative power.
Works focusing on particular sub-groups are considerably more abundant and suffer
from a different shortcoming: being autonomous social, ideological and political entities,
each one of the conservative families had a distinct development. Focusing only or mostly on
one of them can lead the historian to establish as general characteristics phenomena that are
actually quite particular to only one conservative sub-family. A case in point is that of the
National Review conservatives. Led by the colourful William F. Buckley Jr. (hence
sometimes also dubbed 'Buckleyites'), the self-styled 'hard core' conservatives were the
dominant group within the entire American right throughout the third quarter of the twentieth
century, and have therefore received considerable attention. George Nash's towering The
Conservative Intellectual Conservative Movement in America since 1945 traced the origins
2 Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York:
Guilford Publications, 1995); for another example see also Jean Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative
Resurgence from the John Birch Society to the Promise Keepers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).
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and history of the Buckleyites up to the 1970s, while Sarah Katherine Mergel' s more recent
Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon has examined their specific relationship with
the Nixon White House. 3 Nash's analysis accorded considerable stock to the value of
anticommunism as a vital element holding the conservative movement itself together, as well
as cementing the movement's attachment to Richard Nixon, while Mergel's study concluded
that these conservative intellectuals held little final influence over the Nixon administration.
Both of these theses are difficult to dispute as long as one focuses narrowly on the National
Review - or NR as it was referred to by its editors - segment of the right. A broader
perspective suggests the need to qualify these positions, however.
Anticommunism did indeed become a crucial element in the articulation of the hard
core conservatives' philosophical outlook and worldview, which had in tum been constructed
upon the basis of two diverging traditions of thought: classical liberalism and traditionalist
conservatism. Nevertheless an examination beyond the National Review circle reveals that
severe clashes between libertarians and traditionalists continued, as often as not worsened by
diverging views about precisely the kind of Cold War developments that their shared
anticommunism was supposed to have created common cause on.4 In these pages it is
assumed that the different strands which formed the conservative movement were actually
held together - to each other and to Richard Nixon - by a rather more complex set of shared
adversaries and commonly-held philosophical and behavioural mores. Following a reasoning
centred on the anticommunist passion of National Review conservatives, the strength of that
feeling should also have dominated the hard core's relationship with and views about the
3 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (Wilmington DE: Intercollegiate
Studies Institute, 1998); Sarah Katherine Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon: Rethinking the Rise
of the Right (New York: Palgrave, 2010). Mergel's account is nicely completed in Sandra Scanlon, 'The Conservative
Lobby and Nixon's "Peace with Honor" in Vietnam', Journal of American Studies, 43, no. 2 (2009), pp. 255-76.
Another essential account of National Review conservatism is John B. Judis, William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the
Conservatives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).
4 This point has been forcefully made in Hijiya, 'Conservative 1960s', pp. 214-18. For the recurrent clashes between
traditionalists and libertarians see Whittaker Chambers, 'Big Sister is Watching You', National Review, December 28,
1957 (hereafter NR); William F. Buckley, 'A New Look at a Controversial Committee', ibid., January 16,1962, p. 21;
Russell Kirk to William F. Buckley, April 8,1961, f. Russell Kirk, box 14, William F. Buckley Jr. papers,
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter WFB papers); Ronald Hamowy, 'National Review:
Criticism and 'Reply,' New Individualist Review, November 1961; James O'Connell, 'The New Conservatism', ibid.,
spring 1962, p.17-22; Murray Rothbard, 'War, Peace and the State', The Weekly Standard, April 1963, p. 2.
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Nixon administration, and should also have been central to the seemingly irresistible pull
attracting the movement and Richard Nixon to one another. Yet both Nixon and the
Buckleyites were considerably more concerned about what they perceived to be the iniquities
of liberalism than by the military threat of Communism. It is safe to say that, even if
anticommunism laid the foundations of the Nixon-Buckleyite rapport, it was the mutual
interest in blasting liberalism and the shared contempt for liberals that kept the relationship
between the Californian and the movement at large - including those conservatives for whom
the Cold War was always a rather secondary matter - going for well over two decades.
Similarly, once the man from Yorba Linda was installed in the White House, conservatives
ultimately swallowed the Nixon-Kissinger overtures to China and Detente, even if amid
much protestation, and went on to support the president's re-election in 1972.5 Of course, as
historians such as Mergel and Sandra Scanlon note (and as a good many conservatives
noticed at the time), for the National Review conservatives Richard Nixon in the White
House continued to be the intensely frustrating, manipulative partner that he had been ever
since the early 1950s. However, if the Buckleyites failed to bring the administration to heel,
other groups such as the organisational AEI conservatives and the conservative Southern
Republicans were very much nurtured by the president and achieved notable advances under
the aegis of the Nixon White House. Others, such as the neoliberals and the neoconservatives,
were the first members of the conservative movement to be given serious chances of
implementing policy initiatives since 1945. The conservative picture, it seems, is a little more
complex than the perspective of the National Review intellectuals.
This dissertation therefore evaluates the characteristics and the legacy Nixon's
relationship with the American conservative movement from a historical, dynamic
perspective based on examining his bonds with the movement as a whole. The underlying
premise of this analysis is that a comprehensive evaluation of certain disparate groups as
belonging to the same entity can offer a picture of conservatism, its evolution and its impact
5 See Judis, Buckley, pp. 278-98; Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals, pp. 64-65; Scanlon, 'Conservative Lobby', pp.
267-71,275.
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upon the American polity quite at variance from those analyses focused only or mostly on
any of its constituent parts or those which take a larger, more diffuse approach. The focus in
these pages is restricted to those conservative families or sub-groups which self-identified
and were recognised by their counterparts (and, incidentally, by Richard Nixon) as belonging
to the broader conservative movement, and which either fully shared or at the very least
tolerated -even if selectively or mostly rhetorically - certain common ideological
assumptions: American national pride; a vigorous foreign policy; a strong sense of religiosity;
attachment to traditional values and to free markets. It should be emphasised that basic
ideological agreement was by no means exempt from flexibility - some may say plain
cynicism - as in the simultaneous Southern protestations on behalf of free markets and
support for protectionism for Southern-based textiles; classical liberal pursuit of small
government and acquiescence in a large Cold War military establishment; and the
neoconservative interventionist impulse married with lip-service to free markets.
Matching those common 'pull' factors, all members of the conservative movement also
shared with each other (and Nixon) rather strong prejudices against secularly-minded state-
interventionist socialism in all its forms as well as, crucially, the Democratic party,
liberalism, and the perceived leaders of liberal opinion. Yet most of these general shared
issues were also part and parcel of the far right. The aspects of the conservative movement's
behaviour and worldview which more clearly separated its members from other right-wing
groupings were certainly its long-term political behaviour and strategy. However wavering
and frustratingly, conservatives always gravitated around the Republican party. It is no
accident that certain conservative sub-families such as the Southerners and most
neoconservatives effectively abandoned the Democratic fold as they became part and parcel
of the conservative movement. Occasional (and certainly heartfelt) anti-Republican rhetorical
outbursts notwithstanding, the movement always aspired to employ its influence within the
GOP in order to convert itself into a player in mainstream national politics." In tum,
6 The most.cogent and elaborated plan for the conservative movement to ditch its links with the Republican party is
doubtlessly William Rusher, The Making of a New Majority Party (New York: Sheed & Ward Inc., 1975).
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Republican-centred political ambition and plain power-seeking were certainly among the
strongest pulls attracting these conservatives to Richard Nixon. During the more than two
decades that spanned from the emergence of a recognisable American conservative
movement in the early 1950s and the Watergate debacle, conservatives - as did Richard
Nixon in his own fashion - trod a very careful path between expressing dissent (and
sometimes radical dissent) from the established liberal consensus, and pursuing acceptance
as legitimate political contenders from the opinion-makers of that very same liberal
consensus. Right-wingers - such as George Wallace and John Birch Society leader Robert
Welch - who eschewed Republicanism and threatened to become politically embarrassments,
were, sooner or later, expelled from the ranks of the movement.
Beyond the political and ideological realms, members of the conservative movement
also developed a rich and dense network of personal relationships - even if not always of a
loving variety - which did as much to consolidate the movement as abstract philosophical
considerations or political interests did. In this light its emergence cannot be properly
understood without an account of the sometimes rather mundane motivations that coloured
changing social networks of affection (and disaffection). The importance of the personal links
built by men such as William F. Buckley, National Review publisher William Rusher, free
market champion Milton Friedman or long-term AEI director William J. Baroody Sr. cannot
possibly be exaggerated. In this sense, the Goldwater presidential campaign of 1964 became
the rite of passage that consolidated the conservative movement in the form that Richard
Nixon - himself a skilful player in '64 - encountered in 1968. Except for the
neoconservatives, ever latecomers who had peculiar relationship with the rest of the
movement, all the conservative sub-families and most individual conservatives examined in
these pages played a significant role in the Goldwater campaign, had frequently met one
another as a result of their participation, and bore similar scars as a consequence of
Goldwater's doomed presidential race."
7 Interview with Lee Edwards, August 15, 2005, Washington D.C.; Interview with Morton Blackwell, August 29,
2005, Washington DC; Interview with David Keene, August 24, 2005, Washington DC (tapes and transcripts of all
interviews conducted by the author are in his possession and can be made available for consultation); 1. William
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2.... RICHARD NIXON ...
Somewhat peculiarly given Richard Nixon's long association with the populist
Republican right, his main biographers have devoted preciously little space to his actual
relationship and links with organised conservatism.f Both the literature on the conservative
movement and the various Nixon biographies touch on the pre-1968 relationship between the
two, but usually only with regards to the latter's participation in the 1960 and 1964
presidential elections and, rather fleetingly, in the 1962 California gubernatorial race. A
remarkable exception is David Reinhard's The Republican Right Since 1945, which
intelligently describes the evolution of the GOP's conservative wing, including the trajectory
conservative 'sacred cows' such as Robert Taft and William Knowland, as well as the
fratricidal struggle between Republican conservatives and the Eastern liberal faction.9
Although scholars such as Herbert Parmet began to recognise the importance of Nixon's
early links with conservatism and of the role of his presidency for the conservative
resurgence of the 1970s, since the early 1990s, those earlier contacts with the right -
including his most severe clash with right-wing republicans in 1962 - have seldom been
seriously evaluated in the academic literature about Nixon, conservatism or even the
Republican party.!" Yet, since his early days of vigorous anticommunism, Nixon had
developed strong and durable links with prominent conservatives such as the writer Whittaker
Chambers and journalists Raymond Moley and Ralph de Toledano, which would in turn
trigger considerable tension between these men and a significant number of their fellow
Middendorf II, A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater's Presidential Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative
Movement, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), pp. 234-35; Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man Who Made the
Revolution (Washington D.C: Regnery 1995), pp. 343-44.
8 The two best biographical accounts of Nixon are Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream
(New York: Random House, 1991), and the three volume magna opus Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of
a Politician. 1913-1962 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972 (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1990) and Nixon: Ruin and recovery, 1973-1990 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
9
David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); for an
updated evaluation of the period running towards Nixon's presidency see also Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the
Sixties (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
10 Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). Another exception may be found
in Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). As the title indicates, Dallek is not really interested in Nixon's
1962 fracas but in Reagan's 1966 gubernatorial victory. A further exception is Kurt Schuparra, Triumph of the Right:
The Rise of the California Conservative Movement 1945-1966 (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 6O-Q8, 76-77.
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conservatives who always remained hostile to Nixon.11 Most importantly, if the Californian
was a divisive figure within the conservative leadership, he also became a hero for the right-
leaning electorate from which National Review obtained most of its readership. Therefore the
hard core intellectuals always had to contend with Nixon's considerable emotional appeal to
their own foot soldiers. It was no accident that when New York state Buckleyite activists set
up their very own conservative party, they did so upon the basis of the 1960 Nixon-Lodge
campaign organisation, or that after 1964 conservatives of all the other sub-families
spontaneously, independently of each other, and to the alarm of the NR conservatives, drifted
towards the Nixon bandwagon.
Nixon's understanding of conservatism's electoral importance was formed between his
1962 California gubernatorial campaign and Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential race. In
1962 he came to realise that the backing of the Republican right was essential to his electoral
success, while two years later, the ill-fated presidential campaign taught him that pure and
unadulterated conservatism was a sure-fire recipe for electoral disaster.V During his
presidency, Nixon would apply both lessons in order to retain conservative support without
alienating moderate voters. Moreover, his quest was enormously facilitated by that fact that
most conservatives had also accepted the lessons of 1964: they were therefore prepared to
support a non-member of the conservative movement, a relatively moderate candidate.
Throughout his career, Nixon was almost always the sole Republican politician who
combined electability with considerable appeal to both conservative grassroots activists and
at least some elements of the conservative movement's leadership. This was perhaps Nixon's
most important characteristic. Unlike Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, the two grand
political champions of the right that preceded and followed Nixon's presidency, the
Californian was never a political creature of the conservative movement. Unlike the cases of
most politicians identified with conservatism - a list of whom would include such various
II William Rusher to William F. Buckley, January 24, 1959, f. Interoffice Memos, box 8, WFB papers; Buckl~~ to
James Burnham, September, 2, 1959, ibid.; Rusher to Buckley, March 11, 1969, f. 10M (Jan-July 1969), box 61,.ibid.
12 John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 29; RIchard
Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 239, 241, 261.
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figures as congressmen John Rousselot and John Ashcroft, as well as Senators Strom
Thurmond and John Tower - Richard Nixon always saw the conservative movement as an
instrument at the service of his ruthless ambition, and a constituency to be tendered to
according to his short-term political needs.
Aside from Nixon's evidently calculating approach to ideological commitments, his
public career and the trajectory of the conservative leadership bore striking resemblances that
helped to consolidate an intensely frustrating, but seemingly unbreakable relationship. Nixon
and the conservatives initiated their hard uphill struggle from the political and cultural
margins towards the inner circles of national political power as the heirs of Franklin D.
Roosevelt reasserted their dominance over the American polity. In 1945 Richard Nixon was
such an outsider that he entered politics by enduring a pageant-like contest to gain the
Republican nomination for what was then seen as a safe Democratic district.13 At around the
same time modem intellectual conservatism on its part produced Friedrich Hayek's 1944 tract
The Road to Serfdom, the first of its foundational philosophical works. Although surprisingly
popular with the general public, Hayek's views were at the time generally regarded in the
economics profession as a quaint relic of the past." From this moment onwards, in political
terms Nixon appealed to the same voters that National Review and the other conservative
factions tendered to, and his political fortunes eerily mirrored the challenges confronted by
the conservative movement at large. Thus in the 1940s and 50s, Nixon's populist blasts
against supposedly communist-friendly, foreign-policy weakling liberal Democrats that have
been conservatism's stock-in-trade ever since, actually antedated the consolidation of the
conservative movement. It was then that Nixon developed firm - even if, Nixon being Nixon,
slightly distant - personal links with a handful of crucial conservatives. For over a generation
of political activity, the leitmotif of both Nixon and the conservative leadership was a
peculiar mix of visceral dislike, envy, and a powerful sense of victimisation towards those
13 Ambrose, Education ofa Politician, p.l25-27; Nixon, RN, p. 41. ,
14 Theodore Rosenof, 'Freedom, Planning and Totalitarianism: The Reception ofF. A. Hayek's The Roa~ to Serfdom,
Canadian Review of American Studies 5, no. 2 (1974), pp. 149-65; Richard Crockett, Thinking the Unthznkable:
Think Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution (London: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 9-121.
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whom they regarded as the leaders of liberal opinion, together with an equally powerful
desire to gain acceptance and respectability from that very same liberal establishment.
The following pages examme how for three decades the National Review-led
conservative movement and Richard Nixon recurrently gravitated towards each other as a
consequence of the negative forces propelling them against the liberal consensus. To these
must be added a number of genuine philosophical and behavioural coincidences, such as
relative sympathy for free markets and a deep attachment to traditional values and codes of
conduct. 15 This dissertation also contends that a major shared element between the men of the
'respectable' right and the future president was their intense desire to achieve acceptance as
legitimate sparring partners from those otherwise despised political and cultural actors setting
the tone of the zeitgeist in mid-century America. It was that fundamental coincidence that
explains why Nixon and the National Review conservatives had to recurrently (although
reluctantly) try to support and manipulate each other. That shared aim also explains why both
alternated judicious flirtations with, and firm rejections of, those deemed to belong to the
'radical' right." From the viewpoint of the conservative movement, Nixon was always the
only senior politician that, if imperfect, could be deemed 'acceptable' and was also credible
as a national candidate. In the end, as most conservatives fully realised after the 1964
Goldwater campaign, Nixon's ideological flexibility became an essential element for the
movement to actually gain access to executive power. Nixon never became the leader of the
right-wing constituency in the way Goldwater and Reagan did but still, the conservative
electorate always remained the core of his electoral support. However fraught and mutually
frustrating as it may have been, the seemingly unbreakable bond that united the destinies of
15 For an overview of the conservative philosophical make up see Hodgson, World Turned Right Side Up, pp. 44-45,
51; Himmelstein, To The Right, pp. 49-60; Diamond, Roads To Dominion" pp. 29-35; Micklethwait and Wooldridge,
Right Nation: p. 51; Micahel Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Bush Era 1980-1992 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), pp. 4-6; Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment, pp. 39-40; Edwards, Conservative Revolution,
pp. 78-79. Nixon's attachment to 'square values' is a central element in Wicker, One of Us; Parmet, Richard Nixon
and His America; Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York,
2008). The best psychological portrait of Nixon remains Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made
Man (New York: Mentor Books, 1971).
16 Nixon, RN, p. 241; Dallek, The Right Moment, p. 105; Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam, 1982), pp. 10~
101; Himmelstein, To The Right, pp. 68-69.
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Richard Nixon and the early conservative movement remained unbroken and bore its ultimate
consequences during the Nixon years in the White House.
3.... AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS
The difficult relationship between Nixon and the conservative movement certainly
mattered. It was during Nixon's years in the White House that conservative rhetoric was first
broadcast from the highest office of the land since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and that
conservatives first gained direct access to policy-making power. To be sure, in keeping with
their behaviour of the previous three decades, neither Nixon nor the conservatives sought to
destroy utterly the status quo that they opposed. Instead, they sought to achieve incremental
change through relatively modest policy innovations, accompanied by a vigorous rhetorical
and political re-adjustment of the public discourse. Their enterprise in the realm of public
policy management was only partially successful - and that with quite considerable
assistance from developments entirely outside their control in the form of the first symptoms
of the severe economic crisis of the 1970s. In the realm of language, culture and, more
generally, of the accepted forms of government action, their success was however quite
considerable - and was greatly enhanced by Nixon's much-publicised anointment by the
Southern conservatives in the 1968 Republican primaries - even if also aided by external
developments such as the radicalisation of the anti-war and civil rights movements, and the
general exhaustion with the cultural changes unleashed during the second half of the 1960s.
Nixon's pre-1972 caution was, as might be expected, much derided by the less
accommodating elements of the conservative movement. Yet, such conservative blasts should
not be taken at face value. As a close examination of conservative behaviour reveals, the
movement's leadership fully realised that Nixonian moderation - or wavering, according to
the most committed right-wingers - was a crucial stepping stone necessary for the
transformation of American politics witnessed during the 1970s and 1980s. As his
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unwillingness to lead the conservative constituency clearly indicates, Richard Nixon was not
a politically brave man. Yet, he was certainly the ultimate political survivor and a master
manipulator of existing dissatisfaction with the regnant status quo. As David Greenberg's
excellent Nixon's Shadow amply demonstrates, his impact upon the evolution of American
politics rested upon his capacity to anticipate and adjust to the various forms of right-wing
sentiment that ensued between the fall of Alger Hiss and the rise of George Wallace, while
staying squarely within the limits of the politically acceptable. Historians such as Greenberg,
Robert Mason, and Herbert Parmet, and journalist Rick Perlstein, have re-assessed and
acknowledged Richard Nixon's significant contribution to the rise of the right, focusing on
his harnessing of the anti-liberal backlashes of the late 1940s and late 1960s.I7 Still, given
Nixon's obvious lack of ideological commitment, in-depth analyses of these developments,
much like the particulars of the Californian's difficult association with the conservative
movement itself, remain relatively scarce." Yet, as Nixon's contemporaries, liberal and
conservative alike, sensed during his term in office, Nixon's presidency laid the groundwork
for the unravelling of the liberal cultural consensus and the violent conservative reaction
during the culture wars of the following decades, very much like his 1940s electioneering had
helped to unleash post-war dissatisfaction with liberalism dressed up as anticommunist
populism.l"
Nevertheless revisionist historians have posited an alternate view in which Nixon is
presented as an heir of FDR, rather than as the first post-liberal president and mid-wife of
conservative ascendancy. This position has gained reinforcement from many senior
conservatives who, reacting to Nixon's downfall, have fully reciprocated what they regarded
17 The excellent Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Questfor a New Majority (Chapel Hill NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004) is perhaps the most cogent analysis. See also Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America,
and Perlstein, Nixonland; For a more policy-oriented approach see Bruce 1. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer ed.,
Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the I970s, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
18 See Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side up; Micklethwait, Right Nation; David Hoeveler Jr., Watch On the
Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Schaller,
Right Turn; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History I974-2008,(New York: HarperCollins, 2008).
19 The most perceptive contemporary account of Nixon's rhetorical swing to the right and deliberate manipulation of
the 'backlash' may be found in Wills's Nixon Agonistes. Although a veteran of conservative circles, Wills penned the
books as a liberal. For an equally interesting (and hostile) account of Nixon's 1968 campaign written from a new left
perspective see Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970).
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as the latter's blatant disloyalty. Never comfortable with Nixon, once the catastrophic effects
of Watergate began to be discernible, most leading right-wingers proceeded to reproduce the
behaviour they had displayed in previous instances of Nixonian wavering. When Nixon had
moderated his language as vice-president and when he reached an agreement with the
moderate Rockefeller-led wing the GOP in 1960, conservatives had loudly denounced
Nixon's lack of ideological fibre.i" After 1973, most prominent conservatives proceeded to
put as much distance between themselves and the disgraced president as they possibly could
- harried, as may be expected, by those members of the movement who, like William Rusher,
had all along been hostile to Nixon.21 The effect of this was to reinforce the revisionist
impetus of the historical profession, and to fortify the historiographical view of Nixon as the
last grand, liberal-progressive president best and first put forward by Joan Hoff's seminal
Nixon Reconsidered/t Yet, the fact remains that for about thirty years Nixon stayed more or
less firmly attached to the conservative movement, and he did so for much the same reasons
that kept conservatives stuck to one another. Equally importantly - even if perhaps forgotten
by revisionist historians - Richard Nixon's contemporaries in the press, liberal circles, and
even very many conservatives, did not hesitate to identify the Californian as a populist, right-
wing politician and a conservative president.i''
20 See Rusher, Making of the New Majority, pp. 88-89; Edwards, Conservative Revolution, p. 92; Interview with
Jeffrey Bell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Interview with William F.
Buckley, July 25, 2005, New York City; Interview with David Keene; Interview with Milton Friedman, May 25,
2004, San Francisco.
21 For an overview of this phenomenon in the immediate post-Watergate period see David Greenberg, Nixon's
Shadow: The History of an Image (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 200-202; for Rusher's views see Rusher, Rise of the
Right pp. 51-54.
22 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994); see also Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights:
Politics, Principle and Policy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). The climate that led to the re-
evaluation of Nixon by historians who, predominantly, saw the Californian as the man 'they had loved to hate' in their
youths is rather well captured in the profession's reaction to Oliver Stone's biopic Nixon (1995); see Ron Briley,
'Nixon and Historical Memory', Perspectives 36, no. 3 (J 996),
http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1996/960319603fi12.cfm, viewed January 14,2008; idem., 'Review of
Robert Brent Toplin ed., Oliver Stone's USA: Film, History and Controversy', The History Teacher 35, no. 1 (2001),
pp. 122-23; Robert Brent Toplin ed., Oliver Stone's USA: Film, History and Controversy (Lawrence KA: University
Press of Kansas, 2000); Erick Hamburg ed., Nixon: An Oliver Stone Film (New York: Hyperion, 1995); Frank Rich,
'The Stoning of Stone', New York Times, November 11,1996; John Bodnar, 'The Movie Version of Modern
American History', Reviews in American History, 30, no. 3 (2002), pp. 492-93; see also Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow,rp·II4-16,323-29.
3 As a sample of the staggering amount of conservative support received by candidate Nixon during the 1968
campaign, see 'Memorandum Re. Conservative Party (New York) Endorsement of Richard M. Nixon for President',
July 10, 1968 and attachment, John Chamberlain, 'Conservative Tide', [undated], f. CPNYS, box 48, WFB papers;
'Nixon Campaign Off to Roaring Start', Republican Battle Line, September 16, 1968; 'Nixon-Agnew: A Winning
Ticket?', Human Events, August 17, 1968; 'The Conservative Mandate for President Nixon', Battle Line, December
1968; 'Nixon's Victory: Opportunity for YAF', The Freedom Scene, December 1968. Liberal opposition to Nixon
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Beyond public perception, the conservative movement performed two other
fundamental leaps forward under Nixon's watch: firstly, the hitherto underestimated, but
nevertheless crucial strengthening of an embryonic policy-oriented conservative
organisational network that Sydney Blumenthal correctly labelled as a 'counter-
establishment', and which would articulate the explosive expansion of conservative strength
that followed Watergate.24 The Nixon White House-backed injection of resources and
presidential gravitas into the previously dormant American Enterprise Institute is perhaps the
most clear-cut example of this development; but the onrush of conservative appointees to
junior, middle and senior level offices should also be seen in this light, even if conservatives
themselves chose to noisily ignore or were unaware of these events. " Secondly, the definitive
switch to the right of presidential rhetoric enthusiastically adopted by Nixon served to infuse
legitimacy to a number of conservative mores previously regarded as at best quaint oddities
or, at worst, as belonging squarely outside of mainstream respectable politics. Richard
Nixon's words - and words, in politics, matter - and deeds helped Southern conservatives to
finally adjust to the realities of post-Civil Rights act politics by helping to legitimate lawful
resistance against federally-imposed measures to end de Jacto segregation generally and
school integration in particular. Similarly, Nixon's language also helped the nation to re-
evaluate the up-until-then rejected notions of classical liberal economics - which provided
sustenance for Nixon's first two years of fiscal and monetary policy and to the momentous
breaking of the gold window - even if his policy actions were less than ideologically pure.
Nixon also used the bully-pulpit of the presidency to articulate and, again, to legitimise the
simmering resentment against cultural changes regarding matters such as the recreational use
tended to focus on civil rights issues and foreign policy. The latter has persisted until the present day, although
generally aimed against Henry Kissinger, rather than Nixon himself, see 'Finch: First Casualty of the Nixon Cabinet',
Time Magazine, June 15, 1970; Mason, Quest for a New Majority, p. 170; William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger,
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (London: Hogarth, 1986); Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger
in the White House (London: Faber, 1983); Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London: Verso
Books,2001).
24 Blumenthal, Rise of the Counter-Establishment, especially pp. 2-3.
25 William F. Buckley, 'A New Goldwater Blacklist', NR, April 8, 1969, p. 351; 'Mr Nixon, Thus Far, Disappoints',
Battle Line, February-March 1969.
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of drugs, sexual behaviour and abortion, brought about during the second half of the 1960s by
the counter-culture and the New Left.
As for the internal evolution of the conservative movement, an examination of the
behaviour of the main conservative factions as well as that of the National Review group
reveals that the movement underwent dramatic changes during Nixon's tenure in the White
House. Although few realised it at the time, during these years the American conservative
movement engaged in a transformation comparable to that which it had experienced during
the 1950s. This metamorphosis would subsequently render the movement stronger, certainly
larger and more diverse, as well as more self-confident and politically radicalised. Since the
mid-1950s respectable conservatism had been largely dominated by the relatively small
number of thinkers and politicians who gravitated around National Review. Yet, these
conservatives' frustrations during the Nixon years may be better understood in terms of their
slow loss of dominance over the movement as much as in reaction to Nixon's presumed
liberal-leaning policies: as Richard Nixon left office, conservative activists beyond the NR
circle moved to ensure that none of the movement's constituent factions would subsequently
be in a position to control the activities of the others. A significant group, very many of them
- such as OEO head Howard Phillips, vice-presidential assistant David Keene and economist
Martin Anderson - serving as mid-ranking Nixon officials, was made up of young
conservatives who had not endured the long, dark years of marginalisation that followed the
triumph of the New Deal. Consequently, this new cohort of conservative activists displayed
few of the inferiority complexes that had plagued the older generation. These 'Young Turks'
were considerably less tolerant of Nixon's philosophical pragmatism than the established
conservative leadership and, accordingly, suffered greater frustration than their predecessors.
Simultaneously, more than a few veterans of the movement, including those around the
American Enterprise Institute, the Southern Republicans and the relatively small band of
libertarian economists also developed the capacity to act independently from, and
occasionally against, the hard core Buckleyites and, incidentally, each other. Earlier
symptoms of those multiple fractures were the serious infighting among neoconservatives
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and libertarians in the White House during 1969 and 1971, and the willingness of AEI
conservatives to shield the Nixon White House from the blasts of NR conservatives who had
less patience with presidential double-talk.26.
This dissertation examines the position of each of these sub-groups with regards to both
the conservative movement's intellectual leadership and Richard Nixon before and during the
latter's presidency. Chapters are organised in a broadly chronological fashion, and focus on
the particular areas of influence of each of these sub-families, as well as analysing the
peculiar relationship between everyone of these factions and their counterparts before,
during and after the Nixon presidency. At the outset of this period, Buckleyite conservatives
were the most influential and indeed dominant group within American conservatism, and
therefore they receive extended attention in the form of two chapters. Chapter 1 examines
their early history and relationship with Richard Nixon up the aftermath of the 1964 election.
This chapter focuses on the roots of the peculiar entente hostile that bound Nixon and the
hard core together under the Republican umbrella, as well as on their parallel efforts to
disavow the more extreme elements of the radical right in order to position themselves at the
far right end of respectable politics. In the second chapter the evolution of Southern
Republican conservatism is evaluated, including its growing strength within the GOP and its
role in elevating Richard Nixon to the presidency between 1966 and 1968. This chapter
emphasises the willingness of the Southern Republicans to abandon their previous
uncompromising racist populism in favour of pragmatic approach to presidential politics. The
following chapter focuses on the race issue as an example of the shift to the right of
presidential rhetoric and, to some extent, policy implementation. It also examines the role of
race within the conservative movement and evaluates how Richard Nixon's use of racially-
loaded rhetoric combined with conservative shibboleths about the limits of federal action,,
helped to buttress the return of the conservative South to the political mainstream, and to
26 See Holmes Alexander 'Nixon Keeps Promise to Wage Crime War', Reading Eagle, July 20, 1971; Patrick
Buchanan, The New Majo;ity: President Nixon at Mid Passage (Washington DC: Girard Company, 1973); 'Nixon's
China Policy Promotes US Interests, Study Finds', American Enterprise Institute Memorandum, no. I., March 30,
1971.
21
legitimate growing resistance to further civil rights initiatives. In Chapter 4 the analysis
returns again to the conservative hard core and their relations with both the president and the
wider conservative movement during Nixon's years in the White House. It focuses on how
during those years the Buckleyites reproduced the same patterns of behaviour already
displayed during the previous two decades. Most importantly, it also emphasises the
disorientation and lack of foresight displayed by both Nixon and the hard core towards new,
emerging issues of contention and their impact upon the emergence of the conservative
Young Turks. The following chapter appraises the history of the American Enterprise
Institute within the cluster of organisations that emerged from the conservative movement.
This chapter discusses the Nixon White House's efforts to transform the AEI into the embryo
of a conservative 'counter-establishment' which connected conservative intellectuals and
donors with right-wing politicians and federal officials, and which was meant to act as a
counter-balance to, and perhaps even replace, existing institutions such as the Brookings
Institutions, RAND and the Ivy League universities that both Nixon and the conservatives
identified as their 'enemies'. 27 Finally, chapter six explores the rise of the neoconservative
and neoliberal groups, which shared a similarly distinctive outlook with one another. In
contrast to the National Review conservatives, both of these sub-families went beyond the
realm of ideas and engaged in policy-making: they were thus the first within the movement to
actually engage in experiments aimed at modifying the policy assumptions and practices of
the liberal consensus.
Richard Nixon has been memorably described as a 'neurotic tangle of conservative
instincts and liberal aspirations, wrapped in cynical political calculation' .28 What is perhaps
less commonly understood is that Nixon's 'tangle' was essential to the introduction of
conservative principles into the mainstream of American national politics, and that the
27
See Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York: Viking Press, 1977), pp. 188-91; James Keogh, President Nixon and
~e Press (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1972), pp. 132-45; Frank Meyer, 'What Next for Conservatism?, NR,
I ec.ember 1, 1964, p. 1057; Unnamed Memorandum (Charles Colson), March 24, 1970, f. American En~erprise .
nst~tute (f. 4 of 4), box Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59), Charles Colson papers, Nixon Presidential Materials,
~~lOnal Archives, College Park MD. " .
. odfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman/rom New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A BIography (Boston. Houghton
MIfflin, 2000), p. 173.
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conservative movement, to a remarkable extent, fully shared in Nixon's 'neurosis', caught as
it was between conservative principle, thirst for liberal approval and, it cannot be emphasised
enough, cold hard political calculation. The following pages aim at exploring these
conjunctions.
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CHAPTER 1
NATIONAL REVIEW CONSERVATIVES AND RICHARD NIXON
PRIOR TO 1966
In early January 1968, William Rusher - publisher of the conservative National Review
- observed in a memorandum to the magazine's editors that Richard Nixon was the youngest
serious Republican candidate and yet, 'to the American people it will seem, by 1968, that he
has been around since God was a child'. 1 Regardless of what the electorate thought, it
certainly must have seemed to be so for conservatives: by National Review's inception in
1955, Richard Nixon was already vice- president of the United States. Even prior to that,
when a youthful William F. Buckley, the Review's editor and main stock-holder, published
his first tract in 1951, the Californian was already a national household name. This chapter
evaluates the earlier phase of what was undoubtedly a strained relationship between Nixon
and that peculiar group within the conservative movement which gathered around National
Review (or 'NR' as they often referred to it), and which constituted for all practical purposes
the intellectual, organisational and sometimes even political leadership of post-war
conservatism in the United States.'
More specifically, this analysis of conservative behaviour focuses on the views and
actions of one particular man: National Review's publisher William A. Rusher, perhaps the
most often overlooked and certainly the least well-known member of the conservative
leadership. Rusher lacked the intellectual depth of Review editor James Burnham, the thirst
for philosophical coherence of his colleague Frank Meyer or the flamboyance of William F.
rBill Rusher Memorandum to .the editors, '1967, A Tent~tive .Prog.nosis', January 3, 1968, box 43, F. 10M, William
2' Buckley Jr. papers, Manuscnpts and Archives, Yale University LIbrary (hereafter WFB papers) .
.For an insightful, enormously informative and delightfully tender account from within the National Review inner
~Ir~le see Garry Wills, Confessions of a Conservative (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1979). The term
.edItor' is employed in a rather loose sense to include those authors and regular contributors who actually had
mfluence on the editorial line of the magazine. The list of those who were effectively senior editors includes William
~. Buckley Jr., James Burnham, Frank Meyer, Willmoore Kendall, and Russell Kirk. Wills, for instance, should be
listed among those rather influential characters that were never given the official 'rank'. It is worth noting that, in the
end, Buckley retained the power to have the last word in the (frequent) case that disputes between editors reached an
Impasse. The best account of the evolution of intellectual conservatism - particularly of those related with NR - is
George H. Nash; The Intellectual Conservative Movement in America Since 1945 (Wilmington DE: Intercollegiate
Studies Institute, 1998).
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Buckley. And yet his interests, activities and influence made him virtually unique within
what he himself labelled the 'hard core' of the conservative movement. Like most of his
fellow Buckleyites, Rusher's outlook was marked by an Ivy League education, a manifestly
internationalist, vigorously anticommunist and pro-free market (at any rate, as free as the
Cold War would allow) world-view, combined with ample intellectual curiosity. However,
unlike most of the journal's senior staff, Rusher could claim abundant experience in
professional Republican politicking at national, state and local levels. Rusher, it cannot be
overemphasised, knew people. What is more, he always retained an astonishingly sharp
capacity to analyse the evolution of day-to-day politics and its potential impact upon the
conservative movement. Consequently, he also became the most important conduit linking
the intellectual sharp-shooters at National Review with purely political operatives, such as
Barry Goldwater's primary campaign architect F. Clifton White, who would eventually tum
conservatism into an organisational force of nature within the GOp.3 Ironically, and to
Rusher's frustration, his colleagues at the magazine tended to dismiss their publisher's views
on the growth of the movement as wishful thinking, and to ignore his reiterative warnings
against Nixon as plain zealotry. They did so, as it transpired, at their own expense.
Despite Rusher's misgivings, for almost a generation the conservative intellectual
leadership engaged in a protracted ritual of courtship with Richard Nixon: one punctuated by
frequent shrieks of outrage and occasional scandalised slaps, none of which ultimately proved
sufficient to bring to a close the seemingly never-ending game. Thus, in 1955 the first
number of National Review included a glowing portrait of Nixon, penned by veteran
conservative journalist John Chamberlain, describing the vice-president as a 'rather open
young man with decent impulses', and 'Taftian', no less, instincts. At the end of Nixon's
political life in 1978 Jeffrey Hart, another veteran and respected conservative author, wrote
the journal's review of Nixon's memoirs, 'confessing' that after reading them, he had 'come
3
Despite a stubborn determination to remain out of the limelight, Rusher has penned a number of quite informative
works of which The Making of the New Majority Party (New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1975), and his highly
autobiographical The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985) deserve special
attention.
to like Richard Nixon'. This was, he wrote, in spite of the fact that 'for at least two years
following his resignation I was in a rage about how Nixon had aborted... the domestic
counter-revolution' that, according Hart, had swept the nation after the 1968 elections." In
between, conservatives decried Nixon as a traitor when in 1960 he deliberately
accommodated the demands of Nelson Rockefeller, conservative Republicans' bete noire;
then proceeded to hail him as 'The One' in 1968; subsequently accused the-then president of
being a turn-coat in 1971; and finally went back to support his re-election, almost as
enthusiastically as ever, in November 1972. Clearly, Richard Nixon represented, as far as
conservatives were concerned, both a promise and a problem. Rather representatively, men
like the immensely respected Whittaker Chambers and the veteran journalist Ralph de
Toledano fell out, or threatened to break with the Review's senior group as a consequence of
rows about how to deal with the latest Nixon disappointment. Beyond internal struggles, most
conservatives recognised Nixon as the pure-bred political animal that he was, and felt
threatened by a man who combined considerable ideological flexibility with the command of
highly-emotional right-wing popular support.' It is therefore not surprising that shortly after
Nixon's offensive overtures to Rockefeller during the 1960 presidential elections, National
Review senior editor James Burnham would write in an internal memorandum that he had 'so
little personal enthusiasm for Nixon that I many not be able to endure voting for him,.6 And
yet, he also hurriedly stressed that he was at the same time 'more than ever convinced that the
public, objective, conservative position in this election is, and must be, Vote Nixon'.? During
and beyond the near two decades that elapsed between the inception of National Review in
4
John Chamberlain, 'What's wrong with Nixon?', National Review, April 25, 1955, pp. 13-14;Jeffrey Hart, 'Sui
?ene~is', NR, August 18, 1978, 1031-32, p. 1031.
Dunng the Course of a paper delivered during the British Association of American Studies Annual Conference of
2006, in which the author remarked in passing about the difficult relation between Nixon and the conservative
movement, an American fellow panel member, half-confused half-sceptical, exclaimed, 'I don't understand, if Nixon
wa~ .not a conservative, then, what was he?' Asked this question, conservatives universally define Nixon as 'a
POh~lcian', since he was not, according to conservatives, primarily motivated by conservative ideals: his sole
motIvation, conservatives claim, was the career of Richard Nixon. Needless to say, the long shadow of Watergate
does ~ot contribute to conservative willingness to include Nixon amongst the heroes of the right a la Ronald Reagan,
Interv.lew with Jeffrey Bell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Morton Blackwell, August 29, 2005,
Washmgton DC; Interview with William F. Buckley, July 25, 2005, New York City; Interview with David Keene,
August 24, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Milton Friedman, May25, 2004, San Francisco (tapes and
~ranscripts of all interviews conducted by the author are in his possession and can be made available for consultation).
7 James Burnham to William F. Buckley, October 9, 1960, F. 10M, box 10, WFB papers.
Ibid.
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1955 and the Watergate cataclysm Nixon and the intellectuals who led the conservative
movement were never comfortable with each other. Yet they also seemed to be incapable of
extricating themselves from a frayed and mutually frustrating relationship.
What follows below is an analysis of the factors that propelled Nixon and the
conservative leadership towards each other, as well as the consequences that this relationship
had for its participants. In the first place, Richard Nixon and the leaders of the Conservative
movement subscribed to the same sincerely-held perception of themselves as victimised,
positively heroic outsiders pitted against an all-powerful, entrenched 'establishment', with the
latter variously described as well-meaning but mistaken, plainly corrupt, or both depending
on the circumstances. Such a peculiar coincidence was partly based on purely negative forces
acting upon both camps. From Nixon's first campaign against the well-liked, liberal
Democrat Jerry Voorhis in 1946 onwards, the Californian and the men who would end up
around National Review believed themselves to be opposed to (or under attack from,
according to our protagonists) the same political and ideological foes. James Burnham, for
instance, explained his apparently contradictory views on the 1960 election because 'in
support of Kennedy' - and hence pitted against Nixon - were 'virtually all the forces, groups,
tendencies and individuals that NR is not merely against, but recognizes as its primary
targets,.8 Secondly, Richard Nixon and the National Review conservatives also held shared
political assumptions and strategies: from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, they found
themselves broadly aligned with regards to how to deal with the fringe elements of the right
as well as with the vicious sectarian infighting between liberals and the less colourful
conservatives within the GOP.
How conservatives around National Review dealt with Richard Nixon and vice-versa
mattered. Until very recently the academic literature about the conservative movement has
tended to downplay Richard Nixon's role in ascent of conservatism, yet the entente hostile
between Nixon and the conservative hard core reveals, at the very least, some crucial aspects
8
James Burnham to William F. Buckley, October 9, 1960, f. 10M, box 10, WFB papers.
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of the latter's political strategy." Thus, for two decades the National Review circle was rocked
by recurrent infighting regarding what to do and how to respond to the latest Nixon-related
development. Such debates invariably reflected the state and evolution of American
conservatism. Perhaps even more crucially, Richard Nixon became an instrumental element
for the eventual success of conservative strategy. Since its very origins, National Review had
positioned itself at the forefront of a 'war of ideas' over, according to its editors, the very soul
and even the survival of the American polity. For all the shortcomings with which
conservatives faulted him, sometimes because of them, Nixon became the political agent best
able to translate those views into a politically-successful message. In the process, he was the
first to transform the conservative message from the product of a merely reactive,
oppositional redoubt circumscribed to legislative and grassroots reaction into an aggressively
proactive force capable of shaping executive action. Sometimes willingly, sometimes by
sheer force or happenstance, Richard Nixon helped communicate, sometimes formulate, to
the nation a new conservative consensus that would eventually rival that built by the Franklin
D. Roosevelt's New Deal. In the context of unparalleled, continuous economic prosperity and
the Cold War, Nixon and the conservatives put together a new model for the ideal, all-
American citizen upon the basis of a rebranded form of conservatism; they also attempted to
construct a new Republican Party to serve as political vehicle for their ambitions. Ultimately,
the career of Richard Nixon was a measure of conservatism's successes and failures as much
as it was of the candidate's.
9
Academics have tended to acknowledge that Nixon capitalised on growing right-wing electoral appeal but, unlike in
~he cases of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, have generally failed to examine the matter in depth. See for
mstance Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A History ofThe Conservative Ascendancy In America
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative
Power in America, (New York: Penguin, 2(04); Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation of
American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); David Hoeveler Jr., Watch On the Right:
Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era, (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); Michael Schaller,
Right Turn: American Life in The Bush Era 1980-1992 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sean Wi lentz,
The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008, (New York: HarperCollins, 2008). A recent book dealing specifically with
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R~seof the Right, (New York: Palgrave, 2010). Another excellent evaluation of National Review conservatives and t~e
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1. SETTING THE FOUNDATIONS: THE GOOD AMERICAN
It was not until late December 1957 that the first direct encounter between Richard
Nixon and William F. Buckley took place. In a follow up letter Buckley noted his comment
to Whittaker Chambers that 'it was not likely that I would fail to be impressed by someone
who had impressed him; and the unlikely did not happen'. He also agreed with Nixon about
the need to 'hang together' .10 Perhaps the most notable aspect of that meeting is that it would
take place so late, at a time when Nixon had been a major political figure for a decade, two
years after the inception of National Review and three since the first encounter between
Buckley and Chambers. In 1957 the then vice-president was almost universally regarded as
the Republican leader best positioned to appeal to the mass of right-of-centre voters. And yet
he remained very much at a distance from the intellectuals who were doing their best to fire
up that same constituency through the pages of National Review. Less surprisingly however,
Buckley's letter reminds us that Chambers, the scourge of Alger Hiss, remained close to
Nixon at the same time that he became an intimate friend of Buckley's, as well as a respected
figure within the fledging conservative movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s. II
Chambers' relevance within the conservative movement was part and parcel, as was
anticommunism, of the transformation of conservatism from its pre-war, isolationist, market-
royalist form to its post-war, internationalist, rebelliously anti-liberal incarnation. That
Chambers brought Nixon and Buckley together also reflected the equally crucial role that
anticommunism played as a magnet attracting Nixon and men like Buckley. By 1950 (and
throughout his subsequent political career), Nixon believed he had 'proved beyond any
reasonable doubt the existence of Soviet-directed Communist subversion at the highest levels
of American government'. Buckley, in tum, devoted his second book to lambasting Joe
10 William F. Buckley to Richard Nixon, December 26, 1957, F. Nichols-Nixon (1955-57), box 3, WFB papers.
11 Buckley later edited Chamber's letters in Odyssey of a Friend (New York: National Review, 1969), and pr?vided an
emotive recollection of his friendship at a White House special ceremony held in 2001. The latter was prmted as a
foreword to the so" anniversary edition of Witness. See Whittaker Chambers, Witness, (Washington DC: Regnery,
2001), pp. v-xii.
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McCarthy's 'enemies', and would later threaten to 'dye the Potomac red' as a greeting to
visiting Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev.12 This shared anticommunism justified Buckley's
desire to 'hang together' and helps to explain the persistent public support that conservatives
were willing to lend Nixon, despite the recurrent rifts that privately opened up within the
conservative community with regards to the Californian. In 1959 Buckley himself, for
instance, noted that Chamber's 'thraldom of Nixon' had rendered the former 'virtually
incoherent on the issue' of Khrushchev's visit to the United States. A little earlier that same
year, Frank Meyer complained about what he saw as his colleague James Burnham's 'overt
sympathies towards Nixon,.I3 Around the same time L. Brent Bozell, Buckley's brother-in-
law, NR senior editor and co-author with Buckley of McCarthy and His Enemies, concluded
that Nixon was part of the GOP's slide 'towards liberalism' under Eisenhower. Yet Bozell
also thought the vice-president might be redeemable, and suggested a meeting between Nixon
and the Review's editors. Ten years later, the conservative community's increasing criticism
of the Nixon presidency would contribute to Ralph de Toledanos acrimonious resignation
from the board of the American Conservative Union.14
The existence of so much bitterness points towards the need to subject the role of
anticommunism for both conservatism and Nixon's career to a closer and more nuanced
analysis. The literature on post-war conservatism has tended to view the issue as the 'cement
holding the movement together', and shared anticommunism certainly consolidated highly
emotional loyalties towards Nixon among some conservatives, and rather enduring hatred
on the part of very many non-conservatives. 15 Yet beyond the realm of emotion - even more
so as the overcharged atmosphere of the 1950s faded - anticommunism in itself always
12 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 71; William F.
Buckley and L. Brent Bozell, McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning (Chicago: H. Regnery Co.,
1954).
13 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, January 24, 1959, f. 10M, box 8, WFB papers; Buckley to James Burnham,
September, 2, 1959, ibid.; Rusher to Buckley, March 11, 1969, f. 10M (Jan-July 1969), box 61, ibid.
14 L. Brent Bozell to William F. Buckley, January 5, 1959, f. 10M, box 8, WFB papers; William Rusher to Buckley,
March 11, 1969, f. 10M, box 61, ibid.
15 Very many conservatives, as well as Nixon himself, saw the origins of their association in the Hiss case. According
to Buckley, Whittaker Chambers, for one, resisted joining the National Review staff because the magazine had voic~d
doubts about Nixon's fitness to succeed Dwight Eisenhower, see Buckley, Odyssey of a Friend, pp. 103-4. David
Greenberg and Stephen Ambrose have noted that in fact, much of that relationship was built ex-post facto and that the
press's treatment of Nixon during the case was reasonably even-balanced and its effect, if anything, positive for
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remained a purely negative and surprisingly weak ingredient of the glue that tied together the
fortunes of conservatism with those of Richard Nixon." In reality, the anticommunist blanket
served as a cover for the reconstruction of the aloof, isolationist, small-government, free-
marketer set of ideas that had dominated the pre-war right. In practical terms anticommunism
sensu estricto, defined as the need to check, confront (perhaps roll back when safely possible)
the advances of the Soviet Union overseas and of communism at home was even less than a
purely negative matter for conservatives: it was effectively a non-issue. Conservatives in the
United States - as reflected in the America First platform, the writings of National Review's
early collaborators and Buckley's early acquaintances such as libertarians Frank Chodorov
and Albert Jay Nock, not to mention conservative Republicans such as Robert Taft - were
latecomers struggling to adjust to Cold War realities and ultimately harking the initiatives of
successive Democratic administrations.!" Ironically enough, In its adoption of
anticommunism the new post-war conservatism espoused by National Review was effectively
embracing one of the main tenets of the regnant post-1945 political consensus." From that
viewpoint, it should come as no surprise that conservatives would publicly threaten to
abandon the GOP in support of Lyndon Johnson in the event that the Republicans nominated
a dove in the 1968 election. Privately, William Rusher was quite clear on the matter: 'if the
Nixon's career, David Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of An Image (New York: W. W. N0I10n, 2003) p. 44;
Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education ofa Politician. 1913-1962 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp.
206-7. However, other biographers have sustained that his involvement in the Hiss case did indeed help to spread a
diffuse dislike of Nixon in liberal (not only Democratic) circles, and that it further fed Nixon's resentment towards
journalists and upper-class officials within the beltway, see Perlstein, Nixonland, p. 32; Tom Wicker, One of Us:
Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 61-62. In a sense, the issue is
relevant, notwithstanding the actual course of events or their subsequent re-construction: both Nixon and most
conservatives ended up identifying the press, as both part and parcel of the 'liberal establishment' and as 'adversarial',
and the Hiss case as the earliest proof of such an attitude. See for instance, James Keogh, President Nixon and the
Press (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1972), pp. 2--<>.
16 The historiography has broadly accepted the role of anticommunism as key element sustaining conservative unity.
An important exception is James A. Hijiya, 'The Conservative 1960s', Journal of American Studies, 37, no. 2 (2003),
pp. 201-227, particularly pp. 216-217. For a response reproducing the conventional viewpoint see Scanlon,
'Conservative Lobby', p. 259, footnote 6.
17 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 11, 75, 110-117; Wills, Confessions, pp. 26-27, 30.
18 See David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983),
pp. 71-74. It has even been claimed that the entire anticommunist hysteria probably benefited Truman more than the
Republicans in the 1948 election, see Ambrose, Education of a Politician, pp. 187-88.
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Republicans were to nominate a dove (unlikely as it is) I personally would support
Johnson' .19
While part of the post-war consensus against which conservatism was supposed to be
arrayed, anticommunism did become a useful issue because it was efficiently employed at
three distinct levels. Firstly, in the short run it was a rather inglorious instance of low partisan
politics aimed at dislodging Democrats from the White House. In the context of the late
forties and early fifties, the conservative movement was firmly aligned with Republicanism
and the evident weakness of the Truman administration, added to nearly two decades in
opposition, fuelled Republicans' appetite for plain, rather undignified demagoguery.t" Left at
this level, the issue would probably have been as enduring as other outpourings of
Washington political vitriol such as the financial scandals of the Truman administration,
Eisenhower's troubles with Sherman Adams, John Kennedy's colourful sentimental life or
Lyndon Johnson's travails with Abe Fortas. As it was, Richard Nixon, a man so bereft of
political connexions he only became a Republican candidate in 1946 for a race 'dubbed
hopeless by wheelhorse republicans', and only then after a beauty contest-cum-candidate-
casting involving half a dozen hopefuls, was able to use anticommunism to turn himself into
a Republican national star." Secondly, anticommunist positions helped to facilitate
conservatism's shift towards a new-found internationalism, and in the case of National
Review, to an astonishingly cosmopolitan brand of internationalism. NR, after all, was co-
founded by Austrian Willie Schlamm, and all its senior editors had undergone academic
training in Europe.r' Nixon who - like most of the NR staff - lacked any serious connexion
with pre-war Republican politics, was also entirely innocent of Taftian isolationism, and
naturally became a fervent cold-warrior on a par with any self-respecting Truman Democrat
19 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, March 26, 1968, f. 10M (Jan-Mar 1968), box 50, WFB papers. Rusher's
letter agrees with Buckley's dwelling on 'talk ... among anticommunist conservatives of a mass movement to support
Johnson in the event the Republicans nominated a dove' in his NR column of March 28, 1968.
20 Ambrose, Education of a Politician, pp. 128-29; Wicker, One of Us, p. 39; Reinhard, Republican Right, pp. 62-63,
66-67.
21 Even after he captured the nomination, Republican heavyweights stayed away from a man they thought to be a
loser, see Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p.125-27; Nixon, RN, p. 41.
22 Russell Kirk took his PhD at St. Andrews, Rusher and Burnham attended Oxford, Meyer the LSE, Buckley did a
significant part of his schooling in British boarding schools and Bozell would later take his PhD in Spain, Interview
with William F. Buckley.
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or National Review editor. Finally, and most crucially, anticommunism helped to ease
conservatism, and hence right-wing Republicanism, into a new brand of populist anti-elitism.
In a remarkably short period, the right adopted the kind of discourse previously espoused by
radical left-tinged populism, except that the enemy, rather than being big capital, the robber
barons or Wall Street, was now the federal government; the faceless bureaucrat; and the kind
of politicians, journalists and academics that conservatives have ever since identified with
Georgetown cocktails, Ivy League institutions and, above all, the most important organs of
mass-communication. Anticommunism, to a very great extent, served as an efficient proxy
for attacks on the 'liberal establishment'. William F. Buckley's ferocious 1951 critique of his
alma mater in God and Man at Yale was one early example of what would become a standard
conservative shibboleth. In the 'Magazine's Credenda' which opened National Review's first
number, liberal politicians and liberal intellectuals were lambasted on four separate
occasions, whereas communists were mentioned only once. In its 'Publisher's Statement' NR
defiantly set itself at war not merely against 'the liberals who run this country', but also
against the whole of 'literate America'. Ten years later, the crudeness of the 1964 presidential
campaign convinced conservatives of the fact that, in Frank Meyer's words, for practical
purposes there was one single 'mass communication network, solidly in liberal hands' which
was an 'even more formidable an opponent than conservatives [had previously] thought' .23
Richard Nixon moved in that direction faster, earlier, probably more convincingly and
certainly more efficiently than conservatives did. Beginning with his less-than-pure
campaigns for the House and Senate through the unfolding of the Hiss case, the Californian
was the first public spokesman to articulate coherently what would become both the
conventional conservative definition of the Good American, and the orthodox conservative
critique of American society. As in the case of National Review, anticommunism was from
the start deliberately muddled with attacks on the Democratic party and American liberalism
in general.
23 William F. Buckley, God and Man at Yale (Chicago: Regnery, 1951); 'The Magazine's Credenda', NR, November
19, 1955, p. 6; 'Publisher's Statement', ibid., p. 9; Frank Meyer, 'What Next for Conservatism?', ibid., December 1,
1964,p.1057.
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Nixon came to political life through the midwifery of the Group of 100, a local outfit
run by the kind of well-to-do businessmen who combined district-level Republican
politicking with Rotary Club membership.f" His political discourse was immediately
successful locally because it was addressed to the sort of person placed at the less
comfortable end of New Deal-Fair Deal regulation and wartime controls. It later gained
broader appeal because by the late 1940s and early 1950s the Democratic message as
formulated by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Depression appeared a lot less persuasive in
the context of a near-full employment economy - although, as Eisenhower's moderate
economic policies clearly indicated, not to nearly enough voters to guarantee either a
Republican victory or, much less so, anything resembling an abrupt break away from the
New Deal status quo. Both Richard Nixon and the conservative leadership sensed that since
the end of the war voters' concerns had shifted away from unemployment and big business'
depredations towards taxes, government regulation and Democratic venality after two
decades in power. In the speech Nixon gave to persuade those Republican businessmen to
accept him as their candidate, he distinguished between the New Deal as 'government control
in regulating our lives' and his own 'call' for 'individual freedom and all that initiative can
provide' .25
Nixon pronounced that discourse in November 1945, not very long after Americans had
been told much the same by Friedrich von Hayek, who was then touring the nation promoting
The Road to Serfdom. Hayek believed that the main challenge facing western democracies
was not so much the threat of Soviet communism, as the threat of collectivisation by stealth
on the part of social democratic governments." Nixon, more subtly, was aiming in the same
direction. In his memoirs, Nixon claimed that New Deal exhaustion, rather than
anticommunism per se, was the 'central issue' of the 1946 election, and he also explained his
24 Nixon, RN, pp. 33-35; Ambrose, Education of a Politician, pp. 117-212; Perlstein, Nixonland, p. 26; Wicker, One
of Us, pp. 42-43; Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, pp. 11-13.
25 As quoted in Nixon, RN, p. 35. For the overall shift of voting preferences away from the New Deal, see Wicker,
One of Us, p. 42; Reinhard, Republican Right, pp. 16-17; Perlstein, Nixonland, pp. 27-28. .
26 Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp.l9-20, 76-91; RIchard
Crockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution. 1931-1983 (London:
HarperCollins, 1994), pp.lOO--101;Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 3-9.
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success In terms of the fact that 'Voorhis, the former socialist, believed in large-scale
government intervention and I did not'. Along similar lines, in 1949 he warmed up towards
his senatorial campaign by charging that 'the Democratic Party today ... has been captured
and is completely controlled by a group of ruthless, cynical seekers-after-power who have
committed that party to policies and principles which are completely foreign to those of its
founders'. 27 Nixon, whose campaign motto defined him as 'One of Us', left the audience to
figure out by itself what, exactly, were those principles defended by former socialists. In
1952 however, he spelled it out when he campaigned to 'drive the crooks and the
communists ... out of Washington'r" Even Nixon's life story worked to reinforce his stance.
The son of a grocer could and did present himself as the average American, out of a middling
university, who had built a successful career out of plain perseverance and hard work. On the
other hand, his opponents from Jerry Voorhis to John Kennedy through Nelson Rockefeller
had a habit of possessing glamour, an Ivy League education and a wealthy family or, as often
as not, all three combined. According to Nixon this sort of politician, particularly when
associated with the Democratic party, had grown out of touch with his own class of American
to a degree that made them arrogantly unresponsive to the will of great majority of the nation
and, in at least a few instances, positively dangerous for the survival of the United States. It is
in that context that Nixon contemptuously described Voorhis as a 'Quixote', lambasted
Hollywood actress Helen Gahagan as 'pink down to her underwear', and later included
among Alger Hiss's shortcomings his being 'rather insolent', as well as 'too suave, too
smooth and too self-confident'. 29
The brand of anti-New Deal populism spiced up with strident anticommunism espoused
by Richard Nixon was, with very few exceptions, identical to that being put forth by
conservatives.l'' As late as 2007 National Review veteran M .Stanton Evans devoted a full-
length monograph to denouncing the conduct of the press, academia and government towards
27 Nixon, RN, p. 41, 73 (my emphasis); Perlstein, Nixon/and p. 28.
28 Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p. 289-91.
29 Tom Wicker firstly pointed to 'latent class hostility' as a major Nixonian leitmotif in One of Us, pp. 46-47, 57. The
argument is also reproduced throughout Perlstein, Nixon/and .
.10 Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, pp. 15-17.
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Senator Joseph McCarthy in particular, and anticommunism in general." A generation
before, William Buckley devoted his second book to an examination of the same issue,
coming to the same conclusion that Whittaker Chambers had arrived at in his dictum about
the Hiss case:
No feature of the Hiss Case is more obvious, or more troubling as history, than
the jagged fissure, which it did not so much open as reveal, between the plain
men and women of the nation, and those who affected to act, think and speak for
them. It was not invariably, but in general the 'best people' who were for Alger
Hiss and who were prepared to go to almost any length to protect and defend him.
It was the enlightened and the powerful, the clamorous proponents of the open
mind and the common man, who snapped their minds shut in a pro-Hiss
psychosis of a kind which ... in a nation is a warning of the end.32
Nixon, Chambers and the other National Review conservatives were certainly onto
something. From a broader perspective, the gap between New Deal supporters and the
electorate at large grew as economic prosperity consolidated itself; from a more parochial
viewpoint, the Truman administration desperately tried to cover up the issue and used the
Justice Department for strictly partisan reasons, hoping it could protect itself by protecting
Hiss.33 Of course, as Nixon himself later acknowledged, that was Truman's low political
answer to Republican low political pressure." For conservatives, however, these
developments were symptoms of fundamental corruption within the highest circles of
American society. Richard Nixon, together with the bulk of the Republican party, skillfully
exploited and propagated that perception to a degree that would later move Nixon to put
some distance between himself and the worst Republican excesses of that time. In his
memoirs Nixon confided his inner conviction that 'many socialists were dedicated
anticommunists', and doubted Robert Taft's 'grasp of the whole international situation' for
failing to notice that fact. " At the time however, Nixon, who might have indeed grasped the
difference, failed to communicate such a distinction between communists and socialists (or
for that matter Democrats) to either Taft or anybody else.
31 M. Stanton Evans, Blacklisted by History (New York: Random House, 2007).
32 Chambers, Witness, p. 793.
33 Alonzo M. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 88-87; Samuel
Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 152; Reinhard, Republican Right, pp.60--63.
34 Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, p. 44-45; Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p. 195.
35 Nixon, RN, p. 83.
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The scars of the 1950s marked and hurt Nixon more than any other single politician of
his time bar Joseph McCarthy, and also helped to position him as the conservative popular
champion of later years. In spite of Nixon's adaptability to the political environment, those
early years set the grounds upon which his career-long relationship with the right would
develop. At least in part, it was all thanks to the Democrats. Firstly, the Truman
administration chose to support Alger Hiss to the bitter end, and subsequently descended into
vicious smearing during the 1952 campaign. Up to that point - and contrary to his own self-
perception in latter years - Nixon's relationship with the press had varied from the flattery of
the conservative Californian press to fairly even-balanced coverage by the national media. To
be sure the media criticised Nixon for his knuckle-style campaigning but then, Nixon was an
aggressive campaigner. Until 1952 Nixon's poor image and personal resentments remained
within the usual partisan Iimita.'" That year the New York Post ran a sensationalist story
which, under the headline 'SECRET NIXON FUND!' falsely accused the Californian of
receiving cash for personal use from wealthy donors. The story, fuelled by the Democratic
campaign, picked up to the point of threatening both Nixon's position as vice-presidential
candidate and his very political survival. Virtually abandoned by Eisenhower, Nixon opted to
expose his personal finances in a television address. Thanks to the famous 'Checkers speech',
Nixon kept his place on the ticket by falling back on the standard discourse he had been
peddling since 1946: he aligned himself with the average American. His wife, he said, did not
'have a mink coat', dressing instead in a 'respectable Republican cloth coat'. He further
sugared the pill by quoting Lincoln's aphorism that 'that Lord must have loved the common
people because he made so many of them'. Including, he clearly thought, Richard Nixon.r" In
the process, however, the whole affair contributed to affix Nixon, his haters and his admirers
more firmly and even further apart in their respective positions. Nixon gained even greater
contempt from his Democratic opponents, who thought his performance a show of self-
humiliating cynicism. His admirers thought the whole experience further proof of the
36 Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, p. 44.
37 As quoted in Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p. 288; Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Serf-Made
Man (New York: Mentor Book, 1971), pp.140-41.
37
establishment's rabid anti-Nixonism, and by association anti-conservative arrogance and
callousness." More importantly the experience, which was indeed humiliating, sent Richard
Nixon down the path of near-universal resentment against the press and the Eastern
Republican establishment. The former had picked on an evidently false story as a
consequence, he and many of his supporters believed, of his involvement in the Hiss case.
The latter, led by Dwight Eisenhower and the New York Herald Tribune, had failed to
support him." Resentment degenerated into fully fledged paranoia after the admittedly
lopsided coverage of the 1960 campaign, which had for Nixon similar effects to that which
the 1964 campaign would later have for the conservatives. The devastating consequences of
Nixon's intense resentment against the press first surfaced with the catastrophic 'last press
conference' that followed his defeat in the 1962 campaign for the governorship of
Califomia.i"
While Nixon became the Republican grassroots' champion and a prominent hate-figure
for many Democratic progressives during the 1950s, conservative intellectuals attracted little
beyond condescension." In part, the divergent public impact of Nixon and the National
Review types was the result of clear differences in their respective aims and means. The
conservatives around National Review aspired to no less than the regeneration of 'the United
States and Western Civilisation' and, as Frank Meyer graphically described it, saw their
objectives as achievable within 'fifteen or twenty years' .42 The magazine's circulation never
went above 50,000 copies, and its public was the relatively narrow sector of the population
with an active, continuous interest in politics, a flair for quality writing and an inclination to
contemplate the conservative viewpoint. The magazine featured regular contributions from
rather arcane writers from all over Europe, ranging from central Europeans such as Erik Von
E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddhin and Archduke Otto Habsburg, to Britons such as Arnold Lunn or
38 Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, p. 50.
39 Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p. 295.
40 Ibid., pp. 668-72; Perlstein, Nixonland, pp. 60-61; Nixon, RN, pp. 244-46.
41 Micklethwhait and Wooldridge, Right Nation, p. 43.
42 Frank Meyer, 'The Conservative movement: Growing Pains', NR, May 6, 1961, p. 281; Frank Meyer to the Editors
'Re: NR Position on Presidential Candidates', May 10,1960, f. 10M, box 10, WFB papers.
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Evelyn Vaughn through Franco-friendly Spaniards such as professor Rafael Calve-Serer."
Gaining a mass following was clearly not the immediate priority while, until 1964, practical
politics remained a near-pointless exercise.
Richard Nixon's interest, on the other hand, was centred on gaining and maintaining
office. Changing American civilisation remained understandably marginal until his second
presidential term. As with any professional politician, his position was always dominated by
the immediacy of politics, and his agenda was driven by the electoral calendar rather than
decades. But he reached millions from the bully-pulpit of public office. During his first and
crucial years in politics, Richard Nixon helped to communicate to the electorate a new ideal
of the good American and identified a new set of bad Americans. Predictably, Nixon
presented himself as the incarnation of an ideal which was essentially coincidental with the
self-image of his prospective voters: the hard working, painfully honest, self-reliant, patriotic
citizen. In Garry Wills' mocking but cruelly accurate terms, Nixon put himself across as
nothing less than the modem political incarnation of Horatio Alger. As it happened, the
'mystique of the self-made man' was deeply ingrained in the collective identity of America's
middling classes, and it was also very close to the views of the nascent Conservative
movement." Honesty and attachment to traditional values was certainly a useful political
asset in the 1950s. In the 1960s, Nixon was able to use those very same arguments, without
the need for the cover that anticommunism provided in the 1950s, as the foundations of a
conservative counterrevolution aimed directly and openly against those 'bad' Americans in
the press, the universities and the federal bureaucracy.
2. DEVELOPMENT: THE GOOD REPUBLICAN ...
43 Except Serer, they all had regular columns or appeared frequently in the pages of the ~evie~. The Spanish position
was taken by a variety of ad-hoc collaborations and, most frequently, by the regular senior editors, see Rafael Calvo-
Serer, 'They Spoke for Christian Europe', NR, July 27, 1957, p. 107.
44 Ambrose, Education of a Politician, p. 271-72; Wills, Nixon Agonistes, p. 156.
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Richard Nixon's early political career had established his image as a man of the
common folk (at least of the right-wing common folk), and to generate the kind of
adversaries that would endear him to conservatives. Connected with that strategy, he had also
endeavoured to build an image as an upstanding party man. Since the GOP's main
characteristic throughout the 1950s and 1960s was the deepening and widening divide
between its liberal-leaning ('eastern' in conservative lingo) and conservative wings, Nixon's
enterprise became a remarkable and rather transparent exercise in political funambulism -
and one that would satisfy neither conservatives nor liberals within the party. On the other
hand, this conciliatory strategy succeeded, at least in part, because the actual differences
between 'liberal' and 'conservative' Republicans were widely exaggerated, not least by the
main protagonists. In general terms - bar exceptions such as Mayor John Lindsay of New
York (who eventually switched parties) - until the explosion of antiwar feelings in the later
years of the Johnson administration, intra-party disputes were very much circumscribed to
domestic matters, and even then tended to be more a matter of degree than one of actual
substance. The matter was well captured, after the bruising 1964 presidential campaign, when
the party professional John Davies Lodge noted that 'the division between Senator Goldwater
and Governor Rockefeller would appear small' if compared, for instance, to that separating
southern and northern Democrats.45 To be sure, Rockefeller had reacted to the Rusher-White
orchestrated conservative take-over of the Young Republicans by publicly warning that the
GOP was 'in real danger of subversion by a radical, well financed and highly disciplined
minority' of 'vociferous and well-drilled extremist elements', one that had 'engineered' the
'disgraceful subversion of a great and responsible auxiliary of the Republican party'. Worse
still, according to Rockefeller, these were 'the same people who are now [1963] moving to
subvert the Republican party itself'. 46 And yet, even an evangelical conservative such as
William Rusher, not known for his patience with Republican politicking and what he saw as
the party's lack of ideological backbone, acknowledged that 'to be fair, Rockefeller, though
45 George Bush et al., 'The Republican Party and the Conservative movement', NR, December 1, 1964, 1053-56,
1078.
46 'Text of Rockefeller's Statement Criticizing 'Radical Right' of the Republican Party', New York Times, July 15,
1963. Needless to say, William F. Buckley took good care to underline the juiciest bits of the text. See f. Robb, David
- Rogers, Donald, box 27, WFB papers.
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indisputably liberal in many of his policies, was no left winger'. The problem with Rocky,
according to Rusher, was that 'his attitude on the general subject of welfare was
"compassionate.vr'" Following a similar reasoning, James Burnham even suggested, to the
horror of his fellow editors, that the NR conservatives actually support Rockefeller's
presidential ambitions both in 1960 and 1968 (in the latter case with Ronald Reagan as the
running mate, in both instances as a last resort to stop Nixon), because on foreign affairs the
Rock was 'harder than any rival of either party' .48 As for the 1960 primary season, National
Review labelled the governor of New York's frustrated campaign a 'slick, big moneyed, high-
liberal operation' and offered its reluctant, back handed support for Vice-President Nixon, but
it also noted that Rockefeller's objections to the Eisenhower administration 'were not all
from the left', and praised his take on trade with the Soviet Union (because 'he knows its not
trade but economic warfare') and support for resumed nuclear tests (hence 'against pacifist
sentimentalities' .)49 Of course Rockefeller knew this, which is why during the 1968 primaries
he complained to a number of conservatives: 'I'm hard on defence and fiscal policy and soft
on welfare. You've got two-thirds of me - what more do you want?' 50 At bottom, the fact
that relatively small, although significant, differences became a veritable civil war was to a
considerable degree a consequence of power-struggles between distinct social networks-cum-
ideological factions. Rusher could have answered Rockefeller that they wanted Reagan,
among other things because they happened to be personal friends. It is no accident that
Nixon, the party centrist, was as isolated from conservative social circles as he was from
eastern establishment socialites.
The first issue the Buckleyites had to confront in order to guarantee conservatism's
survival in the future, as well as to maximise their immediate capacity to influence politics,
was the intricacy of internal Republican politicking. Conservatives concerned themselves
with two issues in particular after the presidential election of 1952: the consolidation of a
47 Rusher, Rise a/the Right, p. 96.
48 Daniel Kelly, James Burnham: A Life (Wilmington DE: lSI Books, 2002), pp. 250, 317-18.
49 'Rockefeller', National Review Bulletin, 9 January 1960, p. I.
50 Rusher, Rise a/the Right, p.96; Bush, 'Republican Party and the Conservative Movement'. UNIVERSITY
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coherent conservative leadership within GOP senior ranks, and the perceived drift towards
'the liberal left' of the party as a whole. Before the 1960 presidential campaign, the main
force provoking conservative chagrin and propelling Richard Nixon's political advance was
the absence of serious senior conservative politicians within the GOP. Initially, conservatives
had rallied around Senator Robert Taft, whose old-guard conservative credentials, combining
isolationism with market royalism, had made Republicans unelectable for two decades. Yet,
as far as conservatives were concerned, the obvious political limits of a Taft presidential
candidacy (his cantankerous character, lack of telegenia and occasional slips towards
compromise with the forces of liberalism) were decidedly overshadowed by the aura of lost
cause that his defeats at the hands of eastern Republicans in the 1944, 1948 and 1952
presidential primaries provided. Until his death in 1953, Taft remained to the Republican
conservative grassroots (the leadership's assessment was then more nuanced) what Robert E.
Lee was to southern Diehards. After his death his status expanded to include virtually all
conservatives, not least because for about a decade there was no Republican available to take
his place. The death in 1961 of former party chairman Caroll B. Reece finally marked the
fading away of the old Taft apparatus as a force within the GOP. 51
Two years earlier, Reece had celebrated the efforts of Senator William Knowland in
support of 'Right to Work' legislation during the latter's bid for the governorship of
California as a replay of Taft's 1950 Ohio re-election campaign. Reece was not the only
hopeful, for Knowland had been close to National Review since at least 1955, when its first
number included a piece under his name. From then on Knowland was hailed in the
magazine's pages as the 'standard-bearer' of the Republican right, while outside conservative
circles he became known as the 'Senator from Formosa' for his staunch support of Taiwan
and opposition to communist China.52 However, Knowland's star fell even faster than it had
risen when he was wiped out by Pat Brown in the 1958 California gubernatorial race, and
51 Reinhard, Republican Right, p. 76-77. Reinhard's assessment is fully backed .up ~y a lengthy and.detailed let.te: of
Rusher to Bozell (then in Spain) in which he carefully explained the political situation of conservatism, see WIlham
Rusher to L. Brent Bozell, September 28, 1961, f. 10M, box 10, WFB papers.
52 L. Brent Bozell, 'National Trends', NR, November 19, 1955.
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subsequently retired from front-line politics. 53 During those turbulent months two other
developments also took place that would significantly alter the conservative political star-
system. First, in 1957 the Young Republicans elected as their chairman a young Ohioan
named John Ashbrook. Ashbrook's candidacy had been organised by F. Clifton White, a
political plumber virtually unknown outside the YR and then culminating a long trip away
from Thomas E. Dewey's eastern Republicanism towards conservatism. Also in 1958, as
Knowland initiated his own descent into oblivion, Barry Goldwater won, by a landslide, the
senatorial race in Arizona.54 White would go on to mastermind Goldwater's 1964 successful
primary campaign, while Ashbrook became the active politician closest to the Buckleyites,
spent a long tenure as chairman of the American Conservative Union, and would culminate
his career with a symbolic run against President Nixon during the 1972 primaries. But during
the late 1950s and early 1960s all this remained in the future and, as a perceptive observer
noted at the time, the reality then was that 'conservatives find themselves homeless in the
Republican Party. And they will remain so as long as the GOP continues to be dominated by
liberals'. Taft, he reminded the reader, 'was dead', Knowland 'didn't go anywhere' and
Goldwater, 'just can't win'. 55 As late as 1960, National Review itself had to acknowledge that
'conservative sentiment has no organizational or even personal vehicle around which to
build' .56
Alas, there was one hope left, however: Nixon who, after all, 'may have been
conservative at heart', and whose only problem was that 'he lacked the political courage to
don the conservative cloak in public'v" Of course, a man's courage can be another man's
political death wish, and Richard Nixon, vice-president at the age of 39, was already too
much of a senior political figure to maintain a profile akin to that of John Ashbrook.
Association with the Republican right had been useful prior to 1952 but also, he knew, could
easily lead him down the same unhappy path of a Taft, nevermind a Knowland. Throughout
53 Reinhard, Republican Right, pp. 142--43.
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the Eisenhower years, Nixon willingly employed his solid image among the party's
conservative rank-and-file to protect the administration. Predictably, in the process he also
alienated those sectors who had never been all that comfortable with Ike. Among those
unhappy Republicans the sages at National Review constituted the noisiest group, growing
increasingly agitated by what they saw (correctly) as the general's 'awesome philosophical
emptiness' and (incorrectly) as his doing 'nothing whatever' for the advance of the
Republican party. 58
By mid-1960 all of the magazine's senior editors agreed that Richard Nixon was hardly
a conservative champion. James Burnham, Frank Meyer, William Rusher, Priscilla Buckley
(William's sister and the magazine's managing editor) all privately threatened to sit the
election out. While Meyer deplored the fact that 'leading political figures [read Nixon and
Kennedy] can be distinguished one from the other mainly by their haircuts', Rusher summed
up the general feeling when he lamented that 'when the candidates are as similar as Nixon
and Kennedy, how can it possibly be contended that a serious conservative is effectively
registering his opinion?'. He went on to add that there was 'not a single reason for endorsing
[Nixon] that will not apply equally well to every Republican candidate who runs against a
Democrat between now and the dissolution of the Republic'. 59 Nixon, for his part, managed
to sink to his lowest point in conservative estimation when he decided to strengthen his
electoral hopes by striking a last minute deal with Nelson Rockefeller. Known as the
'Compact of Fifth Avenue' by political watchers, it was also labelled as a 'domestic Munich'
by Barry Goldwater. Most conservatives agreed. William Rusher captured the conservative
perspective on the affair when he denounced it as an instance of Nixonian lack of principle.
After all, Nixon had the nomination virtually assured and still 'crawled all the way to New
York and licked the polish off Rockefeller's shoes' .60 And yet, eventually conservatives
behaved in 1960 as they always did with Nixon. Munich notwithstanding, Barry Goldwater
58 William F. Buckley, 'Ecce Ike', NR, December 3, 1963, p. 487.
59 Frank Meyer, 'A Man of Principle', ibid., April 23, 1960; William Rusher to William F. Buckley, September 14,
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quashed the last minute (and weak) attempts to propel him in a symbolic stop Nixon
movement and famously told the Republican right to 'grow up' and work for Nixon. He was
also quite willing to use the pages of the conservative monthly Human Events to tell the
faithful why 'conservatives should support Nixon' (because 'no more dedicated
anticommunist works on President Eisenhower's team', and the alternative was 'an
immature, well-heeled young man'), and to urge 'conservatives, don't stay home!,61 As for
National Review, its editors opted, after much agony, for a convoluted editorial which
simultaneously proclaimed its dislike of 'Nixon's Republicanism'; gently reminded its
readers of how in 1956 'we had to go out in shifts to leave one editor firing the machine gun
at Ike, while another dashed out and voted for him'; and concluded, implausibly enough, by
stating that 'we do not intend to exhort our readers in a particular line of political action'. 62 In
effect, the magazine recommended its readers to vote for Nixon, with regret perhaps, but
without much of a bad conscience. After all, as Brent Bozell publicly acknowledged as early
as January of that year, 'most' conservative voters 'will not abandon Nixon' .63 Raymond
Moley, the former New Deal Brains Truster who was now a well known right-of-centre
journalist agreed, noting that 'Nixon's appeal' to 'conservative voters' in the South would be
'very strong' and, hopefully, 'apparent in the election,.64 Even a conservative former
congressman for New York, less than enthusiastic about Nixon's domestic policies, explained
that as 'a staunch conservative', he would 'support Richard Nixon for President' because
abstention, he contended, was equivalent 'to cast half a vote for Kennedy' who, he stated,
was Khrushchev's favoured candidate.f If 1960 showed something to Richard Nixon, it was
that bar some rather extraordinary event, he could count on conservative support, however
reluctant, as long as he ran against a progressive Democrat. In that scenario, conservatives
quite simply had nowhere else to go.
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Yet two years after his 1960 near-miss Richard Nixon discovered that, to his own
confessed astonishment, Bozell's assessment of his hold over the conservative vote had been
overly optimistic. In 1962 Nixon decided to run for the governorship of California, and in the
process he ran up against - for the first time and to his considerable surprise - a wall of active
and at times vicious political opposition. Nixon's first miscalculation in 1962 was to dismiss
the momentum propelling the candidacy of Joe Shell, the conservative Republican minority
leader in Sacramento. He found out soon enough when he began to travel through the state
before the June primary, and 'met with a lot of heckling'. To be sure Nixon was more than
accustomed to public hostility, but to his horror this time it was 'different'. Before, he
acknowledged thirty years later, 'I had been heckled by the far left; now [in 1962] I was
being heckled by the far right' .66 In the end Nixon won the primaries, but the most
conservative elements of the California GOP refused to either support or vote for him.
The particulars of the 1962 election would mark Nixon's future strategy because they
signalled a number of changes within the Golden State's GOP, which in turn announced an
impending transformation of the party's internal balance-of-power. For a start, Nixon's return
and defeat neither generated nor ended the bitter division between moderates and
conservatives. California Republicans' appetite for self-destruction had actually started four
years earlier: then it had been the conservative William Knowland's tum to get clobbered by
Pat Brown in the general election as a consequence of vicious internecine disputes - in 1962
he did all he could to take his revenge on Nixon." In 1966, it was Ronald Reagan's tum to
suffer a similar ordeal this time, like Knowland before him, at the hands of moderate
Republicans." California's lively Republican politics roughly reflected the evolution of
conservative strength within the party both there and at a national leve1.69 In the 1950s, as
Knowland found out to his own expense, conservatives had been a relatively influential and
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certainly noisy faction within the party, but ultimately could not wrestle control from the
moderate-eastem bloc. In 1962 they remained unable to propel their acknowledged leaders
over a relatively moderate Nixon, but having retained 30 per cent of the most active
Republican voters, they could efficiently torpedo the former vice-president's chances of
victory in the general election by both withdrawing their support and engaging in a
exhausting primary contest. In 1966, Califomia's conservatives managed to capture the
Republican nomination for govemor, even if their candidate was a former B-list actor whose
known politics placed him slightly to the right of no less then Barry Goldwater. 70 Even before
Reagan tumed the tables, a lesson was leamed, and one that would stay with Richard Nixon
for the rest of his political career: as Taft, Knowland and later Goldwater clearly experienced,
conservative support by itself might not be sufficient to ensure victory but, as Nixon leamed,
to irritate the right was also a 'no win proposition' for, with a few exceptions, no Republican
candidate could hope to achieve success without at least the acquiescence of the party's
right. 71
While Richard Nixon coped with upheavals among the Republican grassroots,
conservatives at National Review were facing a few problems of their own with the GOP's
senior ranks. One of the most remarkable aspects of the clear conservative ascent within the
Republican party during the late 1950s and early 1960s was that almost nobody - not even
conservatives themselves - appeared to fully realise what was happening. Yet, if men like
Richard Nixon grossly underestimated the growing strength of conservative sentiment, others
did sense some of the powerful political undercurrents that would erupt during the second
half of the 1960s. One of these rather solitary figures was National Review publisher William
Rusher. Closely involved in Republican state politics in New York, Rusher also retained a
number of friendships within the Young Republicans organisation. While Nixon licked his
1960 wounds and considered whether to run in Califomia in 1962, Rusher realised that his
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old conservative cronies in the YR had graduated into the main party, and that the group
included enough senior elected officials to become the '4th or 5th largest influence in the
senior GOP'. Moreover, Rusher also noted with horror that 'the vast majority of Republican
voters (around 60 per cent) would choose Nixon as their 1964 candidate'. A sharp political
observer, Rusher fully detected the earlier stirrings of conservative re-organisation within the
Republican party, and realised that these men would eventually start 'developing their own
political leaders ... and those leaders are not necessarily going to save a place for National
Review at, or even necessarily near, the head of the parade'. If the Buckleyites wanted 'to
lead the Conservative movement', Rusher urged them 'to get over the idea that it can be done
solely by the means of well-phrased editorials'. Rusher, together with a number of graduates
from the YR such as F. Clifton White, John Ashbrook, and California representative John
Rousselot decided instead to form a group which would 'paddle its own canoe' towards the
1964 Republican primaries. And 'the only relatively empty canoe' available in the bleak
Republican landscape of 1961 was, they decided, 'Senator Goldwater's'. 72
Three years later these same men first celebrated the resounding victory of Barry
Goldwater in the Republican presidential primaries and then charged forward, Light Brigade-
like, into the biggest Republican electoral defeat since 1936: Lyndon Johnson carried all
states except the Deep South and Goldwater's native Arizona. With hindsight, it is widely
acknowledged that Goldwater's triumph and subsequent catastrophe turned conservatives
into the dominant force within the Republican party." At the time, however, conservatives
became 'pariahs' and conservatism was proclaimed dead as a political force. Of course, in the
hectic months that followed Johnson's landslide, the eastern bloc of the party moved in to
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clean the Republican house of Goldwater appointees and to consolidate its grip over the
leadership of the party." In 1965 the roster of Republican potential presidential candidates
was made up in its entirety of liberal Republicans: Michigan governor George Romney, the
attractive newly-elected mayor of New York City John Lindsay, New York Senator Jacob
Javits, Pennsylvania governor William Scranton and, above anybody else, that force of nature
and old conservative nemesis, New York state governor Nelson Rockefeller. Worse still than
being liberal Republicans, according to conservatives all of these men had betrayed the party
by either withdrawing their support or outright opposing the candidacy of Goldwater during
the main campaign against Johnson. Gerhard Niemeyer, scholar and member of the
Goldwater 'brain-trust' squarely blamed defeat on Republican 'liberals' who 'deserted, either
into Johnson's camp, or into separatism, or into inactivity. In precinct after precinct', and
thereby concluded that 'defeat for the Republican party resulted from the sulking of
Republican liberals'. Ronald Reagan was also quite clear on the matter in the immediate
aftermath of the election: '1 do not think' he declared 'we should tum the high command over
to the leaders who were traitors during the battle just ended'. George Bush Sr., then close to
conservative circles, also announced that he had 'no respect for the Republican who quits his
Party this year because he didn't get it all his way', and even dared to mention Rockefeller by
name.75
\
Unsurprisingly, some conservatives were close to exhausted with Republican
politicking and Republican politicians. Chief among them was William Rusher, who
despaired even of Goldwater who, according to the old political warhorse, 'for all the
passionate sincerity of his conservative convictions, [was] from first to last a thoroughly
orthodox party regular'. 76 A few years later, Rusher's partisanship had weakened to the point
that he even threatened to support Johnson in the event that the Republicans nominated a
Vietnam dove, and wrote of a potential 'mass movement' towards the Democratic
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incumbent.i Rusher's views could be dismissed as wishful thinking: after all, this was a man
who had already in 1960 openly 'hoped' for 'a new and more highly ideologized [sic]
political party; a third party'. 78 But this time, Rusher was not alone. Along similarly
depressed lines, James Burnham noted, in the aftermath of the 1964 debacle, that the GOP
was historically the party of 'radicalism', 'progressivism' and 'civil rights' and went on the
emphasise that 'the party's make up' could 'no longer be relied on as a conservative
anchor"." He even mused about how the' Democratic party may become an arena even more
promising than the Republican party for a spectacular conservative advance'. 80 The
depressing electoral results coupled with the - according to conservatives - manifest
disloyalty of the Republican progressive wing had such an effect that George Bush Sf. felt the
need to go straight to the point and tell the faithful that dastardly liberals or no dastardly
liberals 'the GOP must remain the conservatives' hope. A third party movement will never
work. It will simply further divide,.81
But then again, both conservatives and moderates within the GOP knew all there was to
be known about division. At a national level, every single presidential contest since 1948
(except that of 1956) had been marked by such a division - the 1964 affair had simply been
more vitriolic - and similar violent fistfights had erupted within satellite organisations such
as the YR and the Women Republicans, while at state level California might have been a
particularly bloody battlefield, by no means was it an exception. Incapable of wresting
control of the GOP from moderate Republicans, conservatives opted for generating their very
own smattering of conservative political organisations.f In 1960, at the Buckley estate in
Sharon, Connecticut, the National Review circle employed the good offices of Marvin
Liebman - the single most important figure in the emergence of an organisationally
significant early conservative movement - to act as midwife to the birth of Young Americans
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for Freedom, an organisation designed to harness the same conservative energies III the
campuses which had coalesced behind Goldwater in the 1964 Republican National
Convention.83 Although technically non-partisan, YAF became a fixture of Republican youth
politics, rivalling for influence with the YR organisation and, at least in terms of noise, even
surpassing it.84 Observing YAF's success after the Nixon debacle of 1960, Liebman believed
- like many other conservatives - that Nixon's error in such a narrow election had been his
failure to appeal more explicitly to conservatives whom he realised, as had Rusher, lacked a
coherent organisation capable of articulating their influence over that of Nelson Rockefeller
who, of course, had the full backing of at least the New York Republican organisation.f
Post-Goldwater frustration with party politicking (and pragmatism), coupled with the
unleashing of considerable conservative energy during the campaign combined to make the
project of a grown up version of YAF a reality in the early months of 1965. As had been the
case with the youth organisation, the ubiquitous Marvin Liebman successfully managed
harness growing grass-roots energy into a political organisation: the American Conservative
Union. With time, and once the immediate chaotic aftermath of the 1964 presidential election
had passed, ACU became the stronger and longer-lasting conservative political organisation.
Beginning in 1967, it acquired its own weekly newspaper - The Republican Battle Line -
through which it kept the faithful abreast of the latest perceived atrocities perpetrated by
,
moderate Republicans, as well as of the activities of conservative champions, be they
established, as in the cases of Reagan and Goldwater, or up-and-coming new stars such as
James Buckley in the early 1970s. Later on, Battle Line even helped channel funds to
conservative hopefuls in local and state elections. Peculiarly enough, it had actually been the
old publication of the Republican National Committee, which had dropped it in 1965 in
favour of The Republican, as ACU's conservatives specified in the front page of its first
number - the four column headline of which was devoted to presidential prospects and
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illustrated with a smiling portrait of Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater.86 The American
Conservative Union, like YAF, was nominally non-partisan and had no qualms about praising
conservative Democrats, but it was designed to be and effectively became another satellite
Republican organisation.
Despite the occasional alarm of conservative Republican politicians such as George
Bush Sr. and even Barry Goldwater, and for all the rumblings and periodical bouts of
exasperation with the GOP, most sensible American conservatives had no intention of
leaving the party. In fact, as Battle Line's small aside clearly reflected, they thought of
themselves as the repositories of true Republicanism against the deviationism (what
conservatives took to labelling as 'me too' Republicanism) of the moderate faction within the
party. Much to the chagrin of respectable conservatives who, like William Rusher and Frank
Meyer, seriously contemplated abandoning the GOP, even conservative initiatives towards
creating third parties remained stubbornly loyal to the Republican mother-ship. Of these more
serious potential threats the Conservative Party of New York State was the most enduring and
successful. From its inception it was 'animated exclusively by its desire to serve certain
political ideas' and remained steadfastly loyal to both the national Republican party and to
those New York Republicans whom it deemed ideologically sound. The CPNYS emerged
only because 'the Republican Party in this state will never reform until it is subjected to the
pressure of an ideological party \ on its flank - a party that will do for conservative
Republicans what the Liberal Party does so effectively for liberal Democrats,.87 Redemption
rather than desertion remained the conservative aim. And even for such benign designs, the
third party enterprise only worked in a very specific place at a very particular time.
The project for a conservative party had been floating around conservative circles since
at least 1957, but it was Nixon's 1960 'Compact of Fifth Avenue', and Goldwater's
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subsequent call for conservative restraint that sparked the fuse.8s Rockefeller's large shadow
also helped to explain the success of the party in New York: by early 1961, in a prequel of
what would happen after 1964, conservatives were already blaming the governor of New
York's lack of enthusiasm for Nixon's narrow defeat.89 To make matters worse for
conservatives, since the 1930s New York State had possessed a small Liberal Party which
efficiently lobbied to push state politics in a leftward direction by endorsing suitable
Democratic (and later Republican) candidates, or fielding candidates aimed at derailing the
candidacies of excessively right-wing hopefuls. Thus, the CPNYS emerged as an alliance of
the state's Nixon supporters and former staffers of the Nixon-Lodge campaign irritated by
Rockefeller's electoral inaction; grassroots conservative activists who were aggravated by the
state's Republican leaders including Governor Rockefeller, Mayor Lindsay and Senator
Javits's all-too-friendly attitude towards the State's Liberal Party; and Buckleyites, including
Buckley himself, Rusher and the then-ubiquitous organiser Marvin Liebman.9o Conservatives
knew that the party originated and survived because of that set of peculiar circumstances, a
view reinforced by the short and unhappy lives of the various similar enterprises that
appeared in half a dozen other states." In 1962 the CPNYS released its first public statement
as a fully-fledged political party. New York's conservatives used the release to lambast ABC
,
and its 'spiteful "political obituary" of Richard Nixon' - which had included Alger Hiss
among the commentators. Two years later the CPNYS was healthy enough to trigger
Governor Rockefeller's wrath by supporting a hypothetical Goldwater-Nixon presidential
ticket." Nixon, it would seem, was an ever-present figure in the grassroots conservative
imagination.
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The success of the CPNYS opened a number of fascinating opportunities for
enterprising conservatives. National Review editor William Rickenbacker noted how a
number of National Review friends advised the journal to take a 'friendly' but 'aloof' attitude
towards the CPNYS, in order to avoid the ridicule that its inevitable demise would cause. The
new party, it was claimed, quite simply lacked a constituency. More optimistically,
Rickenbacker himself went on to emphasise that the party could and should expand
conservatism's political base by appealing to the right-wing vote generally, rather than to
Republicans alone. Years before Richard Nixon transformed the silent majority into a
conservative shibboleth, Rickenbacker was already noting the growing disaffection of the
white ethnic vote (in particular of Irish Catholic New Yorkers) from the Democratic party."
In more immediate terms, the party also allowed conservatives to score a number of publicity
coups, not least Buckley's famous and widely reported 1965 campaign against John Lindsay
for New York City's mayoralty. Buckley lost, but his remarkable 13 per cent of the vote lent
some weight to, and stimulated, conservative ruminations along Rickenbacker's lines -
Nixon, on his part, had spent 1965 as a 'private citizen' living, of all places, in New York
C· 94tty.
The mayoralty race served, at the very least, to allow Richard Nixon, then laboriously
cultivating the Republican right, to publicly position himself vis-a-vis the CPNYS. In a letter
sent by his then personal assistant Patrick Buchanan - a well known conservative who had
volunteered to work for Nixon in January of that year - to 'the editor of National Review',
Nixon reiterated that he remained 'firmly convinced that the best interests of conservatives
are served by their joining and working within the framework of the Republican party'.
Moreover, and just in case there was any doubt about Nixon's views on the Republican right,
Buchanan also took pains to remind. Buckley of the fact that 'as he [Nixon] has often
emphasised, it would be a tragedy for this nation if conservatives should abandon the GOP to
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form splinter parties' .95 To be sure, there was very little love lost between Nixon and the New
York liberal Republicans, but then again he had also been about the only non-conservative
senior Republican to actually profit from the Goldwater debacle. Nixon had firmly opposed
the Goldwater primary campaign - which was dutifully noted by conservatives - and was not
averse to supporting liberal Republicans such as Jacob Javits, but he had also taken inordinate
pains to support the national campaign against Johnson. 96
With that strategy, and once conservatism was firmly tied to the GOP, Nixon effectively
became the bridge linking the professional party structure - still largely controlled by senior
moderates - with the swathe of young conservative activists who ran the grassroots of the
party. Nixon's success was almost immediate, as can be seen in the aftermath of the 1964
debacle: in their writings the same conservatives who lambasted 'traitors' deliberately
emphasised Nixon's model behaviour. George Bush Sr. specifically noted that Nixon was a
'good example' of Republicans who had 'fought for what they believed in the convention,
lost, and then went to work of their Party swallowing their points of difference'. 'Compare
his teamwork' he thundered on, 'with the performance of Rockefeller,.97 Barry Goldwater,
for one, had been doing some comparing of his own and hurriedly publicised the fact that he
,
considered Nixon to be the man 'who worked harder than anyone person for the ticket'.
Goldwater even went on to personally assure the former vice-president: 'Dick, I will never
forget it. I know that you did it in the interest of the Republican party and not for any selfish
reasons. But if there comes a time I can tum those into selfish reasons, I am going to do all I
can to see that it comes about' .98
Meanwhile another, more optimistic line of argument advanced by conservatives was
interesting for Nixon, while also contributing to stymie third party impulses. National Review
95 Patrick Buchanan to the editor ofNR, March 8, 1966, f. Nixon, box. 40, WFB papers.
96 Mahoney, Actions Speak Louder, p. 348; Clare Booth Luce, 'Tears for the Grand Old Party', NR, June 30, 1964, pp.
529-30, 538.
97 Bush, 'The Republican Party and the Conservative Movement', p. 1054.
98 Edwards, Goldwater, p. 369; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972 (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1990), pp. 60-61; Perlstein, Before the Storm, pp. 504-506.
55
senior editor Russell Kirk, even in the face of defeat and of the eastern impetus to clean
house, nicely summed it up by stating that 'the Republican party now has prospects of
strength and success unknown to it for a generation. For, however confusedly, it is being
transformed into a coherently conservative party'. Moreover, its 'dominant figures ... during
the next four years - men like Mr. Nixon and Representative Gerald Ford - will have no
truck with the grand design of "me too" and will be more clearly conservative in utterance
and proposal than formerly'. 99 Frank Meyer, not a party loyalist, also noted how 'the old-
style precinct workers' had been 'more and more replaced by motivated workers' in both
major parties. In the case of the GOP he rightly emphasised 'the emergence of a powerful
force of committed conservatives as the decisive sector of Republican campaign workers'
which meant 'that American conservatism has moved into the actual political arena, creating
an experienced political corps of a kind it has never had before'. More dramatically, he
prophesised that 'the Republican party has become a party which will in practice, outside of a
few constituencies [namely New York, Pennsylvania and the other north-eastern states],
function as a conservative party or not function at all' .100 Further down the line, and certainly
below the radar of senior party officials, the operation put together by F. Clifton White had
essentially left the lower echelons of the party in the hands of those 'committed
\
conservatives' mentioned by Meyer. As a veteran moderate Republican would later put it, 'in
state after state, Goldwater activists took over party organizations and the machinery for
nominating delegates to the Republican National Convention. By the time Rockefeller,
Lodge, Romney and Scranton realised what was happening, the Republican nomination and
platform were firmly in the hands of conservatives'. These were men and women who
happened to be young, enthusiastic and most importantly, after 1964 both fully organised
within the GOP and aware of their own strength.l'" If those conservatives who participated in
the Goldwater campaign agreed on one single point, it is in emphasising that 1964 turned out
to be the dawn of a new form of conservatism in the United States because, regardless of the
99 Bush, 'The Republican Party and the Conservative Movement' p. 1056.
100 Ibid., p. 1054.
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electoral results, they met each other and did so as Republican activists as well as
conservatives.l'< Much to the benefit of Richard Nixon's future career, as the 1968 election
approached conservatives were not only managing to resist third party delusions: they were
also in the process of capturing the GOP.
Another side-effect of the Goldwater campaign that contributed to weaken eastern
liberals and favoured both Richard Nixon and conservative republicans was Strom
Thurmond's switch to the Republican party and Goldwater's stubborn opposition to civil
rights. In a radical reversal of a secular electoral fixture, the GOP found itself wiped out in
the West and the Northeast but victorious in the Deep South. GOP internal rules established
delegate strength in national gatherings according to electoral results, hence favouring, until
1964, the eastern wing of the party. Goldwater's results and Thurmond's defection suddenly
transformed the southern wing of the party from a non-entity into the single most influential
Republican bloc for the 1968 primary contest.l'" Nixon, who could not have possibly
foreseen such momentous changes in the make up of the party, had supported Goldwater
during the main campaign partly out of actual partisan loyalty and partly because of thirst for
what he called 'the arena' - but he was also aware of the divisions within the party, of his
\
own position as a non-committed centrist, and of his potential future ability to call in a few
political debts such as Goldwater's own. At the same time, conservatives had largely
renounced any serious attempt at abandoning the GOP and were determined, instead, to
transform it in their own image.
3. AND THE GOOD CONSERVATIVE
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Prior to the race for the 1968 nomination, both conservatives and Nixon had to resolve
another nagging issue. After the 1964 Goldwater debacle the Republican party was fully open
to conservative control; the conservative movement was increasingly aware of its capacity to
dominate the party; and Richard Nixon was engaged in a careful and successful navigation of
Republican waters to position himself as the GOP's choice for 1968. The Goldwater
campaign had also made it fairly clear, however, that conservatism could not hope to expand
its influence beyond the ranks of its hard-core supporters unless it managed first to shake off
the rather extensive perception of conservatives as 'reactionary' (Senator Everett Dirksen);
'loony' (William Rusher regarding certain right-wingers); more plainly, 'morons' (Senator
William Proxmire), if not positively 'unstable' (that was Goldwater, according to some press
reports) - perceptions that had been pervasively associated with the right since the days of
Alger Hiss and Joe McCarthy, and which the Johnson campaign had ruthlessly exploited.l'"
Accusations of radicalism had bothered the Buckleyites since the 1950s and were, in
fact, one of the reasons National Review had come into being in the first place. Back then, as
Nixon was making his name as an anticommunist standard-bearer, the post-war conservative
literary landscape was dominated by The Freeman, a small libertarian publication, and the
more influential American Mercury. Buckley and most of the conservative intellectuals that
later populated the National Review as well as very many more who did not (such as US Nazi
Party leader Lincoln Rockwell), had been closely related to both publications until the former
disappeared and the latter descended into open anti-Semitism, triggering its repudiation by
National Review (Rockwell would subsequently receive identical treatmentj.l'" Buckley's
brand of cosmopolitan, internationalist conservatism had as little time for such remnants of
old right-wing radicalism as it had for isolationism or nativism. From its very inception
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National Review was set up to tum conservatism into a respectable ideological option.l'" To
be sure, Buckley's youthful penchant for provocative statements and the magazine's
deliberate aim of pushing the boundaries of the 'politically correct' made the enterprise
difficult at best, and nearly impossible in the overcharged atmosphere of the 1950s and early
1960s. Yet, much like Richard Nixon, the men around National Review managed to survive
the fall-out from McCarthyism to become by 1960 increasingly influential fixtures of the
American political landscape. In tum, Nixon's most consistent long-term success from his
vice-presidential years to the 1968 election was his continuous ability to obtain the reluctant
support of both wings of his party. Invariably, both conservatives and eastern liberals ended
up seeing Nixon as a lesser evil against other candidates clearly committed to one faction or
another within the party, while the irrepressible Nelson Rockefeller was to liberals what
Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan would be to conservatism. Nixon's successes and some
of his failures can only be fully explained by taking into account the decisions and attitudes
of the conservative intellectual leadership towards the issue of radicalism - which also
consisted of striking just the right measure of dissent without inviting accusations of
extremism - and the subsequent evolution of the conservative movement during the 1950s
and 1960s.
In 1964 Barry Goldwater delighted conservative Republicans and horrified the party's
professional cadres (including Richard Nixon) when he proclaimed that 'moderation in the
pursuit of liberty was no virtue'. The incident nicely fitted the conservative movement's
carefully cultivated self-image as uncompromising champions of the right political gospel, as
well as confirming liberal observers' perception of conservatives as radical relics of the past,
dangerous political extremists or, more plainly, in the terms used by John Leonard to describe
L. Brent Bozell, 'totally bananas' .107 However, a closer examination reveals that just as
ideological disappointment never took them out of the Republican fold (and hence the
political mainstream), whenever the intellectual leaders of American conservatism were
106. See Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 98-99.
107 As quoted in Judis, Buckley, p. 318.
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confronted with the actions of certain more extremist champions of the right - such as the
American Mercury, the John Birch Society or, later on, George Wallace - they consistently
fell on the side of caution and, of all things, moderation.
To be sure, a degree of political pragmatism did not prevent instances such as Brent
Bozell's, repeated statement that nuclear holocaust was preferable to accommodation with the
USSR (which caused Leonard's aforementioned riposte). It did not stop James Burnham from
carefully considering the use of nuclear (tactical, he was always clear), chemical or
biological weapons in South East Asia; never mind Russell Kirk's attacks on the entire
university system; the universal tendency to advocate the privatisation of virtually everything,
including the Tennessee Valley Authority; or the rather hairy, even for the standards of the
day, NR stand on the racial affairs of the nation.l'" In short, the Buckleyites certainly did not
lack either ideological backbone or a penchant for generating ideological outrage. Yet their
radicalism was carefully administered and very much circumscribed to both the rhetorical
field and to the provision 'red meat' for the conservative grassroots.l'" Crucially, at least
from 1960 onwards, the men at the helm of NR were always restrained by the awareness that
NR was 'undoubtedly the center of the [conservative] Movement' and that their actions could,
they firmly believed, determine the'future growth or the disappearance of conservatism from
American politics 'in [the following] 15 or 20 years' .110
Despite their relative success during the second half of the 1950s, conservatives
retained a strong sense of victimisation by what they perceived, to a degree correctly, as the
hostile leadership of the American polity. William Rusher put it in rather clear terms shortly
before the 1960 election: 'the Liberals' he said, 'have succeeded in narrowing almost to the
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vanishing point the area of what might be called Permissible Dissent'. Nevertheless Rusher
could not help but notice that although National Review 'still roams at will in areas far
beyond the narrow zone of Permissible Dissent' and that, moreover 'with the exception of the
now totally proscribed mass organizations of the "Extreme Right", we are virtually the only
voice left in this country that is doing so'. From there he went on to ponder 'Why, I wonder,
are we, (generally speaking) immune from the proscription? ...verve and skill have something
to do with it. But I suspect that the essential distinction is that we do not have a mass base in
the political sense' .111 In the aftermath of the 1964 Republican National Convention, Frank
Meyer agreed, noting that 'for years it has been an axiom ... wherever the Establishment
could use the mass-communications network to hatch its eggs that the contemporary
Conservative movement and conservative ideas are outside the American consensus' .112 But
then again, he also noticed that 'in the past couple of years, however, the momentum of the
conservative movement has taken on such startling proportions that there no longer remains
intellectually honest ground for the contentions of the liberal establishment' .113 And yet the
Johnson campaign, Meyer correctly observed, 'is essentially based on a single theme ... that
Goldwater and the movement behind him represents "extremism." 114 Nearly a decade later,
when William Buckley marvelled at the success of the conservative movement, he began his
,
reflections by emphasising the 'efforts, some of them quite ingenious, either to make
American conservatism go away or deprive it of meaning', not to mention the tendency
'particularly in the Academy' of 'identifying American conservatism with altogether
eccentric political modalities'F'''
Of those dastardly liberal academics, conservatives tended to get particularly worked up
by Columbia Historian Richard Hofstadter whom, according to Buckley, by 1967 had
suffered from 'years and years of conviction that that which is not espoused by Professor
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Hofstadter and his ideological colleagues is not worth analyzing but diagnosing' .116
Conservative resentment against Hofstadter was not without grounds: in a series of lectures,
opinion articles and academic texts, the Columbia historian had arrayed himself against the
candidacy of Barry Goldwater and lambasted what he called the 'pseudoconservatisrri'
defended by both the candidate himself and the men around National Review. 117 Hofstadter
argued that the American conservative movement, as a whole, belonged to a particular form
of radical grassroots politics which he labelled 'the paranoid style' and which was, as one
might guess from the name, both dangerous and squarely outside the politically sane, let
alone the politically acceptable. In his devastating 1964 tract 'Goldwater and Pseudo-
Conservative Politics', Hofstadter articulated the arguments that had been plaguing
respectable conservatives for the best part of the previous half decade.118
And Hofstadter was by no means alone. His views were essentially part of the thesis
then put forth by Daniel Bell and other liberal intellectuals of the 1950s, which persuasively
concluded that McCarthyism and grassroots right-wing protest were a consequence of the
'status anxiety' suffered by the traditional middle classes and blue-collar workers at a time of
affluence and, more specifically, of enhanced upward social mobility.l" Less persuasively,
Hofstadter, and (implicitly) Bell's group also, argued that post-war American conservatism
was most clearly and best represented by the radical right in general, and certain groups in
particular. Of these - as Hofstadter's essays nicely reflected - during the first half of the
1960s the John Birch Society was the best known and most difficult to deal with from the
perspective of the 'respectable' right. Named after a US Air Force officer who happened to
have been an evangelical Christian and had suffered death at the hands of Chinese
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communists, the society was created in 1958 by a former candy manufacturer named Robert
Welch and operated through local chapters. In its heyday during the early to mid 1960s, its
membership rose to tens of thousands (more precise estimates varied considerably between
20,000 and 60,000 members) on a nationwide scale, and the society managed to exert
sizeable influence in the South and West of the nation where, according to William F.
Buckley, 'for a season or two ... joining the John Birch Society was on the order of joining
the local country club' .120 Most notoriously, Californians even sent two representatives who
openly admitted membership of the JBS to Congress and several to Sacramento. The Society
set up reading rooms for its members and achieved national notoriety through various
'writing in' and publicity campaigns aimed at objectives as varied as the cessation of trade
with the Eastern bloc (which succeeded in forcing some of the major US retailers targeted by
the campaign to withdraw products), and the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren
(which succeeded in earning the Society both considerable free publicity and great
ridiculer.':" Lending weight to Hofstadter's contention, the JBS's views displayed
considerable continuity with McCarthyism - particularly the shared, strident (and deluded)
obsession with communist infiltration of the federal government and the treacherous
behaviour of senior federal officials - and were broadly aligned with the religious and free-
market-leaning instincts of respectable conservatism.l/'' However, Hoftstadter overlooked the
rather herculean, and eventually widely publicised, efforts of the men around National
Review to first put some distance between themselves and the JBS, and subsequently to
completely excommunicate the society from the mainstream conservative movement.
As the JBS brochures made amply clear, Robert Welch had been a senior member of
the National Association of Manufactures and had received his education from Harvard Law
School and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Well-educated and well-connected, the head of
the JBS enjoyed an extensive social network within the circles of highbrow conservatism.
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This included a minority stake in National Review, and a warm relation with Buckley himself
whom, obviously grateful for the modest support that Welch had lent the nascent magazine,
declared himself initially 'delighted' at the foundation of the JBS, and even went on to offer
Welch 'a little publicity' for his society in NR. 123 Moreover, the initially inoffensive
educational activities of the JBS, combined with its unequivocal anti-communism,
commanded not merely the respect, but the active collaboration of prominent conservative
leaders such as Dean Manion - also famous as an anticommunist proselytiser - Barry
Goldwater and a number of his 1964 staffers, as well as Buckley himself and fellow NR
editor Brent Bozell.I24
Such a cosy state of affairs came to an abrupt end as soon as Welch circulated (privately
at first) the manuscript of a tract entitled The Politician, which denounced Dwight
Eisenhower as a 'conscious and dedicated agent of the communist conspiracy' in cahoots
with his brother and his administration's secretaries of state and defence as well as, obviously
enough, Moscow. Inevitably, Welch's colourful assessment eventually found its way into the
daily newspapers where, in principle, it should have remained yet another outburst from what
William Rusher described as the 'loony right' and Russell Kirk the 'fantastics': enough to
discomfit highbrow conservatives, 'but ultimately inconsequential. Except the society was
actually relatively important in numerical and publicity terms; National Review could not
bring itself to quickly and unequivocally disavow the JBS; the press also found out and
publicised the very extensive links between the society and other respectable conservative
outfits; and conservatives were indeed acquiring enough political muscle to make such
revelations persistently attractive front-page news as Richard Nixon in 1962, Barry
Goldwater in 1964 and Ronald Reagan in 1966 were to find out, at their own expense.
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At a primary level, NR did not instantly denounce Welch's delusions out of the same
kind of solidarity towards anyone or anything that might be offensive towards American
liberalism that propelled it to attempt a defence of Joe McCarthy. In the latter case, Buckley
had recognised the senator's 'gratuitous sensationalism', as well as his 'outrageous',
'censurable' and 'reprehensible' conduct, but still insisted in emphasising that the red menace
was real, and doubted the motivations of liberals' 'slander,.125 In 1961, after The Politician
became a nation-wide headline, Buckley wrote a special lengthy editorial dealing with
Welch, in which he noted that 'every issue of National Review stresses a different analysis
[from Welch's] of the causes of our difficulties', and that these differences moreover, were
'very grave indeed', even 'critical'. Yet Buckley arrived at this point only after emphasising
that the interest of the press in the JBS reflected the fact that 'the liberals, and to the extent
their programs coincide with the Communists, feel threatened by the revived opposition'
from conservatives. In case of doubt, Buckley also lambasted 'certain elements of the press
[which] are opportunizing on the mistaken conclusions of Robert Welch to anathemize the
entire American Right Wing' .126 Of course, it was essentially correct that 'liberals' generally
felt threatened by growing conservative strength, as was the fact that 'liberals' in the press
were all too happy to ridicule their political adversaries. Buckley however, failed to mention
that Welch's statements and analyses were actually positively slanderous, as well as
ridiculous. In fact, National Review put out such a soft rebuke that Welch actually thanked
him for the piece and for the general 'encouragement ... to go ahead and help form more
chapters of the John Birch Society' .127' Moreover, the chief editor of National Review also
went on to stress the difference between Welch himself, whose viewpoints were declared
false, and the JBS as an organisation. According to Buckley, he had 'never met a single
member who declared himself in agreement with certain of Mr. Welch's conclusions', and
therefore assumed that 'the overwhelming majority of the members of the Birch Society were
never aware' of their leader's opinions. After absolving the Birchers, Buckley concluded by
125 As quoted in Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 98-99.
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stating, rather equivocally, that 'I hope it [the JBS] thrives, provided, of course, it resists such
false assumptions as that a man's subjective motives can automatically be deduced from the
objective consequences of its acts' .128 And Buckley was merely reflecting a feeling that
trickled down the conservative lines. Dean Manion, for instance, refused to resign from the
society because 'he could not, as a matter of temperament, retreat under fire'. Frank Meyer
on his part believed that NR's role as 'the conscience of American conservatism' forced them
to 'come to the defence' of the JBS (and Welch) 'for civil libertarian reasons and to protect
the right-wing from continuing attack from the state' in general and Bobby Kennedy in
particular.V"
Yet despite the depth of conservative solidarity and his aversion to attacking a personal
acquaintance, Buckley's hesitation is particularly surprising given that he had already put
some distance between NR and the JBS. He requested and received a copy of The Politician
in 1958, and subsequently engaged in a rather frank (but private) correspondence with Welch
himself and a JBS supporter named Cap Beezley along basically the same lines that he would
later publish in the NR cditorial.l'" Publicly, the NR had already disagreed with Welch's
contention that Boris Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago was part and parcel of the communist
conspiracy through an article written by Reader's Digest editor and old-time anticommunist
Eugene Lyons.l" Moreover, the journal was under pressure from high-minded
anticommunist conservatives who, like free-marketeer and academic Tibor R. Machan,
thought that 'conservative efforts are finding themselves hindered by some so-called 'ultra-
rightish' forces', and that 'remembering Senator McCarthy's fate we should have learned by
now,.132 Even Buckley himself needed no reminding. In March 1961, he confidentially
admitted to Goldwater that Welch was 'nuts on the Eisenhower-Dulles issue', and confided
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his fears that 'he [Welch] will do our cause much damage' .133 Thus, the men around NR knew
the risks of Welch's excesses and, beyond instinctive solidarity with fellow right-wingers
under attack, other considerations weighed at least as heavily in their minds to counsel
restraint.
Firstly, as a friendly correspondent took pains to emphasise to Buckley, there was a
'long list' of JBS collaborators who also happened to be directly linked with NR, including at
least three names which appeared on the magazines masthead: that of millionaire
conservative patron Seth Milliken, one of the main benefactors of the Review, as well as
those of occasional collaborators and good friends of the journal Clarence Manion and
Spruille Braden. As might be expected, the writer noted 'what a mistake that book was', but
still advised that 'if NR does have to speak ever, it should not be in the present climate of
"smear" .134 Along similar lines, Frank Meyer advised his colleagues that the journal 'must in
one way or another dissociate itself from the JBS, but also bear in mind that 'some of the
solidest conservatives in the country are members of the John Birch society'. Thus NR ought
to 'act in such a way as to alienate them no more than is strictly necessary from a moral,
political and tactical point of view'. Meyer was painfully conscious that, to fulfil its moral
role, the journal also had 'to continue to exist and exert influence', and emphasised that
'whatever we do must be carefully thought out so that we do the most good and the least
harm'. 135 As it turned out, Buckley's editorial came out in the same issue that also reminded
National Review's readers of the journal's annual fund drive (an event which happened to be
vital to the survival of the magazine). Meyer, like the rest of the contributors, must have been
aWare of the difficulties that the previous excommunication of fellow right-wingers - that of
the American Mercury - had inflicted upon the magazine in the form of cancelled
subscriptions. The same would happen again, except the JBS had a considerably larger
membership than the Mercury had had readers (or indeed had NR itself), and that that
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membership was entirely made up of natural National Review readers.l " Two weeks after the
editorial saw the light, William Rusher counted up to 150 cancelled subscriptions but warned
the editors that 'a very great many' readers were 'holding on to their subscriptions for the
moment' but 'putting us on a sort of probation'v'Y Caution, it seems therefore, was entirely
justified.
By January 1962, as Meyer had predicted, Goldwater's presidential hopes were
becoming increasingly plausible and the JBS affair, which kept attaching itself to the senator,
was increasingly an embarrassment. In the end a gathering of conservative leaders (including
Goldwater and Buckley themselves as well as William J. Baroody Sf. of the American
Enterprise Institute and a number of Goldwater staffers) decided it was time to rid the
conservative movement of Welch's embarrassing delusions.l " It was too late. As might be
seen from the work of a serious observer such as Richard Hofstadter, the JBS matter lingered
on as a highly damaging issue during the election, and indeed did inflict considerable damage
to the short-term growth of political conservatism. Yet when the eventual, definitive
repudiation of the JBS came around the pain was serious and sustained. William Rusher
noted that 'renewal figures' following the blow against the Society suggested the Review had
managed to 'alienate ... a large part of the American Right on which we had been battening'.
National Review's publisher felt that 'quite a substantial fraction of our readership has bled
away' and that, after attacking Welch, the journal had probably reached its 'upper limit of
readership'. Painfully enough, Rusher believed that the JBS' journal American Opinion had
replaced NR as 'the bible' of a significant portion of the American right.139 The reaction was
so stunning that it even surpassed the Buckleyites predictions and drove Buckley to, again,
hesitate and ponder whether the repudiation of the JBS had not been 'too severe' .140
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To be sure, the reaction from supporters of the JBS was perfectly understandable and
entirely predictable. Unlike in 1961, this second time National Review did not draw any
distinction between Welch and his organisation. In quick succession the Review, Barry
Goldwater and Russell Kirk - the former on the widely seen TV show Meet the Press, the
latter from the pages of the Catholic journal America - demanded the resignation of Welch
from the JBS or the resignation of its members. Kirk associated Welch with 'freaks,
charlatans, profiteers and foolish enthusiasts', as well as with 'political silliness'. More
importantly, in the process he also trumpeted Goldwater's denunciation as 'the beginning,
probably, of a general effort by enlightened American conservatives to reform or else cast off
the political fantastics who have been clinging to their coattails' among which, besides the
JBS were also to be counted other notorious (and embarrassing) right-wing activists such as
Dan Smoot and Kent and Phoebe Courtney.l'" After so much hesitation and caution, NR
conservatives still could not avoid the wrath of Welch and his supporters, but nonetheless
managed to fail miserably in their enterprise of modifying mainstream and liberal opinion:
the antics of Robert Welch did indeed seriously hamper, at least in the short term, the hopes
of those politicians associated with conservatism.
In 1964 the Democrats made sure that Goldwater's equivocal stands towards the JBS in
1961 were given considerably more publicity than his full repudiation in 1962, which
effectively contributed to the magnitude of the electoral debacle. Prior to that, the tardy and
weak conservative response to Robert Welch's claims also generated considerable problems
for Richard Nixon, then running for governor of California. 142 To be sure, at first Nixon had
few of the qualms over which the men of National Review agonised. Back in the early 1950s,
unlike his imitator Joe McCarthy (and McCarthy's collaborators such as Bozell and
Buckley), Nixon sensed soon enough the limits of the red-scare, of its accompanying populist
strategy and of conservative strength within (even more so without) the GOP. During the
1952 primaries, he allied himself with Eisenhower's brand of eastern republicanism and
141 Russell Kirk, 'Conservatives and Fantastics', America, February 17, 1962, pp. 643-645, p. 643. For an overview of
p,0pulist anticommunism during the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Diamond, Roads to Dominion, pp.51-52, 58.
42 Perlstein, Nixon/and, pp. '117-18,438--40.
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against Robert Taft, the conservative champion. Subsequently, Nixon moved away from the
folksy, populist anticommunism of his Capitol days, while desperately attempting to
repackage himself for the first time (it would not be the last) as a 'New Nixon': statesman-
like, moderated and above everything, presidential. In 1962 it was only natural that he would
repeatedly and vociferously repudiate the John Birch Society. Alas, 'New Nixon' or not, he
still remained a standard-bearer for anti communists determined to root out traitors from
government, and was still seen by the general public (however vaguely) as somewhat to the
right. Therefore the California press corps, not to mention Governor Pat Brown, kept asking
the Republican candidate about the John Birch Society - hence doing him no favours among
moderate and conservative-to-moderate voters. At the same time, every denial cost Nixon -
as happened to the National Review editors - greater resentment from a hard-right that in
California was, to an inordinate extent, made up of members of the John Birch Society.
Among senior California Republicans, Nixon lost the support of Congressman John
Rousselot, which could have helped to heal the wounds of the bruising primaries and to
mobilise right-wing activists for the Nixon gubernatorial candidacy. Even Ronald Reagan,
then a rising star and much sought-after conservative speaker, was careful to keep a low
profile and as much distance as possible from the troubled Nixon candidacy. It is obviously
absurd to account for Nixon's defeat' based only on the JBS issue, but disturbances on the far-
right that forced impossible choices upon candidates facing close elections definitely
contributed to the transformation of Nixon's initially comfortable lead into a five per cent
majority for Pat Brown. Nixon, for one, fully realised in 1962 that Republicans just could not
win without the party's right. With the experience of 1962 behind him, and the realities of
delegate arithmetic for the 1968 convention ahead, Richard Nixon turned right. On their part,
conservatives after 1964 also realised that the faithful could not win general elections as long
as their candidates could be associated with extremist movements. Some of those
conservatives would subsequently be readier than ever to rally behind a candidate who, if not
ideologically immaculate, could be a plausible winner. If strict constructionism of the
conservative gospel was too much for the electorate maybe a loyal Republican - one who,
say, had soldiered on for Goldwater - would do. As conservatives looked around while 1964
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became 1965, there was only one such hopeful in sight. It would seem that, no matter what
Richard Nixon or conservatives did, their fortunes remained firmly tied to one other's.
CONCLUSION
During the 1950s, conservatives managed to make their challenge to the political
consensus built by Franklin D. Roosevelt both more acceptable and more respectable. They
offered the electorate a set of values according to which government, the left, and certain
elements of the media and the education establishment bore the main responsibility for the
problems of the nation. In the process, conservatism also articulated an alternative vision of
the good, traditional, American citizen that fully coincided with that peddled by emerging
Republicans such as Richard Nixon: the self-reliant, traditionally minded individual. The
ultimate repudiation of the John Birch Society, like the excommunication of the American
Mercury, eventually helped to dissociate respectable conservatism from the less savoury
elements of the far right. By the beginning of 1965, the men around National Review had
finally managed to establish what, exactly, constituted' good conservatism'. The JBS, like the
Mercury, eventually fell into obscurity and irrelevance, while its attacks on the Buckleyites -
Eugene Lyons for instance would find himself accused of collaboration with the worldwide
communist plot under the guidance of David Dubinsky, then president of the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union - merely enhanced the former's shaky position within the
political mainstream.if National Review continued on, strengthened, as American
conservatism's intellectual centre of gravity. In 1962 and 1964 the Democrats could easily
pin the label of 'extremist' on any given candidate associated with conservatism. In 1968
such a tactic was not seriously attempted against their Republican foes.
143 Victor Lasky, 'Asks Birchites for Disavowal. Pioneer Anti-Red Gene Lyons Stunned by Pegler Broadside', May
21, 1963, f. 5, box 1, Eugene Lyons papers, Hoover Institution, Palo Alto CA.
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Divisions within the conservative grassroots persisted, but in the run up to the 1968
presidential campaign conservatives were both more united than ever before behind the GOP,
and in control of the basic levers of the Republican party's grassroots machinery.
Simultaneously, the Buckleyites had also managed to construct an embryonic network of
organisations centred around the Republican pressure group American Conservative Union
(ACU), the youth organisation Young Americans for Freedom and the splinter Conservative
Party of New York State.144 Through the magazine itself and the increasing muscle of this
organisational network, the Review's senior editors could and did claim virtually
unchallenged ideological control, and as much overall capacity for political direction as could
be reasonably expected in a diverse and fast-growing movement made up of highly
opinionated and independent-minded activists. This success was partly the result of a
conscious attempt at building up a reasonably cohesive movement, and partly the outcome of
prudence and a remarkable determination to not offend any given family of the movement,
including its 'crackpot' wing, beyond the strictly necessary. In a sense the material needs of a
journal that actually suffered from cancelled subscriptions - hence the cautious behaviour of
its senior staff - helped the NR circle built its influence. That said, from the mid-1960s
onwards no conservative politician or activist in possession of an instinct for self-preservation
would choose to ignore, much less openly defy, the National Review. Needless to say, ifthere
was one virtuoso in the art of political survival in mid-century America that was surely
Richard Nixon. Although he may have been second to none in terms of political opportunism,
Nixon's political outlook, political message and, for what they were worth, his actual
ideological instincts (one hesitates to speak of 'convictions') on issues such as the red scare,
ethics or even economics always remained strong positive forces driving him towards the
conservative camp - or at least, they did so as long as this did not conflict with his electoral
interests. Besides, as a close look at conservatives reveals, the most ideologically committed
Savonarolas of the right - such as Burnham, Meyer and Bozell - could also be found engaged
in some opportunism of their own, not infrequently in support, reluctant as it may have been,
144 S L' b .'ee ie man, Coming Out Conservative.
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of a certain politician from Yorba Linda with a near-unfailing knack of spotting the direction
of the political wind.
After the 1964 debacle Richard Nixon, still remembered by many as the first hero of the
common American against the depredations of big government, surfaced as the sole
presidential and loyal Republican that all conservatives could stomach and a few could even
like. Once and again, frequently to both Nixon's and conservatives' chagrin, they found
themselves catering to the same conservative and moderate-to-conservative constituency both
within the GOP's party structure and its corps of grassroots supporters, as well as within the
electorate at large. Both parties believed themselves to be under attack from the same foes -
led by the national press corps who had allegedly ruined Nixon's electoral chances in 1960
and 1962 and savaged Barry Goldwater in 1964. During his ill-fated campaign for the
governorship of California, Nixon experienced for the first time, the result of determined,
well-coordinated and widespread conservative opposition in an actual electoral contest.
Subsequently a horrified Nixon ensured that the first would also be the last instance. To the
end of his political career, Nixon was willing to endure a degree of hostility from the right-
wing intelligentsia in order to increase his overall electoral appeal, but would never again risk
seriously displeasing conservative political activists. On the other hand, for twenty years
conservatives could not bring themselves to inflict upon Nixon the same sort of sustained,
ruthless attacks they administered to Rockefeller, John Lindsay, Dwight Eisenhower and
virtually every other Republican candidate to left of Strom Thurmond (as well as some who
were on his right). During all those years Richard Nixon translated into electoral politics the
right's contentions about the (populist) true soul of the nation and the nature of its
adversaries. After 1964, it was only natural that Richard Nixon, always the good Republican,
would seek the support of all those good conservatives busily redeeming the GOP
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CHAPTER2
THE 1968 ELECTION AND THE NORTHERNISATION OF SOUTHERN
CONSERVATISM
The readjustment of the relationship between the White House and conservative
Southern politicians between 1968 and 1973 was a central novelty of the Nixon
administration. Until relatively recently, however, historians have preferred to focus instead
on South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond's shift to the Republican party in 1964, and the
subsequent emergence of the 'Sunbelt South' during the 1980s.1 Nixon, sandwiched in
between these two explosions of conservative strength and Southern change, rarely receives
much attention as an instrument of the conservative movement beyond the crucial role played
by certain Southern Republican politicians during the 1968 national Republican convention.r
Yet it has never been doubted that Nixon's selection as Republican candidate in 1968 was a
direct consequence of his ability to unite the party behind a moderate candidate acceptable to
all factions within the GOp.3 As was widely acknowledged during the election and its
immediate aftermath, he accomplished this partly by steering to the right, and thereby
acknowledging and furthering the weakening of the liberal wing of the Republican party.
Another phenomenon of equal importance, but less noticed at the time, was that Southerners
did more than merely propel executive rhetoric and policy to the right. They also showed
considerable flexibility and allowed Nixon to accommodate certain liberal Republican
demands in order to preserve party unity in the election and the appeal to moderate voters.
I For two exceptions see Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004) and Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America
(London: Scribner, 2008).
2 See for instance Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 641-43;
Gillian Peele, Revival and Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Matthew
Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turn in American Politics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000); Earl and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 2002); Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right Wing Movements and Political Power in the
United States (New York: Guilford Press, 1995),
3 See for instance 'The Best Republican for 19(;8', Esquire, March 1966; 'Nixon Blueprints Policy Views for 1968',
Christian Science Monitor, August 22,1967.
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Although the crucial impact of the nse of Southern conservatism within the
conservative movement, and Richard Nixon's central role in the consolidation of these
Southerners within national politics, have long been acknowledged, the impact of Nixon's
southern policy as a fundamental element in the growth of conservative influence in the
national politics of the United States has largely been downplayed. Scholars and conservative
activists are quite right to emphasise that the Nixon administration was not conservative in
the sense that the Goldwater candidacy of 1964 was conservative.4 Most certainly, even
though Nixon hoped to oversee a number of significant changes over the practices of post-
war executives, he never proposed a sudden break with the existing social-democratic status
quo comparable to that which had been self-consciously championed by Barry Goldwater.
But then, Richard Nixon actually wanted to be president. He understood that, even under
increasing strain, the United States as a polity was not prepared for outright and radical
rejection of either familiar social-democratic governmental practices or of the basic
assumptions supporting them. Yet, significant aspects of his administration's political
behaviour made crucial contributions to the consolidation of an emerging new conservatism
as a respectable contender for power. This chapter argues that in fact Nixon's behaviour as
presidential candidate and president played a fundamental role in aiding the increasingly
pragmatic Southern conservatives to move from being the marginalised representatives of
reaction to becoming a major force in the national arena. Part one examines the composition
of the main political groups within Southern politics during the 1960s, their relative strengths
and their relations with the national political parties and the federal government; part two
analyses the behaviour of Southern Republicans during the 1968, and part three the impact of
that campaign upon the national political theatre during the subsequent presidential election
campaign and Nixon's administration. Finally, part four assesses the effect of these
4 On the Southern-friendly elements of the Goldwater strategy see Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right S~de
Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), p. 108; Lisa Mcfiirr,
Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 184-
85; Nicole C. Rae, Southern Democrats (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.19, 42-43; Black, Rise of
Southern Republicans, p. 33; Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm, Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American
Consensus (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), p. 334; Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man WhoMade the
Revolution (Washington DC:'Regnery, 1993), p. 233.
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developments upon the relationship between the Southerners and the National Review
conservatives.
1. SOUTHERNERS, REPUBLICANS, AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
In modem American politics, 'the South' is usually understood to represent the eleven
states that seceded from the Union in 1860-61, plus Oklahoma, Kentucky, and sometimes
other 'border states' such as Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia.' By the 1960s, the
meaning of the South had begun to merge with a different label, that of the 'Sunbelt', which
would expand the group to include Southwestern states such as Arizona and New Mexico
which were then experiencing similar socio-economic changes and emerging as an economic
powerhouse vying for influence with the declining industrial centres of the North and
Northeast. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, most observers still associated
the South with the former Confederacy. Since the end of Reconstruction, the single most
important characteristic of Southern politics had been its one-party quality. For most white
Southerners the GOP remained the party of Lincoln and 'Northern aggression', and
consequently, electoral politics gravitated around Democratic primaries followed by elections
with only token or no Republican participation at all. In national politics, these elected
officials acted as a cohesive and distinct group, providing mutual support based on common
electoral needs: above all ensuring re-erection by showing effective opposition to the civil
rights initiatives pushed by the federal (mostly Democratic) authorities. In the public mind,
Southern conservatism had been headed since the end of World War II by Strom Thurmond,
the senator from South Carolina who, out of opposition to the national Democratic party's
support for civil rights legislation, led the 'Dixiecrat' Southern Democrats away from the
national party to run as an independent segregationist candidate in 1948, and left the party for
good in 1964. However, these Southerners should be divided into at least two different
5 The former Confederacy consisted of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North and South Carolina,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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categories. From 1964 onwards an increasingly large segment of Southern political activists
and elected officials operated as 'Southern Republicans', and after 1968 would either work
within the Nixon administration or were particularly close to it. Secondly, the 'Southern bloc'
was a slightly different, larger, but overlapping category that included Southern conservatives
within and without Congress regardless of party affiliation. Thus, a smaller but growing
group was made up by men like Senator Strom Thurmond himself; Senator John Tower
(Texas) and Edward J. Gurney (Florida), who had either moved to the GOP or had been
elected as Republicans. Yet most Southern conservatives, including some very prominent and
influential members of the congressional Southern bloc such as Senator Richard Russell
(Georgia), Harry F. Byrd (Virginia), Robert Byrd (West Virginia), John Stennis and James
Eastland (Mississippi) and John McClellan (Arkansas) remained firmly within the
Democratic fold. Partisan lines notwithstanding, the Southern bloc continued, however, to
operate in much the same cohesive form as Richard Nixon entered the White House.
To be sure, it should not be automatically assumed that Southern politicians of either
party conformed to the conservative mould except perhaps on the race issue, and even in
racial matters, from the mid-1960s onwards both Republicans and Democrats tended to veer
towards more liberal positions. For instance, in 1966 the Republicans managed to capture, for
the first time in a century, two gubernatorial seats below the Mason-Dixon Line, but neither
Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas nor Claude Kirk in Florida could be considered as
conservatives and, regarding civil rights, Rockefeller quietly desegregated Arkansas' schools,
while Kirk ran a relatively liberal first campaign and behaved as a somewhat liberal governor
until his second race (which he lost). Howard Baker Jr., who became Republican senator
from Tennessee may have been a fiscal conservative, but he was also a raciallibera1.6 As for
Southern Democrats, men such as Arkansas Senator William Fulbright and Georgia's
Richard Russell (a man respected by both conservatives and Nixon himself) supported
6 Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of1968
(New York: Viking Press, 1969), p.l88; Black, Rise of Southern Republicans. pp. 93-94; Randy Sanders, 'Rassling a
Governor: Defiance, Desegregation, Claude Kirk, and the Politics of Richard Nixon's Southern Strategy', Florida
Historical Quarterly, 80, no. 3 (2002), pp. 357-58.
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Lyndon Johnson's liberal initiatives, with the conspicuous exception of civil rights legislation
- again a position which Fulbright subsequently moved away from. Similarly, there were
limits to the willingness of the Southern Democrats to cross partisan lines. From his position
in Nixon's Justice Department, Richard Kleindienst observed that, notwithstanding his
support for certain presidential initiatives, Mississippi's Senator James Eastland continued to
maintain Democratic discipline. Most conspicuously, North Carolina's Senator Sam Ervin
would become a prime actor in Nixon's impeachment in his capacity as chairman of the
Senate's Watergate committee.
But in broad terms, Southern Democrats and their conservative Republican counterparts
from both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line had been routinely forming ad hoc coalitions
generally (and correctly) regarded as 'conservative'. The success of this alliance rested on
certain shared political views - particularly, but not exclusively, in the field of civil rights. A
common, generally conservative outlook had helped Southern Democrats to routinely
coalesce with congressional Republicans against liberal policies since the 1930s, be they New
Deal reforms such as the Farm Security Administration and the President's Committee on
Fair Employment Practice, or anti-labour measures such as the Smith-Connally Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act, as well as Harry Truman's civil rights initiatives. Not surprisingly then, the
conservative weekly National Review was not averse to lending its support to Southern
Democrats and their views.' On the eve of Richard Nixon's 1968 victory, the Republican
Battle Line, another organ of Buckleyite conservatism published by the American
Conservative Union, fervently hoped for a consolidation of the 'Republican-Southern
Democratic coalition that has operated so effectively in the past to stop the passage of more
radical Democrat legislation'. 8 As Richard Nixon's political travails worsened in 1973 and
1974, the administration would continue to bank on the loyalty of Southern Democrats as
7 . . •
Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980:. The Story of the South's Modernization (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1995), p. 80; Black, Rise of Southern Republicans, p. 32; 'Voice of the South', National
Review, July 27, 1957 (hereafter NR); 'As the South Sees It', ibid., February, 13 1960; 'The South's Travail' National
Review Bulletin, March 19 1960.
8 'The Conservative Coalition', The Republican Battle Line, March 1967; Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York:
Viking Press, 1977), p. 320..
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much as - and sometimes more than - that of even the conservative members of the
president's own party.
Perhaps most importantly, this Congressional coalition and the influence of Southern
delegates in Washington generally rested on the remarkable adroitness with which Southern
Democrats used the congressional seniority system to capture power-brokering positions in
key committees. Of sixteen Senate committees in 1963, Southern Democrats chaired ten and
were ranking members of another two." The powerful House Committee on Appropriations
was chaired by a Southern Democrat from 1955 to 1993, including Texas's George H.
Mahon, a reliable Nixon supporter, between 1964 and 1979; the Senate Appropriations
Committee was chaired by a Southern Democrat between 1969 and 1977, and by Senator
John McLellan, another dependable source of support for Nixon, between 1972 and 1977. A
further Nixon-friendly Southern Representative, Arkansas' Wilbur Mills, chaired the
powerful House Committee on Ways and Means between 1957 and 1976. Finally, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary was chaired by Mississippi's James O. Eastland, who was to
become another steadfast ally of the president, from 1956 to 1978. From that position,
Eastland proceeded, according to a friendly Attorney General, to hijack the theoretically
presidential prerogative of proposing judicial appointees to federal tribunals other than the
Supreme Court.IO Right-wing Southerners were a crucial congressional force for any
president, and as Richard Nixon moved into the White House facing a Democratic-controlled
Congress, courting such a lever to compensate for the Republican's minority status become a
priority. In fact, the administration consistently attempted to attract conservative (mostly
Southern) Democrats into the fold of either the Republican party or into an entirely new
political organisation. As part of this strategy, Nixon would court prominent Democrats such
as former Johnson staffer Daniel Patrick Moynihan in an effort that crystallised with John
Connally's appointment as Treasury Secretary, and culminated with a 1971 attempt to
orchestrate the formalisation of an en masse defection of congressional Southern Democrats
9 James Jackson Kilpatrick, 'Crossroads at Dixie', NR, November 19, 1963.
10 Richard Kleindienst, Justice (Ottawa IL: Jameson Books, 1985), pp. 125-26.
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to the Republican party. II Although Watergate and the thorny issue of re-adjusting seniority
prevented these White House schemes from succeeding, the administration was still quite
successful at retaining Southern support.
That relationship was buttressed by a certain degree of philosophical agreement, or at
least the image of it, projected by the White House,. John Ehrlichman, Nixon's chief
domestic advisor, believed that 'in fact,' the president 'felt closer' in ideological terms to
certain Southern Democrats such as senators John Stennis and Russell Long than to liberal
Republicans, certainly to those prone to displays of dovish instincts towards the Vietnam
war.12 In a similar vein, Harry Dent, the White House's liaison with the South, believed that
Nixon not only 'understood' the concerns of Southern conservatives, but also 'shared in them
considerably' .13 Raymond Price, a Nixon loyalist and a relatively liberal northerner who
worked as a senior White House speech writer, also reminisced about Nixon's genuine 'deep
resentment' of the 'Northern attitude' towards the South, and about the president's sincere
admiration for certain aspects of Southern politics and Southern conservatism.!" Just in case
that did not suffice - and much to the delight of Southerners on Capitol Hill - Nixon
maintained a clear line of communication between the White House and its Southern base of
support in Congress. The president appointed Bryce Harlow, a conservative Oklahoman well
known among the White House staff for being 'opposed to desegregation in all its aspects', as
the White House congressional liaison. William Timmons, formerly from the staff of
Tennessee congressman Bill Brock, became Harlow's assistant.P Nixon's feelings towards
conservative Southerners seem to have been reciprocated. The conservative newspaper Battle
Line certainly believed that Southern Democrats would be a crucial element of support for the
Nixon White House, and subsequent developments tend to support such views. John
Ehrlichman, for one, estimated that between 1970 and 1972 eighteen Southern Democratic
congressmen and eight senators voted for presidential policies at least 80 per cent of time,
II Hodgson, World Turned Right Side Up, pp. 125-27; Mason, Quest/or a New Majority, pp. 129-31.
12 John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 202.
13 Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power (New York: Wiley, 1978), pp. 68. 69.
14 Price, With Nixon, pp. 120.21.
15 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 224.
80
thus compensating for an equal number of Republican congressmen and nine Republican
senators who supported the White House in less than half of congressional votes.l"
If the strength of Southern Democrats within the legislative branch was a major reason
for Nixon's courtship of the South, the key factor was the matter of his own electoral
prospects. Since the 1930s, the Democratic party had won all but two presidential contests,
and those two when the Republican ticket was headed by Dwight Eisenhower, a national hero
who also happened to have been born in Texas. This dominance had been based on a broad
electoral coalition in which the solidly Democratic South was a central plank. However,
conservative Southern Democrats had been threatening 'a revolt from national party policies'
and to 'destroy the party in the South' since the late 1930s.17 Conversely, Southern
Republican inroads in presidential elections had begun under Eisenhower, who in 1952
capitalised on the growing tension between Southern conservatives and national liberal
Democrats to capture Florida, Tennessee, Texas, Oklahoma and Virginia. After the General's
victory, the Republican National Committee attempted, for the first time, to seriously
challenge the Democratic juggernaut and to establish a permanent Republican foothold by
organizing an aptly named 'Operation Dixie' to reorganise and consolidate the party below
the Mason-Dixon Line.18 Eight years later, conservatives were already explaining the
relatively strong showing of Nixon in that region because 'a new generation in the South is
seeking an alternative to the Democratic party dominated by radicals and liberals'. 19 In 1961,
John Tower seemed to confirm such speculation when he won Texas's senatorial race and
became the first Southern Republican senator in a century. To a large extent, it was
Eisenhower's strategy that had precipitated Thurmond's defection to the GOP in 1964, and
Goldwater's subsequent strong showing in the Old Confederacy. 20 Goldwater, however,
added a slight improvement to the GOP's electoral efficiency in the South. During the 1950s
and early 1960s, Southern Republicans had tended to appeal to an expanding, urban,
16 'The Conservative Coalition', Battle Line, March 1967; Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 202.
I? Bartley, New South, p. 80; Black, Rise of Southern Republicans, p. 32.
18 Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 187 88.
19 Raymond Moley, 'Why the South Resists the GOP', Human Events, February 3, 1961 (hereafter HE).
20 Bartley, New South, pp. 101 102.
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upwardly-mobile segment of the white electorate which was attracted to a relatively moderate
(for Southern white standards) stance on the race matter. In 1964 that state of affairs began to
change.
By the mid-1960s the tensions between the liberal, pro-civil rights national Democrats
and their Southern brethren were obvious enough. Conservative observers in particular
wondered rather loudly whether 'the demands of the Negro minority' would 'have the effect
of breaking up' the Democratic electoral coalition, or at least of reducing it 'to the point
where it can no longer command an effective mejority'<' Barry Goldwater and certain right-
wing Republicans clearly thought so. The 1964 Republican presidential candidate told his
fellow Republicans to 'go hunting where the ducks are', and proceeded to shift the party's
racial stand in order to exploit the prejudices of Southern whites. Among the earlier
symptoms of the re-adjustment to the right of Republican's Southern strategy was the intense
courtship of both Strom Thurmond and George Wallace, the rabidly segregationist governor
of Alabama, with the aim of pulling both away from the Democratic party and into the
Republican ranks. This strategy was directed by Roger Milliken, a wealthy South Carolinian
textile manufacturer who doubled as South Carolina's GOP finance chairman, Goldwater
man, main financial backer of Strom Thurmond (then a Democrat), and benefactor of
conservative causes everywhere.f Wallace never became a Republican, but shortly after
Goldwater's nomination, Thurmond changed parties and joined John Tower as the second
Republican senator from the South. Goldwater for his part, went on to win Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina for the Republican ticket. These successes
notwithstanding, he also managed to produce the worst presidential defeat in American
history, losing in every other state except (barely) his native Arizona.
From the viewpoint of Southern Republicanism, the election of 1964 was determinant
for 1968 on two accounts. Firstly, Republican convention rules rewarded states with strong
21 William F. Buckley, 'The Race Issue and the Campaign', NR, September 22,1964, p. 813.
22 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 657; Jody Carlson, George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness (New
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), p. 44; Perlstein, Before the Storm, p. 431.
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results in the previous election. Goldwater's success in the South and his disastrous showing
elsewhere reinforced the Southerners' voting strength in the 1968 convention to 356
delegates, making for 26.7 per cent of all votes, or about half the total number of delegates
needed to win the nomination. The Goldwater debacle was sufficiently bad to force the party
to alter the rules governing its National Committee so as to include all state chairmen,
because originally only those states which had produced a congressional win or a presidential
majority were eligible for representation. Applying these rules would have resulted in a
drastic and somewhat surreal shift: a virtually all-Southern National Committee in a party
with virtually no elected officials in the South.23 Moreover, the Southern delegations' ability
to co-ordinate efforts under an informal unity-rule agreement forced any serious candidate in
the 1968 primaries to, at the very least, reach some form of accommodation. Secondly,
Goldwater may have carried the South; but he did so at the cost of delivering a crushing
defeat for his party. Dragged down by its presidential candidate, the GOP lost three senators
(partly compensated with a win in California) and 36 Representatives. In 1966, even Ronald
Reagan - universally seen as Goldwater's heir - politely asked the Arizonan to stay away
from his California gubernatorial race. The sobering effect of the 1964 election, and the
subsequent impulse provided by the Johnson administration's civil rights and welfare policies
cannot be overstated. In 1968, Southern Republicans were determined to back a candidate
who could plausibly reach the White House, contribute to a congressional Republican
majority or, hopefully, deliver both. Richard Nixon, with his track-record of support for
Goldwater in the 1964 general election, anticommunist credentials and life-long avoidance of
open conflict with conservatives, was the only Republican with whom conservative
Southerners could live to hold such a promise.f"
23 Mary C. Brennan, 'Turning Right in the Sixties (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p.135; Joan
Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 125; Stephen C. Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun
(London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 63. Shadegg provides a slightly different arithmetical account, noting that 'with 258
delegate votes out of 1,333, the [Southern State Chairmen] Association represents 38 per cent of the vote needed to
win a nomination, ibid., p. 67.
24 Brennan, Turning Right, p.' 122; Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, pp 22 23.
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This gave Nixon a distinctive advantage over the available alternatives: Nelson
Rockefeller, the liberal governor of New York, and Ronald Reagan, the conservative
governor of California. Rockefeller was universally perceived as a potential winner in the
general election, but he was also anathema to Republican conservatives generally and to
Southerners in particular. Reagan was the darling of the conservative South, but as far as men
like South Carolina's Republican Party chairman Harry Dent were concerned, the unfortunate
fact in 1967 was that 'Reagan was being perceived as another Goldwater. He could arouse the
GOP stalwarts, but he would be rejected in a national election' .25 At a meeting with South
Carolina Republican activists early during the 1968 primary season, Strom Thurmond put the
message across to the party faithful. As far as the primaries went, said Thurmond, 'a vote for
Reagan is a vote for Rockefeller', and concluded that 'we have no choice, if we want to win,
except to vote for Nixon'. Perhaps sensing that his audience was not quite as ecstatic as it
might be, Thurmond went on to press home the central point in the starkest terms: 'we must
quit using our hearts and start using our heads'. He then proceeded to remind them of the
horrors of 1964: 'I have been down this road so 1 know,' and based on that knowledge,
Thurmond's conclusion was that 'I love Reagan, but Nixon's the one,?6
2. THE 1968 PRIMARIES
The influence of the Southern bloc upon the administration has been well known since
Nixon won the Republican primaries of 1968. According to most journalistic accounts
published during and immediately after the election, the Nixon campaign manoeuvred to
secure the political capital of the Southern Republicans in order to ensure his victory against
competitors from the right within and without the GOP. Following this standard account,
Nixon's strategy culminated when, as a result of his intense courtship, Strom Thurmond
handed the Southern vote to the future president during the 1968 Republican convention?7
25 Dent, Prodigal South Returns, p. 79.
26 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 448.
27 Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis Of the Self-Made Man (New York: Mentor Books, 1971), p. 255; Chester,
American Melodrama, pp. 446 47; Dent, Prodigal South, pp.76 77; Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam,
1982), pp.l6264; Brennan, Turning Right, p.l26.
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Not surprisingly, contemporary press-records and more than a few political analysts (not least
conservatives) focused heavily on Nixon's Southern strategy as a symptom of the impending
realignment of American politics, and of Nixon's ruthless political skill in channelling this
process for his own purposes." However, the behaviour of both Nixon and the Southerners
needs to be put in perspective. Nixon's willingness and ability to engage with discontented
Southerners was neither new nor particularly imaginative, and it should be understood as a
continuation and a consequence of similar strategies followed by the Republican Party
leadership during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. To be sure, the results of the 1964
election that strengthened Republican Southerners while penalising northern liberals in the
1968 primaries were an artificial distortion of actual party strength, while Strom Thurmond's
defection to the GOP and Republican victories such as those of Representatives Skip Bafalis
in Florida and Prentiss Walker in Mississippi remained the exception rather than the norm
within Southern politics. Yet, the Republican convention of 1968 certainly remained a
powerful dramatisation of a crucial qualitative change: the collapse of single-party politics
below the Mason-Dixon Line, and the growth there of a fundamentally conservative
Republican party apparatus.
However, press accounts overlooked a second aspect of the relationship between
Richard Nixon and Southern Republicans. In 1968 Thurmond had reminded South Carolina
Republicans of the need to avoid a repetition of the 1964 electoral catastrophe. He was not
alone. As a matter of a fact, Nixon did not even need to approach the Southerners: they
approached him. As early as 1966, a close-knit group of conservative Republican cadres had
met in Atlanta to discuss political prospects. Those in attendance included Mississippi's
Republican national committeeman Fred LaRue; Alabama's Republican party leader John
Grenier; Charles Middendorf, the party's national treasurer and a northern conservative with
28 'The Nixon Political Strategy', St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 21, 1969; Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun,
pp.205 206; 'Thurmond Counts his Rewards' The Washington Post, January 3, 1972 (hereafter WP). For examples
of conservative analyses of Nixon's Southern strategy, see Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement
that Remade America (New York: Free Press, 1999) pp. 161··64; William Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York:
William Morrow and Company Inc., 1984) pp. 209, 214 16.
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close ties with South Carolina's Roger Milliken; and Peter O'Donnell, the party state
chairman in Texas and one of those fiercely conservative Southerners struggling to dominate
the Southern wing of the GOP. Like Thurmond, these men had been deeply involved in the
inebriating conservative triumph in the 1964 Republican primaries and, most importantly, in
the subsequent hangover. Hence, looking towards 1968 they were driven by two overriding
interests: avoiding the capture of the Republican nomination by a liberal-leaning candidate,
and preventing another disaster of Goldwater proportions. Like Thurmond, they were also
'determined that this time reason and logic would determine their choice'. 29 While the
Atlanta group considered the advantages of nominating Richard Nixon, Nixon himself
travelled to Columbia, South Carolina, to speak at a fund-rising event on behalf of
Republican congressional candidates. Harry Dent, the state's party chairman and a close
associate of Strom Thurmond, has claimed that he had personally 'sold the Southern strategy
to Nixon' while driving him to the airport. In this conversation, after Nixon mentioned his
plans to run in 1968, Dent reminded Nixon of the support that Thurmond had given to
Goldwater in 1964, and of how instrumental that support had been. Subsequently, another
group of embryonic Southern support was formed around Dent, this group including
Mississippi Republican chairman Clarke Reed; Florida's William (Bill) Murphin; and later,
Georgia's Howard (Bo) Callaway. Sometimes called the 'Greenville group' because of their
frequent meetings at Reed's home in Greenville, Mississippi, like those meeting in Atlanta,
these men had also chosen their presidential favourite before the candidate himself had yet
engaged in either serious campaigning orserious courtship of Southern cadres.i''
The first action of the Atlanta group, in April of that same year, was to arrange for
LaRue and O'Donnell to request an appointment with Nixon and meet the yet-to-be-declared
candidate in his New York law office, in order to ascertain whether the former vice-president
would consider running were they to succeed in stimulating enough party support. He would.
Nixon was also prepared to fulfil the only two requests the pair advanced as a precondition
29 Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, p. 65,
30 Dent, Prodigal South, pp, 6, 77, 85,
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for their support. The first of these was that the now-candidate would refrain from micro-
managing the entire campaign (widely assumed in Republican circles to have been Nixon's
downfall in the close 1960 election). Mindful of the effects that having a 'southern strategy'
had had upon Goldwater, their second condition was that Nixon allow this newfound source
of Southern support to remain quietly away from the public eye for the time being. No other
issues and no other requests were raised by LaRue and O'Donnell before they went back
South to organise a 'Secret Steering Committee' to prop up the campaign." In December
1966, the group - now in close collaboration with Nixon's own men - helped to hire Gaylord
Parkinson, formerly chairman of the California Republican party, and better known for
healing the wounds of the vicious infighting within the state party to which Nixon had fallen
victim in his 1962 gubernatorial race. It was also this group that, by March 1967, had made
Parkinson director of 'Nixon for President', headquartered in Washington DC. However,
Parkinson's Washington organisation clashed with Nixon's New York operation under the
control of John Mitchell, then an unknown partner in the candidate's law finn. O'Donnell
travelled to New York to try to resolve the situation (and to remind Nixon of his earlier
promises) to no avail. Shortly thereafter, Parkinson left 'Nixon for President' and O'Donnell
resigned as chairman of the Steering Committee. Yet, although both left the campaign, both
did so quietly, deliberately avoiding damaging publicity about Nixon's failure to maintain his
side of the bargain. O'Donnell continued to actively support the candidacy, as did his
associate and fellow Texan, Senator John Tower, who declined to replace Parkinson on the
grounds that working in the South he felt would be more efficient than moving to
Washington. LaRue, however, remained a member of the official campaign.f
Nixon may have been prepared to disregard Southern assistance within the senior levels
of his campaign organisation, but he did not do such a thing when it came to the support of
the Southerners in another, absolutely crucial, aspect of the campaign. The main service
provided by both the Atlanta and the Greenville groups was to herd Southern delegates
31 Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, p. 66; Theodore H. White, The Making a/the President 1968 (London: Cape,
1969), p. 52.
32 Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, pp. 113 14; White, Making a/the President, p. 53.
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towards the Nixon camp. Shortly after sounding out Nixon's intentions, O'Donnell organised
a meeting of the Southern Association of Republican Chairmen in December 1966, just ahead
of the meeting of the Republican National Committee to be held in New Orleans in January
1967. The objective of the former was to ascertain Nixon's popularity as a potential candidate
within the Southern wing of the party, and to initiate a sustained effort to prevent any
potential coalescence of support behind any other candidate. Yet, somewhat surprisingly,
O'Donnell, LaRue, and their associates appeared to have not entirely coordinated their
activities on behalf of Nixon with the Greenville group. The latter followed a similar but
qualitatively different approach. O'Donnell's group had formally committed themselves to
Nixon even before they knew that he intended to run, and subsequently became a formal part
of the campaign. Even after O'Donnell's departure from the Steering Committee, LaRue
remained embedded in the Nixon organisation. Not so the men from Greenville. Instead of
publicly committing themselves to Nixon, Dent and his associates chose to retain the external
wrappings of the undecided. The roots of this approach were again in the 1964 campaign,
when Strom Thurmond and the rest of the Southern GOP had declared for Goldwater so early
in the campaign that they had lost all bargaining power with the candidate. Moreover,
Richard Nixon might have been considered a lesser evil, or a tolerable candidate by the
leadership, but grassroots supporters' generally disregarded such complex considerations and
were near-universally committed to the potential candidacy of Ronald Reagan. Besides,
Nixon was still not completely trusted by anyone. Hence, Dent and his associates proposed a
strategy of 'hanging loose, but hanging together,' or in other words, of keeping the various
Southern delegations uncommitted, with the hope of extracting further concessions and
reassurances from the candidate.f On the surface, the different strategies caused some
predictable conflict between the Atlanta group which, being part of the Nixon campaign, was
openly engaging in delegate hunting; and the Greenville group, which was desperately trying
to keep the Southern delegations from too close a rapprochement with any given candidate.
In fact, the differences were never so great. Both the Greenville men and Harry Dent's
33 Dent, Prodigal South, p. 79.
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associates engaged in a little exercise of double-crossing aimed at retaining Nixon's attention
and pliability."
Another event of the 1964 election campaign that was to bear some significance in 1968
was the emergence of Ronald Reagan as a conservative champion. A formerly Democratic B-
movie star, Reagan had hosted a series of television programmes and performed nationwide
tours for General Electric's Employee and Community Relations programmes since the fall
of 1954. In 1964 General Electric had 'loaned' Reagan to the Goldwater campaign, towards
the end of which he had recorded a short speech for television, 'A Time for Choosing', which
propelled him to conservative stardom.V A few months after Peter O'Donnell and Fred
LaRue had approached Richard Nixon in New York, the former actor went on to win the
California gubernatorial race, running a campaign only slightly less conservative than Barry
Goldwater's had been in 1964, and against the same Democratic incumbent who had defeated
Nixon in 1962.36 A mediocre actor, yet superb conservative proselytizer, had just become a
deadly serious threat to Nixon's chances in the Republican primaries of 1968. If most
Southern Republicans harboured an irrepressible hatred of Nelson Rockefeller, they also
seemed to share an equally irrepressible enthusiasm for the Governor of California. The
Southern Republican leadership proceeded to exploit this state of affairs to increase their own
bargaining power, and to commit Nixon to whatever promises they might exact in exchange
for shielding the candidate's right flank. The only problem was that Reagan was not running.
To be sure, virtually as soon as he was sworn in as governor of California, the circle of
conservative backers who had pressed him to run in 1966 began to press him to run in 1968,
and by 1967 F. Clifton White, the mastermind behind Goldwater's primary of 1964, was
effectively directing Reagan's presidential efforts. Nevertheless, Reagan's efforts throughout
1967 and 1968 were conducted in absolute secrecy, and aimed at a declaration of candidacy
at the last possible minute. After all, California voters were unlikely to appreciate the idea of
their new governor running for national office in the middle of his term. Were Reagan to lose
34 Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 439, 443.
35 Lee Edwards, Reagan: A Political Biography (San Diego: Viewpoint Books, 1967), pp. 65 66, 77 _79.
36 Ibid., pp. 12124; Cannon, Reagan, pp. 110 17, 162 64.
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the nomination in 1968, his prospects for re-election in the California race of 1970 had to be
protected.V
In view of this state of affairs, the Southern leadership proceeded to exert pressure on
Nixon by using spontaneous grassroots support to start up their own 'Reagan for President'
organisations throughout the South. They were so (involuntarily) successful that they actually
came close to killing Nixon's own candidacy. As early as 1967, Peter O'Donnell and Senator
Tower orchestrated the formation of Texas' 'Reagan for President', headed by J. R. (Butch)
Butler, a loyal local cadre. Elsewhere there was no need for such manoeuvres. By the summer
of 1968 Clifton White could count on Representative James C. Gardner leading a breakaway
faction from the South Carolina delegation that neither Thurmond nor Dent could seemingly
control. Prior to this, Martin Fieldman, Nixon's man in Florida, also reported to the national
campaign on the alarming growth of uncontrollable Reagan support." Meanwhile Reagan
himself, although still an official non-candidate, used his popularity to travel the length and
breadth of the South in response to frequent speaking requests. In 1967 he earned the
gratitude of South Carolina's Republicans (and particularly of their chairman) for
participating in a fundraising event that cleared the debts that had been incurred by the party
in the previous election. In May 1968 he visited Louisiana, North Carolina, Florida, and
between June and July, toured Texas, Arkansas, Virginia and Maryland.i" Though Reagan
did not officially campaign nor participate in the primaries, his support nevertheless grew
from one per cent in New Hampshire to 'eleven percent per cent in the Wisconsin primary in
April 1968, and from there it shot up to 22 per cent in Nebraska the following month,
stabilizing at 23 per cent in Oregon.l'' By then, the organisation set up by O'Donnell and
Tower in Texas had escaped their control, and although they managed to prevent their
delegation from going straight to Reagan, Nixon's Texans had to compromise. Instead of
endorsing Nixon, Senator Tower went to the Miami convention as favourite son and was
37 F. Clifton White, Politics as a Noble Calling. The Memoirs ofF. Clifton White (Ottawa IL: Jameson Books, 1994),
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unable to extract anything beyond a promise to vote for Nixon in the event of a second ballot,
but candidate Nixon needed their support in the first.41 By mid-1968, the situation below the
Mason-Dixon line was so unstable that the Greenville group set up appointments with each
one of the three main candidates. First with Rockefeller, who was (plausibly enough) hoping
to reap the fruits of a conservative divide between Nixon and Reagan and to put some limits
on the Southerners' dislike of him; then with Reagan, who was (realistically) trying to break
up into Nixon's dominance of senior Republican ranks; and finally with Nixon (now
seriously alarmed), who was trying to avoid the splintering of his own support toward
Reagan.Y The Greenville group managed to force Reagan and Rockefeller to visit Reed's
estate in Georgia. Reagan aroused them, but, to the subsequent relief of his hosts, still refused
to declare his candidacy. As Harry Dent put it, 'had he asked for support in the atmosphere of
that occasion, charged with this presence, the Californian would have received it from us then
and there', but 'a non-candidate can be a non-candidate too long'. On May 19, 1968 the
governor committed the same mistake again at the Southern State Chairmen's conference in
New Orleans.43
Richard Nixon had no such qualms. He met with the Greenville group on May 31 at the
Marriot Hotel in Atlanta. This time Nixon embarked upon an intense campaign of courtship
that would continue throughout the election and his entire term in office. The candidate
presented himself as 'sympathetic' to southern concerns on issues ranging from civil rights to
the war in Vietnam, through the Supreme Court.44 Dent himself was a little more forthright.
Although reservations about Reagan's ability to perform well in the general election were
certainly an important element, the South Carolinian stated clearly that ultimately 'Reagan
was not my choice in 1968 because Nixon affirmed what people in the South wanted to
hear' .45 After the meeting, Dent phoned Senator Thurmond, who flew to Atlanta on a
41 'Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 442_A4.
42 Ibid., p. 446; Dent, Prodigal South, p. 80_81; Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, p. 225; White, Making a/The
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43 Dent, Prodigal South, p. 80; Chester, American Melodrama, p. 445.
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chartered plane that same day. The following day, June 1, Thurmond and an expanded group
of Southern Republican activists grilled Nixon again, and at the end of the meeting
Thurmond committed himself to the candidate.46 It was three weeks later, at a meeting of the
South Carolina delegation (each of whose 23 members were for Reagan), that the senator
implored the faithful to 'quit using their hearts', and declared that he was 'laying my prestige,
my record of forty years in public life, I am playing it all on the line this time' on behalf of
Richard Nixon.V Unlike John Tower's Texans, the South Carolina delegation went to the
Republican national convention committed (if warily) to the Nixon candidacy.
Harry Dent and Fred Buzhardt, Dent's colleague on Thurmond's staff, travelled to
Florida ahead of the rest of the delegation to prepare the ground for Nixon. Two weeks later,
Reagan was the first candidate to reach the convention. Between that point and the
acceptance speech, a painful battle developed between Nixon's men and the Reagan forces.
The governor of California and his conservative backers joined forces with Nelson
Rockefeller in an attempt to break enough Southern delegates away from the Nixon camp to
force a second ballot. Being the ideal candidate for neither liberal nor conservative
Republicans, Nixon's strength rested on his relative success in the primaries (he had won
them all, but running virtually alone) and on a fragile coalition of liberal and conservative
Republicans who, like the Southerners, wanted a presidential candidate able to defeat
whomever the Democrats chose, and found him an acceptable, but far from ideal candidate.
Since most of those delegates already' committed to him were so only for a first ballot,
Reagan planned to chip away support from Nixon's right. Both Reagan and Rockefeller
planned to throw the nomination into a second or even third ballot in the hope of destabilising
Nixon's forces. To the horror of the Southern leadership, their plans to use Reagan as a
bargaining tool nearly worked too well. In the end Nixon won, but with only 26 votes over
the 667 needed. It is a testament to Southern discipline and to the skill of the leadership that
nearly half of those votes came from the South.48 Yet, the strategy was tremendously
46 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 447; Dent, Prodigal South Returns to Power, p. 207.
47 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 448.
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successful in a different respect. Right up until the voting itself started, Reagan forced Dent,
Buzhardt, and the rest to work tirelessly to counter his charm and the persistent rumours of a
Nixon betrayal, but the very need for such exertion effectively earned them the future
president's gratitude and attention. From the day preceding voting night until the actual start
of the voting, most rumours (fanned and inflated by both Reagan and Rockefeller)
threatening Nixon's chances concerned his choice of running mate. Long before the
convention, the New York Times had proposed a Rockefeller-Reagan 'dream ticket' capable
of balancing the internal politics of the GOP and presenting the electorate at large with a
respectable presidential candidate. Following the same reasoning, rumours abounded during
the convention about Nixon balancing his ticket with a liberal (and hence unacceptable for
the Southern grassroots) candidate. On the very evening when the voting was to take place,
the Miami Herald printed a story claiming that Nixon had already selected Mark Hatfield, a
liberal senator from Oregon, as his running mate. The Southerners were forced to, literally,
put their money where their mouths were to keep their delegations in line. Dent found the
author of the article and, in front of the Louisiana delegation, bet him $300 that his story was
wrong. Reed challenged his Mississippians to take on a $100 gamble each. Howard Callaway
bullied the Georgians back into line with the same tactic."
The issue of the vice-presidency had not been touched upon during the negotiations
held between Nixon and his Southern backers before the convention. Even during the
convention itself, Nixon had only promised Thurmond that he would choose a 'national
candidate' or, in other words, someone who would not offend Southern sensitivities. During
the tense hours that led to Nixon's eventual victory, Thurmond and Dent claimed that the
former possessed the power to force a choice of running mate on Nixon. Nixon had certainly
never promised such a thing and, according to some accounts, he had decided to pick Spiro T.
Agnew, then governor of Maryland, as 'early as the previous May. 50 Yet, the truly remarkable
event is that Thurmond did not quite exert such a power, and never tried to force any given
49 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 474.
50 Dent, Prodigal South, p. lO4; Chester, American Melodrama, p, 482; Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun, p. 212.
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name on Nixon. The night before Nixon announced the name of his running-mate, the senator
from South Carolina produced two lists of names. The first contained those of unacceptable
liberal candidates (namely Rockefeller, Michigan governor George Romney and Senator
Mark Hatfield). The second list included the names of the preferred conservatives: Ronald
Reagan, Senators Tower and Baker, George W. Bush, Howard Griffin and Thurston Morton.
The names on that list were in themselves quite revealing, for Griffin, Morton and Bush
should be considered as moderates within the Republican right." Moreover, since at least
mid-1967 and throughout convention, the Nixon forces had tried to stymie fledgling Reagan
support by hinting at the chance of his becoming Nixon's running-mate. Reagan, who knew
that acquiescing in such a thing would effectively kill his chances of capturing the leading
spot, had flatly refused such a deal. Yet, in effect, Thurmond had declined to press Reagan
onto Nixon, or in other words, had declined to press for the candidate that he knew would
send his own grassroots into a delirium of ecstasy. Again, the painful memories of 1964
loomed large over the actions of Southern Republican cadres. At this point Richard Nixon
had, as the press reported, plunged into a Southern strategy, but perhaps more importantly,
once again, the Republican South displayed its willingness to moderate its demands in order
to maximise Nixon's electability. Thurmond and the other southerners had managed to ensure
that a candidate tolerable to their own constituents, or at least one that could be presented in
the appropriate light, had captured the Republican nomination, and had also ensured that that
candidate was firmly in their debt. Goldwater's chances of winning the 1964 convention had
however been pulverized by the actions of the liberal-wing of the GOP. The men of
Greenville and Atlanta were determined to avoid a reproduction of those devastating,
internecine struggles this time around. As the discussion of possible choices went on around
candidates who were objectionable to one or another Republican faction, Thurmond produced
yet a third list. This included candidates who were not quite the South's first choice (like
Reagan) or even 'acceptable' like the rest in the list of suitable names, but would still trigger
51 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 487; Dent, Prodigal South, p. 103.
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'no objections'. Spiro T. Agnew, the virtually unknown governor of the border state of
Maryland, was on that list. 52
Immediately after the Republican convention of 1968, the press reported that although
the Southern caucus had not quite selected the vice-presidential candidate, Nixon had been
presented with a list of unacceptable northern liberal Republicans, by which he had abided,
and that Agnew had been chosen only after being deemed 'acceptable' by the South.s3 Since
the candidate allowed that impression to spread, it escaped no-one that, as far as the
Southerners were concerned, the appointment meant 'that the big [northern and liberal] cities
didn't get who they said they had to get'. 54 The impact of Nixon's choice for the vice-
presidency on policy-making was zero, but the psychological boost that it provided to the
embattled Southerners was incalculable. After the 1968 Republican convention, no literate
Nixon voter could have remained blind to the fact that Nixon's own candidacy and that of his
running mate had come to be thanks to the offices of the Southern conservative bloc. 55 After
election night, it can have escaped no-one that the electorate at large had backed the
candidate of the white South. In case anyone harboured doubts about the Southerners'
influence, Harry Dent went on to claim that Thurmond had personally 'determined the
outcome of the convention'. The senator himself was quite happy to use his first visit to
President Nixon to let his influence on the White House be known, pushing for a military
build-up at the expense of welfare spending - and hence doing no favours to Nixon's delicate
balancing exercise between moderate; liberal and conservative supporters. 56 As for the
Southern grassroots, South Carolina's The State felt entitled to demand the sacking of
unpopular senior federal officials on the grounds that the president 'owes a political debt of
52 Chester, American Melodrama, p. 487; Dent, Prodigal South, p. 103.
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some magnitude to the people of this region'. 57The Nixon administration still tried to avoid
excessive publicity, at least in the northern and national press, about the close connexion with
the Southerners, arguing for instance that the appointment of Harry Dent as special counsel to
the president and his inclusion within Nixon's 'inner circle' had been awarded exclusively on
the basis of 'shrewd political instincts and not his relationship with Mr. Thurmond or the
Southern wing of the party'. White House denials notwithstanding, the New York Times still
reported the appointment under the heading 'A Thurmond Man Named Nixon Aide,.58 A
little earlier, the same newspaper had also wondered whether Nixon had 'sold the GOP's soul
to South Carolina's Strom Thurmond' .59
Yet, if the press was certainly right to point at the increasing influence of the
Southerners within the Nixon administration, they failed to notice a more subtle but equally
important development. Unlike in 1964, the South was now engaged in the politics of the
possible, rather than in an ideologically driven crusade. Thurmond chose to renounce the
beneficial effects that a Nixon-Reagan candidacy would have had for his own support back
home for the sake of guaranteeing Nixon the precious asset of party unity in the general
election. A little later on the same night Nixon met Thurmond to discuss vice-presidential
candidates; he also met with two representatives of the Atlanta group: O'Donnell and Tower.
On this occasion Tower did press Nixon to select Reagan, but neither he nor O'Donnell did
so out of conservative solidarity. That meeting was concerned with a more pragmatic issue:
in the forthcoming campaign Nixon's main threat in the South, and for a while in the North
too, was the impending candidacy of George Wallace. Reagan, reasoned the Southerners, was
the best vote-getter Nixon could find to his right, and hence the best candidate to counter
Wallace's appeal.i" Nixon chose Agnew and party unity. In 1964 Barry Goldwater had faced
the combined opposition of his Democratic adversary and of the entire liberal wing of the
Republican Party headed by Nelson Rockefeller. Unlike Goldwater, Richard Nixon in 1968
57 'Secretary Finch Veers From Nixon Philosophy', The State, January 10, 1970.
58 'A Thurmond Man Named Nixon Aide', New York Times, May 9,1969 (hereafter NY7).
59 As quoted in Dent, Prodigal South, p. 104.
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was allowed to avoid offending the still-influential liberals within the GOP, and went on to
run against Hubert Humphrey with the support of a united party. As veteran journalist
Theodore White put it, after 1964, 'the Southerners had had enough of gallant lost causes;
they wanted winners'. 61
3. THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND BEYOND
After ensunng Nixon's victory in the primaries, the second task of the Southern
Republicans consisted of limiting the potentially fatal haemorrhaging of their region's votes
towards the candidacy of George Wallace and, hopefully, of contributing to the capture of
part of the regular Democratic vote.62 Between 1963 and 1972 George Wallace, the
Democratic Governor of Alabama who ran a remarkably successful maverick presidential
campaign in 1968, constituted a category of his own within American politics. The
governor's activities from 1968 onwards and throughout Nixon's first term constituted an
extraordinary combination of the most poignant characteristics that defined typical post-war
Southern radical reactionary behaviour, together with the most dramatic example of an
innovative Southern conservative strategy.
In 1968 Wallace followed the steps of Strom Thurmond in 1948, brushed aside party
loyalty, and ran as an independent candidate. However, unlike Thurmond, Wallace
deliberately sought to gain a foothold outside of his Southern Democratic heartland. Much to
the alarm of both the Nixon team and the conservative leadership, he chose to do so by
downplaying openly racial issues while emphasising a hawkish foreign policy (particularly in
South East Asia) and appealing to growing exhaustion with perceived growing civil disorder
- racially-inspired or otherwise. All of this was seasoned with the kind of right-wing
61 White, Making of the President, pp. 38, 241; Chester, American Melodrama, p. 488.
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populism designed to appeal to the anxieties of the same white working and lower-middle
class voters traditionally associated with the Democratic party that Nixon hoped to attract.l"
The Nixon team's serious alarm about the effects of Wallace's splinter candidacy was
obvious from very early on in the election effort, and would continue during the entire first
term." As early as 1968, even Nixon's conservative supporters acknowledged that the
'breakout of Wallace from a sectional to national' base was both a clear signal of the shift
towards conservatism within the electorate at large, and the main threat to Nixon's
presidential hopes." Alan Greenspan, assisting Nixon during the campaign, noted that 'if a
major effort is not made against Wallace, we may not make it past November' .66 The
subsequent effort to WIn Wallace's voters was only partial successful. Throughout 1969,
Republican activists still operated under the assumption that the only threat to a Nixon
majority in the Southern and Southwestern states was Wallace's 'third party interference'. 67
Four years later, Patrick Buchanan, Nixon's liaison with the National Review conservatives,
noted again that Wallace was 'quite apparently shifting tactics a bit' by moving away from
the race issue because 'the Republican Right' was 'turned off by his racism', and he was
'clearly making an appeal to the Republican Right - which he only half heartedly went after
last time' .68 Wallace himself acknowledged this, and pointed out that candidates throughout
the nation imitated his own strategy by peddling 'Alabama speeches with a Los Angeles,
Minneapolis and New York accent' .69 Little changed in the run-up to the 1972 election when
H. R (Bob) Haldeman, the president's 'chief-of-staff, emphasized that Wallace's third party
effort was directly responsible for Nixon's lack of a nationwide popular majority in the
63 For journalistic accounts see 'Wallace Feels Vindicated on Former Stands', Los Angeles Times, December 11, 1971;
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68 Patrick Buchanan to Charles Colson, December 10, 1971, f. Colson 1971 (1 of2), box 3, Patrick Buchanan papers,
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polls.70 Nevertheless, the most significant impact of the Wallace campaign was to crystallise
the association between the Southern white vote and the blue-collar and middle-class
northern constituencies that were seen by the administration as responding to virtually the
same issues. Both were perceived, according to influential presidential assistant Charles W.
Colson, as 'our natural constituencies,.71
A measure of the influence of the Wallace campaign was the publication of two
analyses that, in practical terms, advocated Southern-friendly, conservative-leaning, readings
of American politics. It is also worth noting the considerable appeal of these readings within
the White House. 1970 saw the publication of The Real Majority by Ben Wattenberg and
Richard Scammon, two Democrats who had been connected to the Johnson Administration,
and who produced an analysis of the Wallace campaigns up to 1968, articulated around what
the authors called the 'social issue,.72 Scammon and Wattenberg observed the early
symptoms of an electoral backlash against the alleged permissiveness of the 1960s, while
emphasising the increasing centrality of law and order as a concern for the electorate, and the
growing association between lawlessness and civil rights activism. The book was an
immediate hit within the White House, arousing the interest of a president who actively
pressed his aides into reading it. \ By 1970, Jeb Magruder, a senior presidential advisor
working on White House external communications and public relations, pushing for a
particular initiative, took pains to emphasise that 'this does not fly in the face of the
Scammon thesis' .73By then, Wattenberg was also collaborating with the American Enterprise
Institute, an increasingly influential conservative think-tank which counted with
administration backing, and can thus be considered to have been on the periphery of the
Nixon White House.74
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However, Nixon's strategy to offset the Wallace issue was best articulated in a formal
way by Kevin Phillips, then a recently graduated political analyst and a protege of John
Mitchell. Phillips had been charged with directing Nixon's 1968 electoral effort in the South,
and with the specific mission of designing the means for attracting white lower-middle-class
and working-class constituencies.f Although universally seen as a conservative, Phillips
analysed the collapse of the New Deal political alignment, and advocated a political strategy
that, in essence, replicated Wallace's approach without Wallace's stridency. Phillips expected
the emergence of a Republican hegemony cemented upon a socially conservative, but
otherwise firmly social democratic 'silent majority'. He positively hoped that the Nixon
administration would 'dispel apprehensions' about the future of such features of the New
Deal-Great Society welfare state as collective bargaining and Medicaid in Republican
hands.i" In fact Phillips wished that Republicans 'could drop into the Potomac all those
obsolescent conservatives who are still preoccupied with Alger Hiss and General MacArthur,
and who keep trotting out laissez faire economics and other dead horses', and who prevented
the GOP from attracting growing numbers of hitherto Democratic, blue-collar voters.77 He
exerted great influence over the president's mind. Although his proposals, as a conservative
Republican, differed somewhat from those of Scammon and Wattenberg (then two self-styled
liberal-leaning Democrats), they reinforced one another, and tended to give credence to
Wallace's radical right-wing tactics and thereby push the administration's electoral strategy
towards the right." Nixon successfully identified himself with law and order, traditional
values and the other elements of what Scammon and Wattenberg called the 'social issue,' but
which in truth were conservative commonplaces, to such an extent that many conservative-
leaning supporters of the president saw attacks on Nixon during the Watergate crisis as an
75 Published shortly after the election as Kevin phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle NY:
Arlington House, 1969). For a rather horrified overview of Phillips' stand, see Wills, Nixon Agonistes, pp. 246_53.
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assault 'on their mores and way oflife'. 79 As a result, those who most immediately benefited
were the administration's Southern supporters, who were the central element in its attempts to
compete with Wallace for the votes of disgruntled Democrats. Haldeman's diaries note that,
as the 1972 elections closed in, the president himself sought to enlist, in a repeat of the events
of 1968, the Southern Republicans in the White House's electoral effort. He ordered aides 'to
be sure we have' Strom Thurmond's 'approval' for all the White House's electoral
utterances.f"
The administration had been granting concessions to Southerners that were easy to
perform and rather effective in retaining a loyal group of supporters in the Congress and a
solid Republican base in the South. Conservative principles against federal intervention
notwithstanding, Nixon and his Southern backers engaged in extensive 'pork-barrel' politics.
An illustrative example of this phenomenon is provided by Howard Phillips, a loyal Nixon
activist who would become head of the Office of Economic Opportunity, a major executive
agency charged with delivering the social democratic programmes of Johnson's Great
Society. Phillips has described how, as acting director of OEO, he had lunch with Strom
Thurmond 'every week' because Thurmond 'wanted to make sure that we were giving
grants' to South Carolina. Phillips, who was appointed to OEO with the aim of closing down
the agency, said that was 'my main association with Strom Thurmond,.81 Having cut his
political teeth in the conservative college campus organisation Young Americans for
Freedom, Phillips was happy to declare publicly that he believed the OEO to be 'harmful'
and 'based on the wrong notions'. In pristine conservative language, he stated that, like any
other instance of government-run social policy, it 'undermined authority, challenged the
family, promoted a welfare ethic and eroded democratic safeguards'. 82 Yet, the zealous
conservatism of Phillips' 'shutdown' did not extend to the 'numerous federal grants for South
Carolina' .83After his tenure in the OE9, Phillips went on to join the most radical wing within
79 •
80 Davir] Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of an image (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 185, 231.
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the conservative movement, and devoted himself to lambasting full-time the iniquities of the
welfare state. Not so Strom Thurmond, whose conservatism remained blunted by a
willingness to compromise for the sake of electoral expediency. Another indirect way of
assisting the South was through trade barriers - a form of state activity supposedly anathema
to ideologically-driven conservatives. Nixon nevertheless made abundantly clear during the
1968 campaign that South Carolina's textile industry would be protected, and subsequently
raised import quotas against Japanese textile imports.t"
Finally, the administration also distributed an extensive number of appointments to its
Southern supporters. Winston (Red) Blount became Postmaster General, a position of no
policy-making consequence, but endowed with 'the best' patronage opportunities to be
distributed among grassroots supporters. These opportunities were particularly appreciated in
the South, where GOP activists had historically been known as 'Post-Office Republicans' .85
In more policy-substantive positions Mississippi's Fred LaRue remained an influential free-
roaming political counsellor to the president up until the Watergate debacle, as did South
Carolina's Fred Buzzhardt, another former Thurmond assistant. White House Relations with
Congress were directed by Oklahoma's Bryce Harlow and Missouri's William Timmons, and
in Nixon's second term Frederick 'Dent, a South Carolinian closely related with the textile
sector, became Secretary of Commerce at the instances of Harry Dent (no relation). Even the
federal machinery entrusted with civil rights enforcement was penetrated by men who
understood and sympathised with white Southern grievances. Assistant Attorney-General and
former Goldwater staffer Richard Kleindienst, as well Southern sympathisers Robert Mardian
(also a Goldwater man) and Patrick Gray, all found their way, 'fortunately' according to
Harry Dent, into a newly created cabinet committee charged with dealing with civil rightS.86
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Nixon's policy created a virtuous circle in which White House largesse fostered
Southerners' increasing penetration of the federal apparatus, and hence a growing incentive
to forego the radical right-wing populist politics that the likes of Thurmond had favoured
during the previous twenty years. As the South became an ever-more solid and politically-
reasonable base of support for the White House, the administration also found easier to
sustain the Southerners' limited demands. Not surprisingly, the thrust of the internal memos
emanating from the desk of Harry Dent, the former Thurmond aide whose mission within the
administration was to liaise with Southern Republicans, is unequivocal. Southern
conservatives remained the most loyal and unproblematic element of conservative support for
the president. In August 1971, the Republican state chairman of Georgia claimed to be 'proud
of our President', and to demonstrate it proceeded to join with all other Southern party
chairmen in signing a letter sent to 4,500 local Republicans to 'recall some of the
accomplishments of the present National Administration'. 87 In November, Dent detailed
plans to use Thurmond's strong endorsement of the administration to 'help stave off some of
the conservative reaction against recent Presidential policies'. 88 A month later, while a faction
of the conservative movement led by the National Review Buckleyites was on the verge of
'suspending' its support for an administration which it felt had gone soft on foreign policy
and interventionist in economics, the Southern Association of Republican State Chairmen
released a resolution expressing 'appreciation and support for the President' .89 Later, Dent
himself devoted a substantial part of his political memoirs to explaining in some detail how
'Nixon delivers' on, for example, desegregation, bussing, the Southern textile industry, and
Supreme Court appointments.t"
In any event, it is clear that the administration saw its Southern supporters as a crucial
element of congressional sustenance that also allowed partisan lines to be routinely blurred
87 . .
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on matters of race, civil rights and foreign policy. This relationship had two crucial effects.
Firstly, it displayed Nixon's own conservative instincts, or at any rate, his willingness to
publicly espouse conservative principles. Secondly, the shift to the right in presidential
rhetoric on issues such as civil rights and civil disorder allowed the Southern bloc to engage,
bargain, and thereby participate in the political process far beyond reactionary civil rights
obstructionism. Robert Mason has argued that Nixon's main aim regarding the Southerners
was to enlist their support for presidential initiatives in the foreign policy field generally, and
in South-East Asia in particular." Yet, the proximity of the Southern conservatives' views
and the aggressive actions of the Nixon Administration in Vietnam was genuine, and Nixon's
efforts had the predictable effect of pushing the administration's behaviour to the right in
domestic affairs too. Most importantly, it made the electorate perceive the administration to
be, at the very least, consorting with conservatives and adopting some of their principles. 92
4. THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM
Although the Buckleyites had always accorded a considerable degree of cross-party
sympathy to the Southern bloc, the evolution of conservatism was particularly influenced by
the emergence of the powerful Southern Republican wing as a fully-fledged sub-family
within the conservative movement. Moreover, the progress of the smaller group of
Southerners who became fully embedded with the movement mirrored to a great extent that
of those Southerners who never became fully associated with either conservatism or the
Republican party. This smaller group also developed peculiar characteristics, however. In
philosophical terms the close interaction between Southern conservatives and the hard core
anchored both groups to a distinct (if not necessarily coherent) modernised worldview.
Politically, each group exercised considerable sway upon the evolution of the other. This
interaction mutually coloured their simultaneously growing influence within the Republican
party and reinforced the strong links between the conservative movement and the GOP.
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Thus, although many Southern Republicans chose to support the 'centrist' candidacy of
Richard Nixon over that of conservative favourite son Ronald Reagan, this is not to say that
Southern conservatives lacked ideological commitment to the conservative cause - or even
that they only went along with conservatism to preserve racial segregation. For example, by
the 1960s Strom Thurmond seems to have genuinely believed, as did conservative champions
such as Texas' John Tower and Barry Goldwater, in small government - at least on a
rhetorical level, and never to the point of renouncing the not inconsiderable amount of 'pork'
sent to South Carolina by the White House. Thurmond, it seems, went along with federal
'interference' only as far as it served his own political purposes. In 1964 the senator had
justified his apostasy from the Democratic fold by peddling the standard conservative critique
of the New Deal. The Democratic party, Thurmond declared, had 'turned its back on the
spiritual values and political principles which have brought us the blessings of freedom under
God' and worse still, was 'leading our Nation to a socialist dictatorship'. He thereby touched
on familiar conservative shibboleths such as opposition to government expansion,
anticommunism abroad and at home, and traditional values" Moreover, he was also fond of
wondering whether 'the welfare state is an alternative to communism', since 'both, in
essence, are founded on the identical theories of state socialism'. Thurmond became a regular
attendee of conservative gatherings and adorned his speeches with standard conservative
concerns about 'communism,' 'collectivism,' and in language increasingly relevant to the
mood of the electorate, 'the breakdown of moral codes' .94 As early as 1959 the senator from
South Carolina 'reported to the people' that the conservative editors of National Review were
pretty much the only 'objective writers' within the United States press corps on matters
pertaining race."
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The Buckleyites on their part sincerely embraced Thurmond as a fully-fledged member
of the conservative movement. Thanks to his hawkish foreign policy views and abundant use
of right-wing language, conservatives and many scholars have, with some reason, identified
Thurmond and a significant number of Southern ex-Democrats as conservatives who
'despised the increase in federal power almost as much as [they] hated communists' and who,
unlike Wallace, were much more than 'simple segregationists'i'" Thurmond and those
Southerners who followed him were therefore 'unlike other Southerners [read Democrats]
who accepted federal money and interference in all but racial matters' and accepted
conservative principle in other areas." The South Carolinian was seen by William Rusher,
the influential publisher of National Review, as fully belonging to the conservative movement
in his capacity as 'another conservative politician' of the same class as Barry Goldwater,
Representative John Ashbrook and Ronald Reagan. In a similar vein, the conservative weekly
Battle Line variously defined the South Carolinian as a 'hard line conservative', 'the greatest
conservative in the party', and in the same category with other 'Republican conservatives'
such as John Tower and Ashbrook. Human Events, going a little further, not only saw the
South Carolinian as 'a great conservative', but in fact, as 'one of the greatest' within living
memory." Thurmond consistently received the highest marks in the various political rankings
published by conservative organisations from the early 1960s onwards. He was also a sought-
after, regular speaker and signatory of circular letters for conservative organisations such as
Young Americans for Freedom, Americans for Conservative Action, the American
Conservative Union, and the Manion Forum.99 Conversely, the leadership of the conservative
movement largely shared in, and lent a degree of respectability to, the Southern strategy of
opposition to federally-imposed racial integration. By the early 1960s the conservative editors
of National Review continued to express 'frank reservations about the wisdom of Brown v
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Board of Education', and dedicated themselves to supporting the delay of civil rights
implementation and to the prevention of any further legislative expansion in that area -
basically coinciding with the approach of the Southern bloc.IOO Thus, by the mid-I 960s,
despite the natural maladjustment between fiery, ideologically-loaded language and the rather
pragmatic approach to federal largesse displayed by Thurmond and his associates, the
conservative Buckleyites - themselves not averse to some judicious adjusting to pragmatism
- had accepted them as an integral part of the movement.
Philosophical alignment helped. Beyond the question of race, traditionalist
conservatives - including William F. Buckley - had always been strongly attracted to the
Southern agrarian tradition. Hard core conservatives consistently opted for a romanticised
vision which attacked the iniquities of modernity, industrialisation, and free-market
principles, while hailing an idealised vision of the traditional rural white South. Such views
were still popular throughout the 1950s and 1960s as articulated by conservative intellectuals
such as Richard Weaver and, certainly in its anti-modem, unfettered-market-sceptic aspects,
by Russell Kirk, author of The Conservative Mind and acknowledged leader of highbrow
intellectual conservatism.i'" Weaver thought that it was perfectly possible to 'tum the clock
back' to some kind of pristine, pre-industrial past. Kirk, on his part, defined society as 'a
spiritual community' ruled by 'divine intent'. Thomas Fleming, another prominent Southern
conservative, put the issue in even starker terms. Reflecting on the character of Southern
conservatism during the 1970s, he believed that 'when a Southerner calls himself a
conservative he is usually thinking of a way of life, a social and moral order for which the
people of the 1860s went to war'. Like Weaver, he also noted that the 'revival of social
conservatism among the American working people' clearly perceptible as Richard Nixon
reached the White House 'gives us all the first hope since 1865 that we can tum back the
clock and renew the conservative struggle' .102 Such views did, nonetheless, lead certain
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conservatives to a partial divorce from reality. Russell Kirk, once defined by a less romantic
fellow conservative as a 'sentimental vaporizer,' was notorious for leading a self-imposed
medieval-like lifestyle. This included refusing to own a radio (never mind a television set)
and, apparently, central heating, since he believed that 'innovation is a devouring
conflagration more often than it is the torch of progress'. Fleming had no trouble
acknowledging that his own perspective on the South was based on little else other than
nostalgic fantasy. 'The only really conservative myth left to Americans is the South', he
wrote before adding that 'it is a fairy-tale place, of strong courageous men and gentle but
determined ladies'. Journalist James Jackson Kilpatrick resorted to similar devices to explain
away the notoriously dysfunctional and scandalously corrupt politics of the South during the
1950s and most of the 1960s. In his view, elections were systematically rigged and voters (of
both races) disenfranchised because Southerners felt 'that gentlemen ought not engage in
unseemly hassles for public trust', and would find the prospect of partisan (that is,
meaningful) electioneering 'downright appalling'. Without a trace of irony, Kilpatrick
pronounced such a thing 'not mannerly' .103
Of course, the presumed linkage between the 1960s and the events of the 1860s did not
prevent Southern conservatives from updating and modernising their message much along the
lines already established by National Review. As a glance at Strom Thurmond's speeches
clearly shows, the rebranded form of Southern conservatism included a partial embrace of
free markets (as well considerable cold warrior enthusiasm) which clashed with the more
traditional brand of Southern conservatism. Fleming, for instance, kept well within the
Southern conservative tradition of scepticism towards classical liberalism (including free
markets) and defence of social and moral conservatism when he argued that the 1850s
writings of George Fitzhugh were still the 'best sociology of the South' (Fitzhugh had
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employed pre-modem pseudo-socialism to propose the extension of the benefits of slavery to
the northern white working class). Yet, he also had no trouble in echoing the economic views
of Thurmond, Buckley and other conservatives, adapting his discourse to the partial
integration of free-market economics within modem conservatism, and pronouncing 'free
enterprise' as 'the best of all economic systems'. In language typical of 1960s hard-core
conservatism, Fleming easily assimilated the c1assicalliberal viewpoint when he declared that
the aim of initiatives in 'affirmative action, bussing and child-care laws' was, far from
achieving racial equality, to 'concentrate still more power in the socialist state' .104
Together with philosophical adjustment, the most noticeable aspects of the
modernisation of Southern conservatism were surely the abandonment of the Democratic fold
and a deliberate effort the leave behind the most histrionic aspects of race-baiting populism.
In this sense, the contrast between the conservative treatment of the Southerners led by Strom
Thurmond and their contempt for George Wallace is notable and illustrative. As early as
1963, National Review had rapturously reported the 'tide of Southern Republicanism that
rises so dramatically toward the White House'. In 1964, the magazine applauded Thurmond's
defection, advised Republicans to be 'generous' regarding seniority with congressional
Democrats that might follow Thurmond (the party leadership, incidentally, listened) and
indulged in some hopeful day-dreaming about the number of 'conservative-minded
Democrats' that might join the party.105 Yet, at around the same time Wallace had also
proclaimed himself the champion of the traditional South, and had been peddling a political
discourse indistinguishable in many respects from that of Strom Thurmond. William F.
Buckley, however, 'greatly objected' to 'naming a chapter of YAF as George Wallace', and
thought that such a thing would be 'intrinsically wrong and devastatingly bad policy' .106
DUring 1968, although Buckley admitted to largely sharing the Alabaman's views, National
Review opted for a frontal and unsuccessful attack that left its normally gentlemanly editor
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ruefully looking for 'a way to handle the son of a bitch' .107 Up to a point, the conservative
leadership's hostility towards Wallace was a response to 'the kind of [racist] pitch that
Wallace used' in defence of white Southern views, which, it was argued, 'contaminated' a
conservative position based on legalistic and classical liberal arguments. Wallace, needless to
say, undermined the decade-long efforts of these men to purge the movement of its most
unsavoury radical elements. lOS Yet, as the 1968 race approached, conservative cadres were
quite willing to ignore Wallace's new-found Thurmond-like avoidance of open racism. In
reality, it seems that conservative blasts against George Wallace derived from the ever-
present pro-Republican partisanship of the movement. Performing a peculiar and somewhat
cynical political twist, conservatives even strove to question Wallace's claims to
conservatism by using the Alabaman as a blunt partisan instrument to attack the civil rights
credentials of their Democratic opponents. Orthodox conservatives gleefully noted that
George Wallace's crusade against 'federal interference' in local affairs never included federal
subsidies, and that his economic policies as governor of Alabama had more in common with
(in an admittedly populist and corrupt form) mainstream social democratic collectivism than
with his own free-market-leaning rhetoric.l'" William F. Buckley is still fond of noting that
by the late 1960s 'the left-wing' was wooing Wallace, and that when Wallace was shot,
\
'Senator Edward Kennedy was the first person to call to the hospital', a reaction that,
according to Buckley, 'was interesting' .110
As it became evident that Wallace' intended to run as an independent in 1968, he also
became much more of a threat to the Republican party than other Southern Democrats who
managed to remain as such while supporting Nixon. Thus, during the final stages of the
campaign while Thurmond travelled the South on Nixon's behalf, the conservative leadership
struggled, to the considerable irritation of some of its own local cadres, to marshal its
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grassroots away from Wallace and towards the Republican party. I I I Albeit reluctantly,
conservatives had remained well within the Republican fold in presidential politics since the
Eisenhower years, and conservative sectarian behaviour was nothing particularly new.112 The
novelty during the late 1960s was the much-publicised political clout enjoyed by the
Southern Bloc as the single most powerful segment within the conservative political
leadership, over a presidential candidate first and later within the White House itself. During
the Eisenhower years National Review had considered conservatives to be the 'captive
faction' of a 'miserably bad President', whose only redeeming feature, from their viewpoint,
was that he was neither Kennedy nor an actively liberal Republican.l ':' With Richard Nixon
Southern conservatives found a president who was as much a 'captive' of the right as the
right was of the Republican party. Thus, the growing importance of Southern Republicans
within the GOP propelled the other conservative families to both intensify their enmity
against Wallace, and towards a more enthusiastic acceptance of the Republican party as the
natural political vehicle of the right.
Conservatives also benefited from the fact that the GOP's natural growth below the
Mason-Dixon Line proceeded along with right-wing grassroots expansion. Up until 1964
Southern Republicans had possessed no representatives in the Senate, very few in the House
of Representatives and virtually no elected officials at state level. 114 According to Morton
Blackwell, who in 1964 became the youngest delegate for Goldwater representing
Louisiana's Republicans (then totalling 'one per cent of registered voters against 98 per cent
Democrats), to be a senior Southern Republican before Goldwater's campaign implied
putting oneself across as a 'hopeless candidate', or contributing' a lot of money to a hopeless
candidate' or alternatively, to have worked 'for hopeless candidates for many, many
III For an insight over the grassroots tensions between Wallacite and Republican-minded conservatives in the run-up
to the 1968 elections, see Arnold Steinberg to William F. Buckley, September 24, 1968 f. YAF (Sept - Dec 1968),
?SX 57, WFB papers; James P Ruffy to Neil McCaffrey, June 13, 1967, f. McCaffrey, Neil, box. 43, ibid.
Crossroads at Dixie'; 'Senator Goldwater Speaks His Mind', NR, January 14, 1961; William Rusher Memorandum
to William F. Buckley, September 14, 1960, PLB Memorandum to William F. Buckley (undated), f. Interoffice
f';1emos,box 10, WFB papers. .
114 'The Challenge to Conservatives, II', NR, June 17, 1961; 'So Long Ike', ibid., June 14, 1961.
Black, Rise of South ern Republicans, pp. 40 41.
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years' .115 But then again, a small and poorly organised party structure had certain advantages
for the young, hard-working and ambitious. From the early 1960s onwards, a number of these
young, fiercely conservative activists took full advantage of Republican organisational
weakness to steer the Southern GOP firmly in a rightward direction.i" Blackwell gained the
delegate post in 1964 as direct consequence of his vigorous and successful activities
organising Youth Republican Party groups 'in every comer of Louisiana'. When the
Louisiana Republicans had to choose their representative for the 1964 convention, 'as it
turned out, since the Party was small across the state and not very well organised I was one of
the very few people that all the delegates from all the parts of the state knew' .117 After turning
around the disorganised, demoralised and largely inconsequential Louisiana Republican
organisation, Blackwell went on to became the longest serving executive director of the
College Republican National Committee.v'" Blackwell was by no means the only member of
a new breed of aggressively conservative Southern Republicans with a penchant for
organisational activities who would become increasingly influential within the national party
and in the conservative organisations that gravitated around it. Texas-born Richard Viguerie
and David Franke played crucial roles organising Young Americans for Freedom, and the
former went on to direct the emergence of the Moral Majority together with Jerry Falwell,
then heading the Southern Baptist Convention. 119 In 1965, Robert Watson, a South Carolina
Representative, followed in the steps of Strom Thurmond, became a Republican, won re-
election and was appointed to the board of the American Conservative Union, the
organisational ann of conservative Republicans.12o
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By 1971 the numbers of Southern Republicans in Congress had swollen from one in
1962 to 21 representatives and six senators. The conservative Battle Line consistently
awarded approval ratings of over 70 per cent to more than half of the Southerners in
Congress, while less than a third received ratings below 50 per cent. 121By 1972 conservatives
celebrated the definitive emergence of an eminently conservative Republican 'new South,' as
Thurmond's initial move was consolidated when four victorious incumbents were joined by
eight new conservative Southern Republicans, including men like North Carolina's Jesse
Helms, Mississippi's Representative Thad Cochran(who would eventually replace James
Eastland in the Senate), and Senator Trent Lott (who was backed by William M. Colmer, his
segregationist mentor and Democratic predecessor). As the conservative press was quick to
announce, an immediate consequence of Southern success was the parallel increase in the
influence of conservatives within the party.122 In fact, candidates such as Lott, Florida
Representative Skip Bafalis, and Louisiana Representative David Treen (the first Louisiana
Republican in Congress since Reconstruction) had actually received financial assistance from
the American Conservative Union, and enjoyed special reports devoted to the consolidation
of their conservative credentials in Battle Line, ACU's organ.123 In view of right-wing
Republican successes, conservatives were understandably disinclined to support a Democrat
(even a renegade one), although they were considerably less reluctant when it came to
Wooing Wallace's voters. Thus Battle Line's blasts against Wallace merrily coexisted with
flagrantly contradictory remarks about how the Alabaman's appeal was based on
conservative issues such as 'big government, high taxes' and 'welfare spending', as well as
racial anxiety and social disorder.124
Capitalising on what one may call the 'Wallace factor' had been a successful strategy
for conservatives since the exploits of Southern Republicans had swollen the conservative
ranks within the party after 1964. Thus, when Harry Dent had first approached Nixon in
121 'H
122 ow Your Congressman Rates', ibid., August 1971.
123 'Conservative Victories', ibid., November 1972.
'Trent Lott: A Symbol of the New South', ibid., June 1973; Skip Bafalis, 'A Strong Fiscal Conservative', ibid.,
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1966, he was already using Wallace to bolster Strom Thurmond's bargaining power. Nixon,
needless to say, did not need much reminding of the importance of the border states or even
perhaps of the Deep South itself for his own electoral prospects.125 As a consequence of the
deepening Republican inroads in the South, by the 1968 primaries Nixon needed to face up to
the fact that the Southern wing of the GOP had become a right-wing force of nature within
the party. Any presidential contender needed the acquiescence of the South to triumph in the
primaries - as, no doubt to his dismay, Nelson Rockefeller discovered when he found himself
investing a considerable amount of time and effort convincing Southern Republicans that he
did not 'have horns,.126 Moreover, national candidates also needed the party to provide the
precinct-level, nuts-and-bolts operatives who manned offices, performed door-to-door
canvassing, answered telephones and carried out all the myriad of minor, yet crucial electoral
chores. The problem was even more acute in Nixon's case because, unlike Rockefeller and
Reagan in their respective states, he lacked a local base of support. Even hiring Nixon's first
official campaign chairman, required Reagan's clearance because Gaylord Parkinson,
Nixon's chosen man, was also the chairman of the California GOP. In New York, Nixon's
own senior organisation was entirely based on his law firm and personal contacts, for the
formal party structure was controlled by Rockefeller and the grassroots operatives that
supported him in 1960 were in 1968 fully aligned with the Buckleyite-Ieaning Conservative
Party of New York State.l27 Elsewhere, despite the purge within the party leadership that had
followed the 1964 debacle, most active mid-and low-level party operatives nationwide still
tended to be Goldwaterite conservatives broadly aligned with the Southerners. Nixon
acknowledged these facts when he selected Richard Kleindienst as his campaign's National
Director of Field Operations. A man recruited from the Goldwater inner circle, Kleindienst in
tum put together an organization that 'was composed mainly of persons who were part of the
Goldwater field operation' .128
125
126 Dent, Prodigal South, p. 77.
127Ibid., pp. 80~,81; Chester, American Melodrama, p .446.
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In the 19S0s and 1960s Southern conservatives became an integral part of the
conservative movement. During those years the Southern philosophical tradition became
embedded within the modernised, rebranded conservative canon developed by National
Review, which was, in tum, broadly accepted the Southerners. In political terms, Southerners
and Buckleytes mutually reinforced their partisan attachment to the Republican party. By the
time Richard Nixon initiated his second presidential race, it was also the conservative cadres
who had been entirely aligned with Goldwater who could (and did) provide Nixon with the
much needed manpower and local know-how in the South as well as a solid delegate base
from which to win the Republican presidential nomination. Pandering to the Southern wing
of the party (and therefore to the conservative movement they were embedded in) was a
necessary requisite to satisfy a crucial nucleus of national Republican activism. Hence, in
1968 a central part of Nixon's electoral strategy was to 'sectionalise' his message in order to
isolate northern voters from the most blatantly anti-civil rights and conservative-leaning
statements aimed at a Southern audience, and to isolate the Southerner grassroots from the
most liberal-leaning aspects of the Nixonian programme.V" The Southern conservative
leadership - not entirely unlike the Buckleyites - needed no insulation, for they had accepted
Nixon's moderation as a useful quality, rather than a handicap, of their chosen candidate.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the strategy of the Southern political leadership was a major
force deepening the entanglement of the conservative hard core with the Republican party.
Between 1964 and 1970 the single most important group of conservative political leaders
were Southerners and Republicans. More importantly, the expansion of the political branch of
the movement eroded, for the first time, the influence of its original leadership, because the
Southerners possessed a base of support relatively immune to the criticism of conservative
intellectual organs such as National Review, Battle Line or even Human Events. To be sure,
129 s .ee McGinniss, Selling of the President, pp. 122 25.
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after 1968 these publications would criticise the relative passivity of the political wing of the
movement against the most egregious instances of Nixonian liberalism. Yet to the
considerable frustration of some conservative opinion-makers, they did so with no visible
effect upon the behaviour of Southern conservatives in Congress, who remained broadly
committed to the Nixon White House. Throughout Nixon's two terms, Southerners outside
the GOP also continued to break Democratic discipline to support the president and to move
towards his party. Even as the White House became increasingly keen to disassociate itself
from the GOP from 1971 onwards, those Southerners who were already Republicans, some
having received financial support from the administration, remained notably supportive of the
president right up to his final sinking.i" In 1968, far from being 'captive', conservatives
endorsed and actively participated in the electoral campaign and in the subsequent
administration. The mutual embrace between the Nixon campaign and the GOP's Southern
wing was a crucial element of this phenomenon.
At the same time, in a triumph of rhetoric over substance Strom Thurmond managed to
foster a close alliance between himself, the rest of the conservative movement and Richard
Nixon. But in politics symbols matter and even more so in an atmosphere, like that of the late
1960s, dominated by highly emotional issues such as one's patriotism, commitment to 'law
and order' and 'traditional values'. Association with Southern conservatives helped the
administration's strategy of steering towards a quasi-Wallacite right-wing populist discourse,
pregnant with symbolism but, beyond the issue of school integration, devoid of much
substantial policy content. After all, besides increasing appropriations for crime prevention
and funding for the nation's police forces, how can the preservation patriotism or traditional
values be legislated for? Through rhetoric and symbols, which in tum help to consolidate the
proximity between the White House and the conservative movement at large.l3l Remarkably,
although Wallace was never accepted by the conservative leadership as one of their own, it
130 'Virginia', Battle Line, March 1970; 'Conservative Leaders Silent on Richardson', ibid., February 1973; 'Rep Dave
Treen', ibid., December 1973.
131 Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, p. 185.
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was his menacing presence, combined with the objective strength of Southern Republicans
within the party that eased Richard Nixon's steering to the right.
If Thurmond's rhetorical position mirrored ideas expounded by the conservative
movement, these ideas did not prevent him from accepting the kind of federal aid
programmes run by the Office of Economic Opportunity, and from pressing the Nixon
administration into raising protectionist trade barriers for South Carolina's textile industries.
Ultimately Thurmond and his congressional allies, unlike many of the conservative
movement's leadership but very much like Richard Nixon, had ceased to behave like
ideologues and begun to operate as pragmatic politicians.132 In other words, in order to
preserve their traditional political influence over national politics the conservative South
'northernised' its message, adjusting their strategy of resistance to further racial equality to
what was politically acceptable throughout the nation: formal acceptance of the end of de jure
segregation and skilful manoeuvring to preserve de facto segregation. Harry Dent was crystal
clear on the matter and had no qualms in acknowledging that by 1968 'the Southern Strategy
we envisioned was designed to fashion the ends of southern power in the executive councils
of the national government to compensate for the diminishing southern power on Capitol
Hill,.133 The moderation of Southern requests at Miami not only helped to off-set the
challenge of the California governor to Nixon's presidential ambitions. The Southerners also
allowed Nixon to deflect conservative pressure to appoint either Reagan himself or another
conservative as vice-president, and helped Nixon's team to secure the nomination of an
unknown running-mate acceptable to the liberal wing of the party. Willingness to accept
federal funding and to prop-up protectionist policies flew right against the conservative
canon, just as much as opposing the conservative primary challenges of Ronald Reagan in
1968 (and later John Ashbrook's in 1972) sabotaged the political manoeuvring of the
conservative intellectual leadership.P" The contrast between Thurmond's behaviour in 1968
and his strategy in 1948 and 1964 could not have been sharper. Instead of engaging in a
132
Bartley, New South, p. 395
133 Dent, Prodigal South, p. 8.
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symbolic, largely doomed quest, Southern Republicans played a crucial supporting role
within Nixon's strategy to both preserve the all-important image of party unity, and to allow
the candidate to make a sustained appeal to moderate voters.l " From the run up to the 1968
election onwards, Thurmond and his Southern associates were engaged as major players in
serious presidential politics. Moreover, they were on the winning side. The willingness of
Richard Nixon to accommodate and to adopt as his own the views of these men enabled the
right-wing South to abandon the politics of reaction and radicalism that Thurmond and his
Southern associates had practiced since the late 1940s. The Southerners forced that logic,
which included accommodating the non-conservative initiatives of the Nixon White House,
into the behaviour of conservatives at large. After all, the single largest group of conservative
political leaders in Congress was the Southern Bloc. A first inkling of this phenomenon was
the clear frustration of certain conservative operatives during the 1968 primaries, when the
Southerners manoeuvred to secure Nixon's victory during the Miami Republican
convention.l'" Thurmond and his southern colleagues battled not only for Nixon, but also
against the right-wing threat posed by Ronald Reagan, the conservatives' favourite son. I37
Nixon's Southern strategy was at the same time a response to political changes already in
place since at least the mid-1950s, coupled with the particularities of the 1968 Republican
convention. It was also a somewhat delayed and reluctant reaction. During the 1964 primaries
Nixon had declared that a Goldwater victory would be a 'tragedy' and that such conservative
views had to be 'challenged and repudiated' by the party.138Ever after, he would continue to
lament the fact that the Goldwater campaign had allowed Republicans to be 'portrayed as
reckless and racist' .139Even in 1968, conservatives within the administration complained that
Nixon's 'horizon' did not extend 'beyond the election,.14o However, even if Nixon's
Southern strategy and his support for conservative Southerners followed, at least initially, a
needs-must, politically expedient strategy rather than a genuine commitment to either
135 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, pp.178[_'80, 199['201; Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 465, 486. 87.
136 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, p.175; Rusher, Rise of the Right, pp. 213 _:17.
137 Cannon, Reagan, pp.162'J64; Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 436:::'50, 457::'70.
138 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician 1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 51.
139 As quoted in A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Washington
DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 53; Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, p. 23.
140 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, p. 179.
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conservatism or Southern grievances, it still unquestionable that Richard Nixon's 1968
campaign and presidency had a double effect. First it lent the prestige of the presidency to the
main political group then sustaining the electoral advances of the conservative movement,
while it also contributed to making the Republican Party a respectable option for conservative
Southern whites. After all, in presidential terms and with the exception of Jimmy Carter, the
South remained firmly Republican for the two decades following the 1968 elections. The
jump from electing a president presumed to have been anointed by the forces of Southern
reaction, to electing a self-proclaimed champion of Southern conservatism, after all, is about
as long as the distance between Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.
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CHAPTER3
'ENTITLED TO PREVAIL,I: NIXON, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE POLITICS
OF CIVIL RIGHTS
During the early months of the first Nixon administration, Attorney General John
Mitchell appealed to civil rights leaders to 'watch what we do, rather than what we say'.
Thereafter, the White House first tried to keep 'a low profile' on civil rights, and, in the
words of Nixon's Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman, to 'do what we have to do and not brag
about it'.2 Richard Nixon informed his associates that the administration should 'not make a
good deal of all we are doing' on this issue, but ought to concentrate on doing 'quietly our
job', and above all, should not 'be sucked into praising our 'great record' on civil rights
because 'low profile is the key'. 3 In his memoirs, the president self-servingly explained that
behind this strategy lay his intention to 'tackle the [civil rights] problems instead of talking
about them'. Nixon argued that it was necessary to demonstrate that 'we do care by our
actions and not just by our words', and hoped, yet again, that his administration would be
judged by 'what we do rather than by what we say'." Yet that quiet strategy soon gave way to
a much noisier approach - one clearly slanted towards protecting the interests of the
president's Southern white conservative supporters, and which involved various addresses to
the nation by the president and the senior administration staff dealing with civil rights
matters. Nevertheless, a number of contributions to our understanding of the Nixon
presidency have taken these earlier statements at face value, concluding that the
administration intended to both neutralize racial unrest and foster the implementation of civil
rights legislation. Furthermore, according to these revisionist accounts, the White House
J 'The South's Travail', National Review Bulletin, March 14, 1960.
2 Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principle and Policy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
2001), p. 1; H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994),
PPK·lt8l5-8k6:AI' 'C' 'IR'h 35( hasi .. I)o OWS I, tvtxon s IVI Ig ts, p. emp asis m ongma .
4 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 436 (my emphasis).
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actually succeeded, hence rendering Nixon an unlikely 'champion of civil rights'r' The
following pages analyse the rationale behind the Nixon administration's choice to downplay
the apparent quantitative successes of its own civil rights policy, and the long-term effects of
this strategy upon the conservative community to which Southern conservatives belonged,
while emphasising that, in government, 'what we say', may be just as crucial as 'what we
do'.
Building upon that premise, there is a fundamental difference between this examination
of the Nixon administration's civil rights policy and most previous analyses: it focuses on the
school desegregation policies of the Nixon administration to explore the legitimative effects
of policy. This analysis, however, avoids both a reiterative quantitative analysis of Nixon's
policy initiatives, and an even more reiterative evaluation of the president's alleged or real
intentions, instincts and beliefs. Instead, it is assumed that if actual policy-making, whether in
the form of failed attempts or of successful implementation of new initiatives, is obviously
crucial, it is not the only form or the only effect of government action." Any given policy
initiative is of necessity sustained by a rhetorical apparatus designed to make it acceptable to
the citizenry. Presidents - and for that matter all state officials, elected or not - invest a
considerable amount of effort in symbolic gestures more or less empty of 'practical' content,
such as bestowing presidential recognition over particular persons, institutions or ideas.
Neither rhetoric nor symbols need to match the actual impact of policy. Governments can,
and do, carry policies in the exact opposite direction of those expounded by, say, the
intellectuals they celebrate, and at the same time implement policies clearly at odds with the
ideas they claim to defend."
5 For an overview see Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil
Rights; and Hugh Davies Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
6A recent and excellent analysis of Richard Nixon's public persona (or rather, personae) can be found in David
Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 336.
7 For a similar argument applied to Ronald Reagan, see Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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The Nixon team between 1968 and 1974 elevated a common practice to the category of
a fine art when, in the field of civil rights, it consciously embarked on a deliberate effort to
re-adjust the perceived duty of the federal government away from civil rights enforcement,
while at the same time pursuing a moderately successful policy of school integration. It also
did so as a central part of a conservative-leaning symbolic drive to create a new electoral
platform, one designed to serve the political interests of Richard Nixon.8 Attempting to
discern Nixon's own intentions, the 'conservatism' of his policies or the empirical effect of
the administration's initiatives is, in this sense, irrelevant. It may be the case, for instance,
that between 1968 and 1972 Nixon presided over the enrolment of more black southern
schoolchildren in desegregated schools than ever before.9 Yet during this period the
inevitability of de facto school segregation also ceased to be the fallback position of Southern
reaction, and instead became another acceptable argument well within the mainstream of
political debate both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. It is this latter, more difficult to grasp,
aspect of executive policy that is addressed in this chapter. Thus, part one examines the
increasing strain put upon the basic principles that had driven federal policy toward the
expansion of civil rights legislation and enforcement. These developments constituted a
political and ideological milieu external to those engaged in policy-making, but these shifts in
public perception facilitated the Nixon administration's decision to satisfy certain demands
put forward by its Southern white constituency. Part two analyses the internal impact of the
race issue on the conservative movement itself, and assesses the extent to which it shaped the
relationship between different strands of the conservative movement. Finally, part three
evaluates the close relationship between the Nixon camp and Southern conservatives, and the
extent to which the Southerners' demands were indeed satisfied by the administration in the
specific field of school desegregation, as well as the impact of these trade-offs on public
opinion.
8 Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Questfor a New Majority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2004), p. 98.
9 The total number of school children attending all-black schools fell from 40 per cent in 1969 to 12 per cent in 1972,
according to Graham, Civil Rights Era, p. 448.
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1. THE DEMISE OF THE LIBERAL CONSENSUS ON CIVIL RIGHTS
As the 1968 Republican convention approached, the Nixon campaign had welcomed
and fuelled the growing support it was receiving from the Southern conservative wing of the
Republican party. Subsequently, these Southerners remained a solid source of sustenance for
an administration that went to considerable lengths to retain their loyalty. A prime aspect of
the Nixon White House's strategy to maintain this constituency was the administration's
handling of the race issue. Nevertheless, both Nixon's ability to engage with Southern
conservatives and the willingness of Southern Republican cadres to publicly display their
loyalty to the White House were in part due to a combination of factors well outside of any
administration's control. By the time Nixon took office Southern conservatives were in the
process of accepting as inevitable the end of de jure segregation, and had in practice ceased
to demand a full repeal of recent civil rights legislation. Of course, a relatively small, but
significant, sector of the white South's political and economic leadership had been seeking
some form of accommodation in the field of civil rights since the early 1950s, but it was not
until the 1966 and 1968 elections that exhaustion with die-hard resistance became an
increasingly dominant feeling even at grassroots levels.l'' Kevin Phillips, who had helped
mastermind Nixon's 1968 Southern strategy and remained influential in the White House,
was clearly aware of the fact that, as he put it, the Southern conservatives' 'physiological
disposition to fight a hopeless rearguard action' was 'shrinking in the face of the
inevitable'. II
By 1966, Southern Republican leaders were primarily concerned with avoiding an
administration overtly committed to further affirmative action on civil rights matters - and in
particular to integration of Southern schools and the bussing of school children to achieve
10 For an evaluation of Southern white moderates during the 1950s and 1960s see David Alan Horowitz, 'White
Southerners Alienation and Civil Rights: The Response to Corporate Liberalism', Journal of Southern History 54
(May 1988), pp.l73-200; Tony Badger, 'Southerners Who Refused to Sign the Southern Manifesto', Historical
Journal42 (1999), pp. 517~.34.
II Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle NY: Arlington House, 1969), p. 287.
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racially-balanced classrooms everywhere; forestalling any prospect of a civil rights-
committed vice-president; and maintaining a healthy degree of influence within the White
House ..12 Southerners' ability to secure these relatively modest aims was facilitated by the
fact that since 1965, civil rights activism had progressively radicalised and shifted from
seeking the legal enfranchisement of Southern blacks towards a nationwide programme
which was increasingly focused on social and economic inequalities.l'' Republican operatives
and neutral observers alike were fully aware that 'civil rights exhaustion', and the growing
association between race and what were perceived to be soaring crime rates, had gone a good
deal towards explaining the remarkable success of George Wallace's thinly-veiled racist third
party effort in the 1968 election.!"
Furthermore throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Southern resistance to further civil
rights advances began to receive support, albeit indirectly, from rather surprising quarters. A
group of intellectuals, politicians and social scientists deeply embedded in the academic
world and the intellectual circles of New York City, and which had hitherto provided staunch
support for the liberal consensus, progressively turned against what they perceived to be the
excesses of the sixties and the failures of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Dissatisfaction
with civil rights activism would be a prime force propelling these men, later to be known as
'neoconservatives', towards the right.ls These mostly Jewish intellectuals' disenchantment
with liberalism was reaching a peak the same year that Richard Nixon arrived to the White
House. That year, the growing tension between the (mainly Jewish) teachers and the (mostly
black) parents and students of the schools in the New York neighbourhood of Ocean Hill and
Brownsville led to a teachers' strike that effectively signalled the end of the informal pro-
12 Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self Made Man, (New York: Mentor Books, 1970) pp.75,.2.52;
Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980: The Story of the South's Modernization (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1995), p. 394.
13 Graham, Civil Right Era, pp.455-57; Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, pp. 4-14; Godfrey Hodgson World Turned
Right Side Up (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 1996), pp. 64-65.
14 Wills, Nixon Agonistes, pp. 43-47, 331-32; Phillips, Emerging Republican Majority, 136, 138-40; Richard J.
Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 38.
15 The origins of neoconservatism have been accounted for in several excellent studies; see John Ehrman, The Rise of
Neoconservatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who
Are Changing America's Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979); Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were
Right: The Rise of the Neocons, (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).
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civil rights alliance between the Jewish and black communities.l'' The distance separating
black activists and Jewish intellectuals had been increasing for some time: in 1963 Norman
Podhoretz, then a prominent 'radical' New York intellectual and editor of the prestigious
Jewish journal Commentary, published an article in which he questioned liberal 'pieties' on
the race issue. Drawing upon his own experiences of growing up in a racially-mixed
Brooklyn neighbourhood, Podhoretz observed that according to liberals, 'Negroes were
supposed to be persecuted,' and yet, 'such evidence of the senses as comes from being
repeatedly beaten up, robbed, and in general hated, terrorized, and humiliated' seemed to
indicate that 'it was the Negroes who were doing the only persecuting I knew about,.17
During the run up towards the 1972 election, Podhoretz would culminate his apostasy from
the liberal-democratic fold by unleashing a campaign in support of the Nixon in
CommentaryP
Another case in point is provided by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a well known Harvard
academic and Kennedy supporter then working within the Johnson administration. In 1965
Moynihan triggered the fury of civil rights leaders while jumping to nationwide prominence
as a result of penning a Department of Labor study which seemed to suggest that the main
root of African-American socio-economic problems lay in the so-called 'collapse of the black
family'. In the same year, a group ofliberal intellectuals and academics, including Moynihan,
gathered around the pages of a new journal, The Public Interest, which aimed to discuss
issues of public policy - including the problems of 'the Negro American'. By 1968 the
journal had become an immensely prestigious source of comment on the limitations of
government intervention and the iniquities of the Great Society, and in the following year
Moynihan himself could be found working within the Nixon White House and publicly
doubting the efficacy of 1960s civil rights policy.!" A year later, a memorandum from
16 Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, pp. 159-60; Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right., p. 85.
1717 • d i idNorman Podhoretz, 'My Negro Problem - And Ours', Commentary, February 1963, as repnnte In 1 em.,
Commentary Reader (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), pp. 376-77. For Podhoretz's account of his reactions to the
Civil Rights movement, see idem., Breaking Ranks (New York, 1979), pp. 129, 134-35.
18 Interview with Norman Podhoretz, June 28, 2004, telephone.
19 Hodgson, World Turned Right Side Up, pp. 138239, 141; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Coping: Essays on the
Practice of Government (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 198-209, especially pp. 208-209; 'What is the Public
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Moynihan to the president which advocated a period of 'benign neglect' on civil rights issues
was leaked, infuriating African-American leaders (Nixon was enthusiastic about the report's
conclusions). At around the same time Sydney Hook, yet another formerly liberal intellectual
close to the Public Interest circle, was also actively supporting the White House out of
concern about racial quotas and campus violence.i'' Throughout Nixon's first term in office,
the so-called 'neoconservatives' became progressively embedded within the administration.
While Moynihan and Hook actively collaborated with the administration from the inside, Ben
Wattenberg and Richard Scammon, two other Democrats from the Kennedy-Johnson
administrations, published The Real Majority, an analysis of Wallace's campaigns up to 1968
focused on what they called the 'social issue'. The book evaluated the first electoral stirrings
of what has come to be known as the 'backlash' against the permissiveness of the 1960s, and
recommended a political message centred on the 'law and order' issue while emphasising the
growing link between public disturbances and civil rights activism in the public mind. Nixon,
needless to say, was understandably taken by the reasoning. Shortly after the 1968
inauguration, even before the book came out, Wattenberg could already be found operating
on the periphery of the White House as a collaborator with the American Enterprise Institute,
an administration-backed conservative think-tank.i'
Thus, to the delight of the White House, a significant group of formerly Democratic and
(mostly) perceived-as-liberal intellectuals was openly supporting the administration,
questioning what they saw as the 'excesses' of the civil rights movement and hence, at least
implicitly, supporting what would prove to be the rather equivocal White House policy on the
matter. What is more, these intellectuals were prepared to discuss in all seriousness
Interest', The Public Interest, Summer 1966, p. 3 (hereafter PI); Nathan Glazer, 'The Negro American', ibid., Spring
1966, pp. 109.~ 15; Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, p. 38.
20 Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman/rom New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A Biography (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 2000), pp. 157 ~J59; Joseph Baroody memorandum to Charles Colson, October 20, 1970, f. Campus Unrest,
box 44 , Charles W. Colson Materials, Richard Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park ML
(hereafter CC papers, NA).
21 Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1970), pp.
35044, 185CJ99; Mason, Quest/or a New Majority, p. 83; Interview with Melvin Laird, May 16,2006, telephone. It
should be noted that some historians have contested the backlash thesis, see Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority:
Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), and Thomas 1. Sugrue, The
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arguments that were commonly regarded as conservative (and segregationist) euphemisms,
such as the appropriate role of 'state and local action,' or whether desegregating schools was
'less important than getting better schools,.22 To be sure, the role of race relations in the
development of what would later be called neoconservatism should not be overemphasised.
Scammon and Wattenberg noted that most blacks were as sensitive to lawlessness and
permissiveness as whites, and also expressed some delight at what they perceived to be a
'liberalizing' trend toward civil rights enforcement 'even in conservative bastions' _23 In most
cases, these intellectuals' evolving critique of the civil rights movement did not preclude
opposition to, and indeed had little to do with, de jure segregation itself, but stemmed largely
from hostility towards the establishment of racial quotas in universities, alarm about campus
violence, and a general disenchantment with the Great Society. Yet, although the neocons'
motivation sprang from their experiences in the universities and frustration with the perceived
debacle of the Great Society, their arguments against affirmative action had a way of
coinciding with and lending gravitas to similar anti-civil rights views expressed by other
conservative sub-families. Pre-empting the protestations of neoconservatives such as Irving
Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, the classical liberal Milton Friedman had stated the case in a
letter to William F. Buckley nearly ten years earlier. 'The fundamental mission of the
university', Friedman asserted, 'is to provide instruction and the opportunity for the search
for understanding', and nothing else - no matter how 'admirable and desirable' objectives
such as 'clearing slums' or racial equality might be. That was why libertarians also 'fought
against the idea that the universities should be agencies of social change' through, for
. .I 24Instance, racia quotas.
The emergence of the proto-neoconservative critique dramatised in a quite public
manner the increasing erosion of support for further affirmative action outside of the South.
These intellectuals did not question civil rights enforcement out of previously held
22 Glazer, 'The Negro American', pp. 108; 114.
23 Scammon, Real Majority, pp. 238:40, 261. .
24 Milton Friedman to William F. Buckley, April26, 1964, f. 13, box 22, Milton Friedman papers, Hoover Institute,
Palo Alto CA (hereafter MF papers, HI).
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conservative views, or attachment to a segregated way of life: it was the perceived iniquities
1960s civil rights policies that helped to push them towards the right.25 Scammon and
Wattenberg certainly believed that civil rights-related violence and the consequent changing
perception of the movement was 'at the root' of the emergence of the 'social issue'. In 1970,
and employing language which echoed that of George Wallace, Sydney Hook would go as far
as to equate 'benighted' Southern 'racists' with the radical liberal 'homicidal idealists of
Madison, Boston, Rochester and elsewhere' .26 Increasingly, these intellectuals' assaults upon
'bureaucratic inefficiency' differed less from the typical line peddled by conservatives during
the previous decades.f Both the Nixon White House's policy of ingratiating itself with
Southern conservatives, and indeed the Southern conservatives themselves, greatly benefited
from the emergence of this prestigious critique of civil rights. Hence, the critique of civil
rights promoted by individuals who would later be termed as neoconservatives, although not
motivated by support for segregation, strict constructionism, or even a fundamental
disagreement with state interventionism per se, had the effect of sustaining and reinforcing
white Southerners' conservative agenda. This impact was all the more significant because
unlike most conservatives, men like Moynihan, Podhoretz and Hook had operated within the
very liberal community that had originally helped to create and to manage the post-war
liberal consensus, only to discover the limitations of government programmes which,
according to a Public Interest collaborator who again echoed Wallace-type rhetoric, consisted
of having an elite of 'middle-class civil servants hire upper-class students to use lower-class
Negroes' against the 'existing local political systems' .28
25 At this time, conservatives themselves tended to consider these intellectuals as ad-hoc liberal allies against the
excesses of 'radicalism', Interview with Jeffrey Bell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Morton
Blackwell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with William F. Buckley, July 25,2005, New York City;
Interview with David Keene, August 24, 2005, Washington DC.
26 Scammon, Real Majority, p. 42; Sydney Hook, 'Terror on Campus: An Indictment', New York Times, October 22,
1970 (hereafter NY]). Predictably enough, Special Assistant to the President Colson enthusiastically suggested that
the article 'would be worth some wide circulation', Memorandum from Charles Colson to Pat Buchanan, Lyn
Nofziger, Bob Finch, Larry Higby, Jeb Magruder and Jim Keog, October 24, 1970, f. Sydney Hook Centre for
Rational Alternatives, box 72, CC papers.
27 See Robert J. Dwyer, 'I know about the Negroes and the Poor', National Review, December 17, 1963 (hereafter
NR).
28 Interview with David Keene; Aaron Wildavsky, 'The Empty-Head Blues: Black Rebellion and White Reaction', PI,
Spring 1968, p. 3.
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Race was not the only concern of the neoconservatives, and neither was it the case that
all of these intellectuals actually supported Richard Nixon.29 Yet, in 1969 the president's
camp clearly had some justification for concluding that public support for further affirmative
action on civil rights was collapsing, or at the very least, that the popular 'sentiment for
integration' had been 'much higher' in the mid-1950s than it was by the late 1960s.3o As a
consequence, Southern conservatives' relatively limited demands in the field of civil rights
might be met with no negative effects, and perhaps positively good ones for the president's
popularity. The political evolution of Vice-President Spiro Agnew - charged with countering
the Wallacite menace - illustrates how the trajectory followed by the administration mirrored
the evolution of an emerging sector of the public opinion which, like the neoconservatives,
had previously identified with, or at least been neutral towards, the advancement of civil
rights legislation. Although the future vice-president would eventually became an outspoken
conservative, before the 1968 convention Agnew was, in ideological terms, a fundamentally
illiterate, liberal-leaning Republican with strong ties to the Rockefeller wing of the party."
For the most part an unknown quantity, he was at best perceived as 'philosophically
insubstantial'. Not only that: according to a conservative insider, Agnew was also surrounded
by 'political innocents', and his adoption as Nixon's running-mate had 'incensed', among
others, 'many conservatives'v ' Rather than for his then tenuous anti-civil rights credentials,
Agnew had been accepted by the Southerners because he was an unknown quantity who
would not hurt Nixon's appeal among moderate voters and liberal Republicans, and would
also be unlikely to offend the white electorate below the Mason-Dixon Line.33 In fact, his
rightwards shift and emergence onto the national stage began shortly before the convention,
as a result of the riots that broke out after the assassination of Martin Luther King, and
continued as a consequence of his subsequent discovery that a hard-line approach to race-
29 For an overview of these developments see Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 2850357. For Podhoretz's (rather
representative) views on civil rights, see ibid, pp. 118069.
30 William Satire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (Garden City NY: Doubleday,
1975), p. 238.
31 Interview with David Keene.
32 Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Election of 1968
(New York: Viking Press, 1968), pp. 436-50, 457-70; Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, pp. 202-203.
33 Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power (New York: Wiley, 1978), pp. 102-104.
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related disturbances was rather popular among disgruntled white voters. The Nixon
administration was willing to make extensive and ruthless use of this new-found rhetorical
champion, firstly to woo Wallace supporters, and later to assuage dissatisfied conservatives.
Less than a year into the first Nixon administration, its adversaries from the left were already
noting how 'Southern Wallace voters, under the spell of Spiro Agnew' were being 'safely
tucked in the Nixon portfolio,' along with a 'growing number of nervous northern middle-
class suburb anites' .34
Aside from the choice of running-mate, Southern conservatives' other demands were
essentially met by three pledges that Nixon made to his Southern supporters during the
months preceding the Miami convention: to oppose bussing as a means of racial integration;
to appoint conservative strict constructionist, and preferably Southern judges to the Supreme
Court; and to ease the pressure on Southern schools to desegregate." For Nixon, the bussing
issue was relatively easy to handle. Being primarily the responsibility of the courts, all the
president could do was to either protest against it or propose a constitutional amendment
which would expressly prohibit it. Sensing the strong and widespread opposition to the
policy, Nixon systematically attacked the measure in the strongest terms before, during and
after the 1968 election." As for a constitutional amendment, his Southern backers, and
conservatives more broadly, certainly applied a degree of pressure on the White House to go
beyond mere rhetoric, and the administration did contemplate the prospect. 37 Yet both the
Nixon team and its Southern supporters understood that such an amendment had very slim
chances of passage through a Democrat-dominated Congress and, before the run-up to the
1972 election, Nixon was also concerned about the consequences of steering too far to the
right. Regarding the Supreme Court, the White House embarked on a vicious struggle with
34 Wills, Nixon Agonistes, pp. 265-72; 'The World of Richard Nixon and the Congress of the United States',
December 22, 1969, pamphlet published by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, f. Richard Nixon, box
392, Group Research Records, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library (hereafter GR
records).
35 Dent, Prodigal South, pp. 82,97.
36 See 'The Word of Richard Nixon', f. Richard Nixon, box 392, GR records; John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power:
The Nixon Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 222.
37 Patrick Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman, November 17, 1971, f. Haldeman 1971 (f. 1 of 2), box 3, Patrick Buchanan
papers, Nixon Presidential Materials, NA (hereafter PB papers); Charles Colson to Ken Cole, November 2,1971, f.
Conservatives (1), box 52, CC papers.
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Congress over the appointment of collection of conservative judges. According to a leading
Southerner, after two much-publicised showdowns with Congress, 'Richard Nixon was a
hero in the South'. 38 Given the growing collapse of the always superficial popular support for
further expansion of civil rights policies which had been demonstrated by the shifting views
of the neoconservatives and the aloof behaviour of classical liberals, being the hero of the
South was, perhaps for the first time in the post-war period, a useful political asset rather than
a hindrance.
2. RACE AND THE CONSERVATIVEMOVEMENT
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Southern white conservative political leadership
had developed a close relationship with the intellectuals who, through the pages of
publications such as National Review and Human Events, or organisations like the American
Conservative Union (ACU) and Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), were leading the
revival of American conservatism. For instance, following the lead of National Review and
the less sophisticated tabloid Human Events, conservative journals consistently lent space to
white Southern intellectuals' and journalists' defences of segregation. Modern Age, under the
editorship of the prestigious Russell Kirk, incorporated Richard Weaver, a notorious
intellectual champion of the traditional white South, and the conservative Southern journalist
James Jackson Kilpatrick, as editorial advisors and contributors. Even libertarian-leaning
periodicals such as the New Individualist Review were published under the co-sponsorship of
both the libertarian Milton Friedman and the aforementioned Weaver. 39 This relationship
between conservative Southern traditionalists and the other factions within the conservative
community was grounded in a number of shared views regarding race and segregation. In
effect, National Review conservatives attempted to provide what they regarded as a
38 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, p. 89; Dent, Prodigal South, pp. 20L214.
39 Richard Weaver, 'On Setting the Clock Right', NR, October 12,1957; 'Roots of Liberal Complacency', ibid." June
8, 1957; Richard Whalen 'As the South Sees if, ibid., February 13, 1969; 'Semantics vs. the South', Human Events,
February 18, 1960 (hereafter HE); Jesse Helms, 'Falsehoods About the South', ibid., March 11, 1962; 'Editorial
Advisors', Modern Age, vol. 1, no. 1, summer 1957; 'Editorial Advisors', New Individualist Review, April 1961
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respectable argument in defence of segregation in the South, and in the process helped to
secure the position of Southern political conservatives within the broader conservative
community. With the accession of these Southern politicians, the conservative cause would
also acquire a relatively large popular constituency in the South, a region which until the late
1940s had been solidly aligned with the Democratic party and certain aspects of Roosevelt's
New Deal.
Espousing the cause of Southern segregation, however, triggered two less welcomed
effects for the movement as a whole. Firstly, it tarnished conservatism with the stain of racist
reaction at a time when conservatives were consciously struggling to achieve ideological
respectability. Furthermore, the intellectual leadership's stance on race exacerbated the ever-
present tension between the different constituent parts of the conservative movement,
particularly during the second half of the 1960s, and both of these effects would linger on
through the 1970s and 1980s. Yet Richard Nixon's racial policies between 1968 and 1972
represented a turning point because for the first time, a president addressed racial matters
speaking the language created and rehearsed by those very conservative intellectuals. In
short, Nixon helped to soften race-related intra-conservative disputes, which progressively
faded away as the president succeeded to defuse the issue while supporting the case of the
white South on conservative grounds.
The first line of the rhetorical defence of segregation peddled by the Buckleyites was,
much like that of Southern conservatives, to flatly deny that there was any 'objective basis' to
support the claim that the United States (one of the 'least racist countries in the world') had
any particularly virulent race problem at all. In fact, National Review articles and Thurmond
speeches were equally prone to blame the 'utter distortions of reality' promoted by
criminally-minded civil rights activists for the growing racial violence of the 1960s.40 The
criminalisation of civil rights campaigners was reinforced by the alleged association between
40 Jeffrey Hart to Lyn Nofzliger, April 8, 1968, f. 1. Hart, box 50, William F. Buckley Jr. papers, Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale University Library (emphasis in the original) (hereafter WFB papers); William Rusher to William F.
Buckley June 21, 1963, f. Negro Question, box 40, ibid.
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African-American activists and international communism. The Washington Report, published
by an influential anticommunist business group, was quite blunt on this subject: in 1968 it
cited five examples of cities and towns in which 'the Communist Party or Communist splinter
groups had sought actively to inject themselves in legitimate civil rights activities' .41 At
around the same time National Review looked into the issue as well, and denounced the
alleged links between 'Negro militants in America and subversive guerrillas in Latin
America', while noting that 'some leaders of the US civil rights movement are responding to
directives coming out of Havana,.42 After 1969 that conservative critique filtered into the
White House and Nixon's Justice Department deliberately placed civil rights activists in the
same category as common delinquents and, particularly after Martin Luther King declared his
opposition to the war in Vietnam, with the radical left generally.f To be sure, the Johnson
administration had not shied away from treating civil rights activists as criminals or
communists and had accordingly put them under surveillance, but the Nixon White House put
that strategy at the heart of its public relations operation, taking it to the national press rather
vociferously and in terms much reminiscent of both Southern and National Review
conservatives." Thus, after the 1965 Watts riots, the ACU released a statement blaming the
peaceful protests led by King for the explosion of violence. According to the ACU, "'non-
violent" protest of necessity leads to total mob action'. The Nixon administration, through
Vice-President Agnew, peddled the same argument with such enthusiasm that even an aide to
George Wallace acknowledged in Battle Line that Agnew could (and did) 'do a damn good
selling job' on Wallace's Southern turf.45According to Nixon and his conservative supporters
of all stripes, the civil rights problem was, more than anything, a matter of public order.
41 'Summer, 1968 - Riot or Rebellion?', Washington Report, April 15, 1967.
42 Paul D. Bethel, 'Black Power and Red Cuba' NR, September 21968.
43 'Nixon Seeks Conference with Hoover over Disorders', HE, September 21,1968; 'Mardian, The Team Player, The
Loyalist in Hiding', Washington Post, July 8, 1973 (hereafter WP); Interview with Howard Phillips, September 7
2005, Washington DC.
44 'Soaring Crime Rates', Strom Thurmond Reports to the People, August 30,1965 and 'The Radical Le~', Strom
Thurmond Reports to the People, May 31,1965, f. Thurmond, box 313, GR records; 'Dict~torship ofCh~ldren Around
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During the 1950s and 1960s most conservatives ranging from traditionalists to
libertarian free-marketers through neoconservatives - offered critiques of civil rights
legislation and affirmative action on grounds that were at least ostensibly non-racist. Such
conservatives, in contrast to Strom Thurmond and others of his ilk, opted instead to
emphasise legalistic arguments grounded on 'strict construction' of the Constitution;
idealised analyses of society as a slow-changing organic structure; or negative judgements on
government efficacy to effect change." The leadership of the conservative movement 0 and
particularly the more tradition-minded conservatives 0 had for the previous twenty years
fully shared in the Southern white strategy of opposition to federally-imposed integration.
National Review, as the voice of intellectual conservatism, had dedicated itself to supporting
the delay of implementation, and also argued against any further expansion of civil rights
legislation - basically coinciding with the approach of the Southern bloc. As far as the
Buckleyites were concerned, segregation was the product of the South's spontaneous social
development: federal interference was not only unconstitutional - it also risked wreaking
havoc over the region's social fabric. An illustrative and typical example is provided by a
1957 editorial, in which the magazine articulated its standard line on race. 'The South does
not deprive the negro of the vote for the sake of depriving him of the vote', it helpfully
informed African-Americans. Far from such a thing: disfranchisement reflected the fact that
'the White community merely intends to prevail- that's all', on 'any issues on which there is
a corporate disagreement between Negro and White'. Besides, according to the magazine,
'the great majority of the Negroes in the South do not vote and do not care to vote, and would
not know for what to vote if they could." The stand remained essentially unchanged: on the
eve of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights act, National Review's editors continued to
harbour 'frank reservations about the wisdom' of the Brown decision.48
46
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As the voice of sober conservatism aimed at acquiring respectability, National Review
usually stopped short of more blatant strains of racism, although at the same time it did
occasionally indulge in 'explorations' of the relationship between race and intelligence."
Instead, the editors opted for a combination of paternalism and what might be described as
xenophobia. According to this view, Southern blacks possessed a distinct culture that was
both alien and inferior to that of whites. Indeed some conservatives considered black culture
to be sufficiently foreign to justify their support for the draft on the grounds that 'a volunteer
army would attract.. .specifically blacks', and 'we don't want to be dependent upon a black
army to defend us'. 50 In fact, the Buckleyites articulated a view of African-Americans that
was astonishingly close to the one that National Review was applying to the newly-
independent African nations during the 1950s and 1960s. Hence, it followed that African-
Americans deserved about the same treatment that the British had dispensed to the Kenyans
and the French to the Algerians, all in the name of preserving a superior European culture.
The substance of the hard core's analysis of race relations in Alabama and Georgia was
virtually identical to that applied to South Africa and Rhodesia. It was argued that the
political enfranchisement of black Rhodesians was undesirable because white Rhodesians
saw the 'one man one vote' principle as 'a form of reverse racism' which 'would destroy the
white community completely and deprive the country of all the techniques of a modem
society'. Hence, 'the franchise should call for a high degree of education and other
qualifications'. Similarly, as black Rhodesians should expect the advent of full political
equality' gradually', so segregation it) the United States should last 'for whatever period it
takes to effect a genuine equality between the races', or in other words, according to
conservatives, for as long as it took blacks both in the United States and in Africa to become
'westernized' - that is, socially and culturally 'white'. Subsequently, the editors of National
Review reached the 'sobering' conclusion that Southern whites were 'entitled to prevail'
because 'for the time being' they were 'the advanced race', much like the Rhodesian whites
Who had created a 'western, parliamentary and democratic society' in parallel to a black
49
50 E~est Van Den Haag, 'Intelligence or Prejudice?', NR, December 1, 1964.
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'tribal society'. In both cases it was asserted that 'the claims of civilization supersede those of
universal suffrage'. For conservatives the strength of those claims was limited only by their
concern about white violence. Hence, segregation in the United States should only last 'so
long as' it contributed to the enlightenment of African-Americans 'by humane charitable
means,' just as white Rhodesians ought to 'tamper with the tribal society' only through
'example and persuasion' .51 Seemingly, National Review conservatives remained entirely
oblivious to the fact that Southern 'persuasion' was becoming increasingly violent throughout
the 1950s and 1960s. But then, these were men who believed that school segregation below
the Mason-Dixon Line 'was made essential by the social geography of the South', whereupon
'through of no fault of their own, Negro children are markedly different from the well-
mannered Negro children' who attended 'northern schools,.52 This, no doubt, also helped to
explain why 'the South African idea' of apartheid might help to 'bridge the gap between
tribalism and urban civilisation' .53
The conservative intellectual leadership also integrated the white South's rearguard
action against civil rights legislation within a libertarian-based broad opposition to
'government interference with the individual' and to the 'socialist' tendencies of the Great
Society. 54In this sense, a significant portion of the free-market libertarian-leaning wing of the
conservative movement played an absolutely crucial role D and was considerably more
sUccessful than the Buckleyites D in providing Southern whites with a consistent and
seemingly colour-blind argument to sustain segregation: civil rights legislation was equated
51 'A Clarification', NR, August 31, 1957, p. 199; 'The South's Travail', National Review Bulletin, March 14, 1960;
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with government regulation. Many libertarians reached the same conclusions defended by
Southern political leaders who, in the 1956 'Southern Manifesto', had denounced the federal
'dictatorship' from other end of the conservative ideological spectrum. That stand was quite
efficiently abstracted by the New Individualist Review, a prominent libertarian journal. 'None
can deny that discrimination solely on the basis of race is morally indefensible,' it argued.
'But the right to discriminate, the right to express a preference in the use of one's property
which is at variance with the prevailing majority sentiment is of the very essence of liberty' .55
Along very similar lines, Milton Friedman was particularly candid on the matter. Beginning
with the assumption that black Americans had 'progressed a good deal since the nineteenth
century', he also noted that such a development had occurred 'thanks to market mechanisms',
and that 'this progress has been actually slowed down by government intervention' .56
Friedman took the reasoning to its logical, practical conclusion in a 1973 letter to
Patrick Buchanan, who was then still serving as Nixon's advisor. 'The ultimate goal' of the
administration in the area of schooling, according to Friedman, ought to be 'the complete
elimination of governmental finance as well as operation, except perhaps in cases of extreme
distress' .57 Needless to say, this also implied ceasing to interfere with de facto segregated
schools. Frank Meyer, a free-marketeer and National Review senior staffer, had noted ten
years previously that 'while maintenance of equality before the law is a function of
government', other issues such as 'social customs and attitudes' were 'not the concern of
government'. He therefore reached the type of conclusion that Richard Nixon would later
peddle from the White House: 'segregation laws and integrating laws', Meyer claimed, 'are
equally wrong' .58 A few years later, and shortly before Nixon's accession to power, Leonard
Read - the head of the radical libertarian Foundation for Economic Education - lambasted
the 'application of coercion to education' and demanded a full withdrawal of state,
intervention because 'universal education may be a worthy objective. But when coercion is
55
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applied, compelling universal attendance, it becomes necessary to "scrape the bottom of the
barrel" to find teachers. The qualified teachers are "watered down" by the unqualified,
turning the trend away from excellence and toward mediocrity'. 59 Even though many
libertarians genuinely disagreed with the moral iniquities of segregation, by performing
something of an exercise in selective dogmatism, their opposition to 'big government' and
'state interference' in the economic realm led them to oppose civil rights legislation as well.
In the process, libertarian conservatives also appealed to a deep-seated streak of conservative
grassroots resentment and mistrust of the federal authorities that civil rights legislation had
done nothing but exacerbate. The fact that such legislation was in place precisely to preserve
the individual rights of African-Americans seems to have gone unnoticed.6o
Yet, as the mainstream of American politics absorbed the right to legal racial equality as
a given, the National Review conservatives' approach to race created a degree of tension
within the broader conservative movement. Religious beliefs led a number of Catholic
conservative intellectuals and a few devout Protestant Southern politicians such as North
Carolina representative Charles B. Deane to denounce segregation." Garry Wills, a former
seminarian who became one of the brightest conservative rising stars and was William F.
Buckley's protege, realised by the late 1960s that conservative views on race either ignored
the point of view of African-Americans, or portrayed them as a threat to the existing white-
dominated Southern society. In a blunt letter of 1967 to Buckley, Wills asserted that
conservatives only understood one South: the white South. 'That is not enough anymore,' he
declared, 'in fact only to understand one side - black or white - is not even to understand
that' .62 Nearly a decade earlier L. Brent Bozell, a radical conservative Catholic, Buckley's
brother-in-law, National Review editor - and himself no shrinking violet when it came to
59 Leonard Read, 'Look to the Stars', January 1967 pamphlet released by the Foundation for Economic Education, f.
2, box 23, Henry Regnery papers, HI (hereafter HR papers).
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accusing the 'Negro leadership' of deliberately 'singling out for violence' certain Southern
cities - had vigorously contested the magazine's cavalier nonchalance in the face of what he
regarded as a clear violation of both the United States Constitution and basic Christian
principles. After all, National Review's position on civil rights was, Bozell correctly
emphasised, particularly poignant from self-proclaimed strict constructionists and defenders
of the Christian West.63 Ten years later, Garry Wills would leave the magazine and the
conservative movement altogether amidst some acrimony, largely out of discontent with the
. . 64position on race.
In a similar vein, the hard core's ambivalence towards the plight of African-Americans
also helped to increase the tension between traditionalists and those libertarians who believed
that the Buckleyites only considered the rights of 'Anglo-Saxons'. Thus, the libertarians of
the New Individualist Review had no qualms about denouncing what they regarded as the
'mindless racism' of National Review conservatives, and the influence of what they saw as
'segregationists and reactionaries' within organisations such as the Young Americans for
Freedom. 65 This conflict would indeed playa part in precipitating the near implosion of the
conservative movement's youth wing. In December 1969, the entire California branch of
YAF, as well as the most active parts of the New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania state
organisations threatened a collective walkout. According to David Friedman, Milton
Friedman's son and then a leading young libertarian, the event would have meant the loss of
the 'bigger associations, with the most active leaders'i'" Eventually, the California state
organisation was disbanded, and the issue even surfaced in the national the press. Tensions
about race had the power to intensify the petty power struggles within the YAF leadership
and the general strain between traditionalist conservatism and radical libertarianism in the
63 L. Brent Bozell, 'The Lesson of Cambridge ... and Salisbury. Was Violence Necessary?', NR, August 27,1957;
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broadest sense. William F. Buckley, Lee Edwards, David Keene and Morton Blackwell, all
either closely related or founding members of the organisation, coincide in emphasising the
former as routinely triggering crises within YAF.67 Yet, race also became a particularly sore
element of libertarian-traditionalist ideological tension throughout the 1960s. Many young
libertarians objected to what they saw as National Review's devotion to 'a polite form of
white supremacy'. Others, like a young Floridian activist, voiced disgust at the perceived
'incorporation of racists, know-nothings and anti-Semites' into the movement." As early as
1964, some libertarian YAFers deplored their organisation's self-identification as
'conservative', and genuinely (but mistakenly) believed that its views were based 'largely on
the concepts of pre-1880 English liberalism. Namely: freedom, rationality' and 'the
perfectibility of all men' .69 In fact, the conservative youth was even more divided than its
elders. For instance YAF's own organ The New Guard labelled Strom Thurmond 'a man of
courage' and trumpeted the fact that the senator 'has been one of our most outspoken
supporters'. It was also not afraid of labelling civil rights protests 'unchristian' and 'a threat
to our system oflaw', or of even claiming that the main 'problem' with the African-American
was that 'on average, he lacks a desire to improve himself and lacks a willingness to
discipline himself to this end'. 70
If the race issue provoked some tension between different conservative sensibilities, it
also forced the Buckleyites and the conservative community at large to adjust to the new
political reality brought about by black enfranchisement. Thus, by the early 1970s the
movement's intellectual leadership had come to understand at least the electoral rationale of a
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much softer approach to civil rights. In 1970, National Review lent its pages to Vincent S.
Baker, an African-American conservative keen to remind his fellow travellers that America's
blacks 'wanted in' to the conservative movement and the Republican party." Eventually,
some conservative operatives came to regret, and recanted from, their previous opposition to
civil rights legislation. As early as 1968 National Review, although still concluding that full
desegregation was a near-impossibility, celebrated the limited success of a locally managed
experiment in integration in Shaker (Ohio). Jeffrey Bell, a young conservative operative who
worked for the Nixon campaign is quite illustrative of this shift: 'I was never a racist or a
segregationist, but at one time I questioned the need to have national laws on things like
public accommodations. I later realised that you did need that'. 72 Eventually many, indeed
virtually all, libertarians declared their support for civil rights legislation, but continued to
oppose affirmative action generally and racial quotas in particular.P In 1970 even William F.
Buckley applauded the judicial decision calling upon Governor Kirk of Florida to obey the
law, and defined Kirk's Wallace-like racial sabre-rattling as 'grandstanding against the
law'.74 However irresponsible and intellectually inconsistent their approach to racial issues
may have been, National Review conservatives do appear to have been genuinely free from
consciously racist motives. Hence as their Southern brethren shifted towards a more
respectable position led by no less than the president, they followed their cue. This should not
be equated with unequivocal support for integration, but merely as a reproduction of the
strategy of Southern conservatives, who had also shifted towards supporting de facto
segregation on the right side of the law. James Jackson Kilpatrick, for instance, was quite
clear on the matter: although sixteen years after the Brown decision he recognised that
'segregation is dead as a permissible legal device', he still believed that it nevertheless
survived 'in fact and human nature'. Kirkpatrick then proceeded to peddle the typical
Southern discourse that would also be reproduced by President Nixon, arguing that 'the
constitution [and Brown] does not require affirmative measures to undo de facto separation,'
71 Vincent S. Barker, 'Black Americans Want In', NR, August 25,1970.
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and concluded by expressing his 'own conviction' that 'the problems will be tolerably
resolved through the return to old principles of community'. 75
The conservative critique of 1960s civil rights legislation was also reiterated by the
Nixon administration in its efforts to legitimise policies designed to secure and maintain the
political collaboration of the conservative white South. Thus the repeated attempts to appoint
Southern-friendly judges to the Supreme Court were defended by the White House as
intended to equilibrate the Court with 'strict constructionist' voices. According to Nixonites,
much like conservative activists, such debates about legal philosophy were entirely unrelated
to the race issue." The public at large and the mainstream press had no trouble connecting
the dots outlining Nixon's conservative strategy and the Southern strategy's role within it.
For instance, in October 1969, the New York Times noted that the administration's 'retreat'
from civil rights activism, the nomination of Judge Haynsworth to the Supreme Court and the
tactic of shifting responsibility for desegregating Southern schools to the courts had been
'prompted by political pressure from Southern conservatives'. More importantly, it noted that
although 'this has sometimes been called the "Southern strategy" of Mr. Nixon and Mr.
Mitchell", the "'forgotten American" whose feelings it seeks to sooth may hold the political
balance in many crucial Northern areas as well'. Even more interestingly, the Times also
emphasised that Nixon's Southern strategy also included such standard conservative pieties
as 'giving states a freer hand', and was clothed in standard conservative rhetoric, as
exemplified by the president's promise to prevent the federal government from 'grabbing
power from the people' in 'transportation and other realms', as well as in civil rights and
education matters.77
On the ground in the South, even prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights act and
Barry Goldwater's inversion of New Deal electoral alignments, conservative observers had
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been noting the rise in black electoral registration. Southerners fully realised that, in the
words of James Jackson Kilpatrick, 'vastly more Southern negroes will be voting in the
future', and wondered about the effects of such a development on party alignments." By
1966, Arkansas had elected Winthrop Rockefeller as its first Republican (and integrationist)
governor since Reconstruction, a path that was followed in 1969 by Virginia which also
elected, for the first time, a Republican governor with liberal-leaning instincts in the field of
civil rightS.79 That same year, conservatives hailed the emergence of a 'new South', which
had been epitomized during Nixon's 1968 campaign by the embryonic Republican Party
apparatus and its opposition to George Wallace. Conversely, in 1971 Floridians had also
rejected the candidacy of Claude Kirk when the then-governor opted for a Wallace-style
strategy of racial populism.t" Other Southern conservatives avoided Kirk's miscalculated tum
to the populist right. In fact, the most skilled ones had no trouble understanding either
Nixon's equivocal message towards African-Americans or the behaviour of their suddenly
successful, relatively liberal colleagues.l' Harry Dent's reaction to the publication of The
Emerging Republican Majority is quite illustrative. Thurmond's man in the White House
advised the president that the White House 'should not try to repudiate the book'. Yet Dent
also counselled that the administration 'should not permit it to be the "gospel according to
Richard Nixon" either. After all, he concluded, 'we are writing off no state and no vote'.
Moreover, and rather disingenuously for someone who has been variously defined as
'important for Nixon's Southern strategy' and as having 'a lot influence' in Nixon's dealings
with Southern Republicans, Dent also added that 'I know nothing about any Southern
strategy, anyway' .82
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But then, political metamorphoses were nothing new in Southern politics. George
Wallace's decade-long racist political career had been preceded by a refusal to join
Thurmond's third-party Dixiecrats in the 1948 Democratic convention. It originated after
losing his first gubernatorial race as a consequence of being 'out-niggered' by his opponent,
and eventually concluded when Wallace fully recanted his racism and joined the race to woo
the African-American vote.83 Thurmond, rather similarly - except that he never received any
flak from the conservative movement - had run in 1947 as an orthodox New Deal liberal
firmly in favour of federal support for, of all things, education as well as welfare programmes
while maintaining, for Southern standards, a relatively moderate stand on the race issue"
Regardless of his pro-market rhetoric Thurmond was also an accomplished manager of
federal funding and according to conservative insiders, a substantial proportion of the federal
'pork' supplied by the Nixon administration to South Carolina went to 'Strom Thurmond's
black projects'. In fact, old-fashioned 'pork-barrel' politics enabled him to reach out to
African-Americans while minimizing the potential alienation of his traditional white base of
support. From the early 1970s, as race progressively became less of a focal issue within
Southern politics, both Thurmond and (rather spectacularly) Wallace, managed to remain in
the limelight by reconciling themselves, at least to some extent, with their black
constituents/"
Since the mid-1950s, the hard core had developed a close relationship with Southern
conservatives, one in which the former provided some form of intellectual legitimacy and
obtained in return a relatively influential political arm, as well as the broader constituency
that came with it. Nevertheless the price of this collaboration for Buckleyites was the
perception that they were plainly racist, a perception which was underlined by the heightened
tension with other conservatives less comfortable with the hard core's stance. Of course the
relationship between the Buckleyites and the Southerners was not static. Over time, it
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American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 88, 96.
84
Bass, 0[' Strom, pp. 83-86.
85 Interview with David Keene; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Bass, 0[' Strom, p. 289, 296-302; Cohodas, Strom
Thurmond, pp. 446-52; Carter, Politics of Rage.
144
evolved towards more moderate, pragmatic positions that accepted the legal gains of the civil
rights movement. But the conservative community never seriously held any pretensions of
acquiring substantial black support, platitudes to the opposite notwithstanding. Most
conservatives followed Buckley's example and defended states' rights while denying any
racist undertones to their position. Consistently they supported Nixon's open indifference
towards de facto segregation and his efforts to paralyse any further measures designed to
promote racial equality. After all, President Nixon sustained his own political stand on the
race issue with the conservative canon.86
3. SCHOOL DESEGREGA nON AND THE RHETORIC OF POLICY-MAKING
The most troublesome civil rights issue faced by the Nixon administration concerned
the desegregation of Southern schools. Unlike bussing, the principle of equal education - at
least in an abstract sense and where legally segregated Southern schools were concerned -
retained a considerable degree of popular support. Moreover, in contrast to the question of
judicial appointments, school desegregation disputes were quite likely to degenerate into
highly emotional, even violent, conflicts. The Johnson administration's tactic for enforcing
the Brown decision had been to threaten segregated schools with the cutting off of federal
funding, which would be carried out through the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW). By the time of Nixon's inauguration, most Southern schools remained
segregated and the federal government was still struggling, ineffectively and to the irritation
of all concerned, to impose the Supreme Court's ruling. Yet, somehow, by 1974 Nixon had
managed to both defuse the issue and effectively desegregate the majority of Southern
schools. Of course Southern conservatives were well aware that school desegregation, unlike
bussing, was perceived as an issue which mainly concerned Southern schools, and it therefore
retained relatively high levels of nationwide popular support. They had finally acknowledged
86 Gordon Tullock, 'The Hereditary Southerners and the 1968 Election', Gordon Tullock, 'The Hereditary Southerners
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that de jure segregation had to end. Harry Dent, the administration's resident Southerner, had
no qualms about stating, in a memorandum sent to the president early in 1969, that
'deliberate segregation and the dual school system concept must be eliminated'. 87
These sentiments were not limited to those Southerners operating within the White
House. Even local Republican cadres below the Mason-Dixon Line had virtually given up on
the issue. In fact, as Florida governor Claude Kirk found out in 1971, a populist, die-hard
Wallace-style approach to school segregation could very well backfire with the electorate.
Elsewhere in the South local activists were clearly changing their tactics from confrontation
to equivocation. In February 1970, John E. Courson, the financial director of South
Carolina's Republican Party 'realized' that the state's executive branch had 'no constitutional
right to ignore judicial decisions', and claimed that in fact South Carolina had 'long been
reconciled to the fact that integration is the law and has not doubted its validity'. 88 A little
earlier in the year, another South Carolina Republican appealed to Dent on behalf of his local
school district. Far from refusing to integrate the schools, the missive merely requested a six-
month postponement in the schedule to desegregate, enough, he claimed, until a new school
was built. 89 A similar letter from Laurence McIntosh, also from South Carolina, emphasised
that local whites realised that 'some workable plan for carrying out the desegregation of this
school district must be arranged', and volunteered a scheme that, according to McIntosh, was
both 'legally sound under the applicable statues and court decisions' and, crucially, 'a plan
with which the community can live'. Yet a fourth disgruntled Southerner reminded Dent th~t
his local education board was struggling against federal officers in trying to implement 'a
workable plan which will not go the way of Washington and Wilmington' in triggering an
eruption of violence, while another of Dent's correspondents joined the chorus of protests
against HEW, but took pains to establish that his school board had done an 'honest,
87 Dent, Prodigal South, p. 123.
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straightforward, conscientious job of trying to integrate our schools in keeping with the
federal law' .90
This is not to say that Southern conservatives had suddenly embraced or even
reconciled themselves with the prospect of meaningful racial integration. Rather, it meant that
local white conservatives opted for a softer approach, which consisted of refusing to go
beyond a rather narrow interpretation of the law in their still-dogged attempts to perpetuate de
facto segregation. This tactic had been advocated (without much success) by a minority of
'moderate' white Southern politicians and businessmen ever since the 1950s.91 The
fundamental novelty was that hard-line political leaders, local cadres and grassroots activists
seemed to have abandoned frontal opposition as well. The missive from Laurence McIntosh
to Dent is particularly candid on the matter. According to McIntosh, although the 'citizens' of
his area were prepared to comply with federal law, HEW's plan was 'completely
unworkable' because it was, shockingly enough, 'designed to produce a maximum degree of
integration', and those unnamed 'citizens' would not be compelled to send their children to a
school where they would be a minority. Thus, if 'for example' white children wanted to stay
in such a school, that would be 'all right' with the school board, but if some of them preferred
to transfer to a predominantly white school, 'they should be allowed'. Needless to say, blacks
would be given the same choice afforded to the aforementioned, and would be able to either
attend any school of their choosing, so long as they remained a minority, or to transfer to
black-dominated schools.92
In different ways, much of the school-related Southern correspondence to Southern-
friendly administration officials such as Dent and HEW's assistant secretary Robert Mardian
had similar undertones. Southern school authorities attempted to block actual integration with
'freedom of choice' plans; defences of 'neighbourhood schools' coupled with shameless
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gerrymandering of school districts if the patterns of housing were not organically segregated;
accusations that HEW's officials were engaged, precisely, in gerrymandering for the sake of
integration; and heartfelt proclamations in defence of 'quality of education'; not to mention
pointed protests about federal bias against the South. For instance, in June 1969, John E.
Courson's protestations of integrationist impetus were accompanied by a lengthy explanation
of how the small size of certain schools which were still in the process of being built as part
of the desegregation plans in the district would simply not allow for full practical
integration." Don Albergotti wrote on behalf of a Florence, South Carolina school district
expressing horror at HEW's plan to desegregate because the only purpose of the
aforementioned plan was 'to accomplish total racial integration'. Nevertheless, Albergotti
emphasised that the district had a track record of compliance and that the local whites' main
concern was the plan's 'detrimental effect on education' .94 Another Republican official, this
time from Georgia, again had no trouble acknowledging that segregation was indeed
'discriminatory'. Yet, he complained bitterly about HEW's own 'rank discrimination' against
Southern schools vis-a-vis those, de facto segregated but unmolested institutions that
happened to be situated north of the Mason-Dixon Line, and demanded equal treatment for
his own schools." Similarly, E. F. Lucas, who had proudly noted the success of the
desegregation efforts of his school district in North Carolina, also thought that the district was
'unique' in having a residential pattern which placed '91% of the total Negro population' in
one single area of the city. While Lucas did not know how such an unfortunate fact could
have come to pass, he was quite aware that the only remaining all-black schools remained
there - including an unspecified number of new ones built precisely in that area of the city
after the initiation of the actual process of desegregation. However, he could not 'for the life
of me figure out' how desegregating those (new and pre-existing) schools was going to work
'on a practical basis', since that would require bussing for white children. Somewhat
reiteratively, he also asserted that 'all of us involved in the school business should spend our
93 John Edward Courson to Harry Dent, February 6, 1970, ibid.
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time and energies on educating the children', and presumably invest a little less time and
resources in meaningful desegregation."
Unfortunately for the likes of E. F. Lucas, neither HEW's officials nor civil rights
activists seem to have seen things in this light. According to an outraged South Carolinian,
HEW's compliance officials 'insisted that no plan was constitutional if it resulted in an all-
Negro school', and instead appeared to have assumed that such schemas were nothing but
ways of bypassing the law to replace de jure segregation with de facto segregation." As a
HEW officer working in Alabama put it, hearings in the state's Washington County rather
illustratively revealed 'a picture of token desegregation'. Noting that the school authorities
had not been 'unreasonable' in their approach to school integration, he nevertheless
concluded that they had not moved 'rapidly, decisively or adequately'. In fact, according to
this officer, such tactics 'might produce more segregation': unsurprisingly, such plans were
usually rejected by the department."
The reaction of Southern conservatives to these setbacks was, however, somewhat
nuanced: even if the aim was to exert pressure on the administration through a rather
shameless form of electoral blackmail, Nixon's personal reputation among his Southern
white constituents seems to have been left largely unscathed. Thus, in June 1969, John
Courson's explanations of his district's prevarication were accompanied by the pointed
observation that HEW's activities were creating a 'credibility gap' between the
administration and its white South Carolinian voters." In December 1969 South Carolina's
The State wondered whether the president was 'speaking from both sides of the mouth' and
'retreating' from his campaign promises to cease integrating schools 'for integration's sake'
and to have 'no more bussing'. Yet, The State also maintained that 'the implications' of its
own musings were perhaps 'harsher than the Nixon administration deserves', and contented
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itself with demanding that Robert Finch, then HEW's Secretary, be kept in line with Nixon's
campaign utterances in the South or be replaced. Two weeks later, the paper was still
confident that the horrors of HEW were the consequence of Secretary Finch's deviation from
Nixon's own philosophy.100 In mid-19@, \\O\l~\c)l\lt~lt~~l\\a\\\TeJim Eartbman organised
the mailing of 50,000 letters opposing bussing on the grounds it would 'lead to impairment of
mental health' among youngsters while at the same time creating an 'educational monarchy'.
Yet together with the ritual agreement with 'equal educational opportunities for all American
citizens regardless of race, creed or color', the signatories squarely put the blame on 'a
previous administration' and unruly officials at the Justice Department.l'" Alvin J. Wall of
Charleston, writing to Dent on behalf of yet another desegregating school district maintained,
rather menacingly, that unless HEW's 'meddling' in the state's 'local affairs' ceased, he was
'confident that some energetic reporter' would find out about South Carolina's school
problems with HEW officials. Such a thing, wrote Wall, would surely have harmful effects
for the standing of both Nixon and the GOP at large in the state. Yet Wall's specific demands
were limited to requesting that something be done to bring 'Secretary Finch's public
utterances more in line with his private directions' and Nixon's 'campaign promises' .102
Clearly, as far as most Southern Republican conservatives were concerned, the sincerity of
Nixon's campaign promises and the president's personal sympathy for the plight of white
Southerners were not matters of doubt.
During the early months of 1969 HEW - if haphazardly and unsystematically - had
indeed threatened to cut off federal funding to Southern schools, and this pledge was
occasionally implemented.l'" Observing the situation, Georgia Republican G.Paul Jones
wrote to John Sears, a deputy counsel to the president, summing up the implications from a
point of view fully understood by the president's men. Jones pointed out that
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if, in 1970, it can be accurately and truthfully said that the Richard Nixon
administration did not cut off the funds of a single school district for lunch
programmes or for educational programs, we have a political plus that almost defies
the imagination. We would be off a (sic) running, and 1970 and 1972 will offer
unbelievable potential for Republican gains in the South.104
Nixon seems to have agreed. In July 1970, the president ordered his troops to cease 'catering
to liberals and integrationists to our political disadvantage' .105 In fact, by then White House
political operatives were already systematically seeking to comer their Democratic
counterparts into publicly supporting affirmative action on school integration, in the belief
that a clear pro-civil rights stand would damage the latter's electoral standing. As historian
Robert Mason has indicated, Nixon's interest in the fortunes of Republican candidates during
the 1970 mid-term elections was limited. This was not, however, the case when it came to his
own prospects for 1972. In December 1970, Charles Colson, a senior advisor to the president,
was brutally candid on the matter. In a memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, Colson declared
that
The Ribicoff bill to force integration of white suburban schools is the greatest piece of
political gold to drop in our laps ... It is my suggestion that we engineer some
pressure ... [in] all states in which Democratic Senators will be up for election in 1972
to try to force Democrats to co-sponsor the bill ... This should be done fast to try to get
them to give it a reflex reaction endorsement. We should not miss this opportunity
under any circumstance.l'"
Resistance to federally-imposed school integration and particularly to bussing were not only
useful tools to harm Democratic aspirations. These were also crucial elements of what
Scammon and Wattenberg had termed the 'social issue' or, as far as the Nixon White House
was concerned, the central themes in the consolidation of a new Republican majority made
up of suburban, middle-class and blue-collar support in the North, together with the mass of
the white Southern vote.
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In electoral terms, this strategy had been first articulated in a formal way by Kevin
Phillips, who by mid-1968 already claimed to be 'plugged in absolutely' with the campaign.
According to Phillips himself, he had achieved a quite remarkable feat within the Nixon
organisation: 'any memorandum I write' he claimed, 'gets to the top of the heap [read
Richard Nixon] in five minutes' .107 His influence certainly did not fade away after election
night either. In early 1970, when John Ehrlichman, in his capacity as the administration's
domestic issues 'supremo', tried to resist what he saw as 'the pure conservative line which
Phillips peddles', he was castigated with a week long 'big freeze', or complete cut-off from
the president - which in tum triggered the near paralysis of decision-making in domestic
policy. Although Nixon eventually changed track and re-instated Ehrlichman, Phillips
retained a considerable influence over the president's mind. Most importantly, by then,
Southern whites and blue-collar and middle-class northern constituencies were seen by the
administration as responding to virtually the same issues and, according to Charles Colson,
were Richard Nixon's 'natural constituencies' .108
In policy terms, the first measure taken by the administration to satisfy its Southern
supporters was to appoint Southern-friendly staffers to the desegregation machinery. That
approach culminated in February 1970 when - facing a considerable degree of internal
infighting and external pressure - the administration, at the urgings of Dent and the other
members of the Southern lobby created a cabinet-level committee on school desegregation.
This committee, Georgia representative Howard Callaway warned Secretary Robert Finch -
then entrusted with the federal machinery for school desegregation - 'must be believable in
the South' and hence made up of men who 'at least have no bias against the South'. 109 By
July 1970, Robert Mardian, a notorious Southern sympathiser, and Patrick Gray, yet another
107 Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President (New York: Pocket Books 1970), p.126. Phillips' analysis was
published shortly after the election as The Emerging Republican Majority. For a rather horrified overview of Phillips'
stand, see Wills, Nixon Agonistes, pp. 246C53.
108 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, pp.212-22; Haldeman, Diaries, p. 145; Mason, Questfor a New Majority, pp. 67,
77,100-101; Charles W. Colson memorandum to the President 'Recommendations in accordance with Haldeman's
memorandum of November 7th" November 19, 1970, f. Memorandums to the President, box 3, CC papers.
109 Dent, The Prodigal South, p. l35; Howard H. (BO) Callaway to Robert Finch, January 30, 1970; see also Howard
H. (Bo) Callaway to Robert Mardian, January 30, 1970, box 1, RM papers.
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conservative-leading Southerner had found their way ('fortunately' according to Dent) into
the aforementioned cabinet committee, which was chaired by no less than Vice-President
Agnew, then already well on his way to becoming the darling of white Southerners in
particular and of the conservative movement in general.i'" Nixon, to be sure, had appointed
Robert Finch, a civil rights-committed liberal, to head HEW, but he also appointed Gray and
Mardian as Finch's executive assistant and top legal assistant respectively. According to his
colleagues at HEW, Mardian also happened to be 'one of the most aggressive conservatives
in the first Nixon administration', and a man who 'thought ... that HEW was essentially the
enemy' .111 Upon his nomination, Dent instructed Mardian that his mission at HEW was 'to be
the balance wheel' and to 'straighten the wheel out' within the department. Subsequently,
Mardian could be seen informing civil rights activists via The Washington Post that penalties
for segregated Southern schools should be stopped in order to avoid, as his fellow
conservatives would have put it, 'teaching underachievers with overachievers'. 112 From a
Southern conservative this statement was nothing remarkable. However, this was the first
time that senior federal officers placed in the very machinery entrusted with implementing
desegregation measures - and within the administration at large - openly voiced opposition
to further affirmative action and openly disagreed with the moderate civil rights leadership.l':'
In two internal memorandums addressed to Finch and dated March 14 and May 19,
1969, Mardian was particularly clear on the subject. The Johnson administration had, he
asserted, operated on the assumption that HEW's mission was to 'require without exception a
terminal desegregation plan which requires the elimination of all-black schools by September
1969'. Yet according to Mardian, such an interpretation was not 'required by the present
guidelines'. Besides, as he correctly noted, HEW's behaviour was 'totally inconsistent with
the President's statements during the campaign', as well as with the secretary's 'own
110 Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, p. 34; Dent, The Prodigal South, p. 139.
III 'Mardian, The Team Player, The Loyalist in Hiding', WP, July 8, 1973.
112 Harry Dent to Robert Mardian, February 25,1969, box 1, RMP; 'Finch Aide Urges Eased Guidelines', WP,March
23,1969.
113 Russell Kirk, 'Will Federal School Subsidies Bring Equality?', NR, April 3, 1961; Lewis C. Solomon, 'Stop Trying
to Make Equal Education', ibid., October 8,1971; Mason, Quest/or a New Majority, p. 52.
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statements' in a then-recent interview published by the US News and World Reporti'"
Mirroring the behaviour of white Southern conservatives, Mardian did not advise, in the first
memorandum, an open change to HEW's segregation guidelines, but a mere reinterpretation
- according to which the administration should only deal with 'those problems that are
preventing schools from compliance'. In the second memorandum, the department's deputy
general counsel St. John Barret concurred, counselling that 'such policy clarification
probably should not be the subject of any particular public announcement'. lIS
Nixon seems to have thought differently, and in fact, would eventually reach the
opposite conclusion. Despite his earlier urging to his troops to 'keep a low profile' on civil
rights, during his first year in office the White House released two major public
communiques on school desegregation. According to Ehrlichman, these were 'major
announcements which attracted enormous press attention and comment,' and hence they
hardly complied with the doctrine of low profile. Yet Nixon was convinced that he would
suffer politically - with the electorate and with Congress - unless his position was 'perfectly
clear' .116 Presidential rhetoric, both public and private, was carefully attuned to avoid
accusations of racism. But it was quite clearly aimed at - and certainly had the effect of - de-
legitimising the ideological soundness of both affirmative action and the most unpopular
policies aimed at achieving of racial equality. For instance, in a notable reversal from the
previous federal stand Nixon, according again to Ehrlichman, did not want the
administration's initiatives on school segregation to be based on whether it was a 'moral
wrong'. 'If we must disagree with segregation', asserted the president, 'it is not because
Southerners are morally wrong but rather because they are legally wrong' .117
Throughout 1969, the administration had struggled to find a way to handle Southern
schools which remained segregated. Nixon's thinking, according to his assistant for domestic
114 Robert C. Mardian to Secretary Robert Finch, March 14, 1969, box 1, RM papers; Mardian to the Secretary, May
19, 1969, ibid.
115 St. John Barret to Robert C. Mardian, March 17, 1969, ibid.
116 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 223.
117 John Ehrlichman to Ray Price, Len Garment, March 16, 1970, in Satire, Before the Fall, p. 240 (my emphasis).
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affairs, was grounded in the conviction that 'this whole subject has had a history of
hypocrisy', and had been based on 'unrealistic guidelines'. The administration would
therefore do better to 'face the facts as they really are' so as to ensure that it took 'a new and
realistic approach' .118 For further information on this approach, the president referred his
assistants to 'summaries of statements' prepared by former Thurmond's assistant Harry
Dent.119 Initially, the White House contemplated the prospect of organising a fully-fledged
presidential statement on the matter. According to notes on a draft of that speech made by
Nixon's congressional liaison in June 1969, it went 'in the right direction' because the
president 'rebuts Wallace's claims' that there was no difference between his approach to
desegregation and that of Johnson-Humphrey. Further indications that Nixon's approach was
designed to satisfy the white South were provided by the recognition that deadlines were
'ineffective' and, more revealingly, by the president's siding against the 'hated bureaucratic
meddling by HEW officials' - the fact that he possessed ultimate authority over HEW
employees seemed to have gone unnoticed.P" However, the administration initially chose to
shift tactics, avoid the direct involvement of the president, and handle the issue through a
speech jointly delivered by the secretary of HEW and the attorney general. Although the
presidential speech of 1969 was never delivered, the thrust of the administration's public
utterances remained firmly on the same course.
The aforementioned draft presidential speech suspending deadlines for unreconstructed
Southern schools began by echoing Mardian's declarations to the press. 'Efforts to achieve
compliance' with the 1964 Civil Rights Act often resulted', it was argued, 'in a sacrifice in
the quality of education', while it concluded by noting that by suspending the deadlines, the
118 Ehrlichman memorandum to Jim Keogh, June 26, 1969, f. Desegregation Memoranda, box 76, WS papers.
119 Draft speech attached to L. Patrick Gray to John EhrIichman, June 25, 1969, ibid. Interestingly enough, this
quotation - from a different source and sans the recommendation to follow up through Dent - has been used
elsewhere to exemplify Nixon's strong pro-civil rights stand. See for instance Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, pp. 88-89.
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1969, f. Desegregation Memoranda, box 76, WS papers. Nixon's ability to portray himself as an outsider within (and
at the top) of government and to project an image of victim isat ion at the hands of hostile bureaucrats in cahoots with
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president hoped to ensure 'that educational quality is maintained' .121 Although there seems to
be little doubt about Nixon's sincere commitment to educational quality, the president was far
from unaware of the term's connotations: as he himself would subsequently observe to his
speech-writing staff, 'quality education is a code word' .122 In the interim, the speech went on
to touch on other seasoned or soon-to-be typical conservative common-places. It first denied
state responsibility for interfering with de facto segregation - as far as the administration was
concerned, it was segregation 'imposed by official policy' that was 'in violation of the
constitution' .123 Regarding de jure segregation, while vowing to put in place the mechanisms
to end it, the administration also acknowledged that 'at a time when the whole concept of a
society based on law is under challenge, it is important to recognize that this [school
desegregation] has mostly been achieved through voluntary compliance by citizens,.124
Thereby the Nixon team not only intended to broadcast its belief that white Southerners were
capable of integrating their own schools. They went on to add that, as every conservative had
claimed since the 1950s, local communities (read Southern whites) were better equipped to
carry this out than the federal government, and vowed to avoid 'bureaucratic disruption of the
educational process'. In short, as congressional liaison Bryce Harlow had asserted, the
administration intended to send out a clear message that federally-imposed guidelines had
proved to be an 'ineffective' means of achieving school desegregation, and hence had be put
to an end.125
In March 1970, the president himself delivered a further, remarkably lengthy discourse
which was even more clearly aimed at sustaining the position of Southern conservatives on
race matters. Within a lengthy recapitulation of judicial decisions and executive action to
121 Draft speech attached to L. Patrick Gray to John Ehrlichman, June 25, 1969, f. Desegregation Memoranda, box 76,
WS papers.
122 Nixon's apparent commitment to quality education is much emphasised in Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, pp. 24,
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123 Draft speech attached to L. Patrick Gray to John Ehrlichman, June 25, 1969, f. Desegregation Memoranda, box 76,
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by the Arizonan, 'School Desegregation: Draft', June 24, 1969, f. Civil Rights General, box 2, RM papers.
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date, he remarked that 'certain changes' were needed in 'the Nation's' approach to school
desegregation. According to Nixon, certain (unidentified) judicial decisions had 'gone
beyond' what he understood to be the 'accepted principles' guiding federal policy, and hence
did not warrant the White House's consideration.I'" For more information about what the
limits of those accepted principles were, Nixon informed the nation that the courts had not
'spoken definitely on whether or not, or the extent to which, 'desegregation' meant
'integration'. He then proceeded to clarify, on two separate occasions, the distinction between
de jure and de facto segregation, stating that in the case of the latter school authorities were
not 'constitutionally required to take any positive steps', and that the federal government
would not 'insist on a remedy for [the] lawful de facto segregation', and neither 'should this
condition by itself be cause for federal enforcement actions'. 127 Moreover, white Southerners
and civil rights activists alike also learned that from the president's viewpoint, integration
was 'no longer seen automatically and necessarily as an unmixed blessing' for minority
students. In fact, and mirroring the kind of statements normally peddled by segregationists, he
asserted that such ideas responded to little beyond the 'smug elitism' and 'hypocrisy' of
'those in the North most stridently demanding racial integration in the South' while sending
'their children to private schools' .128 Needless to say, everybody understood such a
description to fit an enemy shared by Richard Nixon, Southern conservatives and
conservatives at large: Northeastern liberals. Finally the president also left clear his empathy
for those parents who, quite rightly in his view, perceived integration 'as a threat to their
children', and also volunteered a possible 'imaginative' solution to the problem of race
relations: 'bringing the children together', but 'limiting it to part-time activities' outside the
schools themselves.V"
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Some scholars have interpreted the end of the deadline-approach to school
desegregation as a change from an ineffective tactic to a more effective one which was
ultimately aimed at increasing the pace of school integration.P" According to this view, the
Nixon team intended to replace deadlines with state-wide legal suits, or in other words, to re-
route school desegregation from the realm of HEW to that of the Justice Department - then,
incidentally, headed by John Mitchell, one of the architects of the Southern strategy in 1968
and a man for whom Strom Thurmond had 'the greatest respect', and this while Nixon was
trying to pack the Supreme Court with Southern conservative appointments. The aim of this
strategy was undoubtedly to divert the issue towards the judicial system and away from the
White House. Although the 'maximum efficiency view' is supported by favourable statistical
evidence, the reception that the Nixon approach received at the time was somewhat
different.l" The day after the president's speech was delivered, the Miami Herald announced
that 'Nixon Eases School Integration Stance', while the Louisville Courier-General informed
its readers that the president was 'to relax [the] US campaign against de facto segregation'
and the Des Moines Register noted that 'Nixon ... won't press schools on defacto bias'. Most
incisively, the Jackson Daily News reminded its Southern white readership that although
'Nixon asks race mix in schools', 'no force' would be applied to implement such a policy.!32
After all, the president's speech had clearly spelled out that his first and foremost objective
was 'to minimize the number of cases in which it becomes necessary to cut off funds' from
Southern schools. Of course, it escaped no-one that by happy coincidence, as Bryce Harlow
put it, 'guideline enforcement hurts Southern Republicans'i '<'
When guideline enforcement was dropped, with all the fanfare of an address to the
nation, Nixon's immediate aim may have been to shore up his own electoral coalition.
Nevertheless, as liberal civil rights sympathisers within the administration like Leon Panetta
130 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered; Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights; Graham, Civil Rights Era.
131 Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, p. 28; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, pp. 89-90,93-94.
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- then the beleaguered head of HEW's Office for Civil Rights -realised, it also conveyed a
symbolic message that in the long run would help to undermine a crucial element of post-war
progressive liberalism: the belief that the federal government was responsible for ensuring a
level playing field for the disadvantaged generally, and African-Americans in particular.!"
This is not to claim that the Nixon administration effected a sudden and complete volte face
on civil rights, but that it did initiate a long-lasting shift in the opposite direction to that of
previous policy. Of equal importance was the fact that the administration did so using
arguments commonly associated with the conservative movement - the inefficacy and
dubious moral legitimacy of government action, both in its own right and vis-a-vis local
authorities and communities. Whether in quantitative terms Nixon was the 'unanticipated
hero' of the civil rights movement may be open to scholarly discussion.V' The public
perception and broader significance of his stand is not.
The reception of the new approach within the embattled group of civil rights-friendly
White House officials did not leave much room for doubt either. Their reaction was
instantaneous, revealing and fully in line with the press headlines. As early as March 1969 a
memorandum from Mardian and Jerris Leonard - then the assistant Attorney General heading
the Justice Department's Civil Rights division - had spelled out quite clearly the fracture
which lay beneath the administration's public acceptance of 'what the law demands'
regarding school desegregation.l " A pro-Southern camp headed by men like Bryce Harlow,
Mardian and Dent remained anxious to find ways of satisfying the president's Southern white
constituency, while a civil rights-minded sector comprising other such as Leon Panetta, Finch
and speech-writer William Safire desperately attempted to implement practical desegregation
along the lines mandated by the Supreme Court. In June 1969 Robert J. Brown, then a liberal-
leaning, African-American advisor to Bob Haldeman, was clear about the effects of
presidential rhetoric in his comments about the undelivered presidential speech. 'I would not
134 For a similar assessment, see Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights, p. 29.
135 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, p. 91.
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159
issue the proposed statement', he asserted, because it contained 'several references' that 'in
themselves could easily cause a strong reaction among integrationist-minded groups', and it
'would be considered by many to be an excuse for gerrymandering school districts,.137 That
same month Leon Panetta complained bitterly about the administration's plans to abandon
previously set deadlines for schools to desegregate. Panetta noted that the initiative, besides
being illegal, 'would be a clear signal to all Southern school districts that the administration
supports delayed and weak implementation' of the 1964 Civil Rights act.138 As an
acknowledgment of the liberal critique from within the administration and of the irritation it
caused to Southern conservatives, Nixon took the personal decision to sack Panetta in
February 1970. He later noted that 'the only good thing we have done in this area is to fire
Panetta' because, Nixon informed John Ehrlichman, 'in these race matters, one strong action
is better than a lot of words. Firing Panetta is worth a dozen speeches and statements about
integrating schools' .139
Predictably enough, the former administration official published a book on the matter
denouncing what he regarded as the administration's pro-segregation instincts, while Robert
Finch, Panetta's liberal-leaning boss at HEW, suffered the stress-induced paralysis of one
arm and eventually resigned. Time magazine lost no time in explaining the resignation as a
consequence of 'conservative pressure', and of Finch's 'liberalism' towards civil rights.14o
Regarding Mardian, Dent claimed in one of his numerous letters to Southern supporters that
'the President was leaning heavily on him'. Dent was probably exaggerating but the
conservative Mardian continued to rise within the administration until competition from Jeb
Magruder, another rising star within the White House, and the Watergate scandal put an end
to his career. 141 Much like Mardian, other Southerners and friends of the South such as
137 Robert J. Brown to John Ehrlichman, 'Statement on School Desegregation -June 12,1969 Draft', June 18, 1969, f.
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Patrick Gray and Bryce Harlow enjoyed successful careers within the administration. From
the outside, civil rights leaders themselves also did not seem to need much encouragement to
disparage the administration's trajectory. After an interview with Nixon during the early
months of his presidency, a hopeful Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP, declared that he was
waiting 'with some trepidation' for the time when the president would be able to finally
establish that 'there is not a single school district' either 'in the South or the North' that has
not had 'ample notice' to enforce federal civil rights legislation, so as to follow up with firm
federal action.142 Less than a year later, Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, chair of the
NAACP's board, blasted the administration for being anti-black, and after the Mitchell-Finch
speech on civil rights, Wilkins declared that the administration's stand on desegregation was
'almost enough to make you vomit' .143 It seems that for both African-Americans and white
Southerners alike the conservative rhetoric of the administration mattered rather a lot.
Throughout Nixon's first term in office Southern politics had also begun to reflect the
presence of the newly enfranchised black vote. Curiously enough, the administration made
even less of an effort to adjust to the expanded black electorate than its Southern allies did.
Partly as a consequence of the extension of the franchise, and partly as a consequence of the
relative easing of racial tension in the South, the electoral wooing of African-Americans
slowly ceased to be taboo and increasingly became a necessity for Southern conservatives.l'"
As the 1972 election approached, both White House officials and Southern political
operatives displayed a growing awareness of these new developments, and even the
administration appears not to have been entirely immune to the appeal of the African-
American vote.145 During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon had sought to distance
himself from the Goldwater campaign of 1964 - even though Goldwater had pioneered
conservative Republican inroads in the South through essentially the same formula that
142 'The White House Press Conference of Roy Wilkins' (Undated), f. Desegregation Memoranda, box. 76, WS
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Nixon was using. After all, in 1960 Nixon had managed to capture 32 per cent of the black
vote, not far from Eisenhower's 39 per cent in 1956 and still a crucial percentage in a close
election.Y" Once in power the administration still clung to a somewhat equivocal stand:
although the general thrust of White House utterances was to justify an end to active federal
intervention in civil rights matters (particularly on the school segregation issue), they also
contained several instances of lip-service support for racial integration - mostly in flagrant
contradiction with both the meaning of major White House speeches and the direction of
actual policy.147 Similarly, after the publication of Phillips' The Emerging Republican
Majority, and at the instigation of some of its liberal-leaning members, the White House had
conducted something of a soul-searching exercise. William Safire believed the book to be
'most dangerous', and noted that in practical terms its effect was 'to leave many millions of
Americans with the clear impression that, as a Republican, he [Nixon] does not see a place
for blacks in his party'. Safire even suggested that the administration 'produce an article for
Harper's or similar publication' to reach out to 'the poor, young and black,.148 Even Patrick
Buchanan, Nixon's fiercest conservative speechwriter concurred. Alarmed at the potential
effects of a purely conservative discourse, he noted that the administration should give the
impression that 'there is a healthy rivalry' between 'competing ideologies and ideas' .149
Needless to say, it can be assumed that Buchanan intended for the conservative substance to
be left unchanged, and in any event, as early as 1970 Haldeman had noted that for the
administration, making serious inroads within the black community was 'really not possible,
except with the Uncle Toms' .150In this light, it is clear that the administration's reluctance to
'write off [any] vote' needs to be understood as aimed at the moderate elements within what
was identified as its 'natural constituency': the white middle-class and blue-collar vote, rather
than at African-Americans. Indeed, the black vote had already been virtually abandoned
146 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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during the campaign of 1968, and the small number of African Americans who belonged to
the conservative movement were aware of the fact that 'the Southern strategy of the Nixon
administration' was 'not going to help' the White House's prospects among black voters. 151
CONCLUSION
Throughout Richard Nixon's first term in office, for the first time since the 1954 Brown
decision, the White House followed a policy of barely concealed hostility towards the further
implementation of civil rights legislation. Moreover, presidential rhetoric clearly reveals that
the administration chose to undermine the legitimacy of school integration by borrowing
staple conservative defences of 'quality education' and 'neighbourhood schools', as well as
standard conservative fears about 'social engineering', 'coercion', and 'federal interference'.
This is not to suggest that the conservative authors of such terminology such as Irving
Kristol, William Buckley and Milton Friedman, did not regret the existence of racially
segregated schools. Nevertheless, they effectively supported the aspirations of
desegregation's opponents and, as might be seen in the declarations of men like Nixon civil
rights enforcer Robert Mardian and Strom Thurmond, their discourse was borrowed by the
spokesmen of the white South inside and outside the Nixon White House. In a diluted form,
even the anti-civil rights arguments of the neo-liberals found their way into the presidential
lexicon in the White House's draft and actual civil rights speeches of 1969 and 1970. At the
same time, the white South had clearly reached a point of exhaustion, which saw flat refusal
to integrate local schools replaced by a pragmatic approach, consisting of circumventing the
law so as to replace legally segregated schools with de facto segregated schools. As a
comparison between Southerners' letters to the White House and the administration's
utterances demonstrates, the Nixon team grasped the growing popular hostility to further civil
rights action reflected in the ideological evolution of the neoconservatives, and consistently
151 Vincent S. Barker, 'Black Americans Want In', NR, August 25, 1970; McGinniss, Selling a/the President, pp. 95-
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lent legitimacy to this approach. Whether out of SIncere commitment or electoral
opportunism, the White House between 1968 and 1972 broadcast views that until then had
been typically associated with the conservatism articulated by National Review, Modern Age
and their Southern political allies. The respective stances of President Nixon and the partially
defeated, yet increasingly pragmatic white South appear virtually indistinguishable.
The entente between Southern conservatives and the Nixon administration ultimately
represented a significant break with one of the core elements of the public consensus which
had guided policy-making since the advent of the New Deal. After 1968, open scepticism
about the methods for achieving racial equality no longer belonged to the outer fringes of the
political spectrum. Thus, the deliberate actions of an administration which sought to satisfy
Southern demands lent the gravitas and legitimacy of the presidency to a central element of
the conservative community's challenge. As press reports and the memoranda of demoralised
liberal federal officials show, the message received by the electorate from the Nixon
administration's relationship with the Southerners, regardless of the quantitative outcome of
his civil rights policy, was unequivocally conservative.
Simultaneously, the Southern political leadership, increasingly sensitive to the growing
strength of the black vote, initiated a process of re-packaging itself in a non-racist fashion.
Those closer to the administration found their task facilitated by federal largesse. The bulk of
the conservative movement, in the meantime, led by the increasingly moderate behaviour of
the Southerners, adjusted to this new political reality and left behind the most egregious
instances of pro-segregationism which, throughout the 1960s, had threatened to destabilise an
ever fractious alliance between different conservative factions. Both the political leadership
of the white South and the intellectual leadership of the conservative movement took
advantage of Nixon's equivocal race policy and the emerging critique of civil rights policies
produced by former Great Society staffers and liberals to leave behind racial reaction and
press ahead with other aspects of the conservative challenge against the post-war consensus.
During the 1940s and 1950s these Southerners had adopted the conservative canon and had
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reneged on their previous support for New Deal interventionism in order to strengthen their
defence of segregation. Twenty years later, as the race issue was effectively neutralized as a
political weapon, Southern conservatives remained firmly embedded within the conservative
movement. The result was a shift to the right of the political mainstream, or at least a shift to
the right of what was seen as 'politically doable' by those operating at the centre (and the top)
of national politics. The white South may have failed to achieve its ultimate objective of
maintaining legal segregation; it did however succeed in undermining the principles of the
liberal consensus in the United States. Until the rise of Richard Nixon to the presidency
Southern conservatives had faced an unsolvable political dilemma: the approach necessary to
assuage their grassroots support and guarantee re-election had also ensured that they
remained locked in a radical position squarely outside of respectable politics - hence
renouncing effective influence in the policy-making process, other than protesting and
stubbornly delaying the approval of civil rights legislation for the sake of political survival. 152
Richard Nixon's approach to the race issue helped to ensure the disappearance of this
dilemma. His blatantly anti-integrationist rhetoric, his support for right-wing Southern
politicians and their views, contributed to consolidate the position of Southern Republicans
within the national party and allowed the Southerners to both retain the respect of their white
constituents while becoming respectable political actors in the national political arena. In the
process, the conservative movement gained a stronger base of political power in national
politics while finding some of its most controversial ideological tenets accepted, at the very
least, as legitimate objects of political discussion.
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pp. 295-97; Jon Margolis, The Last Innocent Year: America in I964-The Beginning of the 'Sixties' (New York:
William Morrow and Co., 1999), pp. 34,128,167; Chester, American Melodrama, pp. 478, 481; Tony Badger has
emphasised how Southern politicians with national aspirations tended to gravitate towards racial moderation, see
'Southerners Who Refused To Sign', pp. 517-34.
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CHAPTER4
THE HARD CORE AND THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON, 1966-1972
Just over a year after the cataclysm of the 1964 election William Rusher warned his
fellow National Review editors that, looking towards 1968, 'the question we will have to
answer sooner or later - probably about the tum of the year [1967] - is, Nixon or Reagan?' I
With his usual perceptiveness, a frustrated Rusher anticipated that Richard Nixon's carefully
worked out comeback act was in all probability destined to succeed. Worse still from the
perspective of a seasoned political observer and Nixon-hater, his fellow Buckleyites were
threatening to re-engage in the same old courtship dance with Nixon which had, according to
Rusher, plagued conservatives for the previous two decades. 'I urge you,' he pleaded
pitifully, 'not to be over-hasty in plunging for Mr. Nixon,.2 As Rusher rightly feared, in the
end the men of National Review would do precisely that: plunge for Richard Nixon and even
hail the would-be president as conservatism's own champion. Except in this case it was not
only, or even mainly, the Buckleyites own doing. Long before Rusher wrote his early
warning, two other factions of the conservative movement - the former Dixiecrats led by
Strom Thurmond and the strengthened old Republican southerners represented by Senator
John Tower of Texas - had already, independently from one other and without consulting the
intellectual leadership, pledged their support for Nixon. In a move that could certainly be
described as 'over-hasty' these men gravitated towards Richard Nixon so early on that they
had to request discretion from the candidate, lest potential centrist voters be alienated by his
new-found supporters.'
Predictably enough, or so Rusher would later think, the same old game of
rapprochement and rejection between the Hard core and Richard Nixon would unfold
between the run-up to the 1968 presidential election and the culmination of the Watergate
I William Rusher to the Editors, March 31, 1967, f 10M, box 43, William F. Buckley Jr. papers, Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale University (hereafter WFB papers).
2 Ibid.
3 Stephen C. Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More Fun (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 66.
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drama." This chapter will examine how the behaviour of the Buckleyites between 1966 and
1972 closely followed the same well-established patterns that had drawn them once and again
towards Nixon. In contrast to most other accounts of the Nixon presidency, the present
analysis is not structured on a purely chronological basis nor along policy lines. It is instead
divided into three thematic blocks. The first deals with the period between the 1966 mid-
terms and the 1968 presidential election, focusing on the tensions experienced by the hard
core as the conservative movement gradually moved onto the Nixon bandwagon. The second
part examines the two periods of greater harmony between the president and the Buckleyites,
which occurred between Nixon's first presidential victory and the 1970 mid-terms, and -
after a period of renewed tension - again during the 1972 presidential campaign. Finally, the
third section accounts for the eruption of discontent and eventual actual warfare between the
administration and the hard core throughout 1971 and the first two-thirds of 1972.
This structure facilitates an analysis of how, between 1966 and 1968 (mirroring
developments between 1960 and 1964), the seemingly unbreakable partisan loyalty of most
conservatives helped Nixon gain widespread and early support from the influential
Republican right, and prevented less committed conservatives from mounting an effective
blockade against him. At this time, the deliberate quest to gain acceptance as a respectable
political option on the part of their liberal adversaries forced the Buckleyites to consolidate a
systematic and vicious campaign against the ambitions of Alabama Governor George
Wallace. This quest followed lines not entirely dissimilar from those rehearsed during earlier
fistfights with the John Birch Society, and also put in practice by Nixon's Southern
conservative supporters. Inevitably, the biggest beneficiary of Wallace's excommunication
could only be Richard Nixon, whose enduring appeal to the same constituents that National
Review catered to left the Buckleyites with nowhere else to go: the space to the left, between
the heirs of LBJ and the rising New Left, was occupied by the Democrats; to the right, there
4 William A. Rusher, The Making of The New Majority Party (New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1975), pp. 51-54.
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appeared to be only the 'stigmata' of demagoguery and 'racism' offered by the 'lunatic
fringe' supporting Wallace. 5
The Nixon administration also brought about developments that were less evident even
to conservatives themselves. The halcyon years of Richard Nixon in the White House brought
with them the definitive consolidation of the American conservative movement as a political
force of nature ready to rock the politics of the United States beyond recognition. In the
process, however, the internal dynamics of the American right were significantly altered as
the displacement of National Review and the Buckleyites from their position as unchallenged
leaders of the movement began. The hard core certainly welcomed the emergence of a new,
larger and increasingly influential American right. Yet a concomitant element of such
expansion was the transformation of conservatism into a considerably more fractious and
fragmented force. By the downfall of Richard Nixon, very many young right-wingers were
busy developing new approaches to conservative politics. Men like Howard Phillips, Richard
Viguerie, Morton Blackwell and David Keene, who had all cut their teeth under the aegis of
National Review, emerged from the Nixon years determined to revamp the conservative
movement in a form distinct from, increasingly critical of, and certainly as more aggressive
than that of National Review. In a few years these right-wing Young Turks would direct the
ascent of the so-called 'New Right': a new conservative sub-family which was not only
considerably less keen to toe the line marked by the Buckleyites than their predecessors, but
also better able to readjust the conservative message created by the hard core in order to
develop alternative strategies." Richard Nixon bore prime responsibility for conservatism's
5 Neil McCaffrey to William F. Buckley, February 16, 1968, f. McCaffrey, Neil (Jan-July), box 52, WFB papers.
6 For a brief but excellent academic evaluation of the New Right's early origins see Jerome L. Himmelstein, To The
Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1990), pp. 80-94;
see also John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America (New York:
Penguin, 2004), pp.80-85; David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky, 1983), pp. 228, 247-55; Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan and Bush Era, 1980-
1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 30-34; Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing
Movements and Political Power in The United States (New York: Guilford Publications, 1995), pp. 127-138, and
idem., Not By Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right (New York: Guilford Press, 1998), pp.
58-66. The protagonists' own recollections of the early origins of the New Right under the shadow of the Nixon
White House are rich in detail as well as remarkably consistent with one another, and with published secondary
accounts: Interview with Jeffrey Bell, August 29, 2005, Washington D.C.; Interview with David Keene, August 24,
2005, Washington DC; Interview with Morton Blackwell August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Howard
Phillips, September 7, 2005, Washington DC; Marvin Liebman, Coming Out Conservative: An Autobiography (San
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remarkable comeback from the 1964 Goldwater debacle - a feat almost as astonishing as
Nixon's own political resurrection if the obituaries of conservatism written after November
1964 are to be believed - because, despite Nixon's repeated and occasionally spectacular
wavering, for the first time the basic tenets of the conservative credo were put forth to the
public from the highest office of the land. Moreover, for all the conservative groaning and
moaning, the Nixon administration was the first opportunity for young Buckleyites to
exercise meaningful, sometimes direct, influence upon executive policy. However, virtually
all those committed conservatives who served in public office experienced frustrations with
the press, the bureaucracy and the actual limits imposed over the capacity to bring about
change of those who actually held office, as opposed to those engaged in writing 'well
framed editorials'. 7 These frustrations would ultimately trigger a break with the conservative
political strategy of the previous two decades.
Recent scholarship has rightly emphasised the significance of Richard Nixon in the
sharp tum to the right of American mainstream politics during the 1968 and 1972 elections, a
transforrnative role which would culminate with his frustrated attempt to make reality, of all
things, the old dream of no less than William Rusher: a conservative third party made up of
blue collar workers, white ethnics, Southern and Midwestern conservatives - that is, Nixon's
own backers in 1968, plus supporters of George Wallace and those right-of-centre Democrats
who could still bring themselves to vote for Humphrey but had been definitely alienated by
George McGovern and the New Left in 1972.8 And yet, it cannot be overemphasised that -
Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1992), pp.152-55 offers the viewpoint of the Buckleyites on such developments, and is
fully backed by the author's interview with William Rusher, March 21, 2006, (telephone), and William Rusher, 'The
New Right: Past and Prospects' in Robert Whitaker ed., The New Right Papers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982),
pp. 2-26, and Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America (New York: Free
Press, 1999), pp. 183-99. See also the new-righters own written accounts in Whitaker's aforementioned collection, as
well as in Howard Phillips ed., The New Right at Harvard (Vienna VA: Conservative Caucus, 1983); Richard A.
Viguerie and David Franke, America's Right Turn: How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take
Power (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2004), pp. 39-107, 137-45; Richard A. Viguerie, The Establishment vs. The People:
Is a New Populist Revolution on The Way?(Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983); idem., The New Right: We're Ready
To Lead (Falls Church, VA: Viguerie Co., 1981).
7 William Rusher to L. Brent Bozell, September 28, 1961, f. 10M, box 10,WFB papers.
8 See Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2004); Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (London: Scribner,
2008); Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the Right. The Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990).
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bar a few instances such as the Watergate imbroglio - Richard Nixon always remained more
a cautious follower of events than a visionary shaper of his own, or his country's, political
destiny. It is no accident that he sought to 'equilibrate' conservatives and liberal-progressives
within both his first cabinet and inner circle of White House advisors. Even before that, his
1968 campaign had been a highly sectionalised affair, plagued by vagueness and flagrant
contradictions designed to appeal to the 'centrist' voter or to the sensibilities of whatever
constituency he was addressing at any given point in time, to a degree that a left-leaning
observer such as Joe McGinniss was scandalised by what he viewed as the philosophical and
political vacuity, rather than the conservatism, of the Nixon train."
But then again, if conservatives could rightly point to Richard Nixon's lack of political
bravery as one of his main personal handicaps, the Californian's lack of foresight about the
changing nature of American politics was fully shared by most National Review
conservatives themselves. Symptomatically, during 1967 and 1968 they agonised for too long
about Ronald Reagan's options - Rusher was, again, right to notice the California governor
could have won the Republican primaries. Subsequently, as before, the Buckleyites remained
stuck within the analytical framework they had built for themselves during the late 1950s and
early 1960s. For instance, as if nothing had changed since the days of Alger Hiss, they
persistently and implausibly associated the civil rights and anti-war movements with the old
threat of Communist infiltration (of course, a creature of the political Pleistocene such as J.
Edgar Hoover ensured that even Johnson Democrats would not be entirely free of such
delusions), and stubbornly adhered to a China policy that may have served William
Knowland well but was altogether outdated two decades later.!" In a social context were
returning Vietnam veterans found that, after their twelve month tour of duty, 'change was
shocking', 'totally devastating' and ranging from 'clothes' to 'people's attitudes', the hard
9 Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), pp. 19,25,28.
10 Bob Haldeman refered to Hoover as 'a real character of days of yore' who found it 'hard to relate to current times.'
Of course, that did not stop the administration from lending credit to the continuum between Khrushchev and Martin
Luther King. The pages of National Review were littered with analyses as delusional as Paul D. Bethel, 'Black Power
and Red Cuba', National Review, May 21, 1968, pp. 494--97 (hereafter NR).
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core was nearly as unable 'to comprehend' those changes as the returnees from Vietnam."
Unlike other conservative families, the Buckleyites (much like, incidentally, the Nixon
administration) took inordinately long to fully grasp the rapidly overheating debates about
matters such as abortion, homosexuality and sexual mores that would become the bread and
butter of the right from the mid-1970s onwards.
In the end, the Buckleyites' moderation prevented them from either abandoning Nixon
or bringing him over to conservatism more openly and earlier in his presidency. Richard
Nixon on his part, faced with conservative mildness and handicapped by his own political
short-sightedness, refused to see the Buckleyites as potential political partners in a long-term
strategy. As ever before, he opted instead for manipulating conservatives according to short-
term objectives. The right always remained Richard Nixon's main source of support, but the
president refused to become the leader of the movement and never quite managed to tum it
into his own constituency. The short-term end result for both camps was to miss the
opportunity to capitalise on the electoral realignment well underway in 1968. The right had to
wait for another decade to consolidate itself as the dominant force of American politics. By
then, the deeply unsatisfactory experience of the Nixon presidency had served to further
fracture the cohesion of the movement, and contributed to an enhancement of the autonomy
and influence of its younger, more radicalised wing at the expense of the hard core.
1. 'EVERYBODY'S SECOND CHOICE': THE HARD CORE AND CANDIDATE
NIXON, 1966-1968
Relations between the National Review conservatives and Richard Nixon after the
Republican recovery of the 1966 mid-terms followed a pattern of distrust, offence and
insincere reconciliation that had been familiar since the late 1940s. In the run up towards
1966, at a time when conservatism was still supposed to be heading for the political
II As quoted in Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing. Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century
Warfare, (London: Granta Books, 2000), p. 362.
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graveyard, Nixon had declared that the Buckleyites were 'a greater menace to the Republican
party than the Birchers'. 12 The predictably indignant reaction from NR was followed by a coy
answer from the Nixon camp, which Rusher labelled as 'other handed and phoney as only
Mr. Nixon can be', but still good enough for the journal to be 'justified in constructing it as a
denial' .13 Clearly, the editors of National Review believed that Nixon had said what the press
had reported him as saying but, as ever before, thought best not to initiate an open war with a
man who had managed to position himself as the senior Republican most loyal to the party's
Goldwaterite wing. Nixon, on the other hand, knew which side of the Republican toast was
buttered and, when William F. Buckley ran as the Conservative Party of New York State's
candidate for New York's mayoralty in 1965, took pains to remind the hard core that 'it
would be a tragedy for this nation if conservatives should abandon the GOP to form splinter
parties' .14 Subsequently, the Californian would also send the Buckleyites copies of his
speeches dealing with issues such as 'the rising disregard for the rule of law', the manifold
iniquities of university professors, social workers and 'left wing radicals,' and the need to
upheld traditional 'square values' .15 Tom between well grounded mutual distrust and
powerful practical considerations attracting them to one another, Richard Nixon and the
editors of the National Review eventually arranged a meeting in December 1966. As might be
expected, the gathering was entirely inconclusive. 16
The conservative hard core's internal dynamics regarding Nixon also remained largely
frozen along the same lines that they had been for the best part of two decades. William
Buckley hesitated; Frank Meyer and James Burnham fatalistically readied themselves to
accept what they increasingly saw as the inevitable Nixon candidacy in 1968, while Rusher's
frustration grew in direct proportion." In the immediate aftermath of Nixon's agonic
12 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, March 9, 1966, f. 10M, box 39, WFB papers; A. James Reichley.
Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution,
1981), p. 53.
13 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, March 9, 1966, f. 10M, box 39, WFB papers.
14 Patrick Buchanan to the editor of NR, March 8, 1966, f. Nixon, box 40, ibid.
15 Patrick Buchanan to William F, Buckley, June 6, 1966; Buchanan to Buckley, June 9, 1966, ibid.
16 Patick Buchanan to William F, Buckley December 21,1966, ibid.
17 John B. Judis, William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp.
278-98; Daniel Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life (Wilmington DE, 2002), pp.317-19.
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convention victory the Old Pro quite literally exploded in a lengthy memo that, somewhat
comically reflects the atmosphere in the National Review offices:
Unless the convention of 1972 requires merely the pro-forma re-nomination of
President Nixon, I expect to be involved (as I was this time [the other editors
were not], and probably much more so) in its foreplay and outcome; and I am
quite resigned to further accusations of distortion through bias in the successive
analyses I will undoubtedly press upon you - not, let me hasten to add, that Iam
conscious of any guilt in that respect. But I would like to think that the relevant
parties might abjure, next time, of those relentless declarations many months in
advance, that Candidate X [read Nixon] had it "all locked up" - declarations
fortified, this year, with displays of mathematical logic and quotations from
Cosimo de Medici, and buttressed by reiterated offers of cash wagers, all at a time
when the merest YR in South Jersey knew that the outcome was still very
.. d d 18uncertain m ee ...
It is not known whether Rusher cashed the wagers, but he was certainly correct. In 1963 and
1964, the stubborn refusal of NR's cooler (and less politically literate) heads to believe in
Goldwater's possibilities had turned the Review into a less effective tool than it may
otherwise have been. However, since Goldwater won the primaries anyway, the deleterious
effects of the Buckleyites' condescending torpor were circumscribed to hurting Rusher's
pride. In 1967 and 1968 things were different. Rusher, with some reason, believed that NR's
failure to administer to Richard Nixon the same treatment accorded to other non-conservative
Republicans, compounded with their refusal to accept Reagan's real possibilities of success,
had become a hindrance to the right's political hopes. He therefore lambasted what he
described as 'these gratuitous, hard-breathing pronunciamenti, appearing (as they did this
year, on more than one occasion) in the pages of NR', asserting that they contributed 'in
some small measure to the very outcome they predict: they are, in their minor way, self-
fulfilling prophecies'. It was the editorial board alone, he reminded his colleagues, which
possessed the prerogative to determine 'whom we shall support' .19
By early 1968, Rusher had correctly measured the strength of conservative power from
'the midwest, the west and the south' within the GOP, and desperately warned his fellow
18 William Rusher to My Valued Colleagues, the Editors of NR, 'Preliminary Observations on the Republican
Convention', August 12, 1968, f, 10M (Apr-Jun 1968), box 54, WFB papers.
19 Ibid.
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Buckleyites that 'to settle for less than the top spot [of the Republican presidential ticket]
seems unnecessary and indeed irresponsible' .20Moreover, the uncommonly sharp Rusher
could already see some rather dark clouds looming over Lyndon Johnson's future, and
playfully noted that 'assuming Johnson runs again' and giving the distorting effects of
Vietnam upon the American political landscape, the 'liberal establishment' may very well
find an eastern Republican, such as New York governor Nelson Rockefeller or Michigan's
George Romney, more palatable than LBJ's dauphin. In such a murky state of affairs, there
was only one 'logical answer' for conservatives in 1968. Since the hard core was wedded to
the GOP, its best bet for power was to block a potentialleft-of-centre takeover of the party by
rallying, and as soon as possible, behind the only candidate who could present Republicans
with a much needed 'fresh face' and a winning conservative profile: Ronald Reagan."
As for Richard Nixon, according to Rusher his main virtues consisted of having the
support of the 'regular pros', which the Californian had gained during his tireless
campaigning in 1964 and 1966. Just as importantly, Nixon had 'with callipers and a
footrule ... finally found the exact centre of the Republican party, and occupied it'. 22 Since
that had been Richard Nixon's game since at least 1960 (and perhaps even 1956), Rusher
could be therefore excused for contemplating the possibilities of Nixon shifting towards the
left, as he had done in 1960, if right-wing strength were to bleed away from him and towards
Reagan. According to Rusher, a further Nixon problem derived from the above circumstances
was the vice-presidency. Since Nixon had placed himself at the ideological centre of the
party, ran Rusher's logic, his choice as vice-president would necessarily detract from either
the conservative or liberal faction within the GOP. Rusher's rather fanciful proposal for
derailing Nixon's presidential hopes in 1968 consisted of a ticket made up of the conservative
Reagan and a tolerable, liberal running mate such as Illinois Senator Charles Percy.23 It is no
accident that other Buckleyites such as James Burnham reasoned along similar (and
20 William Rusher Memorandum to the Editors, '1968, A Tentative Prognosis', January 3, 1967, f, rOM, box 43, WFB
papers.
~I Ibid.
22 William Rusher to the Editors, October 20, 1967, ibid.
23 Ibid.
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somewhat less far-fetched) lines to propose a Reagan-Rockefeller 'stop Nixon' ticket" It
was only a few months later, in June 1967, that Rusher implored his fellow editors to ponder
more carefully the prospects of both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.f
Three elements conspired against Rusher's manoeuvring and in favour of the final
success of Richard Nixon. Firstly, the man from Yorba Linda himself was quite aware of his
own relative position within the GOP and of his own past mistakes. In 1968 he had no
intention, at least not during the primary season, of accommodating the Rockefeller wing of
the party and repeatedly declared himself to be a conservative 'at least as I define it'.26 Nixon
was certainly aware of conservatives' long memories and of the deleterious effects that the
'Compact of Fifth Avenue' had had upon his image among them. Most importantly, the
would-be candidate could count heads just as well as William Rusher, and was perfectly
aware that conservatives were the single largest (if most fractious) block of convention
delegates, as well as the party's main corps of grassroots activists. It is no surprise then that
as his campaign consolidated itself, Nixon would seek out the help of the kind of
conservatives who where broadly aligned with National Review, such as journalist Richard
Whalen, and economists Martin Anderson and Roger Freeman. As early as 1965, he had also
enlisted the support of former Goldwater staffers such as Robert Mardian, Richard
Kleindienst and Charles Lichenstein, all of whom he had come to know during his Herculean
campaigning of the previous year. These would be the men who went on to staff the
campaign's all-important field machinery in the West and Midwest with other Goldwater
veterana " In 1966 political observers could remark that warmth towards Richard Nixon was
'seldom seen' in other conservative quarters such as the Young Americans for Freedom.28
24 Kelly, Burnham, p. 317.
25
26 Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972),
p 12. Whalen was probably the first conservative to lose patience with Nixon's lack of clear ideological commitments
and about the only one who actually resigned his position in the campaign before Nixon became president. See ibid.,
pp.vii - viii. See also John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), pp.
48-49,249.
27 Charles Lichtenstein to Richard Nixon, February 5, 1965; Lichtenstein to Nixon, September 17, 1965, f. Nixon,
Richard M., box 12, Free Society Association papers, Hoover Institution, Palo Alto CA; Richard Kleindienst, Justice:
The Memoirs of an Attorney General (Ottawa IL: Jameson Books, 1985), pp. 39-40,47-48.
28 Ibid.
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The candidate was determined to change such a state of affairs and began by organising a
meeting with representatives of Young Americans for Freedom (led by the ubiquitous
William Rusher) in March of that year. After the gathering Nixon had managed to attract the
then little-known president of the youth organisation named Tom Charles Houston, who told
Squire magazine that whatever his shortcomings, Richard Nixon was about the only
candidate 'acceptable to all kinds of Republicans'v" That kind of reasoning would soon
became commonplace within the conservative community.
A second issue favouring Richard Nixon was that, even assuming that National Review
could keep the factions within the conservative movement closest to itself away from the
Californian, after 1964 the journal was no longer the single voice of the movement, and
neither were the Buckleyites its undisputed nucleus. As Rusher himself had feared,
conservatives were organising by means other than 'well phrased editorials'. In remarkably
large numbers, and unknown to the Buckleyites, from 1966 to 1968 they flocked of their own
accord toward the Nixon bandwagon. It is significant that Nixon's first staffer devoted full
time to the advancement of his presidential ambitions would be a young right-wing former St
Louis Globe-Democract journalist named Patrick Buchanan. At the time Buchanan possessed
no direct personal connection with either National Review or any other conservative faction,
but had been inspired by the NR throughout his youth. Subsequently, he quickly became
Nixon's main conduit to the American right and, later, the senior-most resident conservative
within the Nixon White House. It is worth noting that Buchanan was one of those cases
where deep commitment to conservatism mixed easily with an equally deep admiration for
Richard Nixon harking back to the Hiss case, and that it was Buchanan who deliberately
sought Nixon - and freely admitted so to whoever asked - rather than the other way around.
30 A similar process occurred with the former Dixiecrats who, under the leadership of Strom
Thurmond, had defected from the Democratic party to Goldwater Republicanism in 1964;
29 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'Insider Report: Nixon's Shoreham Meeting', Washington Post, September 7,
1965.
30 Patrick Buchanan, Rightfrom The Beginning (Washington DC: Regnery, 1990), pp. 218-19,319-23; Rich Koster,
'Dick Nixon's Right Hand Man', St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 9-10,1968.
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and with traditional Republican southern conservatives led by men such as Fred LaRue, the
Republican national committeeman of Mississippi, John Grenier, leader of the party in
Alabama, and Texas' senator John Tower. In different ways, all these men coalesced behind
the candidacy of Richard Nixon voluntarily and independently from each other as well as,
initially, from the candidate himself.31
The third element preventing the conservative hard core from mounting a successful
challenge to Nixon was its own relative timidity - which mirrored that of the conservative
movement as a whole - combined with an absolutely pragmatic political realism. The
southerners had joined Richard Nixon because after the 1964 debacle, to quote from
Theodore White, 'they wanted winners,.32 Richard Nixon offered the best shot at the
presidency from a palatable candidate. Slowly, most conservatives from Richard Whalen to
Patrick Buchanan, through the former Goldwaterites, came to the same conclusion. And
Nixon was a plausible presidential nominee precisely because of his centrist position. In a
backhanded way, even Rusher had to acknowledge that conservatism by itself could not win
in a general election, even if it managed to railroad the Republican eastern wing in the
primaries as it had done in 1964. In the same memorandums in which he excoriated Richard
Nixon's lack of ideological substance, Rusher also suggested that Reagan should ape Nixon's
moderate strategy. Early on in the primary campaign the old political hand freely admitted
that 'if [Governor Reagan] elects to posture himself as merely the 1968 edition of Barry
Goldwater' it would actually help Nixon, and speculated that Reagan may therefore 'may not
prove so accommodatingly extreme'. 33 About a year later Rusher repeated almost verbatim
that Reagan should 'not to be so cooperative as to remain merely the stand in for Goldwater'.
Instead, he urged that the governor 'substantially broaden his appeal toward the centre of the
Republican party'. 34 In other words, Rusher was explicitly asking Reagan to adopt Nixon's
31 The complex and fascinating story of the various and overlaping Southern plots to ensure Nixon's victory and retain
influence over his subsequent administrations have been best told in Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to
Power (New York, 1978) and Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The
Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York, 1969).
32 Theodore H. White, The Making of The President 1968 (London, 1968), p. 241.
33 William Rusher to the Editors, July 10, 1967, f. rOM (July-Dec 1967), box 43, WFB papers.
34 William Rusher to the Edtiors, May 3, 1968, f. rOM (Apr-Jun), box 50, ibid. (emphasis in original).
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centrist strategy and to occupy, to the extent that that was possible, a place as close as
possible to Nixon's own at the centre of the Republican ideological spectrum.
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the other NR editors adopted a fatalistic,
pro-Nixon stand long before the 1968 convention opened its doors and at a point when
Ronald Reagan's candidacy had, as Rusher correctly pointed out, realistic possibilities of
success. A few months before the Republican national convention, Rusher could take the
Review's lassitude no more, and addressed the matter emotionally by asking his fellow
editors 'why should it be necessary for me [Rusher] to manoeuvre and counter-march in an
effort to keep N[ational] R[eview] from doing an irreparable disservice to Reagan?,35 In an
increasingly desperate tone, he went on to remind the Buckleyites that 'Reagan Is the
conservative spokesman, standard bearer and candidate in this race' and therefore, according
to Rusher, had 'more than a right to our silence ... he has a right to our support'. 36And yet,
for all Rusher's passion, Buckley had already expressed his views over a year before when,
asked which Republican presidential possibility he considered the 'wisest choice', he had
replied that Richard Nixon was 'the one who could win', and that he himself was 'for the
most right, viable candidate who could win'. 37Buckley subsequently refused to alter the
aloof stand of the National Review towards the unfolding Reagan-Nixon contest. Throughout
the primaries the Review would remain generally friendly to Reagan but, as Rusher correctly
noted, in practical terms it supported Richard Nixon to the point of, about two months before
the convention, even musing about a possible Nixon-Reagan ticket." And it did so with the
support of Frank Meyer. Neither a Republican loyalist nor a Nixon admirer, Meyer
nevertheless refused to 'see any emergency which would justify a change in the position
officially adopted [by NR] - to implacably oppose Rockefeller and to treat Nixon and Reagan
with complete even-handedness'. 39 Of course, Meyer was perfectly aware that apparent
35 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, May 23, 1968, f. 10M (Apr-Jun), box 50, ibid.
36 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
37 Judis, Buckley, p. 280.
38 'What Reagan is Saying', NR, June 18, 1968, pp. 594-495; William F, Buckley, 'Reagan-Rockefeller', ibid., June
18, 1968, pp. 624-25; 'Nixon', ibid., June 4, 1968, p. 533.
39 Frank Meyer to the Editors, May 25, 1968, f, 10M (Apr-Jun), box 50, WFB papers.
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neutrality was tantamount to a blessing (even if admittedly backhanded) of Richard Nixon
and a slap to Reagan. James Burnham, a man who had freely expressed his disgust at the
Eisenhower presidency and who, like Meyer, was not known for his love of either Nixon or
Republican politicians, had 'resigned himself' to Nixon by early 1968. Once Burnham had
persuaded himself that the man from Yorba Linda had the nomination 'wrapped up', he took
an attitude, reminiscent of that of 1960, which led him to go out of his way to 'excite interest
in the Nixon-Agnew ticket' only days after the Republican National Convention of 1968.40
In his final, desperate memorandum to Buckley, Rusher correctly emphasised that
'Nixon not only isn't' a conservative, 'he doesn't want to be,.41 Rusher chose to forget that
conservatives of all factions, including those working at the National Review, had decided
four years before that with Barry Goldwater they had already had their fair share of
unelectable 'Sir Galahads'. Rusher's own persistent ruminations about Reagan's need to
move to the centre lent credibility to his fellow conservative's support for the genuine
moderate within the roster of Republican presidential candidates. Moreover, aside from the
short-term electoral calculus, Richard Nixon's 1968 candidacy also offered the Buckleyites
the possibility of consolidating their position within the American political mainstream. After
all, in conservative terms Richard Nixon was a candidate who had managed, like Goldwater,
to gain 'the establishment's mortal enmity' but - unlike Goldwater - its acceptance as a
legitimate contender for power. In 1960, 1962 and 1964 National Review conservatives had
miserably failed to dissociate themselves from what they themselves labelled the lunatic
fringe, then personified by Robert Welch and the John Birch Society. The presidential
election of 1968 allowed the Buckleyites to attempt anew the redemption of conservatism
from its association with the radical right. For supporting the Republican presidential
nominee meant to oppose George Corley Wallace, formerly governor of Alabama, presently a
populist, radical right-wing third party candidate. The stand of National Review conservatives
within Republican politics clearly signalled how in 1968 the Buckleyites were more worried
40 James Burnham to William F, Buckley August 14, ibid., Kelly, Burnham, pp. 317-19.
41 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, May 23, 1968, f. 10M (April-June 1968), box 50, WFB papers.
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about being plausible political contenders than immaculate conservative doctrinaires. Their
stand outside the Republican party, and in particular their determined opposition to the
former Governor of Alabama, fortified their claims for a place within the acceptable political
spectrum.
From the outset, Wallace presented conservatives with a similar challenge to that of
Robert Welch, to the point that the American Conservative Union's weekly Battle Line
deliberately tried to associate these two adversaries of respectable conservatism.Y The
Buckleyite response was similar in substance: faced with a choice between respectability and
successful, populist, right-wing radicalism, National Review would do everything within its
power to dissociate conservatism from the latter, but always at the minimal possible cost to
the movement. Neil McCaffrey, a conservative activist and close friend of Buckley noted, as
Frank Meyer did with the John Birch Society, that the 'answer on the Wallace problem' was
to 'not shatter the conservative coalition (uneasy and awkward at best) beyond repair'. 43A
distressed McCaffrey realised that as the election of 1968 approached, Wallace counted with
enough popular support to be a threat to a conservative organisational network still in its
infancy - particularly organisations such as the Conservative Party of New York State which
needed the support of disenchanted Democrat voters - comparable to the one posed by Welch
towards National Review in the early 1960s. Accordingly he warned Buckley that 'when
leaders loose touch with their followers, they find new leaders, even from Alabama'.44 And
McCaffrey was onto something. The Wallacites themselves noted that Buckley and the
CPNYS's stubborn subservience to the GOP held back the support of disgruntled Democrats
who felt increasingly attracted to the right, but still abhorred all things Republican -
subsequently, Richard Nixon himself would come to the same conclusi~n.45 Back in 1964, a
group of young YAF members had tried to set up a chapter named after the Alabamian:
42 'Reagan', The Republican Battle Line, June-July 1968.
43 Neil McCaffrey to William F, Buckley, February 27, 1968, f, McCaffrey, Neil (Jan-July), box 52, WFB papers.
44 Ibid.
45 James P. Ruffy (coordinator of the NYS committee to elect G. Wallace president) to Neil McCaffrey, June 13,
1967, f. Neil McCaffrey, box 43, WFB papers; Mason, Questfor a New Majority, p. 161.
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Buckley had instantly resorted to the national director of the organisation to block it.46
Subsequently, Wallace's appeal certainly went from strength to strength among the white
working class disenchanted with the Democratic party, as well as among a substantial
fraction of the traditional conservative vote. Alarmingly enough, and heralding latter shifts
within the conservative movement, Wallace even attracted men like Richard Viguerie, one of
the most effective among the young conservative activists who had cut their teeth in Young
Americans For Freedom. Viguerie went on to work for Wallace, as did a number of the old
Goldwater grassroots supporters, because, as even Battle Line was forced to acknowledge,
Wallace was correct when he noted that not all that much separated the two mainstream
parties.Y
In the meantime, as happened with the JBS, Buckley tried to excommunicate Wallace
from the American conservative movement by denouncing him as a political 'impostor', but
had some severe trouble in actually distinguishing the conservative message from that
peddled by Wallace.48 Though Buckley believed that the former governor 'contaminated' the
conservatives' legalistic position on segregation, he was forced to acknowledge that the
Alabamian had refined his 'coarseness' of yore and his basic themes on law and order and
against civil rights activists - as well as, even if Buckley neglected to mention it, the
accompanying, racially-loaded political dog-whistling - were indistinguishable from
National Review's or, for that matter, Nixon's.49 When it came to Wallace's most evident
shortcomings from a conservative viewpoint - namely his addiction to government funds as
governor - McCaffrey noticed that not even Goldwater or Reagan, much less so Nixon,
would pass the kind of muster that Buckley tried to apply to Wallace. 50 In the end, Buckley'S
frustration gave way to an extremely rare example of crude name-calling; 'I do wish I could
46 Marilyn Flinn to William F. Buckley, August 13, 1964 and Buckley to Robert Bauman, August 17, 1964, f. YAF,
box 33, WFB papers.
47 The best analysis of Wallace's infamous career remains Dan T Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the
Origins of New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1995);
See also Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors. The Origins of the New American Right, (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2001), pp. 211-213 and Gerome L. Himmelstein, To The Right, p. 64.
48 William F, Buckley to Neil McCaffrey, February 27, 1968, f. McCaffrey, Neil (Jan-July), box 52, WFB papers.
49 Interview with William F. Buckley, July 25, 2005, New York City.
50 Neil McCaffrey to William F, Buckley, February 27, 1968; Buckley to McCaffrey, February 27, 1968, f.
McCaffrey, Neil (Jan-July), box 52, WFB papers.
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think of a way to handle the son-of-a-bitch' he told McCaffrey. 'That', Buckley resentfully
insisted 'is what he is'. 51 National Review conservatives never quite managed to justify their
visceral hostility to Wallace with any degree of persuasiveness, but unlike their earlier
experiences with the JBS, they did succeed in distancing themselves publicly and
vociferously from the Wallacite school of radicalism. When Buckley took Wallace to his
Firing Line TV program he managed to come across as an angry, confused and half-irrational
opponent of the latter, reduced, according to McCaffrey, to trotting out 'the most
unconvincing set of double standards'. 52 After all, as early as 1964 National Review had
openly acknowledged that 'few conservatives could fault or improve upon Wallace's assaults
on liberal foreign policy attitudes'. Nevertheless, it went on to remind its readers, 'Wallace
may proclaim the faith but no one in the dues-paying Right' was about 'to invite him into the
doctrinal temple for a guest sermon' .53 Cynically enough National Review concluded, as
Buckley would repeat later on, that despite Wallace's pretence to be a conservative, he did
not 'look like one'. 54 Of course despite Buckley's views, which combined plain snobbery
with a frustrated, backhanded admission of defeat, Wallace's political 'beauty' was precisely
that his arguments definitely looked and sounded like a conservative's, and that by the second
half of the 1960s his still-strident but modulated style and the abandonment of the traditional
two-party system threatened to out-manoeuvre the Buckleyites. At a personal level the whole
affair was a painful fracas for Buckley - in rather delicate terms half a century later he still
defined that Firing Line show as 'one of the most tense' he ever did - but then again, he
definitely came across as a strong opponent of Wallacite populism, in the process assisting
the conservative movement's slow road towards respectability. 55 Wallace had inadvertently
performed a useful role in propelling the Buckleyites, who desperately wanted as much
distance as possible between themselves and the Alabamian's 'disrepute', further and more
firmly within the Republican fold and therefore behind Richard Nixon. In order to achieve
5) Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Victor Gold, 'Bounce High the Head Beams, Governor', NR, June 16, 1964, p. 492.
54 Ibid.
55 Interview with William F. Buckley; Judis, Buckley, pp. 191, 200, 283; Neil McCaffrey to William F, Buckley,
February 27, 1968; Buckley to McCaffrey, February 27, 1968, f. McCaffrey, Neil (Jan-July), box 52, WFB papers.
182
respectability, National Review, Battle Line, the Washington conservative weekly Human
Events and, individually, virtually every conservative of consequence supported the idea that
'the conservative movement would be better served by voting for Nixon'. 56
A crucial difference between Wallace and previous, more difficult to handle instances
of right-wing 'paranoid style' populism was that, as conservatives never tired of reminding
anyone who would listen, George Wallace came directly from the ranks of the Southern
Democratic party. 57 Unlike Robert Welch and the other right-wing radicals excommunicated
in the early 1960s, Wallace had never been part of the conservative organisational, political,
much less so social, networks. As a result the Buckleyites' task of disavowal was
considerably easier. The men at National Review may have had trouble communicating to the
faithful a coherent disavowal based on philosophical finesse but, at long last, Wallace
afforded serious conservatism the possibility of satisfying their deep yearning for political
acceptance through an attack on the populist right constructed on visceral partisan grounds.
After all, as National Review had pointed out back in 1964 and Human Events repeated in
1968, Wallace had been as big a threat to Barry Goldwater as to the Democrats and the
Governor's political origins were in Jim Folson's Alabama Democratic party machine. 58 As a
result, despite McCaffrey's fears, the excommunication of the Alabamian took place at a
relatively low cost in terms of cancelled subscriptions to NR or even actual damage to the
good health of the movement. The CPNYS, for instance, actually endorsed Nixon before the
convention following a form of reasoning opposite to McCaffrey's: right-wing New Yorkers
hoped that such a move would 'deflate' the Wallace threat in the city and elsewhere.i"
Similarly enough, the leaders of YAF reported in September 1968 that despite pressure form
'the Wallace people', the organisation remained 'solid for Nixon', and it only registered one
56 'Should Conservatives Vote for Wallace', Human Events, October 19,1968 (hereafter HE). See also 'A Close Look
at Wallace's Words and Actions', ibid., October 19, 1968; 'George Wallace, The Great Divider', Battle Line,
November 1, 1968; 'A Vote for Wallace Is... ', NR, September 10, 1968, pp. 908-909.
57 William F. Buckley, 'An Hour With George Wallace', NR, March 12, 1968, pp. 258-59, and articles cited in
Brevious footnote.
S Victor Gold, 'Bounce High the Head Beams, Governor'; Victor Gold, 'The Rise and Stand of George Corley
Wallace', HE, January 27,1968.
59 'Memorandum Re. Conservative Party (New York) Endorsement of Richard M. Nixon for President', July 10,1968
and attachment, John Chamberlain, 'Conservative Tide', [Undated], f. CPNYS, box 48, WFB papers.
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resignation in protest at the Buckleyites' hostile treatment of the ex-govemor.i" For once,
conservatives found themselves siding with the dreaded establishment they had fought off for
so long, and thereby implicitly accepting the legitimacy of their main political adversaries. In
1968 Wallace's third party candidacy helped conservatism to complete the long road from
political ostracism to acceptance by the political mainstream that had taken National Review
from supporting Joseph McCarthy to opposing George Wallace.
The months that elapsed between Richard Nixon's victory in the Republican National
Convention of 1968 and his swearing-in ceremony in Washington D.C. were a moment of
unchecked conservative euphoria on a par with the weeks that had followed Barry
Goldwater's primary victory in 1964. Even the nagging William Rusher, who had spent the
previous three years fustigating his fellow conservatives' tenderness towards Nixon, could
not help suffering from contagion. 'Make no mistake' he told his fellow editors at the
National Review, 'Nixon was a candidate of a strictly and highly conservative bloc, put
together in the first instance by Goldwater, financed by [major conservative patron Jeremiah]
Milbank, blessed by Buckley and ultimately put over the top by the accession of J. Strom
Thurmond'. Nixon, according to Rusher, 'had almost no liberal support whatever', and
therefore if 'Nixon's nomination may have been (as I [Rusher] believe) an error' it 'was at
last the error of a group of indisputable conservatives' .61 Less than a month later, error or no
error, Rusher finally went all the way and volunteered to pen (and sign) National Review's
formal endorsement of Richard Nixon, explicitly 'hoping' to make it 'all the more effective
because it comes from a Reagan supporter'. 62 Where National Review went, the other
organisations in its orbit followed. Both Battle Line, the organ of the American Conservative
Union, and Human Events had continuously expressed a preference for Reagan throughout
the primaries, but also accorded an even-handed and occasionally friendly coverage to Nixon
60 Arnold Steinberg to William F, Buckley, Sept 14, 1968, f. YAF, box 57, ibid.
61 William Rusher to My Valued Colleagues, the Editors of NR, 'Preliminary Observations on the Republican
Convention', August 12, 1968, f. rOM (Apr-Jun 1968), box 54, ibid.
62 William Rusher to William F, Buckley, September 3, 1968, ibid.
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and his growing number of conservative supporters.I" The CPNYS endorsed him nearly a
month before the convention, at a time when Reagan's hopes were still fairly high. At around
the same time, John Chamberlain noted that 'the nation as a whole is well aware that
Republican conservatism is lining up behind Richard Nixon' .64 From then on, individual
conservatives ranging from young activists such as Jeffrey Bell, to old warhorses such as
Jeffrey Hart joined the Nixon ranks to write speeches and position papers/" After the
convention, enthusiasm for Nixon reached a feverish state: Battle Line went out of its way to
celebrate how the Nixon campaign had got off to 'a roaring start', while Human Events
underlined that 'conservatives across the country should take heart' from Nixon's victory."
After the general election, YAF activists celebrated the opportunity granted to the
conservative movement to 'take part in guiding the destiny of the nation', since the new
administration clearly owed 'its very life to the electoral votes delivered by Republican
conservatives' .67Along identical lines, Human Events headlined how 'Nixon victory provides
great opportunity', and Battle Line celebrated 'the conservative mandate for President
Nixon,.68
After November 1968 the right faced new, exciting and uncharted territory. For the
conservative movement had finally become a major and accepted player in national politics,
to the point that the tenant at 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue owed his position to conservative
support. The question for conservatives then was to figure out how much access to actual
power Richard Nixon would be prepared to grant to the right and what, exactly, was to be
done with that power. For the previous two decades the movement had been relentlessly
63 'Presidential Politics', Battle Line, June-July 1968; 'Presidential Politics', ibid., July 15, 1968; 'Reagan', ibid., May
1968; Richard M. Nixon, 'America is Also Being Tested', HE, January 6, 1968; 'Moving Left Courts Election
Disaster', ibid., August 3, 1968.
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65 Interview with Jeffrey Bell; William F. Buckley to the New York Yacht Club, September 5, 1968, f. Jeffrey Hart,
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66 'Nixon Campaign Off to Roaring Start', Battle Line, September 16, 1968; 'Nixon-Agnew: A Winning Ticket?', HE,
August 17, 1968.
67 'Nixon's Victory: Opportunity for YAF', The Freedom Scene, December 1968.
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critical of the men who had held the responsibility for making policy decisions. In 1968 they
found themselves closer than ever before to the other side of the barrier.
2. 'IN THE SADDLE'? THE HARD CORE AND THE HALCYON DAYS OF NIXON'S
PRESIDENCY
After the vote-counting had been completed, the Buckleyites' first activity was to
subject the president-elect to as much pressure as they could possibly muster to influence the
general character of the new administration's appointments, and to place within it as many
conservatives as possible. Immediately after the election, F. Clifton White reminded the hard
core that 'the White House is incomparably the most important place in Washington', and
advised them that 'the stress should be on putting good people there'. 69 Buckley, for one, set
about it in earnest, channelling conservative names towards the Nixon staffers then engaged
in hiring administration personnel.I" In the meantime Daniel Mahoney, of the Conservative
Party of New York State, set up an appointment with John Mitchell, who was already seen as
one of the key figures within Nixon's closest circle of aides and advisors.I' From within the
Nixon camp men such as Tdm Huston and Patrick Buchanan not only pushed for
conservative hopefuls, but also actively spurred the Buckleyites' efforts to mount pressure on
Nixon to appoint the 'right' candidates.f Predictably, some disappointments were inevitable.
Tom Huston framed his appeal' for support within the 'awful' 'performance and
appointments' of certain senior Nixon advisors such as Robert Finch in the Department of
Health Education and Welfare (which dealt with civil rights matters), and William Rogers in
the State Department. Buckley on his part engaged in a rather personal and ultimately
unsuccessful quest to emplace his personal friend Evan Galbraith in the new administration.
69 William Rusher to William F, Buckley, November 11, 1968, f. White House Suggestions and Recommendations for
Positions, box 67, WFB papers.
70 See William F, Buckley to Peter Flanigan, February 25, 1969; Flanigan to Buckley, April 8, 1969; Flanigan to
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Eventually Buckley, irritated by the president-elect's unresponsiveness to
recommendations in favour of his friend, went out of his way to publish an article (sanctioned
by Barry Goldwater), in which he attacked Nixon's recruitment practices on the grounds that
former Goldwater staffers had been 'blacklisted'. 73 Even prior to this, Battle Line had already
expressed doubts about Nixon's staffing practices and their alleged leftward drift, while
around the same time conservative columnist and National Review resident southerner James
Jackson Kilpatrick noted the increasing 'sense of unease among the conservative right'. His
fellow columnist Richard Wilson 'hoped' that Republicans would not be 'entirely excluded'
from 'the spoils of victory' after 'watching so long the benefits accruing to their Democratic
colleagues.i" Yet on close examination, conservatives' complaints can neither be construed
as a Nixonian repudiation of the right, nor used to sustain that claim that 'conservatives did
not have an intellectual champion in the Nixon White House' simply because more
moderates and liberals were employed on his stafes After all, the Evan Galbraith affair that
so incensed Buckley arose because the position was eventually filled by Warren Nutter, a
prominent member of the 1964 Goldwater 'brains trust'. As for the cabinet-level appointment
of moderates that so irritated the right, these were more than compensated for - as the press
took care to publicise - at sub-cabinet and assistant level by men from the Goldwater and
Southern factions of the conservative movement such as Richard Kleindienst, Harry Dent and
Robert Mardian, the latter in an area of special sensitivity as was HEW, much like Nutter and
his own retinue of conservatives at Defence.76 And to these must be added White House
staffers such as Patrick Buchanan and (in a more junior capacity) the later infamous Tom
Huston. To crown it all, even the less ideologically-driven Nixon senior advisors seemed to
73 William F. Buckley to BaiTYGoldwater, March 18, 1968, f. Goldwater, ibid.; William Rusher to Buckley, f. 10M,
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lean towards the right: most notably John Mitchell, the virtually unknown Attorney General,
who quickly sided with white Southerners against civil rights activists, and labelled
Republican liberals and old foes of the Buckleyites in the Ripon Society 'juvenile
delinquents';" Lastly, the administration was increasingly receptive to a number of political
analysts who were either unknown or formerly related to the Democratic party, and whose
viewpoints reinforced Richard Nixon's populist conservative instincts. The most popular of
these was Kevin Phillips, who published his The Emerging Republican Majority after
orchestrating Nixon's 'southern strategy'. His influence was reinforced by that of two former
Johnson assistants, Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon, who published The Real
Majority in 1970 and became administration electoral gurus on a par with Phillips.78 By mid-
1969, the public image of the administration was sufficiently right of centre to prompt even
Pat Buchanan to recommend that the White House should project the image of 'healthy
rivalry' between 'competing ideologies and ideas in the administration'. 79
As the remarks of Richard Wilson clearly indicate, a substantial aspect of the
conservative disappointment with the administration's recruitment policies had more to do
with old fashioned struggles for patronage than with Nixon's presumed ideological
meandering. It should not be overlooked that, in his article, Buckley was able to mention by
name no less than five senior members of the administration that had been directly
approached on behalf of Evan Galbraith. The noise that the Buckleyites made over
appointments was, at the very least; in equal measure the product of a new-found sense of
belonging within the political mainstream and of their right to the perks of such membership,
than of any feeling of ideological rejection. Throughout the first two years of the Nixon
presidency, conservatives could find relatively little of substance to genuinely complain
77 'Mitchell Acts as President's Strong Man', The Washington Daily News, December 4, 1969; Rightwing Making
Gains Under Nixon', St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 1, 1970.
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about: Nixon continued to talk the conservative language on the crucial issues of the day
ranging from student unrest to economic policy, through the Vietnam withdrawal and civil
rights radicalism. Beyond rhetoric, Nixon's aggressiveness in South East Asia, vigorous
response to student protesters, a school desegregation policy virtually designed and run by
Southern conservatives together with the battles over judicial appointees essentially
guaranteed a reasonable level of conservative satisfaction. Even in economic policy, from
1969 to 1971 the administration adopted a 'steady as you go' approach approved by no less
than Buckley friend and conservative star-economist Milton Friedman.8o It is no surprise
then, that in January 1969 a close acquaintance of Buckley advised him in alarm to maintain
a 'critical distance from the President' and that, a year later, the conservative press could
proclaim that 'Rightwing Making Gains Under Nixon'. 81 Less enthusiastically, but still
broadly satisfied, Battle Line noted that Nixon had provided 'something for everyone', and
that 'for every concession the liberal GOP has received, the conservatives have been handed
a prize as well' .82
Paradoxically, as the Nixon White House moved rightwards, both William F. Buckley
and to some extent National Review had by 1968 lost much of their previous taste for
provoking the outrage of the liberal establishment. Buckley was no more the enfant terrible
of the McCarthy years, but was now a mature man accustomed to receiving the recognition of
the intellectual and journalistic establishment. By the late 1960s he had developed a
remarkably successful socialite life - mingling with the likes of actors David Niven and
Roger Moore, Princess Grace Kelly and Keynesian economist John Kenneth Galbraith on the
Swiss slopes - and seemed more driven towards writing fiction, skiing, and sailing than
toward incensing liberals.V It was in this context that Buckley's acquaintance with Henry
80 Interview with Milton Friedman, May 4, 2004, San Francisco. The most perceptive evaluation of Richard Nixon's
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Kissinger deepened into full-blown friendship. The two men had known each other since at
least 1956, when Kissinger had suggested a meeting to exchange impressions about the
newborn National Review. Subsequently Buckley himself as well as Frank Meyer, L. Brent
Bozell and especially James Burnham on various occasions attended Kissinger's international
seminar - in itself a clear symptom of the distance between National Review's 'radicalism'
and the lunatic fringe even during the early years of the magazine. In 1964 and 1968,
Kissinger, who had always been closely associated with Nelson Rockefeller, tried
(unsuccessfully) to mediate between the Governor of New York and the Buckleyites." Once
Kissinger found himself as Nixon's National Security Advisor he became a major conduit
between the White House and National Review. Later on, he failed to assuage conservative
fears about Detente and the opening to China, but it was still remarkable that Henry
Kissinger, Buckley's most powerful friend in the White House and someone immensely
respected by James Burnham, also happened to be the nation's premier practitioner of
realpolitik and, therefore, the blJte noire of the less sophisticated evangelical anticommunist
- which is to say most conservatives.
So far did Buckley gravitate towards the respectable centre, while the administration's
rhetoric moved in the direction of the populist right, that he found himself opposed to Spiro
Agnew during the run up towards the 1970 mid-term elections because the vice-president had
become too strident in his populist right-wing message. Although an entirely minor incident-
NR eventually fell into line - the affair was quite revealing of the shifts in the relative
positioning of both Richard Nixon and the conservative hard core during the first two years
of the former's presidency. After November 1968, Richard Nixon and a good many political
analysts led by Kevin Phillips, Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon realised that the
addition of Wallace's electoral support to that of the president amounted to both a
conservative political mandate for Nixon, and the definitive implosion of Franklin
84 Henry Kissinger to William F. Buckley, February 7, 1956, f. Kirk-Kissinger (1956), box 3, WFB papers; Kissinger
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Roosevelt's New Deal coalition. In a nut-shell these observers noted that the growmg
reluctance to address de facto segregation, the perceived increasing violence of civil rights
and anti-war protestors, together with the challenges to traditional mores about sex and drugs
had finally had the deleterious effects upon the Democratic coalition that Nixon and the
Republicans had been waiting for ever since 1946. According to the men assisting the
president, the culture wars of the 1960s had, at long last, achieved in 1968 what affluence,
wartime controls and fellow-travelling all combined could not in the late 1940s: that the blue-
collar white Democratic voter had finally tired of the arrogant liberals castled up in the
federal bureaucracy, the mass-media and the liberal foundations.V
As might be expected, Richard Nixon was not about to miss the chance of nailing his
manifold 'establishment' enemies, but his shift from the candidate of the centre to the
president of the right-wing, disgruntled voter took place gradually and unevenly between
November 1968 and November 1970.86 Throughout their first term in office, both Nixon and
his assistants reacted warily to his narrow defeat of Humphrey. 87 After all, support for George .
Wallace may have lent the administration conservative moral support, but what counted was
the ballot box and the Alabamian was not expected to disappear in 1972.88 Move too far to
the right, and in a three way election one could very well lose the centrist vote that had
actually pulled Nixon ahead of the Democrats in 1968, with no accompanying electoral gain
whatsoever on the right. That calculus explains Nixon's deliberate efforts to include liberal
Republicans within his cabinet: it was a measure designed to retain a hold on the liberal wing
of the party, and one which should be seen in the same light as the careful tailoring of the
message during the campaign that provoked so much outrage among observers of every
ideological stripe.89 The situation only changed, and rather gradually, as the 1970 mid-term
85 Patrick Buchanan to the President, November 10, 1972, f. Memorandums to the President, box 7 (Staff
Memoranda), Patrick Buchanan papers, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park ML (hereafter
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34-36.
88 Patrick Buchanan to the President, July 5, 1972, f. Presidential Memos 1 of 2, box 7, PB papers.
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elections approached. During those months, campus dissent and civil rights hostility to the
president increased, partly because of the administration's transparent support for
conservative Southern resistance to school desegregation and partly because of the expansion
of the Vietnam war into Cambodia and Laos.
The later months of 1969 saw an intensification of the sort of dynamics that eventually
led to the Kent State and Jackson State killings, the New York Hard Hat riot and an evident
shift to right of the president's rhetoric. As far as the 'social issue' derived from civil rights
and antiwar dissent went, the administration progressively intensified its hard, hostile
approach to the protestors themselves and anyone else who the administration could possibly
perceive as one of its 'natural enemies', including university faculties across the nation and
the bulk of the press corps, as well as the Democrats.9o Nixon's troubles with the left began
with the 'Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam' in October, which was replied to by the
White House with an address to the nation by the president on November 3, followed by an
antiwar mobilization day on November 15 and two speeches by the vice-president in Des .
Moines and Montgomery on November 13 and 20. Nixon's famous 'silent majority address'
quite simply re-stated that he 'would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of
this nation to be dictated by the minority' which was trying 'to impose on the nation by
mounting demonstrations on the street'. 91 The national press correctly identified the address
as an exceedingly successful and essentially conservative 'message to the silent majority' and
'the people who elected him', and 'one which did not really add much to what was already
known about the war. 92 The White House, paranoid as ever when it came to the press,
perceived the assessment as 'ranging from disappointment to anger'. 93 Vice-President
Agnew, who had already established himself as the blunt instrument for use against Nixon's
adversaries during the 1968 campaign, took things even further ten days later when he
lambasted television coverage of the presidential address as another example of how an
90
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'unelected elite' could 'make or break - by their coverage and commentary - a moratorium
on the war', and charged the television networks with having 'abused the power they
enjoy' .94 The president actually participated in the writing of the speech, which 'amused and
highly pleased him' .95 Five days later Agnew replied to the predictable journalistic outrage by
expanding the attack to the New York Times and the Washington Post with the consequent
'swift, predictable and explosive' expansion of journalistic rage."
In theory therefore, conservatives should have been ecstatic to hear the vice-president of
the United States reproduce what they themselves had been proclaiming throughout the
previous two decades. Indeed William Rusher and Cliff White went to meet their newfound
champion in December 1969, and the former subsequently wrote the VP that he was 'an
enthusiastic supporter of everything you are doing', and even stated that 'you can count on
me on anything I can be of assistance'. 97 From there onwards Rusher developed a veritable
political love story with the vice president (later, a genuine deep friendship), while Agnew
himself became more and more embedded with the right. After the 1968 election he had .
become an icon for American conservatives, and was certainly the most notorious right-
winger within the administration. The vice-presidential staff in tum became a hub of young,
up-and-coming appointees of 'every conservative stripe, including NR contributors-cum-
vicepresidential speechwriters." Nevertheless, Spiro Agnew never quite became a fully
fledged member of the conservative movement, which is why in early October 1969, just
before antiwar protestors took to Washington, William F. Buckley decided to have a 'rap' at
the VP. 99 According to Buckley, Agnew's performance had been 'pretty bad' thus far, and he
concluded that the vice-president was not 'skilled in polemics, and therefore should not
94 See for instance 'The Vicepresidency: Agnew Unleashed', Time Magazine, October 31,1969; Speech reproduced in
Keogh, Nixon and The Press, pp. 191-98.
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engage in them without help'. 100 Later on, both the White House and Agnew personally got
wind of rumours alleging that Buckley believed 'the president's re-election contingent on the
dropping of the vice-president' .101 National Review's editor went out of his way to deny such
a thing but admitted that the he may have analysed Agnew's retention as Nixon's running
mate on strictly electoral grounds, and that such analysis may not have been entirely
supportive of Agnew's position. Even more interestingly, Buckley warned the distressed VP
that the magazine's contributors and editorial line would continue to carry such analysis on
'technical' grounds.l'f
In reality, the relationship between Agnew and the Buckleyites, and Buckley's travails
in differentiating his personal relationship with Agnew from his capacity for political analysis
revealed a deeper issue then engulfing the American right - one that the journal's tepid
attitude towards Reagan in 1968 had already signalled. For the presidency of Richard Nixon
witnessed, and in part helped to bring about, a growing gulf between National Review
conservatives and the younger generation of right-wing activists then coming of political age'
and clustered in Agnew's staff. Richard Nixon had selected Spiro Agnew as running mate
because the governor of Maryland was political incognita, mostly known for his association
with the Rockefeller wing of the GOP and for grossly mishandling the Baltimore race riots of
1968.103 William Rusher's first reaction upon hearing about the candidacy was to ask 'Spiro
who?'. From there, as was the case with most conservatives, he made clear his contempt for a
man he rightly considered entirely innocent of philosophical attachments.i'" Agnew's
function as Nixon's right-wing hatchet man, coupled with the evident hostility of the press
corps during the election, naturally endeared the ex-governor to Rusher and most grassroots
right-wing activists, but even then, a year or even longer lapsed between the national
100 William F. Buckley, 'Mr. Agnew and the Demonstrators' NR October 23, 1969.
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convention and moves on the part of Rusher and other hard core conservatives to actually
meet the VP.
The distance between the hard core and conservatism's latest political champion was in
equal parts a social and ideological matter. By 1968 conservatives had already developed
their own political star system - populated by the likes of Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan,
John Tower and the ACU's John Ashbrook - with which the vice-president was not even
remotely connected. Moreover Agnew, by the admission of his own conservative advisors,
might have been receptive to 'new ideas', but he was also a complete ignoramus when it
came to the philosophy of conservatism. His shortcomings were also a matter of style and
inclination. The hard core had spent the best part of the previous decade trying to dissociate
conservatism from precisely the kind of right-wing populism that Agnew was enthusiastically
espousing. Moreover, by the late 1960s and early 70's the sages at National Review tended to
have a lot more interest in Henry Kissinger than in those considered to be half-hysterical,
barely literate ex-governors (whether from Maryland or Alabama). Agnew never quite'
managed to overcome these handicaps: while he received considerable sympathy from the
pages of National Review, this was not enough to stop Buckley from publicly losing patience
with the vice-president's verbal 'antics or to refrain himself from damaging Agnew's chances
of retaining the vice-residency when Nixon was actively considering dumping Agnew in
favour of John Connally. Neither was it enough to prevent the Review and most of its
contributors from deserting the vice-president when murky financial dealings from his
Maryland years provoked his downfall. lOS
Yet this time around, National Review's stance did not necessarily correspond with the
evolution of conservatism elsewhere. During the second part of the 1960s, the conservative
organisational network had helped to create and promote a new generation of activists who
were younger, more aggressive and completely free from any need to gain the acceptance of
the political mainstream. These 'Young Turks' within the movement would later became
105 William Rusher to Spiro T. Agnew, October 19, 1973, f. Agnew, Spiro. T., box 6, WR papers.
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known as the 'New Right' and, during the Nixon years in the White House, as they gained
experience and independent stature they also became less willing to toe the National Review
line.t06 These were men who had often broken their political teeth as young activists during
the Goldwater campaign, and had made their way up via Young Americans for Freedom or as
conservatives within the Young Republicans and who, in remarkable numbers, found their
way into junior positions within the Nixon administration generally, and the vice-president's
entourage in particular. Tom Huston, and Agnew-staffers David Keene and Howard Phillips
(later director of the Office for Economic Opportunity) had all held senior office in YAF.
Others took a different route: Richard Viguerie set up his own political operation and
supported Wallace, while M. Stanton Evans moved up the ranks within the National Review
group as did John Coyne, later to move onto Agnew's and then Nixon's speechwriting teams.
Furthermore, young conservatives like Jeffrey Bell and Richard Whalen actually re-joined the
conservative organisational network fairly early in Nixon's first term after working in the
campaign or having suffered brief and unhappy stints in the administration. These new
conservatives - within and without the administation - far from being embarrassed by Spiro'
Agnew, saw him as 'a fighter' and were instead naturally drawn to his vigorous right-wing
populisrn.l'" As long as Richard Nixon presented a plausible case for conservatism, the fault-
line went largely unnoticed. After all, as Rusher remarked, the Nixon ranks in the 1968
primaries contained as many of those young conservatives as the Reagan forces did, and the
situation remained largely unchanged for the first year and a half of Nixon's first term: not so
as the public image of the administration drifted leftwards between 1970 and mid-1972. t08
In 1970 the president, frustrated by what he saw as Republican candidates' poor
showing and by the failure of his conservative-leaning strategy, moved back to the centre. By
mid-1972 that disappointment had given way to a fairly acute case of the not-uncommon
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White House syndrome that distances second-term presidents from their party. As re-election
approached and the Democrats selected George McGovern as their presidential candidate,
Nixon knew that incumbency, together with his own appeal to the party's essentially
conservative grassroots activist - which had been immensely fortified by a Democratic
candidate vulnerable to charges of radicalism - insulated him from any need to pay lip-
service to the ever-more debilitated liberal wing of the GOP. Ambitiously and aggressively,
the president initiated what historian Robert Mason has labelled a 'sharp tum to the right' .109
Nixon, being Nixon, vindictively aimed for a 'clearing out' of his 'enemies'. More
meaningfully, he also planned to initiate the 'building up' of his 'own establishment', as well
as 'clearing up the bad programs', particularly the Great Society's 'huge social programs'
which, according to the president, 'don't work'. 110 Richard Nixon was, at long last, prepared
to give the American right the counter-revolution they had been seeking since 1945.
Moreover, looking to the longer-term, he also set his sights on the creation of a national
conservative party. III
Conservatives, needless to say, had already been there, and provided an excellent test
run for the president in 1970 when the White House backed James Buckley, running on the
CPNYS ticket, against incumbent liberal Republican Charles Goodell. A year later, while the
hard core, smarting from Nixon's shift to the centre, was trying to make the president's life a
little more difficult, Patrick Buchanan drafted a proposal exploring 'the possibility of a
national Conservative party' which would in effect replicate the New Yorkers' strategy
throughout the nation: having Nixon on a double Conservative-Republican ticket.112
Conservatives, thought Buchanan, would consent because they would finally acquire a
national party. Richard Nixon's benefit would be an strengthened candidacy in what
Buchanan predicted might still be a four-way election between Nixon and an Edmund
109 .
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Muskie-like centrist Democrat at the centre pitted against Wallace to the right and a
McGovern or perhaps Eugene McCarthy-type on the left. In that scenario Buchanan's
proposal would enable the president to make inroads into the Wallace vote by escaping the
Republican label in those sections of the country - such as New York itself and the Deep
South - where conservative sentiment was on the rise, but cohabited with a visceral anti-GOP
partisanship that still hindered Republican advances. Buchanan was not the only conservative
thinking new party thoughts. William Rusher, Nixon's old conservative nemesis, strategised
along very similar lines, and would eventually publish a similar proposal for the radical
restructuring of the GOP, or its substitution by a new conservative party.113
Of course, the president did not need much persuading. Since the run up towards the
1968 elections, Richard Nixon had been fully aware and had greatly benefited from the
growing disaffection of those southerners who, although generally loyal to certain incumbent
Democrats on Capitol Hill, had already voted for a Republican president in 1964 and an
Independent in 1968. As Nixon was inaugurated in 1972, Louisiana's Joe D. Waggoner led·
conversations between no less than forty conservative (and not only southern) Democratic
representatives and the GOP on the subject of switching sides.114 In part this was a
consequence of the ascent of' George McGovern which, coupled with rather unnerving
Republican gains in the South since 1964, had become the last straw for many of those
Democrats in the legislative branch who had already lent their wholehearted support to the
president during the campaign. I IS As November 1972 had approached, the Democratic old
guard - the wing which comprised the trade union and white-ethnic vote and which had been
gravitating towards the right since 1968 - had had about enough of McGovernite new left
adventures."6 Outside the South, Chicago's all-powerful Mayor Daley, Philadelphia's party
machine boss Frank Rizzo, together with the AFL-CIO's George Meany and Teamster
113 Rusher, New Majority Party, pp. 96-1l3.
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115 See for instance the reception of the presidential entourage in Mississippi in July 1972, as described in Haldeman,
Diaries, p. 594.
116 Perlstein, Nixonland, 509-15; Alonzo M. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992) pp. 277-'-81, 330.
198
president Frank Fitzsimmons, as well as (covertly) Lyndon Baynes Johnson, repudiated the
Democratic party of George McGovem and embraced Richard Nixon's 'silent majority'v'{'
To crown it all, even George Wallace, then recovering from a gunshot wound but still his old
right-wing populist self, discreetly backed Nixon against McGovem. In exchange he only
asked that the Wallacite 'message on the issues' be heard. I IS The president enthusiastically
obliged.
However, if political realignment meant spectacular implosion for the Democratic
party, the Republicans also culminated a metamorphosis of their own. The GOP had first
undergone a highly pyrotechnical intemal transformation in 1964. Since then party liberals
had, incrementally and almost imperceptibly, lost influence, first at grassroots level and later
at more senior levels.'!" In 1968, as William Rusher correctly noted, the right-wing of the
party was strong enough to enjoy a choice between two candidates - Nixon and Reagan - but
had lacked the self-confidence to go all the way for their own champion. Throughout Richard
Nixon's first term the position of liberal Republicans deteriorated to the point where, as·
William Rusher liked to gloat, New York's mayor John Lindsay and Representative Ogden
Reid left the party altogether, while Senator Charles Goodell found himself expelled from
office by the joint efforts of the, CPNYS and the White House.120 In 1972 not even Richard
Nixon dared to irritate the faithful, and ruefully kept Agnew as his running mate. Less than
three years later, Nelson Rockefeller's selection as Gerald Ford's vice-president was very
much the swan song of the Eastern Republican establishment that had so much tormented
both Richard Nixon and the conservative hard core since the days of Dwight Eisenhower. In
the light of such developments Richard Nixon came to the same conclusion that William
Rusher had reached earlier and, going beyond what Patrick Buchanan had suggested in 1970,
actively manoeuvred to create his very own conservative party.
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And yet, as always, Nixon tried to enlist conservative support without recruiting the
conservative movement itself The president's chosen dauphin and putative head of this
enterprise was former Johnson protege, outstanding Treasury secretary, and Democrat
tumcoat, John Connally. Nixon's relationship with Connally had begun in late 1970 and
quickly took the president from respect to believing his flamboyant Treasury Secretary to be
the only man who could take his baton in 1976 and thereby transform the politics of the
United States.121 On the surface he was right. Connally was regarded as the sort of earthy,
right-of-centre southemer who would be safe and likeable for conservative Republicans, and
attractive for those Democrats gravitating towards the GOP. Moreover, Connally possessed
the political savvy, physical energy and capacity for dealing effectively with high-level
functionaries and grassroots activists alike that had gained the admiration of the two most
dangerous political beasts of the mid-twentieth century United States. Few men could
command the respect and support of no less than Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon at the
same time. Hence by December 1972 Richard Nixon had persuaded himself that Connally'
could act as the conduit for a rightward electoral readjustment which would culminate in a
new conservative party that would go beyond traditional sectarian partisanship. The president
was wrong, and even someone las ambitious as Connally knew better. The Texan thought it
was more plausible to 're-establish the old Republican party' along new ideological and
electoral lines. 122 Nevertheless, even this more modest approach was destined to fail.
As Watergate began to unfold, the president was soon forced to became single-
mindedly focused on his own survival and, without White House support, Connally was a
mere tumcoat despised by both his former fellow-Democrats (one of them back in Texas
though it would be a good idea to have Connally, who had been travelling in Kennedy's car
on that fatal day in Dallas, shot 'every six months'), and by the Republicans whom he had
regularly humiliated for most of his political career in Texas. When Connally had joined the
12~ Wicker, One of Us, pp. 544-45; Ambrose, Triumph of A Politician, pp. 585-86.
12_ Haldeman, Diaries, p.668.
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administration back in 1970, the president's men had gloated over Democrats' rage, while
assuaging the hostility of prominent Republicans by distributing patronage and reassurances
to the likes of George Bush Sr., Senator John Tower and Texas state party chairman-cum-
early Nixon backer Peter O'Donnel1.123 The effort sufficed as long as Nixon remained a
commanding figure, but Bush never forgot that Connally had left him unemployed in the
1970 mid-terms, much like Tower and O'Donnell did not forget a decade-long string of
continuous lost battles against Connally as governor. In 1973, as Spiro Agnew fell into
disgrace, the administration knew it lacked the wherewithal to overcome the visceral
bipartisan opposition that Connally's confirmation hearings as vice- president were certain to
generate.l/" Abandoning the Democratic party, the Texan had become a Nixon creature
bereft, like Nixon himself, of any political base of his own. The conservatives that John
Connally was meant to appeal to reacted as they had initially towards Spiro Agnew. Even
those within the administration saw him as an opportunistic 'politician' with whom they held
little in common. Moreover, unlike Agnew, Connally bore the burden of the deep-seated
hostility of several prominent Southern conservative leaders such O'Donnell and Tower; he.
never appealed to visceral right-wing populism; and, on top of it all, was also rightly
associated by conservatives with Nixon's dreaded price and wage controls.l'" These
developments effectively ended Richard Nixon's attempt at boldly altering the political map
of the nation, and the conservative movement's earliest opportunity to become the
acknowledged hegemonic force of American politics.
3. 'PRETTY BAD UNTIL YOU CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVE': THE HARD CORE AND
THE VAGARIES OF RICHARD NIXON, 1970-1972126
The tone and the limits of Richard Nixon's conservatism were solidly established
during his first two years in office. Throughout his years in the White House, the president's
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right-wing leanings would remam selectively circumscribed to the 'social issue' and the
tortuous particulars of Vietnam disengagement and school desegregation. Other domestic
matters such a social security and environmental regulation were left for the underlings
within the presidential entourage - mostly those working under the self-consciously
technocratic John Ehrlichman - to deal with. Overall, domestic affairs received as little direct
attention as Nixon could possibly afford and such as was given remained dictated by political
expediency.Y' International affairs certainly received the bulk of Richard Nixon's interest,
but there the Nixon-Kissinger tandem held very specific and clear views quite at odds,
excepting Vietnam, with the conservative worldview.
In mid-1971 Patrick Buchanan was instructed by the administration to interview the
conservative columnist Holmes Alexander in order to gauge the administration's 'problems
with conservatives'. In that interview - which Buchanan judged a good barometer of right-
wing attitudes - Alexander conveyed 'the feeling among conservatives' that the president had
'moved left', and how the right felt that 'for [the previous] two years the President was doing.
just fine on the anti-inflation front, the war [in Vietnam], on the Supreme Court, on law-and-
order [and] on a balanced budget', but that after the mid-term elections 'all that, except the
war, has changed'. Conservatives were only partially correct. Richard Nixon's policies had
never been nearly as conservative as conservatives had hoped in 1968, but in 1970 the
president felt he had lost the mid-terms, which had been approached by using Agnew to 'hit
hard' and 'play the conservative trend' in order to 'hang our opponents as radical liberals'v'r"
Alas the expected transformation of the new majority into a Nixon Congress did not
materialise, and in response the president attempted to move the administration's image back
to the centre.129 For the following months - up to George McGovern's victory in the
Democratic primaries - the conservative movement and Richard Nixon re-enacted, as if
following a metronome, the second move of their recurrent dance (mutual recrimination and
127 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 207-8. Ehrlichman claimed that Nixon 'insisted I not bother him about many
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denunciations). As ever, the hard core's disappointment was again tempered by the
pragmatism and moderation of some of its members - Burnham, Buckley, Jeffrey Hart -
while the old Nixon haters -Rusher, until his death Meyer, and the younger, more radicalised
elements- unsuccessfully struggled to realign the right against Nixon. Yet this time around
the long term consequences of those old dynamics turned out to be quite different from
before. For now new and younger conservatives watched and learned.
Although earlier reports of systematic 'trouble on the right' had been reaching the
White House since the fall of 1970, it was not until early 1971 that Patrick Buchanan began
to produce systematically alarming memos for the president. Early on, declared Buchanan,
disaffection had been located within what he labelled 'the Reaganites at the Miami
convention', as well as 'a majority of the younger conservatives'. 130 Yet, he declared in
January 1971 'the situation on the Right' had become 'as bad as I have known it since joining
R[ichard] N[ixon],.131 Buchanan managed to sound the alarm loudly enough to concentrate
the president's mind on his political right-flank, but neither for long enough nor with.
sufficient depth. Initially, Nixon admitted the administration's 'move to the left' may have
been excessive, but expressed as much reluctance to 'get too far off his natural [right-wing]
base' as to follow Buchanan's counsel 'to go all conservative'. Nixon settled instead for
'PR,.132 As Rusher would have noted, after the failed experiment of 1970 Richard Nixon's
'ruler and calliper' told him that the exact centre of American politics was not as far to the
right as some had thought. Nevertheless, the most active elements of the right itself were not
about to be as accommodating in 1971 as they had been in 1968. As Buchanan warned,
conservatives 'feel that they are the dominant force in the Republican party; yet the president
seems sensitive to them only at election times', and that 'while they get the "rhetoric" the
liberals within the party get the policies and programs'. 133 Worse still, as Buchanan reported,
conservatives had correctly concluded that 'the squeaky wheel in the Nixon administration
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gets the grease', and were thus about to 'start squeaking publicly' .134 This they did.
Throughout 1971, the leaders of the four main Buckleyite bodies -ACU, YAF, National
Review, and the CPNYS, which became known to the administration collectively as the
'Manhattan 12' - initiated a crescendo of hostility which culminated in their' suspension' of
support for Nixon, and the subsequent mounting of a symbolic (and entirely unsuccessful)
primary challenge by John Ashbrook in the 1972 primaries. 135
Yet at no point did Richard Nixon actually consider altering his political course as a
consequence of conservative pressure. In practical terms the administration's response to
conservative disaffection between late 1970 and August 1972 chiefly consisted of the
continuous administration of the 'White House stroke process' to selected conservatives.l"
The president's men also increased their efforts in the communications area, both to translate
the administration's un-conservative initiatives into conservative language - this required
some remarkable but yet fairly unconvincing contortions - and to drum up its genuinely
conservative initiatives.F' By late 1970 the president was alarmed enough to order the.
creation of a conservative monitoring group outside the White House intended to examine the
contents and effects of major presidential communiques in order to 'get their [conservatives']
views and to enlist them as advocates'v'r'" Nonetheless, so firm was Nixon's intention to put
some distance between himself and the right that an outraged Buchanan had to arm-twist
Haldeman into accepting that such analyses be channelled through the White House's
resident conservatives instead of the Republican National Committee: Nixon, through
Haldeman, relented, but still insisted on conducting the flow of documentation through one
single person - Buchanan himself.l " By February 1971, the White House had intensified the
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activities of the 'group of six', an informal gathering of the most prominent insider
conservatives (David Keene, Martin Anderson, Buchanan, Houston, Harry Dent and Bill
Timmons), to figure out how best to deal with right-wing discontent, and which subsequently
recommended William F. Buckley's appointment of as counsellor to the president (Nixon had
suggested NR columnist James Jackson Kilpatrickj.i'" In the end nothing formal came out of
it but, as may be expected, Buckley continued to receive personal White House attention, as
did some of the most relevant conservative columnists such Kilpatrick, Holmes Alexander,
James Burnham, and John Chamberlain, in the form of direct sessions with the president as
well as highly elaborated meetings with Henry Kissinger and other senior White House
staffcrs.l'l'
The effects of White House attention were at best uneven, and on the whole certainly
fell short of Nixon's hopes. Buchanan and the other right-wingers inside the administration
knew better, and unsuccessfully tried to remind other staffers that conservatives were
'ideologues concerned with substance and policy, more likely to be alienated than appeased.
by gestures and cosmetics in the absence of action' .142 Charles Colson, who was by late 1971
charged with handling White House relations with external groups, found out soon enough
and to his own evident irritation that men like William Rusher were 'beyond recovery', and
quite impervious to the administration's 'logic' .143 The White House's inability to satisfy the
hard core's demands had, by December 1971, pushed conservatives into allowing the latter to
become the 'leader of the group and [its] designated spokesman' .144 The move was calculated
to ignite war, for Rusher doubtless enjoyed telling Nixon staffers exactly what he thought of
the president. Buchanan had correctly identified him as the 'most hawkish' of the Manhattan
140 Interview with David Keene
141 Patrick Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman, February 11, 1971, f. Haldeman 1971, f. 2 of 2; Buchanan to Haldeman,
February 8, 1971, ibid., box 3, PB papers; Buchanan to Haldeman, June 17, 1971, f. Conservatives, f. 2 of 2, CC
papers. To conservatives' general hilarity, Kissinger had a habit of warning his audience they should keep the contents
~~ the ~riefing~ secret 'from even their wives', Interview with Jeffrey Bell.
Patnck Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman September 13 1971 f Conservatives f- 2 of2, box 52, CC papers.
143 ." ,. ,
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Twelve, and Colson thought him possessed by 'latent personal hostility' to all things
Nixon.145 Other conservative leading lights, such as YAF national director Randall Teague -
who had in 1970 proclaimed the organisation to be 'behind you, as President and as
Commander-in-Chief' - were by mid-1971 judged 'unacceptable altogether', and quite
simply blacklisted by the White House.146
And yet what would prove to be the administration's siren songs certainly had some
effects upon a number of prominent individuals. National Review editor Jeffrey Hart, for
instance, was offered the directorship of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities,
and subsequently wrote what Buchanan considered 'the best thing that has been written about
Richard Nixon'. 147 He was also asked to 'put together some lists of pro-Nixon artists, writers,
professors and the like' liable to 'be gradually moved into our orbit', which he complied with
by recommending San Diego academic Ronald Berman for the post at the NFAH - where he
remained long after Watergate - and passing onto Buchanan the names of novelist and NR
contributor D. Keith Mano as a potential alternative to Arthur Miller.148 And Hart was by no.
means alone. All the main conservative political stars - including most of those closely
associated with the hard core - behaved similarly. James Buckley, the newly elected Senator
from New York on the Conservative party ticket in 1970 was reported as 'continuing to do an
effective job for the administration' as late as September 1971, while a few months earlier
Ronald Reagan dispatched a 'blistering four-page letter' to some over-enthusiastic supporters
in YAF who had endorsed him against Nixon, and whom he called 'pea-brains' and
'irresponsible'. Not only were both Reagan and Senator Buckley uninvolved in the right's
'suspension of support' for Richard Nixon: they were seen by the president's men as their
'most effective political spokesmen' to rebellious conservatives-Y After all, in 1970 Reagan
145 Patrick Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman, September 13, 1971, f. Conservatives, f- 2 of2, box 52, CC papers; Charles
Colson handwritten notes of meeting with conservatives, undated [ca. June-September 1971], f. Conservatives, box
Contested Documents boxes 31 to 59 ibid
146 ' •Randall Teague to George Bell, September 22, 1970; Teague to Charles Colson, May 3, 1970, f. YAF, box 52, CC
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147 ' , ,.
Patrick Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman, August 11, 1971, f. Haldeman, f. 2 of 2, box 3, PB papers.
148 Ibid.; Jeffrey Hart to Patrick Buchanan, August 9,1971, f. Haldeman, f. 2 of2, box 3, ibid; William Satire, 'Where
Are All of Nixon's Men ?', Oscala Star-Banner August 10 1975
149 ' ,.
Patrick Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman, May 28, 1971, f. Box 1-5, f. 1 of 2, box Contested Documents, PB papers;
Buchanan to H. R. Haldeman, July 28, 1971, f. Conservatives 2 of2, box 52, CC papers.
206
advisor and close acquaintance Lyn Nofziger advised Nixon - no doubt with the governor's
knowledge - to shift to the centre and seek some 'distinguished Democrat' for the cabinet in
order to replace former Johnson aide Daniel Patrick Moynihan (who had resigned).150 Later
on, Richard Nixon's speech accepting his re-nomination was preceded by those of, precisely,
Reagan and James Buckley.l'" Goldwater, much like the southern contingent on the Hill,
remained as steadfastly loyal to Richard Nixon throughout the conservative storms as he
would be during the subsequent Watergate crisis.152
However, so much solicitude put those conservatives friendly to the administration in
an increasingly uncomfortable spot. Too much opposition to Richard Nixon meant losing
their useful connections with the White House; too much support could lose one the respect
of fellow right-wingers, as well as any usefulness one might have for the men in the White
House. Hence, following his political chat with Patrick Buchanan, Holmes Alexander
engaged in a remarkably Nixonesque exercise in political funambulism on behalf of the
president. In view of the deteriorating relationship between the administration and the right,.
he was forced to resort to some of the most well worn conservative arguments for rallying
behind Richard Nixon. Firstly, reminiscent of James Burnham's ruminations back in 1960,
Alexander reminded his readers both of the Democrats' deplorable nature, and of the fact that
the president also happened to be a Republican. While he acknowledged that by no stretch of
the imagination did the comparison make Nixon appear spectacularly conservative, he
concluded that 'you can say the same words about Richard Nixon that Dwight Eisenhower
once said about old age "its pretty bad until you consider the alternative"'. Moreover, the
journalist emphasised, whatever his shortcomings Nixon remained a conservative at heart,
and the administration had achieved some indisputably conservative achievements such as
150 Reston, Lone Star, p. 378.
151 Nelson Rockefeller was the person selected to nominate Nixon and to thus symbolise Republican unity behind the
Ps~esident,Ambrose, Triu"!ph of a Politician, p. 600. .
Chuck Colson to Patnck Buchanan, December 20, 1971, f. Conservatives, f. 2 of 2, box 52, CC papers; Barry
Goldwater to Gilbert E. Wheeler, December 17, 1971, ibid. The latter is a three-page reply to an unhappy conservative
in which Goldwater not only mustered the usual common place arguments to defend Nixon, but amazingly enough
even brought himself to positively justify wage-and-price controls. See also [Release] From the Office of Senator
Barry Goldwater, December 29,1971, ibid.; Reinhard, Republican Right, pp. 225-26.
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the comparatively 'tough on crime' stance of Attorney General John Mitchell, and the four
'strict constructionist' appointments to the Supreme Court.153
William F. Buckley also suffered an ordeal of his own. Back in 1970, an infuriated
young conservative had written to the NR complaining that Buckley had 'certainly' not
'thumped on the Nixon administration with the gusto of old'. Although the correspondent
emphasised 'I really do like NR', its editor, he thought, could be 'terribly stuffy at times,
really' .154 In January of the same year Patrick Buchanan reported, more seriously, that
Buckley's 'influence among the hard-core right' was fast 'being diminished', and the
administration 'cannot count on his bringing them over' .155 As might be expected, those
conservatives who were within the administration suffered the most. Tom Huston found
himself writing anonymous attacks on the administration's domestic policy while, by 1971,
the wavering conservatives explicitly demanded that presidential advisor Chuck Colson keep
Buchanan out of the meetings between themselves and White House - partly to avoid their
being 'smoothed over', and partly because they did not believe in his capacity to influence
'the Old Man' any more. Buchanan, it must be noted, complied with the request.l" Around
the same time David Keene reported that anti-Nixon feeling was spreading, by association, to
other bona-fide right-wingers in the White House such as Agnew, Goldwater speechwriter
and ghostwriter Stephen Shadegg, and himself.157
In fact by that time, the epidemic of anti-Nixon dissent had expanded from those
conservatives - like Rusher - who had opposed Nixon in favour of Reagan in 1968, to those
who had been all along behind the president.F" In qualitative terms this expansion also
intensified resentment exponentially since, as Keene reported, the latter group turned out to
153 Alexander, 'Nixon Keeps Promise'.
154 As quoted in Buckley, Living It Up, p. 199.
155 Patrick Buchanan to the President, January 26,1971, f. box 1 to 5,1 of2, box Contested Documents, PB papers.
156 Interview with Jeffrey Bell; Interview with David Keene; Charles Colson to Ken Cole, November 2, 1971, f.
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suffer, reasonably enough, from an even greater frustration and sense of betrayal than the
former. 159 Yet despite the obvious expansion of conservative disappointment, their
disenchantment completely failed to either affect any changes in executive action or even so
much as to disturb, never mind derail, Richard Nixon's steaming race towards re-election.
John Ashbrook's gallant primary challenge ended in near-ridicule and, in the end, the
organisations represented by the Manhattan Twelve wound up behind the president in 1972
with even greater enthusiasm than in 1968. Nixon's feat was even more remarkable in light of
the administration's manifest unresponsiveness. After all, conservative complaints referred to
specific issues, were in their own terms entirely justifiable, and went accompanied with
specific, feasible policy alternatives. As Buchanan put it, despite the admittedly
uncompromising 'shopping list' that the anti-Nixon right-wingers repeatedly sent over to the
White House, in the last instance conservative demands boiled down to three issues:
elimination of the Family Assistance Plan espoused by the administration at Moynihan's
urgings (which Nixon eventually allowed to die but for reasons unrelated to conservative
pressure); a significant increase in or at least maintenance of the defence budget (which-
Nixon ignored); and the guarantee of Taiwan's seat in the United Nations (which Nixon
sacrificed). Spiro Agnew's continuation as Nixon's running mate was the only act which
responded to conservative pressure between the mid-terms of 1970 and Nixon's re-election.
Other frankly galling matters such as the opening to China itself, wage and price controls and
the occasional flourishing of Nixon's Keynesian enthusiasm were digested - with much
noise, certainly - by what appears on closer inspection to have been the not-so
uncompromising Buckleyites.l"
Yet the Buckleyites were no longer the undisputed leaders of the conservative
movement. As the stream of Buchanan and Colson memoranda and the enthusiasm for Spiro
Agnew in certain quarters clearly showed, underneath the calmer National Review facade
159 David Keene to Jeb Magruder, September 8, 1971, ibid.
160 In retrospect nearly all conservatives admit to their own moderation and justify it by claiming that Richard Nixon
fooled them: Interview with William F. Buckley; Interview with William Rusher; Edwards, Conservative Revolution,
p.I78.
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lurked a much less accommodating new generation of right-wing activists. In contrast with
the likes of William F. Buckley and James Burnham, the emerging conservative Young Turks
did not need nor seek the approval of the liberal 'establishment'. The Buckleyites, on the
other hand, for all their passionate hostility were pure-bred establishment specimens
themselves. It cannot be emphasised enough that the entire National Review senior staff had
received an Ivy League education - fortified in each case with stints in British institutions -
and possessed rather 'Eastern' prejudices regarding literary matters and, as the reaction to
Spiro Agnew and George Wallace indicates, political action as wel1.161In contrast, most new-
righters (bar exceptions such as Howard Phillips, who had attended Harvard) tended to
proceed from Southern, Western, or Midwestern institutions such as the University of
Louisiana (Blackwell), the University of Houston (Viguerie), and the University of
Wisconsin (Keene).162 Moreover, Richard Nixon had given some of these young right-
wingers the opportunity of joining a presidential administration without the need to renounce
an ounce of their conservatism, while others had been busy building up what Sidney
Blumenthal perceptively termed a conservative 'counter-establishment'. 163Four men were"
particularly shocked by what they saw during the Nixon years, and would eventually playa
vital role in the creation of the New Right.l'" Within the administration David Keene and
Howard Phillips, formerly of the YAF national structure, moved into Spiro Agnew's staff.
From there, Phillips found his way into the Council on Youth Opportunity and the Office for
Economic Opportunity.l'f Operating well outside the White House was Richard Viguerie,
who had learned the basic ropes of-grassroots mobilisation watching Marvin Liebman run the
Young Americans for Freedom, and had effectively already become a Nixon foe while
working for George Wallace. Somewhere in between the young conservatives in government
and the young conservatives trying to make government's life more difficult was Morton
Blackwell, a man immensely proud of having been Goldwater's youngest delegate in 1964,
161 Interview with William F. Buckley; Interview with William Rusher.
162 Interview with David Keene; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Interview with Howard Phillips.
163 Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise a/the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New
York: Times Books, 1986).
164 Himmelstein, To The Right, pp. 80-94; see also footnote 6 above.
165 Interview with Jeffrey Bell; Interview with David Keene; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Howard Phillips, 'A
New Right Perspective', in New Right at Harvard, pp. 1-3.
210
who went on to serve on the Republican National Committee before spending two years,
between 1970 and 1972, engaged in building up the American Enterprise Institute's bank of
scholars - a database of academics and intellectuals ready to be supplied to the White House
by the sole conservative think-tank then in operation. These four men, together with other
'conservative impresarios' (Blackwell's words) such as Paul Weyrich and Lee Edwards, were
directly responsible for the explosion of renewed conservative energy that immediately
followed Nixon's downfall, which would translate into the creation of the Heritage
Foundation - AEI's great competitor as the nation's second right-wing think-tank - and the
eruption of religious right as an organised political force.166
As with virtually all conservatives who followed Richard Nixon into government in
1968, these young men had believed that the experience of power - especially under the
leadership of 'the slayer' of Alger Hiss, a man most of them had supported against Kennedy
in 1960, whose support they had received in 1964 and whose anticommunism was widely
admired .- would allow them to initiate the reversal of the liberal policies they had opposed-
since the mid-1960s. By 1972 disappointment with the president had set so deeply that even
those working within the administration could barely bring themselves to support him. Keene
and Houston, for instance, were sent in 1972 to prevent the YAF national convention from
declaring against Nixon. They dutifully attended, but limited themselves to playing 'a week-
long poker game' and observing the proceedings, finally reporting back with glee the intense
level of conservative animus towards the president. That, according to Keene, was 'all our
contribution to the Nixon campaign' in 1972.167 Not long thereafter Howard Phillips, who
had also entered the administration under the general patronage of Agnew, had developed a
deep admiration for the VP, and was then busily trying to dismantle the OEO from its
directorship, became one of the first conservatives to publicly request the president's
resignation.!" Phillips' quarrel with Nixon was not Watergate per se: like very many
166 Interview with David Keene; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Lee Edwards, The Power of Ideas. The Heritage
Foundation at 25 Years (Ottawa, IL, 1997), pp. 1-13; James A. Smith, The Ideas Brokers: Think-Tanks and the Rise
of The New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 19-23, 279-80.
167 Interview with David Keene.
168 Interview with Howard Phillips; see also Diamond, Roads to Dominion, p. 116.
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conservatives he saw the affair as another example of the deplorable dark political arts that
had been part and parcel of most previous presidencies - usually with conservatives and
Republicans as victims.l'" Yet even if John Mitchell's 'White House horrors' were no reason
to impeach a president, according to Phillips Nixon's decision - born of political weakness -
to sign into law the creation of the Federal Legal Services Corporation was certainly a capital
motivation for demanding the president's resignation.l/" In a similar vein and at around the
same time, Morton Blackwell got 'very upset' and resigned in disgust from the American
Enterprise Institute when he realised that the AEI was refusing to publish any documentation
regarding legislation being discussed on the Hill until after it had been approved or
rejected. i7i With some reason, an indignant Blackwell thought such a strategy self-defeating
and proceeded to inform Joseph Coors, head of the beer-brewing company, conservative
patron of unparalleled largesse and a main AEI donor, who in tum failed to affect any
changes in the Institute's policy. Less than three years later Blackwell, with the financial
backing of Coors and together with Paul Weyrich and Lee Edwards, set up the Heritage
Foundation. In keeping with its creators' cast of mind Heritage, a far more aggressive outfit··
than AEI, was variously described as a 'do-tank' and' advocacy-tank', as opposed to a think-
tank.in The status of Heritage as the main source of conservative intellect for the Reagan
administration would be paralleled (although only indirectly related to) the decline in
influence of the more moderate AEI. 173
As Heritage's modus operandi indicates, if the right-wing Young Turks brought with
them a philosophical and political outlook fiercer than that of the Buckleyites, they had also
developed a remarkably pragmatic, technically-minded attitude to the art of conservative
169 David Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 132-80;
Buckley, Living It Up, p. 191; Interview with Howard Phillips; Interview with David Keene.
170 Interview with Howard Phillips; see also Phillips, 'A New Right Perspective', ppA-ll.
171 The reason for so much caution was that in 1964, Lyndon Johnson had ordered the IRS to investigate AEI's
accounts in order to get its tax-exempt status removed for involvement in political campaigning. Since this was the
second time that the Democrats went after AEI for the same reasons, William 1. Baroody Sr., the Institute's director,
subsequently opted to play it safe, Interview with Morton Blackwell; Interview with Michael Baroody, September 6,
2005, Washington DC; Interview with David Keene.
172 See Edwards, The Power of Ideas, p. 8; Interview with Lee Edwards, August 15,2005, Washington D.C.
173 AEI suffered a major crisis and severe restructuring in the mid 1980s, normally ascribed to financial
mismanagement, but the increasing competition for conservative funds cannot have helped the institution; Interview
with Michael Baroody; Interview with David Keene; Interview with Lee Edwards.
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politicking that had been notably scarce among the hard core - bar the happy few, such as
Rusher and F. Clifton White, responsible for Goldwater's success in the 1964 primaries; it is
no accident that that campaign, and its failure in the national election, marked the new-
righters' coming of political age.174 In Morton Blackwell's terms, 1964 taught them to
disregard the' Sir Galahad Theory of Politics' according to which 'being right, in the sense of
being correct, is enough to make you win,.175 According to the new-righters, earlier
conservatives tended to behave as if they could 'win' because their 'heart is pure': the Young
Turks set about winning because their use of technology was also more refined.i" While the
Buckleyites had spent two decades translating the philosophy of conservatism into politically
respectable terms, the younger right-wingers proceeded to develop the technical resources to
tum what they believed to be good and respectable political ideas into the basis of actual
electoral success. Blackwell, Keene, Viguerie, Weyrich and later on even Patrick Buchanan
had all seen National Review's well phrased editorials as a foundation stone of the
movement, but unlike the earlier generation of conservatives, they eschewed philosophical
lucubration and highbrow-inclined journalism in favour of the kind of activity that could
channel growing popular dissatisfaction into grassroots conservative political action. The
combination of Nixon's unresponsiveness with the older conservative leadership's relative
timidity and absolute inability to bring the supposedly friendly administration further to heal
accelerated that process.
The Young Turks not only displayed a different attitude to conservative action: they
were also developing a new set of issues over which to fight the liberal 'establishment'. An
early lesson was learned in late 1971 when one of the few instances of genuine conservative
influence upon the White House was orchestrated by Connie Masher, a young YAF staffer
working for the organisation's newspaper New Guard and closely associated with the
Viguerie group. On that occasion Masher managed to ignite conservative indignation against
174 Interview with Jeffrey Bell; Interview with David Keene; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Interview with Lee
Edwards; Edwards, Conservative Revolution, p. 184.
175 Interview with Morton Blackwell.
176 Ibid. See also Viguerie, America's Right Turn.
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the Child Development bill by flooding the White House with sufficient angry conservative
mail to move Nixon personally to veto it - and, rather ironically, to actively seek the support
of the Buckleyites in order to offset the 'heat from the left' the president expected to
attract. 177 At around the same time Phyllis Schlafly, an old Goldwater supporter and fierce
grassroots organiser made her own transition from 1950s anticommunist conservatism to the
1970s anti-new left, culture-war version. Like Masher, Schlafly moved to oppose what she
saw as the government's double sin of interfering with citizens private lives while failing to
protect certain traditional mores, this time in the form of the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) then on the verge of being added to the Constitution.i/'' These were the
first stirrings of the pro-family and pro-life movements, and the earliest incursions of right-
wing evangelicals into organised conservative political action.179 Activists such as Viguerie,
Blackwell and Schlafly, all of them originally associated with the Buckleyites, began in the
early 1970s a process of ideological readjustment that would transform the American
conservative movement much like the transition from Taftian isolationism to the belligerent
cold-warriorism espoused by National Review and Richard Nixon had in the early 1950s. Yet-
on this occasion both the president and the bulk of the hard core were, in practical terms,
oblivious to the potential political effects of that particular aspect of the backlash against the
cultural revisionism of the 1960s.
Abortion was, needless to say, at the epicentre of the incoming culture wars. As Nixon's
policies helped to neutralise Vietnam and civil rights as issues of political contention, the
nation braced itself for the increasingly acrimonious disputes between conservative and
liberals regarding the right (or lack thereof) for women to voluntarily interrupt their
pregnancies. Richard Nixon and the hard core, however, remained oblivious to the future
relevance of the issue. The White House desperately sought to pass what it saw as a hot
177 CharlesCo'lson to H. R. Haldeman, December 8, 1971, see also attachment lames Jackson Kilpatrick, 'Child
Development Bill Is a Monstrosity', f. Conservatives, f. 1 of2, box 52, CC papers; William Martin, With God on Our
Side. The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: Broadway Books, 1996), pp. 174-75.
178 For a detailed account see Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlajly and Grassroots Conservatism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 214-53.
179 Martin, With God On Our Side, pp. 174-75.
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potato on to somebody else's - namely the states' - hands. The Buckleyites, apparently
confused, decided to open a debate, not against the usual list of radical liberalism ' s defenders,
but between themselves, and with some considerable publicity.i'" Forced by circumstances
and pressure from the ever-vigilant Catholic Church hierarchy, Nixon reluctantly released a
number of statements outlining his position. In April 1971 the president reversed the
liberalising policy on abortions in military bases sited in the United States carelessly
approved by his own administration the previous summer - the price ofleaving such things in
the uncontrolled hands of John Ehrlichman. To justify such a volte-face Nixon explained that
'from personal and religious beliefs' he considered abortion 'an unacceptable form of
population control', and certainly not the 'the kind of alternative to its social dilemmas' for 'a
nation with a Judaeo-Christian heritage' .181Two virtually identical messages were released in
May 1972, a second to the nation (when the president received a pro-choice leaning report
from the Commission on Population Growth) and a third to Cardinal Cooke of New York
(then initiating a pro-life campaign against the state's 'liberalized abortion laws,).182 Nixon's
language might be indistinguishable from what later became common-stock Catholic or-
evangelical pro-life speak, but there were at least two fascinating twists distinguishing the
president from the right-wing champions of subsequent decades. Firstly, he framed his
posture as opposition to mass-scale abortions as a form of population control or as a part of
anti-poverty programmes, which was tantamount to, and about as controversial as, being
opposed to eugenics: the real abortion debate was that of the rights of foetuses versus those of
pregnant women. The president was aware of this, but sought to capitalise on the matter by
burdening the Democrats with the issue of moral choice about abortion in the abstract, while
carefully avoiding any mention of women's rights. Charles Colson recognised the twist when
he noted that 'as far as the Catholics are concerned, they care only about the Democrats'
personal views. As far as the women's lib go, we are best simply leaving the issue as it is' -
180 Patrick All it, Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America. 1950-1985 (Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993), pp. 140-41.
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unaddressed, one might add.183 To complete what Sir Humphrey Appleby would have
labelled - approvingly no doubt - as the administration's 'no-policy policy', Nixon refused to
take any step to initiate a serious political debate, never mind legislation on the subject. Even
when abortions on military bases, which squarely depended on the federal government,
became an issue the president opted for adjusting the situation in each individual base to the
law in the state it was located in. It should escape nobody that military policy towards issues
such as segregation, and more recently gay rights, had sent in the past a clear signal of White
House positioning towards matters of complex legislative solution.
The Buckleyites did not fare much better. To be sure, virtually all NR senior editors
held deeply felt religious (and Catholic at that) beliefs and were personally dead-set against
abortion, but the matter was never a priority. As a young Jeffrey Bell delicately put it, Bill
Buckley's attitude, and by extension that of the journal he headed, to the nascent cultural
wars in the early 1970s was 'aloof - others have used the adjective 'casual' - when
compared with issues such as the state of the nation's military and of the federal budget,"
always much closer to the heart of men who remained the children of McCarthyism and
Robert Taft.184 Along similar lines William Rusher openly rejected the argument that the
unborn should have the same rights as the women who carried them, and believed that 'other
preliminary social considerations should figure more prominently in the social program of the
Catholic Church' .185 In yet another example of National Review's pragmatism, both Rusher
and Buckley agreed that the Church's frontal opposition to abortion was actually
counterproductive. In their view, Rome should actually downplay its pro-life stand in order to
avoid an unnecessary increase of the already raising 'resentment against the Church' which,
the pair agreed, 'might be of itself the greater evil' .186 Moreover, the conservative movement
contained a powerful, even if always subordinated, libertarian and libertarian-leaning
undercurrent which did not have things so clearly decided, even if during the 1960s the split
183 Charles Colson to John Ehrlichman, August 5, 1972, ibid.
184 As quoted in Judis, Buckley, p. 369; Allit, Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics, pp. 140-41, 180--203.
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between libertarians and traditionalists remained largely controlled and circumscribed to how
best to approach the Cold War.187In retrospect, Morton Blackwell thought that 'in 1964 I am
confident that nobody asked Barry Goldwater "do you favor legalizing abortion?" I am
confident nobody ever asked him "do you favour legalizing bank robbery?" either, because
then abortion and bank robbery were thought illegal and thought settled in the United
States' .188But if they had, they may have discovered that Goldwater's wife was both the
founder of Arizona's Planned Parenthood in 1937, and a firm pro-choicer. As it was, when
confronted with the situation, the Sir Galahad of American conservatism infuriated several
members of the New Right when he turned out to favour legalised abortion on civil
libertarian grounds. His later reversal, in order to secure pro-life support and re-election, was
a telling example of the New Right's spectacular success.i'" Much the same happened with
Ronald Reagan, whose rather passive attitude towards a proposed change in California's
abortion laws was quite akin to that of the Nixon White House. Like Goldwater, Reagan later
recanted, but the severe split within his gubernatorial entourage and his own indecision were
an accurate reproduction of the division that the cultural wars opened within the conservative"
movement at large, separating traditionalists and new-righters from the entire neoclassical
and libertarian wings of the movement, which remained firmly - if not always too
conspicuously - in the pro-choice camp.l'"
And thus, the downfall of the Nixon administration found the Buckleyites as an
immensely prestigious wing, perhaps a primus inter pares, within the different factions of the
growing conservative movement. However, NR had already ceased to be the only source of
conservative leadership and direction. Adjectives such as 'aloof', 'right-wing establishment'
and even 'stuffy' directed towards National Review conservatism by fellow conservatives
187 Interview with Milton Friedman.
188 Interview with Morton Blackwell.
189 Howard Phillips, for instance, believed that Goldwater 'had his daughter impregnated' and then 'had his daughter
have an abortion', Interview with Howard Phillips; see Lee Edwards, Goldwater. The Man who Made a Revolution
(Washington DC: Regnery, 1993), pp. 420-22.
190 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam, 1982), pp. 128-32; Interview with Milton Friedman; Interview with
David Keene; Interview with Richard Ebeling, November 20, 2005, Swindon, UK. When asked about abortion
Ebeling, the current head of the libertarian Foundation for Economic Education specifically requested the tape-
recorder to be switched off and noted that he personally favoured a libertarian, pro-choice option but could not risk
losing sponsorship. He therefore kept his personal views to himself and FEE's corporate views away from the issue.
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were squarely on the mark, for the Buckleyites had achieved between 1968 and 1973 what
most of them had yearned for since the 1950s. They had been accepted as respectable
contenders for power and could exert direct - if not always successful - influence over the
men at the top of the federal government. But success in the quest for respectability came at
the price of a degree of pragmatism. During the following decades pragmatism and the will to
accommodate, combined with a remarkable, even if somewhat natural slowness in adjusting
to new political and cultural circumstances, would relegate them to a secondary place within
the American right. As William Rusher and Neil McCaffrey had feared, in the end, the
conservative grassroots found leaders who could take them beyond well phrased editorials.
CONCLUSION
By the time the Watergate affair became a national obsession threatening the political
survival of the president, the hard core could be found in the same place it had been almost-
every time Richard Nixon had run into trouble: as a loyal source of support for the man from
Yorba Linda. Thus, Battle Line ran a campaign under the heading 'Millions Say No to
Impeachment', in which it dendunced the 'hysteria' and the 'open season on the president' .191
Similarly, John Chamberlain thought the scandal a 'circulation building circus' orchestrated
by the Washington Post and the New York Times, both of which had joined in 'a Roman orgy'
entirely 'out of all proportion to anything ... the president had done' .192 Truly astonishingly,
even William Rusher was reported to be behaving as a 'Nixon loyalist. ,193
To be sure, Nixon's good luck with the right during the final period of his presidency
was largely due to the same negative reasons that had propelled Burnham to support Nixon
against Kennedy in 1960, and which remained well in place right to the end: Nixon's enemies
were conservatism's enemies. Rusher's spectacular volte face, for instance, reflected the fact
191 'Millions Say No To Impeachment', Battle Line, June 1973.
192 William Chamberlain, A Life with the Printed Word (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1982), p. 171.
193 Priscilla Buckley; Living It Up, p. 191.
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that he, like Howard Phillips and very many other conservatives, saw Watergate as 'Nixon
was being railroaded by the usual liberal suspects' .194The Democrats' appetite for self-
destruction and the selection of George McGovern as their presidential candidate in 1972
magnified those feelings even further. McGovern, a certifiable egghead down to possessing a
PhD, openly championed the 'new politics' of the Democratic left, proposed a radical
reduction of the armed forces and a 'dishonourable' withdrawal from Vietnam. He was, at
least according to the perception of McGovern by the conservatives and the projection of its
adversary put forth by the Nixon camp certainly, a pristine incarnation, almost a caricature, of
that liberal establishment that Nixon and most conservatives envied and despised. The
McGovern candidacy - accompanied as it was by the scandalous nature of the Democratic
National Convention - was rightly perceived as signifying the takeover of the Democratic
party by New Left activists and had the instant double effect of horrifying conservatives -
even the Rusher types - into an 'anybody but McGovern' position, while simultaneously
pushing Nixon towards the right. McGovern re-kindled the kind of visceral hostility, fully
shared with the president, that National Review had developed in the 1950s and 1960s, that"
had been entirely assumed by the New Right and that men like Tom Huston were prepared in
the 1970s to put forth in terms of wiretapping and security proposals such as those included
in the infamous 'Huston Plan".195At the same time, the Democrats also enabled Nixon to
exploit and magnify McGovern's perceived radicalism to move to the right while appealing
to the centre too - reversing what Lyndon Johnson did with Barry Goldwater in 1964. The
further to the left that McGovern seemed to be, therefore, the sharper to the right that Nixon
could afford to move. The political circumstances were in this way ideally arranged for the
president and the Buckleyites once more to proceed to the third step of their particular dance:
reconciliation for the sake of expediency.
194 Ibid.; Chamberlain, Life with The Printed Word, p, 171; Interview with Howard Phillips.
195 Reichley. Conservatives in an Age of Change, pp. 259-69. Reichley has correctly emphasised the explosive effects
which resulted from the mix between Nixon's personal (and sometimes clearly delusional) rancour against the liberal
establishment and the Buckleyites' own, together with the very real tension and hostility generated by Vietnam and
civil rights protestors. He mentions reports of 3000 bombings only in 1970. Each element of the combination
contributed to magnify and increase the effects of the others, and resulted in a peculiarly tolerant attitude towards the
kind government-sanctioned security operations that eventually led to Watergate.
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Yet those events, external as they were to the fundamentals of Nixon's relationship with
the hard core, do not in themselves suffice to account for either the persistent loyalty of
conservatives to the president, or the ultimate failure of the entente hostile between the
president and the right. At a deeper level the Californian's ability to hold onto his vital right-
wing support in the end and when it mattered was also a consequence of both Nixon's very
real shift of the presidency towards the right and of the move to the centre of a substantial
segment of the conservative leadership. If anybody had any doubts about how conservative
Richard Nixon was, the Democratic party certainly did its best to dispel them, but presidential
conservatism was, between 1969 and 1970 and again in 1972, real and meaningful even if it
was progressive and partial. As conservatives rightly complained, matters such as relations
with the great powers and environmental protection had no trace of conservative influence
but still, as the president gained confidence in the move to the right of the electorate, the
administration intensified the rhetorical assaults on the establishment and conducted entirely
conservative policies in Vietnam, civil rights and, until 1971, economics. It was only the'
disappointing returns of the 1970 mid-terms and the deteriorating economic situation that
pushed Nixon leftwards and towards the centre for the following eighteen months. Thus, the
bitter complaints of those conservatives who suspended their support certainly held water.
But then again, the relapse towards right-of-centre pragmatism, however galling it may have
been to the hard core, by no means translated into Nixon's either becoming or being
perceived by the electorate at large as a liberal. Vietnam, which remained the all-dominant
political issue of the day, ensured that the president was rightly perceived as a conservative
hawk. In fact, depending on one's viewpoint, some intelligent observers have seen Richard
Nixon as a warmonger, for some even one of the variety nowadays dealt with in the
International Criminal Court.196
196 The solidest indictment of Nix inger's foreign policy remains Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in
the White House (London: Faber, 1983). A recent and colourful assessment may be found in Christopher Hitchens,
The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London: Verso Books, 2001), see also Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, pp. 298-99.
220
The president's decision to put an end to Spiro Agnew's incendiary speech-making and
to 'tune down' the conservative tone of the White House's public language arrived too late,
and had little or no effect upon a press corps and an intellectual class which had been
thoroughly alienated by the president's men, and which the administration itself had given up
as lost to the left and the Democrats. School integration went apace and slowly ceased being
a thorn in the side of both the administration and its Southern conservative supporters but, as
the latter and everybody else was well aware, it did so on the best terms that the likes of
Strom Thurmond could possibly expect to obtain within the realm of the politically and
legally possible. When the polls opened in November 1972, every vote for Richard Nixon
was cast for a conservative president who was proposing a conservative agenda. And Richard
Nixon knew this.197Eventually the hard core had nowhere to go except behind the president,
where the bulk its own constituency already was. Ironically enough, for much of 1972 the
hard core found itself at war with the president precisely at the point of Richard Nixon's
career at which he was preparing himself to follow the electorate further to the right than at
any other time since the 1952 elections.
The unfolding Watergate catastrophe soon eliminated Nixon's capacity to do much of
anything, never mind realign tlte partisan lines of the nation for, if anything else, the scandal
temporarily hardened up those wobbling sectarian walls that John Connally needed to
collapse in order to lead the emergence of either a new conservative party or a reconstructed
GOP. In the end the two national parties struggled for the best part of a decade to adjust to an
electoral realignment that all major political actors had recognised in 1968.198 The GOP
eventually managed to reconstruct the Nixon coalition of 1968 and 1972 in 1980, but the
strained relationship between Nixon and the hard core bore as much responsibility for such a
remarkable time lag as Watergate. The case of the Democrats is less surprising, since
believing that they had a clear base of support among minority voters and the young, together
with still-strong support among organised labour and even a wing of foreign policy hawks,
197 Ambrose, Triumph of a Politician, pp. 661--62; Haldeman, Diaries, pp. 615-16.
198 Mason, Quest for A New Majority, p. 77; Rusher, Rise of the Right, pp. 221-22; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan:
A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 4-5, 20-21.
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the party never quite figured out whether realignment should actually take them to the centre,
the left or a combination of both according to policy area.199 In the meantime, the
conservative movement generated its own band of Young Turks, free from the inferiority
complex that had plagued the president and their conservative forebears, politically savvier
than the latter, aware of conservative strength within Republican ranks and willing to reach
out for further support. These were the men who were first among conservatives to lose
patience with the Nixon White House and, eventually, with the Buckleyites within and
without National Review for failing to bring the administration to heel.
In 1972 the Buckleyites rallied behind Richard Nixon for purely negative reasons - he
was not McGovern - fortified in the case of politicians such as Reagan and James Buckley by
plain political expediency - he was a right-of-centre Republican and a popular president. But
the distance between the two camps was still seemingly unbridgeable. Nixon even failed to
take the Buckleyites seriously enough to make the still-leaders of the American conservative
movement part of his plans for a new conservative party. For if Richard Nixon always
managed to obtain the support of the hard core right whenever electoral expediency so
demanded, he was never the 'right, viable' political leader that conservatism had desperately
needed since the late 1940s. And thus, Nixon was instrumental in both easing the hard core
into the politically accepted mainstream and in preventing conservatism from becoming the
dominant force in American politics, while he also contributed to the further fragmentation of
the movement along strategic and generational lines.
199 See Schaller, Right Turn, pp. 38~1, and also Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided America: The Ferocious Power
Struggle in American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), pp. 27-29; Hamby, Liberalism and Its
Challengers, pp. 354-56.
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CHAPTERS
NIXON, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, AND THE ORIGINS OF A
CONSERVATIVE ESTABLISHMENT
Deep-seated resentment against the established cultural and political elite of American
society is one the most often mentioned traits of Richard Nixon's complex character and
personality. This has been the case to the extent that in a recent biographical analysis,
detestation (and envy) of this elite was persuasively described as the most important aspect of
both Nixon's personal psychology and political strategy for well over twenty years. I His early
political battles against Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas were fought against
wealthy and sophisticated socialites. Subsequently, Nixon chose to portray himself as the
champion of the hard-working common man against a morally weak class of arrogant snobs.
From the perspective of his political career, that message reached a paroxysm of intensity
during the Hiss case when the defendant became, in Nixon's hands, the personification of that
class. From a more intimate viewpoint, the (false) accusations, magnified by the press corps.,
that led to the Chequers Speech in 1952; followed by the clear hostility of the Washington
social scene against Vice-President Nixon during the 1950s; and his narrow defeat in 1960 at
the hands of John F. Kennedy (that is, at the hands of the social aristocracy of the Democratic
\
party and the nation) pushed resentment into the near-paranoid mindset that would eventually
grip the entire Nixon White House and, ultimately, trigger the downfall of the president.
Throughout, Nixon's attitude towards what he saw as a hostile 'establishment' oscillated
between seeking acceptance in an envious yearning to belong, and a hostile, alarmingly
aggressive, contempt.
Much of the conservative movement shared Nixon's anti-establishment perspective.
From the late 1940s to the early 1970s conservatives strenuously devoted themselves to two
1 Rick Perlstein, Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (London: Scribner, 2008), pp 21-
25,27-28; Fred 1. Maroon and Tom Wicker, The Nixon Years 1969-1974: White House to Watergate (New York:
Abbeville Press, 1999), p. 10; Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Questfor a New Majority (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 115-16; David Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of an Image
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 180-207.
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seemingly incompatible objectives: achieving acceptance as legitimate sparring partners with
the liberal establishment and destroying (and replacing) that very same liberal establishment.
The best known example of this is the National Review, which from its inception until the
1970s sniped mercilessly at the representatives of the regnant liberal consensus and their
works, but did so according to the standards of literary quality and intellectual coherence set
by the intellectuals and opinion makers who led that consensus.
As the movement matured into an increasingly influential force within American
politics, it also determinedly set out to dissociate itself from the most radical (and unsavoury)
elements of the 'lunatic fringe't ' Very early on, William F. Buckley Jr. and his associates
wrote off from the movement the anti-Semitic American Mercury. Later on, the excesses of
the John Birch Society led to painful denunciations and the severing of ties between the
conservative movement and the Birchers. Finally, Richard Nixon himself would benefit from
conservative abhorrence of George Wallace's rebranded form of racist right-wing populism.'
For over twenty years, and mirroring Nixon's journey, conservatives had sought to earn a
place in the mainstream of American politics, while at the same time aiming to alter the basic
tenets that defined the 'respectable' so as to achieve acceptance of conservative political
principles marginalised within 'the liberal consensus. Some conservatives realised relatively
early on that certain organisations which gathered funding, ideas (particularly ideas
applicable to public policy) and politicians together played a crucial role in 'setting up the
agenda for government' , and hence were a vital part of that consensus." By the 1950s these
organisations had begun to be known as 'think-tanks', and have ever since operated, or
aspired to operate, as 'islands of excellence applying full-time interdisciplinary scientific
2 See for instance John B. Judis, William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp.
184, 193-200. '
3 Dan Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of New Conservatism, and the Transformation of
American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 324-70; Interview with William F. Buckley, July 25,
2005, New York City; 'Wallace Again', The Republican Battle Line, January 1970; Robert M Schuettinger, 'Wallace
and Grenier: The Old and New South', The New Guard, September 1966.
4 Thomas R. Dye, 'Oligarchic Tendencies in National Policy-Making: The Role of the Private Policy-Planning
Organisations', Journal of Politics 40, no. 2 (1978), p. 329.
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thinking to the in-depth improvement of policy-making' and as bridges between 'power and
knowledge'<
This type of institution appeared in the first half of the twentieth century as a
consequence of two parallel forces: the progressive impetus to improve government
efficiency through 'objective' technical analysis, and the expansion in the functions and
complexity of government itself.6 Between 1916 and 1950 some of the better known
examples emerged to lend a charitable helping hand. The list includes the National Industrial
Conference Board, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Twentieth Century Fund
and the Committee for Economic Development. The most conspicuous, successful and
prestigious of them all was the Brookings Institution. First set up III 1910, Brookings
consolidated itself in 1927 with the amalgamation of two other similarly-minded
organizations. Although it initially reflected the predominantly free-market-leaning zeitgeist,
Brookings became a staunch supporter of New Deal policies during the 1940s as social
democratic mores became hegemonic within American politics. Subsequently it became a
mammoth organisation - its budget reached $15 million in 1987 - and it remained closely
associated with New Deal liberalism. Brookings became a core element of the establishment
to the point that Arthur Okun, a prominent member of its own staff, believed that it had
become 'too establishment oriented' and 'too much part of the system'. 7
A crucial aspect of the conservative movement's endeavours to enter the mainstream of
American politics was its effort to generate a conservative stable of think-tanks capable of
challenging the older network of liberal institutions. The Washington-based American
Enterprise Institute was at the heart of that effort, and it would eventually become the best
known and most important intellectual powerhouse for conservative policy-makers thanks in
5 James A. Smith, 'Think Tanks and the Politics of Ideas', in The Spread of Economic Ideas, ed. David C. Colander
and A. W. Coats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 178; R. Kent Weaver, 'The Changing World of
Think Tanks', PS: Political Science and Politics 22, no. 3, (1989), pp. 568-69; Yehezel Dror, 'Think-Tanks: A New
Idea in Government', in Organizations for Policy Analysis: Helping Government Think, ed. Carol H. Weiss (Newbury
Park: Sage, 1992), p. 141.
6 Carol H. Weiss, 'Preface', ibid., p. vii.
7 As quoted in Leonard Silk and Mark Silk, The American Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 157.
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great measure to the efforts of the Nixon White House. By the end of Gerald Ford's
presidency, AEI was a think-tank capable of generating about as much respect and
acceptance as its older liberal-minded counterparts. The following pages examine the Nixon
administration's crucial role in these changes, and evaluate the impact that the AEI's
transformation had upon and within the general metamorphosis of the American conservative
movement. A first section traces the origins and early history of the Institute during the 1950s
and 1960s, followed by a section which discusses the interaction between the Nixon White
House and AEI. Finally, this chapter closes with an examination of the most important effects
of AEI's spectacular growth and rise to prominence upon the trajectory of conservatism at
large.
1. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT PRIOR TO 1969
The American Enterprise Institute, or the American Enterprise Association as it was
initially known, was founded in 1943 by Lewis H. Brown, president of the Johns-Malville
Corporation, and a number of fellow right-of-centre businessmen. Its aim was to combat the
tide of New Deal policies by publicising free-market leaning views and supplying business-
friendly analyses of pending legislation to responsive congressmen and senators. For about a
decade, the AEA remained a small, relatively ineffective outfit whose main expenditures
were the fees it paid to a Washington Law firm named Sullivan, Bernard & Shea for
preparing analyses of proposed legislation.f Yet, if its activities during this early period paled
in comparison to those of its liberal counterparts, it nevertheless succeeded in capturing the
attention of congressional Democrats and labour activists alike. In 1950 the association was
already being monitored by Group Research Inc., a labour-financed research outfit devoted to
keeping tabs on conservative organisations. That same year it was also subjected by
8 American Enterprise Association: Report of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities .. (Washington DC:
G.P .0, 1950); 'American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research', September 27, 1963, f. American Enterprise
Institute, box 11, Group Research Records, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library
(hereafter GR records); 'GRI Report' [undated]; 'Notes on the Visit to American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research', April 18,1963., ibid.
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Democratic Representative Frank Buchanan to the first of the various in-depth examinations
of its activities aimed at suspending its tax-exempt status.' Although AEA's fiscal status
remained unchanged, the Buchanan Report clearly indicates that the Association had already
developed some of the traits that would characterise it for the following half-century. In the
first place AEA adopted a modus operandi and technocratic veneer that it has retained for the
rest of its life and which remains a central element of its organisational character. It eschewed
attaining a broad constituency and instead adopted a selective outreach strategy: the analyses
produced by the association's staff were sent to political operatives on Capitol Hill, and to
educational institutions such as universities and other think-tanks, but there was no hint of
attempts to reach the wider public. Furthermore, the association took pains to emphasise that
its work was of a technical nature and that, being developed on a bipartisan basis, was being
supplied to members of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Thus AEA proclaimed
that it took 'no stand either in favour or against any proposed legislative measure', while its
president proudly emphasised in 1949 that the 'outstanding value' of AEA's work had been
to provide a 'working base' for a 'coalition of Republicans and Democrats on major
legislation' grounded on technical expertise rather than ideological politicking.!"
In second place, for all its claims of aseptic bipartisanship and technocratic neutrality,
Democrats and labour activists were right to signal AEA's close association with the GOP
and with business interests. For instance, during the 1950s its president, Sinclair A. Weeks,
was a member of the National Association of Manufacturers, and Robert A. Lund, the
president of the NAM, also doubled as a member of AEA's board of directors, while three
directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States moved subsequently to AEA.
Other prominent businessmen linked to AEA's management were Lewis H. Brown, the first
president of the association, who had also been director of AT&T, and H. C. Lumb, a trustee,
who was also vice-chairman of the NAM. Colby M. Chester and Charles R. Hook, both some
time presidents of the same organisation, also found their way onto AEA's board, as did
9 Report of the House Select Committee.
10 Ibid. .
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NAM vice-president Arthur Kemp. The GOP supplied the board with Robert P. Burroughs
from the Republican National Committee; John O'Leary, who had been vice-treasurer of the
Hoover campaign, and the aforementioned Sinclair Weeks, who as well as being connected
with the NAM, doubled as president of AEA and treasurer of the Republican National
Committee.'! The list of companies recorded as supporting the early AEA included
champions of the automobile industry such as General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and
Studebaker, as well as large corporations in other sectors such as International Harvester,
General Electric, Standard Oil and Bethlehem Steel. Yet although the list of early
contributors to the association included a total of261 names, AEA's funding relied mainly on
a much smaller list of large contributors. Consistent with this, the association avoided the
mass pamphleteering and direct mailing efforts that would later on be a trade-mark of the
conservative movement, and opted instead for a selective fundraising strategy: funds were
captured through contacting a mix of selected heads of prominent companies and getting
them to either suggest other potential donors or to contact these possible donors themselves.r'
Unfortunately for its sponsors, the business response to the association's appeals was
rather tepid, and by 1950 the organization was all but bankrupt: from 1947 to 1950
contributions went down from $192,000 to an altogether insufficient $94,000, against
expenses which ran to $160,000 in 1949. However, this depressing panorama changed
significantly after 1953, when A.D. Marshall, then heading General Electric, took over the
chairmanship. As the victorious 'Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower took office,
instead of shutting down AEA as some of the Association's early supporters suggested,
Marshall hired two new members of staff: William J. Baroody Sr., a Lebanese immigrant
who became executive vice-president and effective head of the association, and, as his
assistant, Glenn Campbell, an economics PhD.13 Baroody Sr. was one of those conservatives
II Ibid.
12 Such correspondence constitutes the bulk of AEI's early epistolary archives within the papers of William 1.
Baroody Sr., the longest serving head of AEI, who continued this fundraising strategy and the general thrust of the
activities performed by the organisation.
13 For an overview of AEI's history see Patrick Ford, 'American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,' in
Organizations/or Policy Analysis, pp. 29-47; James A. Smith, The Ideas Brokers:. Think-Tanks and the Rise of the
New Policy Elite, (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp.175-77.
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who perceptively realised that Brookings fulfilled a number of functions central to the
maintenance of the New Deal consensus in Washington and beyond. He set about creating an
AEA that would fulfil the same functions for the conservative challengers to the status quo.
Baroody sought to turn the association into an entirely different organisational animal: a
think-tank. First, he and Campbell deliberately sought to change the old image of the
organisation as a pro-business advocacy outfit. Baroody convinced Marshall to allow the
association to change its name to the less compromising and more academic-sounding
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, while continuing to impress on the
neutral and technocratic character of the organisation. The standard fund-raising letter that he
sent throughout the 1950s reflected quite neatly the organisation's aims and strategy. AEI,
Baroody asserted, was 'not a crusade to save the world. Nor is it designed to achieve
miracles'. Rather, the Institute 'operates on the premise that better legislation results from a
better informed legislatory [sic]'. 14 In second place, Baroody and Campbell also endeavoured
to drastically reorganise AEI and to expand its scope of action so as to turn it into a much
more efficient organisation. Therefore, the activities of the Institute up to the early 1970s
increased in number and quality but were still focused on assisting congressmen and senators
through press digests, occasional papers, 'legislative analyses' of 'current legislative issues'
according to 'timely' and 'factual' criteria, as well as broader studies aimed at supporting the
free enterprise system. IS In third place, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s AEI also
acquired an expanded cohort of academic advisors, incorporating men like Milton Friedman,
Warren Nutter and Gotfried Haberler. Far from being a 'crusade', most of the Institute's
associates were senior academics and technical advisors who, if generally conservative and
certainly linked with the right-wing of the Republican party, tended to take a pragmatic
approach to policy-making.
14 William J. Baroody Sr. to Edward G. Budd, April 26, 1956, f. Bub-Bun, box 1954-1979, William J. Baroody Sr.
p,apers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, (hereafter WBSr papers, LC).
5 Baroody tirelessly explained AEI's activities to potential donors throughout the 1950s and 60s, see for instance
William J. Baroody Sr. to W. G. Achenbach (executive director of Johnson & Johnson), July 3,1958, f. Aa-Ac 1955-
1979, box 3, ibid.; and Baroody to C. F. Adams Junion (President of Raytheon Manufacturing), March 15, 1955, f.
Ad-Ak 1954-1978, ibid.; Baroody to J. Dawson Ahalt, March 18, 197, f. Ad-Ak, ibid. See also 'Institute for Social
Science Research, American Enterprise Institute, Inc., and Roger Freeman' [undated], f. American Enterprise
Association, box 11;GR records, and 'Institute for Social Science Research', September 27,1963, ibid.
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Furthermore, a number of conspicuous AEI associates - such as Maurice Stans, Arthur
Bums and Paul McCracken - served, as befits technocrats, both in the moderate Eisenhower
administration's Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors before moving,
respectively, to the Commerce Department and the chairmanships of the Federal Reserve and
the CEA during the first Nixon administration.l" Of course, influence over actual policy-
makers in the executive branch was crucial for the success of any self-respecting think-tank.
During the Eisenhower years the AEI managed to build something of a relationship with the
White House through men such as the already mentioned Bums, McCracken and Stans, as
well as others such as the all-powerful White House Chief of Staff Shennan Adams,
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, his undersecretary Phillip A. Ray and John B.
Hollister, head of the International Cooperation Administration from its inception in 1955 to
1957. 17 During these years AEI even succeeded in obtaining some public works contracts,
most notoriously a request from a Senate Special Committee to study foreign aid programmes
which ended up splashed across the pages of the New York Times: AEI's was the one analysis'
out of ten advising the suspension of all programmes, and AEI trustee John B. Hollister was
also head of the ICA. The fact that Baroody gave testimony accompanied by a well-known
conservative such as Milton Friedman escaped no-one either.l" By the late 1960s the AEI was
still modestly funded but it had survived, and what is more it was beginning to develop the
main characteristics that define a think-tank, including steady links with a decent stable of
donors, academics and office-holders.
2. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT
PRIOR TO 1969
16 For an illustration of the AEl's relationship with the Eisenhower administration, see the correspondence between
White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams and William 1. Baroody Sr. in f. Ad-Ak, box 3, WBSr papers.
17 William 1. Baroody Sr. to Sherman Adams, May 5,1954, f. A, box 1, ibid.
18 'GRI Report' (undated), f. American Enterprise Institute, box 11, GR records.
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The American Enterprise Institute, together with its sister organisation the Hoover
Institution, were unique organisations within the conservative spectrum. Since the early post-
war years, the conservative community had generated a number of organisations pursuing a
wide range of aims. Some, such as the Foundation for Economic Education and the
Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, operated as educational charities distributing
literature and organising seminars; others like the American Conservative Union and the
Young Americans for Freedom effectively became political-pressure enterprises harnessing
growing grassroots support. A third group, including the Philadelphia Society and the
regional branch of the Mont Pelerin society, successfully helped to expand the movement
within academia and the intellectual world.!" However, until the mid-1970s AEI was alone in
fulfilling a different but crucial function, even if until 1964 it remained small and largely
inconspicuous. As a think-tank, AEI operated by distributing funds amongst academics, who
in tum produced policy proposals and policy analyses for supply to the public in general and
to elected officials on Capitol Hill in particular. In other words, the AEI worked to connect
conservative 'moneymen' and academic 'experts' on the one hand, with policy-makers and
the public at large on the other.i"
Conservatives' lethargy in the policy-making field during the 1950s and 1960s is
particularly remarkable giving their strenuous (and largely successful) efforts to expand in the
education and grassroots fields. Neglect of this area reflected at least three core aspects of the
conservative movement's evolution and outlook prior to the late 1960s. Firstly, a major
element of conservative belief - with the partial exception of some neoliberal thinkers - was
precisely the rejection of the overt 'rationalism' which characterised the liberal approach to
policy. As far as conservatives were concerned, the less governments did, the better, and what
the state needed to perform better accorded to 'spontaneous' and 'organic' evolution. Hence,
19 'Some Facts About the Foundation for Economic Education', July, 1951, f. 5, box 82, Milton Friedman papers,
Hoover Institution (hereafter, MF papers, HI), 'Why the Foundation for Economic Education?' (undated, ca. 1951),
ibid.; Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion. Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New
York:Guilford Press, 1995), pp, 27-28; George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since
1945 (Wilmington DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998), pp, 21-22,168-69.
20 AEI's role as a networking hub is much emphasised by the movement's in-house historian, Lee Edwards, Interview
with Lee Edwards, August 15,2005, Washington D.C.; Ford, 'American Enterprise Institute', pp. 35-36.
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there was little to push people with that kind of viewpoint into engaging precisely in what
was regarded as inefficient rationalising about unnecessary, if not positively harmful,
policies." In second place, until the late 1960s conservatives were seen, and largely saw
themselves, as a very much peripheral political option with little or no chance at all of
actually holding governmental responsibility. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the
conservative movement, led by the National Review, specialised in criticising the government
and spreading the ideological gospel. Organisations such as the Foundation for Economic
Education, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists and the Humane Studies Institute later
on all excelled in this field. But again, given conservative remoteness from the actual seats of
power, there was little to propel them towards developing actual policy proposals. Perhaps
more importantly, their position on the margins of the political spectrum gave them even less
of an incentive to engage in the kind of compromise and trade-offs that are part and parcel of
attempting to introduce new policies: for the right, ideological purity was considerably more
valued than capacity for actual political success. As has already been seen the AEI leadership,
which always understood the importance of a certain amount of moderation and of gradual
change, was distinct in that crucial aspect. Thus, although by the late 1950s and early 1960s
AEI coexisted with a number of conservative institutions and foundations, all of these
focused virtually exclusively on ideological proselytising via education or grassroots political
mobilisation.
The oldest of these was the Foundation for Economic Education, founded in 1946 by
Leonard Read, a disenchanted New-Dealer who devoted his time to spreading the gospel of
free market economics. Although FEE achieved considerable strength and a secure economic
basis, its work was entirely devoid of political direction and circumscribed to organising
21 Smith, 'Politics of Ideas', p. 187 and idem., Ideas Brokers, pp. 22-23. Smith correctly emphasises the appearance of
these sceptical views in Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1944). Other
examples include James Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1959) and
Russell Kirk, The Sword of Imagination: Memoirs of a Half-Century of Literary Conflict (Grand Rapids MI: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co,. 1995), pp. 192-93.
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seminars and courses for high school and university students.r' A similar organisation was
the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists (later renamed Intercollegiate Studies Institute),
founded by the anarcho-libertarian activist Frank Chodorov in 1953. As its name indicates,
lSI devoted itself to working with undergraduate students. Unlike FEE, the lSI was always
closely related to National Review, with men such as Russell Kirk and Buckley himself
doubling as NR editors and lSI trustees-cum-speakers. It soon moved away from a pure
libertarian position to incorporate traditionalist conservative stands.r' To be sure, both FEE
and especially lSI helped to link intellectuals to conservative donors and, to some extent, with
politicians who were invited regularly as speakers to seminars and summer courses. 24
Despite the notable differences in aims and operational outlook AEI, FEE and lSI did share
more than a broad ideological outlook. The same academics and advisors who worked for
AEI tended to assist the educational organisations, as was the case with writers and
academics like Herrell DeGraff from Cornell, Henry Hazlitt, Roscoe Pound from Harvard
and James McCarthy of Notre Dame.25 Further, these organisations tended to exchange senior
staff and trustees. Thus, one Malcolm Hardgrove doubled as Washington representative for
AEI and FEE when both were based in New York, and by 1963 at least three trustees of AEI
(Henry Bodman, Hughston McBain and Charles White) were also on the board of FEE.
Moreover, these organisations' all had to compete for funds from a limited number of
conservative donors and right-wing 'philanthropists' such as Henry Salvatori, Joseph Coors,
Richard Scaife and Roger Milliken, as well as foundations such as Kresge, Olin, Mellon
Donner, Relm, Earhart and the Volker Fund.26 Given the strong focus of conservatives on
22 Interview with Richard Ebeling, November 20,2005, Swindon UK; 'Some Facts About the Foundation for
Economic Education', July 1951, f. 5, box 82, MFP papers; 'Why the Foundation for Economic Education?'
~undated], ibid.
3 See Lee Edwards, Educatingfor Liberty: The First Half-Century of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute
(Washington DC: Regnery, 2003).
24 The two most conspicuous examples of active politicians with a penchant for attending conservative educational
~et-togethers were Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, see ibid., pp. 115-16.
5 William J. Baroody Sr. to Amos F. Gregory, September 14,1956, f. Grea-Grun 1954-1980, box 12, WBSr papers.
26 Edwards, Educating for Liberty, p. 146; Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional
Change in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 156-57. William J. Baroody's
careful courtship of these conservative foundations is best spelled out in a fundraising letter to Amos F. Gregory, head
of the Kresge Foundation, see William J. Baroody Sr. to Amos F. Gregory, December 27,1955, July 8,1955, and
September 14, 1956, f, Grea-Grun, 1954-1980, box 12, WBSr. papers. Other instances of early support from
conservative foundations can be found in Baroody to Amos. F. Gregory, November 7, 1955, July 1, 1965, ibid. As
early as 1966, the fruits of Baroody's networking amongst the foundations were solid enough to warrant an offer of
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education, it is no surprise that AEI moved into the field through a spin-off organisation
named the Institute of Social Science Research/" Even there, however, the emphasis
remained on the publication of policy recommendations and analysis rather than on
proselytising. In short, by the mid 1960s conservative organisations had developed a certain
division of labour. FEE and the lSI operated in the education field while AEI, and to some
extent the Hoover Institution, directed the financial and human resources of the growing
conservative movement towards influencing the policy-making process in Washington DC.
Despite being the only conservative organisation with a working horizon aimed at the
implementation of policy, AEI had always had an uneasy relationship with the hard core of
the movement. William J. Baroody Sr. had been in touch with the National Review group
through William F. Buckley and his brother-in-law L. Brent Bozell since at least 1957, and
by the early 1960 these men enjoyed a warm relationship." However, although AEI regularly
passed on research to NR, the closeness between Baroody and Buckley seems to have been
grounded more on personal sympathy and shared Catholicism (Buckley also sent Baroody a
manuscript by fellow Catholic and then-rising National Review star Garry Wills) than on
professional grounds. 29 At no point did the intellectual leaders of the movement coordinate
their activities or develop a corlsistent working relationship with the-then modest AEI. AEI's
limited means and technocratic outlook, together with Baroody's efforts to acquire bipartisan
credentials put the Institute somewhat on the periphery of a movement centred on grassroots
mobilisation and firmly focused oh strident ideological fighting.r" More significantly, after
1964 the correspondence between the NR offices and AEI grew remarkably scarce and
assistance to the London-based Institute of Economic Affairs, see John Wood to Baroody, 16 November 1966, f. Wir-
Wyn 1954-1979, box 30, ibid.
27 For an overview of the ISSR see' Institute for Social Science Research', September 27, 1963, f. Institute for Social
Science Research, box 176, GR records.
28 See William Rusher to Don Bostwick, August 8,1957, f. Ru-RY, box 26, WBSr papers.
29 Donald Lipsett to William Buckley, March 4, 1967, f. Philadelphia Society, box 45, William F. Buckley Jr. papers,
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter WFB papers); Arthur Kemp to All Members [of the
Philadelphia Society], February 23, 1968, f. Philadelphia Society, box 53 ibid.; Earl H. Voss to Buckley, September
18, 1969, f. Bul:r-Bun 1954-1975, box 6, WBSr papers; William J. Baroody Sr. to Buckley, December 12, 1962, ibid.;
Baroody to Buckley, November 18, 1959, ibid.; Baroody to Buckley, December 9, 1958, ibid.; Baroody to Buckley,
December 12, 1962, ibid.; F. Clifton White, Suite 3505: The Story of the Draft Goldwater Movement (New Rochelle
NY: Arlington House, 1967), p. 205.
30 See ibid., p. 201. -
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devoid of the previous personal warmth between Buckley and Baroody. Beyond accidental
meetings in conservative get-togethers (most notably in the meetings of the Philadelphia
Society) no relationship seems to have been maintained after that year." Yet, for all its
ideological nuances, sudden coolness was mostly a direct consequence of the not-so-discreet
power struggle that followed Barry Goldwater's primary victory in 1964, pitting National
Review conservatives against a circle of close Goldwater associates headed by Denison
Kitchel and AEI's senior staff. Kitchel was a political novice whose only qualification to
preside over the campaign (according to the Buckleyites), was his being the candidate's
personal friend and attorney. Baroody, who had known Goldwater for years through his work
with senators and congressmen, was certainly a more experienced and better connected
operative. Baroody's political experience, however, was confined to peripheral activities with
already elected officials on the Hill, and had not involved electoral politics. Understandably,
men like Buckley and William Rusher - not to mention Cliff White, who had masterminded
Goldwater's victory in the primaries - considered themselves, and with some reason, entitled
to a major role in the campaign, and resented both being displaced by the candidate's
'Arizona Mafia' and Baroody's status as Goldwater's 'guru' and 'grey eminence,.32
Resentment blossomed into fully-fledged rancour when that struggle became public in a
manner less than flattering to the Buckleyites. A leak, apparently produced at the instigation
of Baroody and describing a strategy meeting between the two camps, led the New York
Times to publish a story about how the 'Goldwater-for-president ship has just repelled a
boarding party from the forces who supposedly occupy the narrow territory to the right of the
Arizona senator'. In case Goldwater's intentions were not clear enough, the article
reproduced the campaign's belief that 'what their candidate needs least is more support from
the far right', which the Times proceeded to identify, by name, as Buckley, Bozell and
31 William J. Baroody Sr. to William F. Buckley, September 8, 1966, f. Bub-Bun 1954-1975, box 6, WBSr papers;
Baroody to Buckley, December 21, 1973, ibid.; Thomas F. Johnson to Buckley, September 5, 1974, ibid.; Gary L.
Jones to Buckley, November 7,1975, ibid.
32 F. Clifton White, Politics as a Noble Calling: The Memoirs ofF. Clifton White (Ottawa IL: Jameson Books, 1994),
p. 149; William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1984), p. 157.
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National Review.33 Perhaps not surprisingly, such infighting resulted in the National Review
circle being politely but firmly ignored by a campaign tightly controlled by the Baroody-
Kitchel tandem, and the near-termination of relations between Baroody and the most
influential elements of the conservative movement. 34
However, although the power struggles between Baroody and the National Review
circle neither reflected nor definitively triggered any ideological battle, they did reflect rather
important tactical differences. Baroody had set to tum Goldwater into a mainstream
acceptable candidate. Buckley, for one, seemed to realise Goldwater's conundrum and
accepted that 'he doesn't want me around and, I say this with all sincerity, shouldn't have me
around, since my style and personality are different from his' .35 Alas, most of the hard core
were less forgiving and reacted in a fashion well expressed by James Burnham, a leading NR
luminary. Burnham summed up the feelings at the magazine's offices, observing that 'the fact
is, as we know, that Goldwater is a second-rate person; and seems to be surrounded by third-
and fourth-rate persons', while urging Buckley to attack 'the conduct of the campaign' from
the pages of the magazine." Yet, the meeting which resulted in the leaks to the New York
Times was aimed at discussing a proposal by Buckley to form an 'advisory committee' made
up of intellectuals and acade'mics, which was still established despite the leaks. More
tellingly, although the National Review crowd was deliberately shut out of the committee's
formation (and virtually from the rest of the campaign) its membership, in theorydrawn from
AEI's own stable of talented conservatives, included virtually the same men who were both
already advising Goldwater and connected to Buckley and Bozell.37 Baroody, thus, did
33 White, Suite 3505, p. 206-7; J. William Middendorf II, A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater's Presidential
Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative Movement (New York: Basic Books, 2006), pp. 50-51; Rick Perlstein,
Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2001), pp. 255-56.
34 See William F. Buckley to Denison Kitchel, August 19, 1964, f. Goldwater Correspondence, box 30, WFB papers;
Kitchel to Buckley, October 26, 1964, ibid.; Interview with Michael Baroody, September 6, 2005, Washington DC.
35 William F. Buckley to William Rusher, April 14, 1964, f Interoffice Memos, box. 29, WFB papers.
36 James Burnham to William F. Buckley, February 16, 1964, ibid.
37 The campaign's strategy of distancing itself from National Review went to the point of withdrawing an invitation
for Buckley to participate in a Madison Square Garden rally, see Barry Goldwater to William F. Buckley, May 21,
1964, f. Goldwater Correspondence, box 29, ibid. See also 'Goldwater's "Brain Trust'", US News & World Report,
July 27, 1964; 'The Heavyweights in Goldwater's Comer', New York Herald-Tribune, July 19, 1964. Some of
Goldwater's publicly-acknowledged advisors with links to National Review were Milton Friedman, Robert Strausz-
Hupe, Warren Nutter, Harry V. Jaffa, Gerhart Niemeyer, Raymond Moley and Russell Kirk.
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achieve some success at gathering existing conservative talent on technocratic rather than
ideological grounds, and at publicly distancing the candidate from the relatively abrasive
style of National Review. Nevertheless Baroody's strategy, which included declaring to the
press he couldn't 'really say whether I am a liberal or a conservative', did prevent Goldwater
from suffering a humiliating defeat after being painted as a dangerous radical/" Goldwater
was too poor a presidential candidate and too closely associated with aggressive conservatism
- not even the efforts of National Review itself to assure readers that 'President-elect
Goldwater would not call for a atom bomb rattling, or for dismantling the social security
system' could soften the Arizonan's hard image. Lyndon Johnson was too skilled and ruthless
to let the electorate forget about such alleged radicalism, and successfully ensured that voters
would, to use Buckley's own expression, 'recoil with funk' at the prospect of Goldwater in
the White House.39 Most important, the electorate was too broadly attached to the New Deal
consensus to receive Goldwater's proposals with anything other than 'funk'.
Of course, in 1968 all these elements would be different but in the meantime, and in
common with the other factions within the conservative family, AEI had to survive in the
political wilderness, trying to preserve its own niche within an increasingly crowded
organisational field and all that 'without much support from the National Review circle. As the
'Arizona Mafia' discovered, to enter the conservative field having irritated the established
leadership could have notably deleterious effects. After the debacle that conservatives
endured in the aftermath of the 19'64 election, an alternative organisation emerged from the
Goldwater campaign when Denison Kitchel set up the Free Society Association, which in
tum used extensive AEI support. The FSA counted a number of key AEI members among its
senior staff such as Lynn E. Mote, who was FSA's executive director, Ann Brunsdale, as
FSA's research director and Karl Brandt, as FSA advisor. 40 If that were not enough, FSA' s
board also included a number of academics and writers conspicuously linked with the AEI
38 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'The Men Around Goldwater', Saturday Evening Post, October 24,1964.
39 William F. Buckley to All Concerned, 'Re: July 14 Issue of NATIONAL REVIEW', June 9, 1964, f. Goldwater
Correspondence, box 30, WFB papers.
40 'Lynn E. Mote Named Executive Director', Press Release, June 24, 1965, f. Goldwater, box 35, ibid.
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such as Robert Bork, Milton Friedman, Raymond Moley, Gerhart Niemeyer and Warren
Nutter.41 Although the Watts riots would subsequently trigger some AEI-like specific policy
proposals, Kitchel's FSA developed a markedly different character when it proclaimed
through Barry Goldwater its determination to 'launch a crusade of unusual gravity ... aimed
literally at the preservation of the free American society' .42 To be more specific, FSA entered
the fields of action into which established conservatives had been drawn (and in which they
had more experience) during previous decades. Thus, FSA 'was organized for the purpose of
establishing a nationwide, grassroots political education program' by providing educational
material devoted to 'the principles of the free society' for use at the community level by
discussion and study groups.l'' Of course this presented Kitchel and his associates with a bit
of a problem: that field was already alarmingly overcrowded. Hence, in his fundraising
efforts, Kitchel acknowledged the existence of 'many organizations which are disseminating
information on specific phases of the conservative philosophy', and tried to justify FSA's
existence by noting that 'the Free Society Association is the only organization which
represents an educational program in all phases of responsible conservatism' .44 As may have
been expected, potential donors do not seem to have been wildly impressed by such tactical
finesse.
Forced to look for other forms of action, Kitchel tried to enter the second-most well-
trodden field of action for conservatives: political organising. To that end FSA began to
operate a 'Public Affairs Consulting Service', offering political analysis and services such as
a 'Basic Action Course in Practical Politics' .45 The trouble was, again, that that field was also
already occupied by yet another set of organisations, led by the American Conservative
Union, which aspired to take on the role of 'a much needed overall coordinator' of
41 'The State of Our Free Society' (1966) f. 6, box 81, MF papers.
42 Whitaker and Baxter to Denison Kitchel: August 26, 1965, f. Consultants, box 2, Free Society Association records,
HI (hereafter FSA records); Barry Goldwater, 'A Call to Arms', f. 6, box 81, MF papers; 'The State of Our Free
Society' (1966), ibid.
43 Denison Kitchel to E. F. Wildermuth" June 24, 1966, f. Correspondence, box 2, FSA records.
44 Ibid.
45 'Basic Action Course in Practical Politics', (undated) f. Consultants, box 2, ibid.; 'Services Offered by the Public
Affairs Consulting Service', (undated), ibid.
238
conservative political organisations.l" Like lSI in the educational field, ACU was intimately
related, and in many ways dominated, by the men around National Review. If being
repudiated by the Goldwater presidential campaign was hurtful, to be challenged on their own
organisational turf was outright intolerable for men who had considered themselves the
leaders of political conservatism for over a decade. William F. Buckley wrote to Goldwater in
clear terms, complaining he had not been informed of what FSA 'was about'. He was willing,
he continued, to do publicity for it in National Review as a personal favour to Goldwater, but
he also emphasised the fact that 'the organization of FSA amounts to a repudiation of the
ACU,' not least because ofFSA's 'failure to list any conspicuous official of the ACU among
[its] organizing cadre' .47 In part, such a failure corresponded to the obvious pro-Republican
(or at least conservative-Republican) outlook of ACU against an FSA which claimed to be a
'non-partisan haven for all those who share the principles of the free society - Republicans,
Democrats, and independent alike' .48 But above all, its 'organizing cadre' reflected the
intimate relationship between the association and AEI - and the notable coolness between
that group and the men around National Review. In the end, lack of support from the core
element of the conservative movement helped to bring about FSA's demise: after four
frustrating years it was forced by its inability to attract sufficient financial support to close
down.49
Hence by 1969 AEI found itself in a peripheral position within a conservative
movement dominated by the National Review intellectuals. Moreover, both its own size and
the general ideological climate of the time prevented Baroody's enterprise from rivalling the
influence of the older liberal-leaning think tanks, and therefore from mounting a credible
challenge to the liberal premises that they defended. By the mid-1960s AE!' s funding had,
unlike the FSA, reached a respectable amount that oscillated between half and three quarters
46 Frank Meyer, 'Memorandum', (undated, c. 1964), f. 10M, box 30, WFB papers.
47 William F. Buckley to Barry Goldwater, June 18, 1965, f. Goldwater, box 35, ibid.
48 'Memorandum for Editors on the Free Society Association' (undated, c. 1965), ibid.
49 Denison Kitchell circular letter to the members of FSA, June 1, 1969, f. FSA, box, 10, FSA records; Interview with
Milton Friedman, May 4, 2004, San Francisco.
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of a million dollars depending on the estimate. 50 Baroody even contributed to the appearance
of two new organisations that emerged out of AEI: the Institute for Social Science Research
and the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University." On the other hand, Glenn
Campbell, who had been Baroody's closest associate and right-hand-man at AEI, became
head of Stanford's Hoover Institution in 1960, but retained a place on the board of AEI's, just
as Baroody himself gained a seat at Hoover's board of advisors. From then on, Hoover
quickly evolved from the holder of the eponymous president's personal papers into a
conservative research centre not entirely unlike AEI. 52 In other words, by the end of the
1960's AEI had amassed financing to guarantee its own survival, and had even become the
centre of gravity of an embryonic network of conservative organisations. Yet if this evolution
was, as Baroody himself put it, 'healthy' it was certainly 'non-spectacular' and at any rate,
the Institute's situation was still a far cry from the resources and prestige of liberal
organisations such as Brookings or the Rand corporation. 53
Moreover, the zeitgeist of the 1950s and 1960s had not served to enhance AEI's
influence. Despite the clear links between the Institute and the Eisenhower White House, the
general's administration remained firmly attached to the basic tenets of the post-war
\
consensus, to the point of triggering no small amount of conservative criticism. Far from
achieving acceptance by what conservatives perceived as liberal bastions, the CSIS had to
dissociate itself from Georgetown University at the urgings of the latter's faculty, while the
Hoover Institution lived through' more or less constant low-level warfare with Stanford
University. The Institute for Social Science Research eventually withered away. Even the
50 'Rightist group list expenses of $421.088', St. LOllisPost Dispatch, January 20, 1965. AE1 declared to the taxman a
total income rising from $273,259 in 1962 to $545,681 in 1964, see' American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research Attachment to Form 990-A', f. AEI General, box 12, GR records.
51 Inevitably, the ISSR also caught the interest of the liberal wing within the trade union movement, see the briefing
elaborated by the National Education Association under the title 'Institute of Social Science Research, American
Enterprise Association, Inc and Roger Freeman' (undated, c. 1958), and 'Institute for Science Research', Group
Research Report 27, September 1963, f. American Enterprise Institute, box 11, ibid. For hints of ISSR's financial
troubles, see William 1. Baroody Sr to Glenn Campbell, August 12, 1969, f. Campbell, box 6, WBSr papers.
52 It is clear that the expertise gained by Campbell at AEI was a prime contribution to Hoover's success: for decades,
the latter was known as the 'East Coast AEI', Interview with Michael Baroody; John Mickelthwait and Adrian
Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 49-50; William 1.
Baroody Sr. to Glenn Campbell, July 5, 1960, f. Campbell, box 6, WBSr papers; Baroody to Campbell, February 8,
1961, ibid.; Thomas .F. Johnson to the Chairman of Admissions of the Cosmos Club, December 27, 1972, ibid.
53 William J. Baroody Sr. to Glenn Campbell, July 19, 1960, ibid.
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American Enterprise Institute itself lived through one of its lowest periods in the aftermath of
the 1964 election, when Baroody's professed reluctance to engage in crusading had proved to
be no obstacle to his deep involvement in the management of a fiercely conservative
presidential campaign. 54 Baroody's political adventure ensured that AEI acquired certain
nationwide notoriety, but the Institute also became quickly and inevitably identified with the
most conservative wing of the Republican party - to the point of calling for the renewed and
unwelcome interest of the Internal Revenue Service which, under the Johnson administration,
unleashed another two-year long investigation into AEI's charitable status.55
By the time Richard Nixon arrived at the White House, AEI possessed the technical
characteristics and traits of a think-tank, including a 'talent roster' listing over one thousand
intellectuals and academics. " Nonetheless it still lacked the financial clout to fully develop
its ideas; had never found a willing audience in the seats of power capable of implementing
those ideas; and, last but not least, was still perceived as remaining squarely outside of the
ideological mainstream of American political life. To complicate things further, AEI had also
something of an outcast status even for conservatives, who had tended to frown upon
Baroody's seemingly tepid stands and, in the case of the National Review circle, were still
smarting from the Goldwater campaign's power-struggles. In 1969 therefore, the AEI - like
Nixon (if we take him at his word) and conservatism at large - was still an outsider.
3. REACHING THE PROMISED LAND: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AEI
54 Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New
york: Times Books, 1986), p. 39.
)5 Interview with Michael Baroody; Interview with David Keene, August 24, 2005, Washington DC. See also National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 'The Professors and the REA: An Account of How Tax-Exempt, Non-profit,
Educational Front Peddles Power Company Propaganda About Rural Electrification', f. American Enterprise Institute,
box 11, GR records.
56 Anne Brunsdale to.Glenn Campbell, October 7, 1968, f. Campbell, box 6, WBSr papers; William J. Baroody Sf. to
Campbell, July 15, 1970, ibid.
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Nixon and his advisors were quick to recognise the potential of an organisation like the
American Enterprise Institute. In the immediate aftermath of the 1968 election, President-
elect Nixon wrote to Baroody that 'the time has now come for a really major effort' to re-
examine the legislation of the Great Society. In fact, Nixon declared himself to be 'fully
convinced of the urgent need for such an effort. It would be a public service of far-reaching
significance if the Institute could launch such a program as quickly as possible' .57 By January
1969, AEI was already contracted to conduct a 'series of evaluative studies of significant
government programs'. 58 A year later, under the watchful eye of White House Chief of Staff,
Robert (Bob) Haldeman, Nixon's inner circle began plans to 'orchestrate certain White
House and Administration personnel' into a nationwide fundraising campaign on behalf of
AEI.59 Initially, the campaign was designed to last for at least a year; eventually it continued
until 1973, when Charles Colson, the devoted and determined Nixon advisor who was
directing it, was replaced by William J. Baroody Jr.60 According to the plan, administration
appointees such as congressional liaison Bryce Harlow, Under-Secretary of State John Irwin,
Under-Secretary of Defence Packard and presidential counsels Lynn Nofzliger and Jeb
Magruder attended fundraising meetings following an established modus operandi, whereby
presidential staff refrained from direct fund-raising on behalf of AEI but, we can assume,
emphasised the links between the political interests of the administration and the
organisation. Thus, Baroody Sr. would 'make the financial pitch' while White House
personnel 'would not discuss business but talk on general governmental problems'. 61 Also in
February 1970, presidential assistant Peter Flannigan recruited Secretary of Commerce and
old AEI friend Maurice Stans for the White House's 'sustained and systematic effort' to build
57 Richard Nixon to William J. Baroody, November 17, 1968, f. American Enterprise Institute, box 32, Charles Colson
Bapers, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park MD (hereafter, CC papers, NA).
8 William J. Baroody to Martin Anderson (Special Assistant to the President-Elect), January 7, 1969, f. Am-Ar
1954-1975, box 3, WBSr papers.
59 Dan Hofgren memo to H. R. Haldeman through Jeb Magruder, 'AEI and Related Special Fundraising Efforts',
February 13, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), box Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59), CC papers.
60 William J. Baroody Jr., 'Memorandum for the Record', October 20, 1972, f. American Enterprise Institute 1971-
1972, box 52,. William J. Baroody Jr. papers, Gerald Ford Presidential Materials, Gerald Ford Presidential Library,
Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter WBJr papers, Ford Library); Charles Colson to William J. Baroody Sr., January 28, 1972, f.
Colem-Comst 1954 -1979, WBSr papers; Colson to H R Haldeman through Jeb Magruder, 'AEI and Related Special
Fundraising Efforts', February 13, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), box Contested Documents (boxes
31 to 59), CC papers.
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up a think-tank base of support for the administration.62 Shortly thereafter, Colson ordered
Stans to pursue a second, 'long term' line of support on behalf of AEI through which the
administration would seek to enlist wealthy foundations as well as large corporations. Stans'
assignment was to lobby Howard Pew, then heading one of the major conservative
foundations to increase Pew's contribution to the AEI.63
By April 1970, Bryce Harlow described the effort as the 'development of powerful
support on an urgent basis for the American Enterprise Institute' and urged Colson to involve
President Nixon personally in the fundraising drive.64 In March, Colson and Baroody had
enlisted John Swearingen, president of the Standard Oil Company ofIndiana and chairman of
the American Petroleum Institute's Special Services Committee, an organisation gathering
the executive heads of all the major oil companies. Swearingen's role was to act as envoy to
the business community, after the same fashion as Stans was approaching the foundations.
Throughout the remainder of 1970, Swearingen and Colson organised an intense campaign of
fundraising covering private foundations, wealthy individuals and corporations.f Both men
essentially followed the same technique that Baroody had been pursuing since the late 1940s:
a qualitative strategy of approaching a few very wealthy potential donors, normally at the
suggestion of those already supporting AEI; only that now AEI had acquired, and would
thereafter retain, the capacity to multiply its appeals and direct them to the largest and
wealthiest businesses nationwide." Between August and October 1970 Swearingen's
progress on behalf of AEI included contacts with all the major national banks based in New
York City including Chase Manhattan, Morgan Stanley and First National Bank, top
industrial corporations like ALCOA, IBM, Bethlehem Steel and Ford Motor, as well as all
the Texas-based oil companies. Furthermore, this was in addition to appeals to traditional
conservative donors to either initiate or increase their support for AEI, which included the
62 Peter Flanigan, to Secretary Stans, February 16, 1970, ibid.
63 Charles Colson to Maurice Stans, February, 27 1970, ibid.
64 Bryce Harlow to Charles Colson, April 6, 1970, ibid.
65 Charles Colson Memorandum to the President (draft), May 18, 1970, ibid.
66 See for instance Baroody's letter of thanks to John E. Angst, of the American Car and Foundry, detailing the
answers of the 'seven companies to which you sent letters', William 1. Baroody Sr. to John E. Angst, June 29, 1960, f.
Am-Ar 1954-1979, box 3, WBSr papers; see also note 12 above.
243
DuPont Family, the various foundations controlled by the Pew family, the Coors brothers,
Roger Milliken, Reed Hunt and the Kellogg Foundation.67
Most importantly, by May 1970 Nixon himself put the weight of the presidency behind
AEI's fundraising effort, and gave direct orders that 'ways be found to fund more adequately
the American Enterprise Institute' .68 A month later, Bob Haldeman (no doubt with Nixon's
knowledge) instructed Colson to concentrate his efforts in the search for 'one or two big
funders to finance the entire AEI operation', and pressed Colson into keeping him (and hence
the president) updated on the progress of the project. As well as urging Colson to report on
the matter 'as soon as possible', Haldeman also guaranteed that if such funders were to be
found, 'they could meet with the President' .69 In fact, the president took the issue into his
own hands, called Swearingen and, through Dwight Chapin, summoned both Colson and
Swearingen to the White House for a discussion about the progress of AEI's fundraising
effort.i" The meeting took place on June 23, after a further follow up call from Nixon on June
19.71 Shortly before that, in April, Swearingen had proposed a first meeting between the
president and a potential donor, De Witt Wallace, in order to capture endowment funds for
AEI. By then, Colson was claiming that the whole AEI project was Nixon's own idea, and
was freely using presidential backing to press the White House's staff into swift action.72 In
fact, Colson was probably exaggerating. There is no evidence that the president ever met with
any AEI donor, and in early 1971 Nixon refused (against Colson's advice) to chair an AEI
fundraising event. 73 Still, such an investment of the president's time as there was would have
been rather noteworthy for any administration; in the case of a president who, like Nixon,
67 J. E. Swearingen to William J. Baroody Sr. and Charles Colson, 'Summary Report: Visits with New York Bankers',
October 13, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 2 of 4), box Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59) CC papers;
Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America's Rightward Turn (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 29, 38; Mickelthwait, Right Nation, pp. 79-80.
68 Charles Colson Memorandum to the President (draft), May 18, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4),
box Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59), CC papers.
69 Haldeman to Colson, June 17, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), ibid.
70 Dwight Chapin to Colson, June 29, 1970; ibid.
71 .. , • •
Charles Colson to the President, 'Chronology of AEI Program' , August 12, 1970, f. American Enterpnse Institute
(f. 3 of 4), ibid.
72 Charles Colson to Dwight Chapin, April 5, 1971, ibid.
73 William J. Baroody Jr. to the President, January 12, 1971, f. AEI 1971, box 32, CC papers; Charles Colson to Hugh
Sloan, January 14, 1971, ibid.; David N. Parker [on behalf of the President] to Charles Colson, January 28,1971,
ibid.; Reply slip fromthe President's office to Colson (undated), f. AEI William Baroody, ibid.
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famously refused to see even his own senior appointees, it was truly remarkable and it
underlines both the White House's and Nixon's determination to enhance the standing of
AEI.
From mid-June onwards the White House stepped up its efforts. Prior to Nixon's
personal push the effort was mainly conducted by Haldeman, Nixon's personal aides Peter
Flannigan and Jeb Magruder, Colson, and Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans."
According to a summary written by Colson, those members of the administration who had
been closely related to the AEI prior to 1968 were formally enlisted only once the fundraising
effort was in full swing - although clearly these men had obviously been acting on AEI's
behalf, even if in an informal and somewhat more discreet fashion." Secretary of Defence
Melvin Laird became actively involved in the White House's formal efforts from July 13. It
is safe to assume however, that Laird, who was a long-time close associate of Baroody and
had William J. Baroody Jr. as his chief personal assistant, had been working on AEI's behalf
since election night; James A. Smith has written that the White House campaign on AEI's
behalf was kickstarted in an undated meeting at a 'Pentagon dining room', presumably at the
behest of Secretary of Defence Laird." Senate minority leader Gerald Ford followed suit
several days later, and was joihed by Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Paul
McCracken.77
During December 1969, Baroody Sf. had already tried, unsuccessfully, to get Vice-
President Agnew's support for AEI by inviting him to speak at a 'dinner session' organized
by the Institute." In September 1970, Colson tried again, informing the vice-president of
Swearingen's activities, and emphasising that they were being carried out on behalf of 'the
74 Peter Flanigan to Maurice Stans, February 16, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), box Contested
Documents (boxes 31 to 59), ibid. Charles Colson to Stans, February 27, 1970, ibid.
75 See for instance Paul W. McCracken to William 1. Baroody Sr., February 25,1969, f. McCra 1959-1978, box 20,
WBSr papers.
76 Smith, Ideas Brokers, p. 179.
77 Charles Colson to the President, 'Chronology of AEI Program', August 12, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute
(f. 3 of4), box Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59), CC papers.
78 William J. Baroody Sr. to Vice-President Agnew, December 30, 1969, f. Ad-Ak 1954-1978, box 3, WBSr papers.
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President' .79 It appears that Agnew decided against being involved in the AEI effort, but by
January 1971 at the latest, the Institute was already regularly organising, and at a pace of
'several' every week, the sort of meetings between AEI staff, administration officials and
members of large corporations that Baroody and Haldeman had been planning about a year
earlier. 80Each meeting was designed as an 'informal gathering' on 'major issues of the day'
of interest to business leaders, such as tax policy, income policy or environmentalism, and
was limited to around ten attendees. Administration officials, very much the centre of gravity
of the whole exercise, were provided with a list of possible attendees and dates from which to
pick the most convenient. By this time, more members of the administration such as
Secretary of Labor (then at the Office of Management and Budget) George Shultz, Transport
Secretary John A. Volpe, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality Russell Train,
Special Assistants to the President Virginia H. Knauer, Egil Krogh and John P. Whitaker, as
well as other junior members of the presidential bureaucracy were also lending their weight
on behalf of AEI.81 The outreach effort had also expanded beyond typically conservative
donors and Swearingen's friends within the Texas oil companies and the financial world. AEI
now approached leading companies working, for instance, in the utilities (ITT, Allegheny,
Pacific Gas) Chemicals (Dow), shipbuilding (Norfolk), the aircraft industry (United, Boeing),
mining (Kennecott, Hanna) and heavy industries (Aluminium of America and American
Metal).82
The White House's efforts to support AEI were not limited to increasing the flow of
funding towards the Institute. With the aggressiveness characteristic of the Nixon
administration, Colson and Baroody Sr. also sought quite actively to, in Colson's terms, 'nip
79 Charles Colson to Art Sohmer, September 22, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), box Contested
Documents (boxes 31 to 59), CCP papers.
80 Interview with David Keene. Keene began working for the vice-president in 1970 and could not recall any
fundraising efforts undertaken by Agnew on AEl's behalf.
81 List of AETseminars and attendees provided by Baroody to Colson, January 22, 1971, f. American Enterprise
Institute 1971,1, box 32, CC papers; List of AEI seminars and attendees, f. AEI seminars, ibid.; William J. Baroody
Jr., to the Secretary of Defence, January 23, 1971, f. American Enterprise Institute General, box 52, Melvin R. Laird
rapers, Ford Library (hereafter MRL papers).
2 William 1. Baroody Jr. to the Secretary of Defense, January 23, 1971, f. American Enterprise Institute 1971-1972,
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in the bud any competing fund raising efforts,.83 As early as February 1970, Haldeman's
assistants re-routed towards the AEI an ongoing programme to create a think-tank type centre
of intellectual support for the president." By September 1970, Colson had unsuccessfully
attempted to incorporate another alternative project, directed by banker Henry Wallich, into
AEI and was pressing Baroody to negotiate Wallich into the AEI effort. At around the same
time, a third competing effort pushed by Undersecretary of the Treasury Charles Walker was
'turned off, and Walker became involved in the AEI drive. 85 In January 1971, Colson
instructed Secretary Stans to abort yet a fourth alternative project, this time organised by
Sandy Trowbridge under the aegis of the National Industrial Conference Board.86
As a result of the administration's aggressive support for AEI, the Institute performed,
In the words of a long-time staff member 'a great leap forward' .87 In qualitative terms,
traditional conservative sources of funding continued to assist AEI, but the Institute no longer
depended exclusively on them, and could parade a wide, non-political or even liberal range of
funders. In quantitative terms, by December 1971 AEl's annual budget jumped from
$750,000 dollars to nearly $2.5 million.88 In fact, the Institute appears to have suffered some
problems keeping pace with the administration's efforts. Symptomatically, both Colson and
Haldeman noted at different stages that one of the main problems facing the AEI throughout
the entire fundraising campaign was that the organisation lacked specific detailed plans to put
such a large amount of new funding to specific use.89 In February 1970, when Colson
instructed Secretary of Commerce Stans to lobby the wealthy conservative donor Howard
Pew to increase his contribution to AEI, Pew initially refused to contribute because he 'didn't
83CharlesColson to William J. Baroody Sr, September 16, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), box
Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59), CC papers.
84Dan Hofgren memo to H. R. Haldeman through Jeb Magruder, 'AEI and Related Special Fundraising Efforts',
February 13, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), ibid.
85Charles Colson to William J. Baroody Sr., September 16, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), ibid.;
List of AEI seminars and attendees provided by Baroody to Colson, January 22, 1971, f. American Enterprise Institute
1971 1., box 32, ibid.
86 Charles Colson to Maurice Stans, January 22, 1971, f. American Enterprise Institute 1971, (f. 1 of 4), box Contested
Documents (boxes 31 to 59), ibid.
87 As quoted in Smith, Ideas Brokers, p. 179.
88 Other sources situate AEl's 1968 budget at around $1 million, see ibid., p. 179.
89 Charles Colson Memorandum to the President (draft), May, 18, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4),
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know why AEI needed such a large quantity of money'. 90 Subsequently, Colson urged
Baroody Sf. to produce a detailed blueprint of AEI's future activities. By June 1970, Colson
informed the president that Baroody had managed to produce a 'sound operating plan for
effectively using substantial additional revenues' .91 It did not remain on the drawing-board
for long. In a letter to Glenn Campbell dated December 1971 an exuberant Baroody Sr. noted
that 'it is a measure of how busy things have been here over the past six weeks that my thank
you notes get off as part of some new business' .92
4. OUTSIDERS WITHIN: AEI'S WORK FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
As early as December 1970, Colson had emphasised to Haldeman that the White
House's efforts had put AEI 'in a strong position', and that what was now needed was 'to
make use of the resource'. To this Haldeman added, in handwriting, 'let's be damn sure we
do,.93 From the viewpoint of the administration, the new business of AEI fell squarely within
three categories. On a short-term basis AEI became a source of position papers and speeches
to be supplied directly to the president, other members of the administration and Nixon
supporters outside governmentThe administration profited politically from AEI's ostensibly
non-partisan status, and from its capacity to be an effective producer of academic literature
supporting presidential initiatives. From a longer-term perspective, the administration clearly
intended to use AEI as a counterweight to what it saw as the predominately hostile, liberal
establishment entrenched in the universities, the press, and particularly, the Brookings
Institution. In 1970 Brookings was a mammoth think-tank boasting, according to White
House estimates, a budget of around $7 million and an endowment of $50 million, against
AEI's initial $750,000 budget and no endowment at all.94
90 Charles Colson to Maurice Stans, February 27, 1970, Peter Flannagan to Brice Harlow, March 18, 1970, f.
American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), ibid.
91 Charles Colson to the President, June 11, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), ibid.
92 William J. Baroody Sr. to Glenn Campbell, November 2, 1971, f. Campbell, box 6, WBSr papers.
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Bob Haldeman, for one, was also determined to make 'damn sure' that AEI's services
were primarily 'not for the Domestic Council but for R[ichard] N[ixon]', and helpfully
suggested that if Ehrlichman, the then-White House supremo on domestic matters, or his
Domestic Council were to use AEI's resources, 'they should pay a consulting fee' .95 Most of
those within the administration involved in the AEI project were, however, a little more open-
minded. For Colson, it was certainly 'imperative' that the AEI acquire a 'top flight writer'
who could 'write thoughtful position papers, analyses, and perhaps even speeches'. With
characteristic candour Colson emphasised that the administration's need for such a person
was 'very desperate', and instructed AEI to place this 'at the top of the agenda'v'" However,
he was careful to emphasise that AEI's functions and capabilities went well beyond assisting
the presidential speech-writing team. Perhaps understandably, AEI's staff also had different
ideas to Haldeman's, and had no intention of becoming a mere addendum to Nixon's
personal staff. In January 1971, Baroody requested to Jeb Magruder that either Ken Cole or
Ed Morgan, two Ehrlichman staffers, be appointed as liaisons between the Domestic Council
and the AEI. 97 Of course, AEI had already been supplying the kind of services that Colson
was referring, even if on an informal basis and mostly to those members of the administration
already within its orbit."
As early as January 1969, the office of the president-elect was already using AEI to
assist the economic programme of future Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Bums.99 By
1970, it was also being suggested that various federal agencies should evaluate whether
'some of their functions might not better be farmed out to the private sector, in particular to
the Institute' .100 Subsequently, AEI activities both expanded and became increasingly
95Haldeman's handwritten notes in Charles Colson to H. R. Haldeman, December 30,1970, f. American Enterprise
Institute, 1971, ibid. (emphasis in the original).
96Charles Colson to William J. Baroody Sr., March 3,1971, f. American Enterprise Institute, 1971, ibid.
97 Jeb Magruder to John Ehrlichman, January 4, 1971, ibid.
98See William J. Baroody Sr. to Arthur Bums, June 10, 1969, f. Burb-Bryo, box 6, WBSr papers; Bums to Baroody,
March 5, 1969, ibid.
99William J. Baroody Sr. to Martin Anderson (Special Assistant to the President-Elect), January 7,1969, f. Am-Ar
1954-1975, box 3, ibid.
100 Unnamed [Colson] Memorandum, March 24, 1970], f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 4 of 4), box Contested
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embedded within the administration's strategy. Most importantly, AEI's proposals were now
listened to at the highest levels, and not only by those who had previous links with the
Institute. During September 1970 the Institute produced a survey on the proposed Hatfield-
McGovern amendment, which would have cut-off any further funds towards the war effort in
South East Asia. According to Colson, it was a 'good example of how AEI can be quickly
responsive to our needs'. The survey, Colson added, was 'written to present both sides of the
argument', but 'clearly it is slanted our way': to that extent, it was 'useful to our supporters in
the closing days of the fight' in Congress - a fight that the administration won by a 55-39
margin.l'"
AEI's offices were again enlisted to collaborate in the 1970 Heard Report - which
concluded that, although the Vietnam War was increasing tension in the campuses, the
president had been more sensitive toward student and minority concerns than in the past. 102
Less than a month after that, the Institute agreed to 'undertake a study of the effect of campus
political activities on the tax-exempt status of colleges and universities'. AEI thereby trained
its sights on what the administration believed to be the breeding-ground of its enemies: the
universities.l'f An AEI panel, directed by the future United States Solicitor General and
United States Attorney General Robert Bork, concluded that the tax-exempt status of
universities should preclude their indulging in 'almost any kind of political activities', and
proposed that 'individual citizens' could bring suits to force the Internal Revenue Service to
revoke that status if such activities 'were to take place on-campus.l'" The IRS also noted, in a
rather menacing release carefully choreographed by Colson to achieve maximum impact, that
college officials could even risk 'prosecution for violation of the federal Corrupt Practices
act' .105 The value of the study for the administration was twofold. The findings of the AEI
panel were widely publicised by the national press as sponsored by 'a private organisation of
101 Charles Colson memorandum to Larry Higby, September 11, 1970, f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), ibid.
102 Charles Colson memorandum to Larry Higby, August 3, 1970), ibid.
103 'Memorandum for AEI File from Charles W. Colson', f. AEI (f. 4 of 4), box 32, ibid.; Joseph Baroody to Charles
Colson, October 28, 1970, f. AEI (f. 1 of 4), ibid.
104 Charles Colson circular memo, October 6, 1970, f. Campus Unrest, box 44, ibid.
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non-partisan character'; headed by a 'Yale law professor'; and, in true AEI technocratic style,
one which had also included the collaboration of 'the president of a university' and 'the dean
of a law school' .106 Hence the White House threatened to suspend the tax-exempt status of
any university which allowed anti-war demonstrations on campus, which in tum triggered
widespread closures of predominately liberal college campuses ordered by panicky university
governing bodies. And all this choreographed to take place during the run up toward the 1970
congressional elections. Yet Nixon's men did so under the cover of a possibly 'stem', but
'not unfair', and most certainly non-partisan report.l'"
Jeb Magruder also realised the potential usefulness of AEI as an addendum to the
presidential speech-writing and research staff. However, he was also well aware of its
potential wider uses, as an 'asset to the President in getting his programs sold and understood
both on the Hill and by the Public' .108 When it came to the Hill, AEI possessed 20 years'
experience assisting members of the Congress. According to the Institute's staff
correspondence, in the early 1970s AEI had definitely ceased to be the sleepy, largely
inconspicuous organisation of the early 1960s and the ideologically stigmatised conservative
hotbed of the late 1960s. Now, AEI was being 'swamped with rush projects' from
congressmen.l'" Regarding the' public at large, Magruder noted that' AEI can be productive
in the area of continuing emphasis, on debates and utilization of other public forums'. This
was especially the case with television, a medium that the Nixon team had been ruthlessly
exploiting since the 1968 campaign, and which was where 'spokesmen of AEI, assisted by
our office, could be placed in adversary positions with the other side' .110 AEI had been
organising, under what they called the' Rational Debates Series', precisely that kind of public
discussion between prestigious conservatives and well-known liberals since the late 1960s.
106 'Political Activism on the Campus', St. Louis Globe-Democrat, October 9, 1970. A manuscript of the report can be
consulted in 'Political Activities of Colleges and Universities', f. Political activities in colleges and universities, Box
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Now the series took on new impulses with more prestigious guests, a wider audience and
more frequent debates.
Similarly, AEI also helped to enhance the administration's standing thanks to its
academic-minded, non-partisan image. In this function, the Institute was particularly useful
for Colson who, being responsible for the administration's liaison with external groups,
frequently distributed Nixon-friendly material. When it came to the academic constituency,
the AEI was an efficient and credible source from which to distribute that literature. 111 Along
similar lines but on a different front, from the end of 1971 the nucleus of the Buckleyites had
finally had enough of Nixon's liberal gimmickry, 'suspended their support' for the
administration, and mounted a conservative primary challenge against the president out of
outrage at Nixon's opening to China and erratic economic policy. Subsequently, Baroody Sf.
found himself in a position not entirely unlike that of 1964, when he determined to push
Goldwater's public image towards the political mainstream. In its capacity as a right-of-
centre think-tank, the AEI co-sponsored a 1972 book-length study entitled Bear at the Gate,
which concluded that although the Chinese were indeed bent on world-wide revolution, that
threat could be better met through 'trilateral' power equilibrium. Hence, and in frank
violation of a conservative article of faith, AEI declared that 'Nixon's China policy promotes
US interests'. 112 That same year, and in the same vein, AEI also became the venue for
Secretary of Defence Laird's defence of the 'Nixon Doctrine' of Detente, in which he
directed a thinly-veiled attack on the National Review conservatives, whom he defined has
'utterly ruthless' and 'pure moralist' types unable to operate 'in the real world' .113
And then there was Brookings, the press and the liberal establishment. Nixon believed
he had been at the receiving end of the national press corps' vindictiveness since his
involvement in the Hiss case. From 1968 onwards this developed into a notorious and highly-
III See Charles Colson to William J. Baroody Sr., October 28, 1971, f. Colem-Comst 1954-1978, box 7, WBSr papers.
112 'Nixon's China Policy Promotes US Interests, Study Finds', American Enterprise Institute Memorandum, no. 1.,
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113 Melvin R. Laird, 'The Nixon Doctrine', June 20, 1972, f. American Enterprise Institute, Seminar on the Nixon
Doctrine 1972 1, box-52, MRL papers.
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publicised war between a near-paranoid administration and the mainstream media,
particularly the New York Times, the Washington Post and the television networks. The
conflict was best illustrated by Vice-President Agnew's savage denunciations of the press in
speeches delivered in Des Moines and Montgomery in November 1969.114 Although Agnew
became the focal figure in the dispute, his views were widely shared throughout the
administration. For instance, Patrick Buchanan believed that press to be not merely
'occasionally hostile' to 'the president and his purposes', but 'endemically hostile'.
According to Nixon's men, 'a small, ideological clique has managed to acquire monopoly
control of the most powerful medium of communication known to man', and was using that
power to 'politically assault the President and his Administration' .115 Needless to say, the
dysfunctional behaviour of the Nixon White House tended to both frighten and infuriate a
press corps that would soon develop a 'healthy fear' of certain members of the
administration, hence further rarifying an already bad relationship - and perversely
confirming the administration's perception.i'" Subsequently, perhaps due to AEI's growing
media expertise and certainly as a result of its increasing respectability and relative autonomy
vis-a-vis the administration, in late 1972, the White House also used the Institute to organise
a General Advisory Committee, chaired by Colson, to evaluate and hopefully uncover that
bias in the television coverage of the 1972 election.l "
In a presidential memo dated that same year, Buchanan also noted the 'clear need for a
conservative counterpart to Brookings which can generate ideas', and which would be crucial
in transforming Nixon's 'Silent Majority' into a truly 'permanent majority' .118 Buchanan was
not alone. Charles Colson, notoriously, thought that bombing Brookings may have been a
good idea, while a less bloodthirsty aide to Haldeman merely recommended 'the low road' of
114 See Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York: Viking Press, 1977), pp. 188-91; James Keogh, President Nixon and
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deliberately associating Brookings and other liberal organisations with 'pro-Hanoi and anti-
American' activities so as 'to arouse the wrath of the unenlightened folks west of the
Appalachians' .119 As early as February 1970, one of the main aims of the administration's
drive on behalf of AEI was to provide 'a reasonable alternative to Brookings', as well as
hopefully 'to direct future funds away from the negative foundations like Brookings' .120
Baroody Sr. himself, fully aware of the White House's detestation of Brookings, was fond of
reminding those members of the administration within his reach of the clear links between
that organisation and past Democratic administrations.121 In fact, the administration saw
Brookings as the heart of that liberal establishment bent on destroying the work of the Nixon
White House. As Colson put it, by undermining Brookings 'we would be striking at the heart
of the establishment'v'<' In a passage revealing of the Nixon's men's view of their own
position, Colson warned that AEI 'could expect a response in kind' on the part of the
administration's alleged enemies and that, since the aim of the Institute was increasingly pro-
Nixon and anti-establishment, it would collapse' through the IRS' if the administration were
to lose the 1972 elections.123 Consequently, the White House went to some lengths to keep
the pro-AEI effort in the most absolute secrecy. Even after Gerald Ford left office, and once
AEI had become openly known as the Republican party's own' government in exile', several
memoirs by former Nixon staffers involved in the effort remained conspicuously silent about
their endeavours, and with some success: even the academic literature tends to associate
AEI's rise to prominence with Ford rather than Nixon.124
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4. REAPING THE REWARD: AEI'S COMING OF AGE
If the administration benefited greatly, the rewards for AEI were even more substantial
and long-lasting. AEI-related personnel moved on into government, a possibility previously
closed to conservatives at large and only tangentially fulfilled during the years of the tepid,
consensus-seeking Eisenhower administration. As may be expected, the presence of these
men within the administration had a two-fold positive effect for the AEI. First it lent a degree
of policy-making influence during the tenures of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and, just as
importantly, once the GOP lost the presidential election of 1976 the Institute acquired its own
stable of experienced former (and potentially future) office-holders to be added to its
academics and financial backers. In other words, it had acquired all the traits that had
characterised Brookings as the Democrats policy shop-cum-refuge when out of office. It was
not long after November 1976 that the press and liberal activists alike identified the AEI as
the conservative wing of the GOP's 'government in exile'. A second positive effect of close
proximity to executive power and an increasing flow of financial support was a significant
expansion of AEI's outreach 'activities. This went quite beyond its work on behalf of
President Nixon and into a veritable battle of ideas to challenge liberal mores. Somewhat
ironically, AEI's expansion led the Institute into the kind of outreach work traditionally
performed by other organisations within the conservative movement, although AEI's version
always retained its trademark technocratic bent. As a result of all these developments, AEI
achieved what had been Baroody's - and after their own fashion, of all other conservatives' -
objective ever since the 1950s: acceptance by the liberal establishment and the recognition of
the AEI as an equal by the liberal champions within the growing think-tank community. In
this sense, it is not an exaggeration to affirm that Baroody's moment of success arrived when
the Ford Fo~ndation agreed to finance an AEI project, and Brookings organised it with the
AEI in a joint programme.l'"
125 See correspondence in f. Brookings Institution 1969-1977, box 86, WBSr papers.
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In the aftermath of the Nixon electoral victory of 1968, Baroody's networking for over
nearly two decades produced some immediate results. A number of AEI associates became
members of the administration, mainly in the Defence Department and in economics-related
positions. Through the offices of AEI, the benefits of patronage trickled down the
conservative ranks.126 Melvin Laird, perhaps the closest political ally of the AEI in Congress,
was appointed Secretary of Defence, and William J. Baroody Jr., the son of AEI' s president,
was made his personal assistant. Warren Nutter, a strict conservative economist with a taste
for foreign affairs, became Assistant Secretary of Defence for Internal Security. Nutter, in
turn, appointed Richard Ware, then president of the conservative Relm Foundation, as his
own assistant.F' Edward Feulner, Laird's fiercely conservative assistant in the House and
future head of the Heritage Foundation, was assigned to the office of the assistant secretary
responsible for filling the 90-odd slots available to the new administration. From there,
Feulner paid 'frequent' visits to the White House Office of Personnel to defend Laird's
insistence on appointing candidates who were 'right on defence' .128 Martin Anderson, a close
associate of AEI, became first Nixon's 1968 campaign Director of Research, and
subsequently went on to serve as presidential special assistant. Paul McCraken, chairman of
AEI's advisory board, became 'Chairman of the Council for Economic Advisors, and Arthur
Burns, a close friend of Baroody Sr. and one of the many academics who occasionally
collaborated with AEI, became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Milton Friedman
became an unofficial but rather influential advisor to the president, while in 1973 Baroody Jr.
replaced Charles Colson as special assistant to the president in charge of liaising with
external groups. According to Howard Phillips, the conservative activist and former head of
the Office for Economic Opportunity, that same year, it was Baroody Jr. and Melvin Laird
who managed to secure the appointment Gerald Ford, yet another long-term associate of AEI,
as vice-president. 129
126 Thomas F. Johnson to Martin Anderson, September 24, 1969, f. Am-Ar, box 3, ibid.
m Thomas F. Johnson to Martin Anderson, January 7, 1969, ibid.
128 Lee Edwards, Power of Ideas, p. 190.
129 William J. Baroody Sr. to Martin Anderson, January 7, 1969, f. Arn-Ar, box 3, WBSr papers; Interview with
Howard Phillips, September 7, 2005, Washington DC.
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The presence of a large group of AEI-related senior appointees, however numerous,
should not be taken to mean a drastic change in policy orientation during the Nixon
administration. To a large extent, the profile of these individuals followed AEI's own
outlook. Of all the AEI-related appointments, only Nutter and Ware qualify as firebrand
conservatives and both were appointed to relatively junior posts. McCracken and Bums were,
in academic terms, firm defenders of orthodox neoclassical liberal economics; but they were
not evangelical true believers along the lines of Milton Friedman - although Friedman was
close to both of them and had been a protege and disciple of Bums. Similarly, Laird had been
chairman of the Republican party during the Goldwater campaign of 1964 and belonged to
the conservative end of the Republican spectrum.l" Yet, however friendly Laird might have
been to conservatives, this was not the reason Nixon appointed him Defence Secretary. Laird
had been chairman of the House Republican Conference for over a decade, and had always
remained a man of the party, free from the apparent principled zealotry of conservative hard
liners and willing to collaborate with other conservative-to-moderate Republicans such as
Gerald Ford and George Bush Sr. It was in that capacity, as a 'professional Republican' and
experienced political operative capable of dealing with a hostile Congress, that he entered the
cabinet. 131 Baroody Sr. himself, at least after the calamitous defeat in 1964 and its unpleasant
consequences, had decidedly opted for a strategy of achieving change in a conservative
direction through the slow path of technocratic prowess.132
Nevertheless, the influence of these AEI-related conservative appointments was
certainly felt within the administration, and the Institute could reasonably claim for itself and
its associates to have had a certain impact on the policy-making process. For instance,
130 Laird had chaired the 1964 Republican Platform Committee and, unlike other Republican grandees, remained loyal
to Goldwater. According to the conservative movement's 'in-house' historian, Laird was a conservative-friendly 'well
known hawk in Vietnam', who also made an effort to appoint conservatives to the Department of Defence, see
Edwards, Power of Ideas, p. 191; John D. Saloma, Ominous Politics. The New Conservative Labyrinth (New York:
Hill and Wang,'1984), p. 103.
131 See 'Considerations in Selecting Cabinet', December 9, 1968, f. Presidential Campaign: Transition Cabinet
Appointments, box IS, William Satire papers, LC; Edwards, Power of Ideas, p. 23; Peschek, Policy-Planning
Organizations, p. 148.
132 Interview with David Keene; Interview with Michael Baroody; Interview with Morton Blackwell, Washington
D.C., August 29, 2005; Edwards, Power of Ideas, p.4.
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Warren Nutter was put in charge of the powerful Pentagon Office for International Security
Affairs (ISA). ISA, under the leadership men like Paul Warneke and John McNaughton, had
acquired a reputation for vetoing hawkish military decisions (particularly in South East Asia)
on political and diplomatic grounds. According to a senior Pentagon official, thanks to
Nutter, 'ISAjust died'. For some observers that was evidence of Nutter's 'incffectiveness'v"
But a glance at his statements disparaging civilian interference in military affairs and weak
foreign policy clearly signalled him as, in the words of newspaper reports of the time, 'a
thinker of the hard-line school' who complained about the government's proclivity to 'shy
away from anything that carries any immediate risk' .134 The Washington Post, for one, fully
realised the potential consequences of Nutter's appointment and noted on its editorial page
that an 'intellectual zealot of the right' like Nutter was an 'an improbable choice' to head the
agency. Clearly, as some commentators at the time fully realised, neutralising the ISA was a
quite deliberate action.l "
In the economic sphere, as early as 1968 and before the conclusion of the actual transfer
of power to the White House, AEI's economists were hard at work in the different advisory
committees assisting the candidate and president-elect. These men, including Friedman,
Burns, McCracken and a few Iothers such as future Secretary of Commerce Stans can be
considered directly responsible for designing an economic policy that went well beyond
Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism. On the advice of these men the Nixon administration used
for the first time the principles of monetarism as the basic blueprint for economic
management, and opted to break the gold window and thereby precipitate the end of the
Keynesian international monetary system.F" Monetarism, up to a point the end of controls
133 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (London: Hogarth, 1986), p.
104.
134 'Nixon Eyes Ex-CIA Official', Washington Post, February 18, 1969 (hereafter WP); see also 'Some Kind of
Sentinel System Will Be Built Despite Wide Opposition, Pentagon Hints', Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1969; 'A
Key Defense Aide Who Is Known for Calling the Tum on Russia', US News and World Report, March 17,1969.
135 'A StrangeAppointment at the Pentagon" WP, February 23,1969; Robert Novak and Rowland Evans, 'The Evans-
Novak Report', noA2, February 26,1969, 'Defense "Statesmen" Take Tum to Right', WP, June 1,1969.
136 James Buchanan to William 1. Baroody Sr., October 10, 1969, f. Bub-Bun 1954-1979, box 3, WBSr papers;
Richard Nixon to Milton Friedman, October 3,1968, and attached Statement by Richard M. Nixon 'The Case for
Removal of Foreign Investment Restrictions', Milton Friedman Uncataloged papers, Hoover Institution, Palo Alto CA
(hereafter MF papers [uncatalogued]). See also 'Economics: Nixon-Humphrey Debate', Business Week, September
28, 1968; Tom Wicker, One of Us, Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1991), pp.
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over the international circulation of money, and the demand for an aggressively hawkish
foreign policy had traditionally been core elements of the conservative challenge to the post-
war consensus. It was through AEI-connected appointees that these policies penetrated the
organs of policy-making. Of course, Nixon's monetarist enthusiasm evaporated as soon as it
seemed to threaten his political prospects in the 1972 election, and no amount of extensive
bombing could save an untenable position in Vietnam. Yet, conservative policy options were
nevertheless implemented, preparing the way for a more solid adoption of similar options by
subsequent administrations. Of these, as may have been expected, the Ford White House was
particularly receptive to AEl's imput. Not only had Ford been a long time acquaintance of
Baroody Sr., but the latter's son had replaced Colson as the Nixon administration's liaison
with external groups and was retained in the same capacity by Ford. Hence AEI could have
their trustees received by senior Ford staffers in the White House, attract senior
administration appointees to gatherings with conservative academics such as Friedrich von
Hayek, as well as organise meetings with AEI-friendly intellectuals such Nathan Glazer and
Martin Anderson in the Oval Office.l37
On more practical grounds, Nixon's demands forced AEI from the early days of the
administration to 'mov[ e] ahead quite rapidly on our plans for the recruitment of the needed
talent and resources', while the sharp increase in funds allowed the Institute to afford the
enlargement of its staff. I38 Thus it was at the instances of the White House that AEI hired the
prestigious Karl Brandt of Harvard University to head their academic council.i " Perhaps
more rewarding for Baroody Sf. himself, he developed something of a relationship with
Brookings through two of its presidents, Kermit Gordon and Bruce K. McLaurie, and by the
mid-1970s AEI and Brookings were actually collaborating through joint seminars and get-
548-49; Allen J. Matusow, Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars & Votes (Lawrence KA: University Press of
Kansas, 1998), p. 12.
137 William 1. Baroody Jr. Memorandum, box 1, Robert A. Goldwin files, Ford Library (hereafter RG files); Thomas
F. Johnson to Robert Goldwin, March 11, 1975, f. American Enterprise Institute, ibid.; Warren Rustand to Goldwin,
November 13, 1974, f. Irving Kristol, box 3, ibid.; Memorandum from Robert Goodwin to Donald Rumsfeld,
September 5,1975, f. Seminar 9-27-75, box 2, ibid.
138 William J. Baroody Sr. to Martin Anderson, January 7, 1969, f. Am-Ar 1954-1975, box 3, WBSr papers.
139 Charles Colson and Bryce Harlow to the President, April 30, 1970 f. American Enterprise Institute (f. 3 of 4), box
Contested Documents (boxes 31 to 59) CC papers.
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together sessions - although such friendliness did not prevent Baroody from ordering an
examination of Brookings' accounting to test the institution's financial bona fides.14o In
subsequent years a wary relationship evolved into another marked by the increasing traffic of
employees between AEI and Brookings, while the status of the AEI grew to the point where
even Jimmy Carter's staffers resorted to collaborating with it.141
Yet, if clearly gaining ground in the political mainstream from the early 1970s onwards,
Baroody Sf.' s ideological orientation seems to have remained largely unchanged. Thus, in the
aftermath of the Nixon presidency Baroody could simultaneously celebrate the Ford
Foundation's generosity while simultaneously lambasting progressive liberalism. It was to an
audience of businessmen that the old conservative warhorse reminded potential donors that
the 'consumer protection movement' and the 'environmentalist movement' were anathema to
'the kind of civilisation common men create when they are given the power - which the
market economy does uniquely give them - to shape the world in which they wish to live'.
Still worse, the same liberalism that had bestowed its acceptance upon AEI through Ford and
Brookings was, according to Baroody, responsible for stimulating 'the progressive
undermining of the attitudes towards the institutions of our society be they business, the
government, the church, education or the courts'. As he had done in the 1950s, Baroody lost
no opportunity to alert corporate donors to the fact that 'in the intellectual arena business has
been persistently losing because it has been persistently defaulting' .142 Yet, if Baroody's
discourse had not changed much in two decades, the attitude of his audience most definitely
had. During the 1950s and 1960s, the corporate response to AEI's appeals had been at best
tepid, and Baroody's most important donors had been individual conservative businessmen.
From 1968 onwards, however, the business community began to suffer the effects of both the
nation's economic troubles and the intensifying anti-corporate mood propelled by the New
Left. Accordingly, the 'mainstream' business community mobilised and became considerably
140 See correspondence in f. Brookings Institution 1969-1977, box 86, WBSr papers.
141 William 1. Baroody Sr. to 1. Dawson Ahalt, March 18,1977, f. Ad-Ak, box 3, ibid.
142 William 1. Baroody Sr. Speech to the Business Council meeting in Hot Springs, VA, November 20, 1972, f.
American Enterprise Institute General 1971-1972, box 52, MRL papers.
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more receptive to Baroody's narrative and proposals - helped, needless to say, by the efforts
of the White House.143
It should therefore come as no surprise that during the 1970s AEI also managed to
employ its enhanced status to capture some of the leading conservative thinkers and
publicists of the time, including Antonin Scalia and champion of supply-side economics Jude
Wanniski, as well as neoconservative intellectuals like Irving Kristol - who specialised in
appealing to the business community with a discourse virtually undistinguishable from
Baroody's - and his fellow neocons Midge Deeter and Nathan Glazer.144 These men and
women tended to have an attitude toward public policy and policy-making quite different
from that which conservatives had displayed during the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike those
around National Review, Kristol, Glazer and the others belonged to a different conservative
family, the first generation of the so-called neoconservatives who, although sharing some of
the scepticism towards government efficiency, had spent a considerable part of their
professional careers commuting between academia and being part or at least collaborating
with the federal bureaucracy. It should be no surprise that AEI became their natural home.145
As if to reinforce AEI's status as the Nixon and Ford administrations left office, the
Institute's staff also incorporated many of the old Nixon-Ford senior appointees such as
former Secretary of Commerce Stans, former presidential assistant William J. Baroody Jr.,
former Defence Secretary of Defence Laird, former chairman of the Council of Economic
143 Silk, American Establishment, p. 179. The literature about the change of political outlook on the part of corporate
America is considerable and consistent. A recent, excellent survey may be found in Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible
Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010); see also Phillip H.
Burch Jr., Elites in American History, Volume III: The New Deal to the Carter Administration (New York: Holmes &
Meier, 1980), p. 235; J. Craig Jenkins and Teri Shumate, 'Cowboy Capitalists and the Rise of the "New Right": An
Analysis of Contributors to Conservative Policy Formation Organizations', Social Problems 33, no. 2 (1985), pp.
136-41; Silk, American Establishment, pp. 159-79; Blyth, Great Transformations, pp. 126-202; Thomas Byrne
Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), pp. 4-6.
144 Thomas Johnson to Nathan Glazer December 28, 1972, f. Gla-Gold 1954-1979, box 11, WBSr papers; Robert J.
Pranger to Glazer, November 22, 1976, ibid.
145 See Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), p.
4; Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 14,47; Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the
Culture Wars (Lanham ML: Madison Books, 1996), pp.147-48; Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who
Are Changing America's Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 11-12.
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Advisors Paul McCracken, and former President of the United States Gerald Ford, as well as
an array of junior Nixon and Ford appointees.
It was quite natural then that during the 1970s Baroody would expand AEI's field of
activities. In a curious reversal, AEI devoted itself now to developing a vast outreach
programme similar to those traditionally designed by more typical conservative organisations
such as FEE, lSI or the Institute for Humane Studies. The AEI tried to influence the
ideological atmosphere in the universities by organising seminars and disseminating ideas
through several printed publications, as well as via television broadcasts. By April 1973, the
Institute was releasing its 'Rational Debate' series through a nationwide network of 226
television stations; later that same year the network had expanded to 268; and a year later
AEI boasted a 380-strong network capable of reaching as far away as Guam. In a return to its
earlier history AEI also developed a programme of donations to hundreds of universities and
colleges, which received printed material to establish so-called Centers for Public Policy
Research to 'contribute through educational institutions to the formation of attitudes and
ideas' .146 According to a rather alarmed political observer, AEI had managed to develop 'the
most effective campaign for disseminating political ideas that has ever been mounted' .147 By
the end of the Ford administration, Time, Newsweek, and even the New York Times had
produced flattering profiles of AEI, which the Institute busily reproduced to further enhance
its status as the conservative Brookings and the GOP's very own 'government in exile' .148
CONCLUSION
The American Enterprise Institute, like other factions within the conservative
movement such as the Southern Republicans and the neoconservative and the neoliberal
146 See the pamphlet 'American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1973-1974', f. American Enterprise
Institute, box 43, WFB papers; '226 TV Stations Now Broadcast AEI Programs', American Enterprise Institute
Memorandum no. 5, April 23, 1973, p. 5;'42 More TV Stations Broadcast AEI Programs', ibid., no. 6, summer 1973,
p,. 5; [Untitled] ibid., no. 11, winter 1973, p.l0; Smith 'Think Tanks and the Politics of Ideas', p. 190.
47 Saloma, Ominous Politics, p. 8.
148 See fundraising letter from William 1. Baroody Sr. to Ray C. Adam, September 21, 1978, f. Ad-Ak, box 3, WBSr
papers; Ford, 'American Enterprise Institute', p. 46; Smith, Ideas Brokers, p. 179.
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intellectuals, enjoyed access to the upper echelons of political power for the first time during
the presidency of Richard Nixon. In common with the wider conservative movement, AEI
acquired the enhanced prestige and respectability that this proximity entails. To be sure,
AEI's closeness to political power demanded a degree of moderation in the manner it sold its
conservative message, so as to make it palatable to an enlarged audience. But then, that had
always been AEI's strategy. It is no accident that Patrick Buchanan, Nixon's 'resident
conservative' did not believe that AEI 'could fulfil' its assigned roles as counterweight to
Brookings and the liberal establishment. Buchanan's sympathies and instincts were aligned
with the National Review conservatives, themselves a lot less radical than thought of by
liberal observers, and who as the Nixon years drew to a close were fast-losing their dominant
role in a rapidly expanding and increasingly diverse conservative movement. The old
conservative leadership would no doubt have agreed with a Washington Star headline of
1972, which emphasised that although in the past AEI's conservatism 'was perhaps more
conspicuous than its scholastic eminence, now, the AEI's aspirations have moved front and
center more and more, its projects reflect an openness to all thoughtful viewpoints'. 149
However, an examination of AEI's staff clearly indicates that its 'thoughtfulness' was
devoted to defending virtually the same principles it had been defending in 1964. AEl's role
in the conservative renovation during the Nixon years was that of an alternative clearing
house for pre-existing conservative ideas and conservative activists, as well as for new
activists with a readjusted conservative message on their way to prominence. As has already
been noted, Baroody's omnivorous taste nurtured the work of monetarist and supply-sider
economists such as Milton Friedman and Jude Wannisky, neoconservatives thinkers like
Irving Kristol and Midge Deeter, traditionalist legal scholars such as Robert Bork and
Antonin Scalia and conservative Catholic theologians alike Michael Novak and Robert
Nisbet. Those scholars and opinion makers who had left memoirs and recollections of their
time at the AEI during this years have invariably emphasised the importance of the
interaction that this set up favoured in terms similar to those employed by earlier
149 'Debate on How to Prevent Apocalypse', The Washington Star, September 24, 1972
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conservatives to describe their experience as young activists during the Goldwater campaign
or reading the National Review during the 1950s and 1960s. 150
Nevertheless the Buckleyites were not alone in considering AEI too soft. In fact the
perceived timidity of Baroody Sf. pushed some youthful conservatives then in the process of
developing their own strategies quite independently of even the National Review
conservatives into creating their very own think-tank. Morton Blackwell, who was then
working at AEI, notes how the Institute would 'not publish studies if there was some pending
discussion about it in the Congress'. Apart from Baroody's known reluctance to engage the
AEI in open politicking, the main reason for such caution was the IRS investigation of AEI's
tax-exempt status in the aftermath of the 1964 elections. According to David Keene, the IRS
'scared the be-Jesus of Baroody' and, as Michael Baroody recalls, made his father's life 'hell
for a couple of years'. Yet Blackwell and his associates belonged to a different generation
free from the psychological scars of marginalisation and victimisation. Equally importantly,
these Young Turks had become acquainted with the federal bureaucracy as junior members
of the Nixon White House. Neither needing nor seeking the approval of the liberal
establishment, and radicalised by their frustrating stints in the halls of power, these men
proceeded to apply the organisational lessons that AEI had taught them to create a more
aggressive and less compromising think-tank.F" Heritage certainly developed a markedly
different character, stepped into aggressive ideological battling and was much more engaged
in day-to-day politics, but the inspirational role played by the existence of the AEI as an
example - however wanting - is undeniable.P''
150 Interview with Jude Wannisky, August 14-15,2005, email; Interview with Norman Podhoretz, July 30,2004,
telephone; Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp 33-
37; see also footnote 146 above.
151 Interview with David Keene; Interview with Michael Baroody; Interview with Morton Blackwell; Edwards, Power
of ideas, p.4. The most violent attack on how the AEI had lost 'its sense of mission' came out years later in National
Review as consequence of the financial troubles into which the Institute ran during the early 1980s, see Todd Lencz,
'The Baroody Bunch', National Review, September 12, 1982.
152 Interview with Morton Blackwell; Edwards, Power of Ideas, pp.4-5; Interview with Lee Edwards.
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In any event regardless of (indeed, at least partially because of) the increasingly
fractious nature of the expanding conservative movement, by the mid-1970s no one failed to
take AEI, and by default the principles it defended, seriously. Moreover AEI's organisational
character and focus on economics attuned the organisation closely with an increasingly
evident change in the dominant zeitgeist. After Nixon's ill-fated experiment with price and
wage controls and the devastating effects of the oil shocks, the business community
developed a sudden interest in an organisation which had spent the previous three decades
denouncing the very same policies that business began to find intolerable. The emergence of
the Business Roundtable and the reinvigorated activities of the National Association of
Manufacturers were symptoms of a reversal in roles between AEI and its liberal-progressive
counterparts. On the one hand, after the efforts of the Nixon administration AEI was no
longer dependant on typical conservative donors. On the other, by the later years of the
decade Brookings felt decidedly threatened by AEl's newfound prominence and was forced
to perform a switch to the right whereupon, to quote from Brookings chairman Robert Roosa,
they had to 'do some things on the conservative side toO,.153This phenomenon partially
explains why the AEI succeeded in the 1970s where it had failed in previous decades. As
with conservative Southern Republicans and neoliberal economists, the combination of
careful pragmatism with the exhaustion of the existing liberal consensus contributed to the
growing acceptance of conservative proposals, and of conservatives themselves into the
political mainstream. Hence, the crisis of systemic proportions endured by the Great Society
helped to propel the AEI into the place that Baroody Sf. had always envisioned for the
Institute. It would however be a mistake to forget the crucial role played by agency. Just as
Richard Nixon's political short-term calculus helped Strom Thurmond restore the political
power of the white South, the president's self-interested support for AEI propelled the
Institute and its conservative views towards the same status enjoyed by its more established
liberal counterparts. After all, both Baroody and Nixon initiated their contribution to change
the status quo before the eruption of stagflation, the more acute phases of the culture wars,
153 See Phillips-Fein, invisible Hands and footnote 146 above.
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and the pervasive extension of feelings of systemic failure on the part of public opinion.P"
Conservatives have always been fond of remarking that 'ideas have consequences'. William
J. Baroody Sf. and his associates at the AEI proved that organisations do have consequences
as well- and that, as Richard Nixon and his assistants fully understood, they can be central to
the triumph or failure of ideas.
154 See the views of two senior Nixon economic staffers in Paul W. McCracken, 'Reflections of an Economic Policy
Maker: A Review Article', Journal of Economic Literature 18, no. 2 (1980), p. 581; Herbert Stein, Presidential
Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton (Washington DC: American Enterprise
Institute, 1994), p. 134.
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CHAPTER6
'WE WERE WILLING TO BE USED': CLASSICAL LIBERALS, NEOCONSERVATIVES
AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT-WING POLICY-MAKER
Ever since the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, right-wingers drawn to the
conservative movement had vociferously, but ineffectively, protested against the progressive
policies espoused by successive Democratic administrations and maintained by Dwight
Eisenhower.l This state of affairs changed during the presidency of Richard Nixon, when
neoclassical liberals and neoconservatives became the two sub-families of the conservative
community first capable of offering and experimenting with positive policy options from
within the executive. Neoconservatives and neoliberals were undoubtedly (and largely
remain) two fully independent social networks-cum-epistemic communities built around
quite different philosophical assumptions and distinct socio-cultural environments. Therefore
the two groups could (and still can) be found opposing each other as often as working
together. Evaluating the work of neoconservatives and neoliberals in tandem is a useful
exercise, however, for they shared two fundamental characteristics which also distinguished
them from other conservatives. Firstly, they held a common behavioural or attitudinal
\
characteristic: unlike NR conservatives, Southerners, or even the sort of right-wing partisan
Republican who supported Richard Nixon, neither neoclassical liberalism nor
neoconservatism ever developed or tried to develop a mass following. With a few exceptions,
neoliberals and neoconservatives' never became or seriously attempted to become a
'movement'< They instead aimed at implementing long-lasting changes upon the American
polity by exercising influence over the upper echelons of political power. From that fact came
the second quality shared by these two groupings, for neoconservatives and neoliberals
developed a relationship with the Nixon administration entirely unique within the American
conservative movement: they provided the bulk of conservative personnel capable of
I 'Publisher Statement', National Review, November 19, 1955, p. 5 (hereafter NR).
2 Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), p.165;
Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars «Lanham ML: Madison Books,
1996), pp. 5-6; Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservative: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 9.
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undertaking managerial and policy work in the technocratic fields of welfare provision and
economic management.
Nevertheless, the history and outlook of neoconservatives and neoliberals under
Richard Nixon displayed characteristics which were shared by the other sub-families of the
conservative community. Like the Buckleyites and the Southern conservatives who came to
support Nixon because the Californian was the one electable - or 'centrist' - candidate who
would listen to them, classical liberals and 'neocons' who worked in the White House
between 1968 and 1973 consciously sought to effect change on a relatively modest - or
moderate - scale. In common with other conservatives, they would find soon enough that
their proposals were first attempted - or seemed to be attempted - only to be subsequently
dropped by a president for whom the one overriding interest always remained re-election. In
other words, as far as their immediate aims and objectives were concerned, neoconservatives
and neoliberals miserably failed to alter the overall direction of policy-making. Still, the
Nixon years significantly changed their relationship vis-a-vis the conservative hard core
operating from the offices of National Review, and hence the subsequent make-up of the
conservative movement after the president's demise. For, whatever their immediate success
within the Nixon White House, neoconservatives and neoliberals did succeed in drastically
altering both the language used by policy-makers, and the framework within which they
operated.
After 1968, the limits of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programmes were widely
acknowledged, as was the fact that alternative forms of welfare administration and economic
management deserved at least a hearing.' Among those policies gaining increased credence
were the proposals put forward by neoconservatives advocating a reduction in direct federal
involvement in welfare administration and a greater emphasis on certain cultural mores.
3 See for instance Alonzo M. Hamby Liberalism and Its Challengers. From FDR to Bush (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), pp. 260-61; Sean Wilenz, The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008 (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), p. 23; Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 129-32.
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Similarly, the specific prescriptions of monetarism - that is, of one of the remedies proposed
by neoclassical liberalism to manage a modem economy - jumped from the realm of
academic symposia to occupy the thoughts of officials at the Federal Reserve and the
Department of the Treasury. As a consequence, during the following decade and a half, as
two British scholars writing in the late 1980s put it, 'conservative capitalism has changed the
fundamental symbolic parameters of politics', even if 'achieving decidedly mixed results
from its policies'." This chapter will examine how Nixon's choices during and prior to his
ascent to the White House were as critical in bringing around that result as 'structural'
economic developments which were not totally understood in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
or actually occurred subsequent to Richard Nixon's earlier policy initiatives. Events such as
the implosion of Keynesian economics into intractable, simultaneous increases in the
inflation and unemployment indices - the famous stagflation that bedevilled politicians and
economists for nearly a decade - or the seemingly uncontrollable expansion of welfare
entitlement costs wildly beyond the estimates of their creators certainly help explain the
sustained drift rightwards of public policy in the post-Nixon era. Yet it was Richard Nixon
who launched the conservative policy proposals that would later dominate policy-making into
the public arena before those developments permeated the public consciousness, and hence
helped bring about their eventual re-adoption by subsequent administrations earlier and more
smoothly than would have otherwise been possible.
A further shared aspect of the neoconservative and neoliberal experience under Richard
Nixon was fatalism in the face of the unknown. From 1969 onwards the administration faced
a number of radically new developments, against which both neoconservatives and (most)
neoliberals consciously adopted a modest, even fatalistically pessimistic attitude towards
their own - or anybody else's - knowledge of the workings of socio-economic processes, and
therefore towards the capacity ofgovernment in general to achieve effective social change.
Compared with the boundlessly optimistic outlook exuded by the Kennedy and Johnson
4 Kenneth Hoover and Raymond Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States. A Critical Appraisal
(London: Routledge, 1989), p. 7. Plant and Hoover actually refer to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, but the
assertion is equally applicable to Nixon (and Edward Heath).
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administrations, only that change was tantamount to 180 degree volte face. These president's
men knew and deliberately emphasised that difference.
In order to examine the evolution of both neoconservatism and classical liberalism and
the impact that the Nixon years had upon them this chapter is divided into three sections. The
first two sections evaluate the origins of both conservative sub-families and their relationship
with the National Review cluster prior to Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign, while the final
section discusses their travails as part of the administration and the tensions that conservatism
at large endured as a consequence of the ascent and decline of neoliberal and neoconservative
influence through two specific policy proposals: the Family Assistance Plan and monetarist
'gradualism' as a tool for controlling inflation and unemployment.
1. CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
In strictly philosophical terms the post-war American conservative movement was
constituted by two distinct ideological narratives: traditionalism and libertarianism or
classical liberalism. The core of the former's social vision was the creation of a 'virtuous
society', in which it is the state's responsibility to make active use of its law-making and
enforcing functions to foster certain 'virtuous' patterns of social behaviour grounded on, as
the leading traditionalist Russell Kirk had it, the 'divine intent' which forges 'an eternal chain
of right and duty which links great and obscure, living and dead', as well as 'respect for
established usage and longing for continuity'. 5 Needless to say, Kirk believed that 'political
problems, at bottom, are religious and moral problems'." On the other hand, the heart of the
libertarian social vision was (and remains) the free interaction of individuals in the market
place. From the neoliberal perspective, the main (sometimes the only) mechanism of coercion
appropriate to the good society is social sanction imposed through the market process. Any
5 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 7,200-
201.
6 Ibid., p.7.
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expansion of state activity beyond its essential functions (defence, law and order) constitutes
a violation of the fundamental social good. According to the standard description of
American conservatism first put forward by historian George H. Nash, between the mid-
1950s and the late-1960s the movement was an uneasy marriage between these two
ideological traditions brought together by the Herculean efforts of synthesis carried out by the
Buckleyites at National Review - most notably Frank Meyer, the first and most articulate
proponent of 'fusionism' between classical liberalism and traditionalism - and held in place
by a shared anticommunism.'
This is a useful and illuminating narrative as long as one focuses, as Nash did, on the
development of the intellectual conservatism proposed by the hard core in the pages of the
Review. Not so much, however, if one expands the object of analysis to the entire movement.
In the first place, although this perspective acknowledges that classical liberalism was an
older branch of the American right than the Buckleyites', it obscures the fact that after 1945 it
had been developing a rich intellectual, political and organisational life fully independent and
frequently at odds with that of the Review. It also tends to overemphasise both the weight of
classical liberalism within the philosophically hybrid nature of the modernised conservatism
developed by the hard core and the novelty value of the debate. After all, a significant wing
of the Republican party variously labelled as 'Stalwarts', as belonging to a 'republican virtue
7 The first to articulate this argument cogently was George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in
America Since 1945 (Wilmington DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998), p. xv. Nash was an 'insider' within the
National Review group, and his book was very much focused on the evolution of hardcore conservatism. Nash's view
of a three-pronged (libertarians, traditionalists and anticommunists) conservative movement held together by
anticommunism is consistently repeated in every book surveying the post-war conservative movement in the United
States, see for instance Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative
Ascendancy in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), pp. 44-45, 51; Jerome L. Himmelstein, To The Right: The
Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 49-60; Sarah
Diamond, Roads To Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: Guilford
Publications, 1995), pp. 29-35; John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in
America (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 51; Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan-Bush Era
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 4--{); Jean Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative
Resurgence from the John Birch Society 'to the Promise Keepers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), pp. 39-40; Lee
Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 78-
79. This view has been persuasively challenged along lines not entirely dissimilar from those of this dissertation in
James A. Hijiya, 'The Conservative 1960s', Journal of American Studies, 37, no. 2, (2003), pp. 201-27, especially pp.
214--18. Hijiya's analysis has been partially answered according to more orthodox assumptions in Sandra Scanlon,
'The Conservative Lobby and Nixon's "Peace with Honor" in Vietnam', ibid., 43, no. 2, (2009), pp. 255-76,
particularly p. 259, footnote 6.
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tradition', or quite simply as 'conservatives' never had any trouble combining a deep
commitment to a small federal government with minimum economic regulatory powers with
an equally deep attachment to traditional mores in the cultural sphere.f In this sense at least,
the men of National Review simply readjusted and rationalised trends of thought and attitudes
already existing within the GOP. Besides, up until the second half of the 1960s the traditional
mores championed by the Buckleyites had not been significantly challenged. Pornography,
abortion, the basic goodness of American society, the recreational use of drugs and all the
debates that made up the cultural wars which broke out during the second half of the 1960s
were quite simply not controversial and not part of the public debate when Buckley and his
associates first elaborated on the role of government as upholder of moral values. Their self-
appointed task was instead a rather abstract struggle to save the Christian soul of the nation
and to preserve the role of God in the public sphere."
Moreover, the debates that took place within NR about the proper equilibrium between
a 'virtuous' society in which public authorities exercise a vigorous role, and a 'free' society
in which the state abdicates any interference with the behaviour of the individual beyond bare
minimum public order matters seemed to have had remarkably little impact upon the
libertarian community. Rather than 'fusing' traditionalism and classical liberalism, the
Buckleyites proved to be more adept at excommunicating the latter from National Review
conservatism. In general terms the label classical liberalism included an array of
philosophical sub-families which shared strong reservations about both the ethical quality and
efficacy of government regulation, but diverged in the degree and the manner in which they
advocated government reduction. At its most extreme end 'anarcho-capitalists' defended
8 A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administration (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 22-26; Gerson, Neoconservative Vision, p. 9; David W. Reinhard, The Republican
Right Since 1945 (Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 5-9.
9 See Frank S. Meyer, 'The Twisted Tree of Liberty', NR, January 16, 1962; M. Stanton Evans, 'Do it Yourself
Conservatism', ibid., January 30, 1962; L. Brent Bozell, 'Freedom or Virtue?', ibid., September 11, 1962. Of course,
William F. Buckley's first book was titled God and Man at Yale, but was as critical of Yale's education for
overemphasising Keynesianism and neglecting classical liberal economics as for its lack of Christian righteousness.
Needless to say, the book was also published long before the advent offusionism or even National Review, and to
judge from the enthusiastic response in certain quarters, it clearly responded, if anything, to bog-standard right-wing
republican views, see William F. Buckley, Miles Gone By: A Literary Autobiography (Washington DC: Regnery,
2004), pp. 57-94; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 24-25, 127-28.
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radical individualism and the complete withdrawal of public authority to bare mimmum
functions such as the higher courts, some police capacity, and defence against foreign
aggression. Anarcho-capitalists had their most successful champion in Ayn Rand, a Russian
emigre and writer with no formal training in economics who turned blind faith in radical
individualism and the unfettered market into the stuff of successful cult novels. Rand's
radical secular individualism, together with the cult-like mentality she fostered, were
summarily dispatched from the pages of National Review by no less than Whittaker
Chambers as early as 1957. The leading libertarian Murray Rothbard suffered a similar fate,
despite attempts to reach some accommodation.i'' Traditionalist Russell Kirk proscribed
Rothbard as a 'loony' author of 'doctrinaire benthamism' and 'Manchesterian outpourings',
and declared collaboration with such people 'a foolish thing' .11 A year later, William F.
Buckley reminded his fellow conservatives that it was 'an empirical question ... whether a
Western nation can pursue a truly effective pro-Western policy while adhering to
conventional libertarian attitudes'. According to Buckley, it was a 'tragedy' that the
American right could be 'frozen in in-action' by the 'lofty and other-worldly pronouncements
of John Stuart Mill' .12
Rothbard and his acolytes resented such 'contemptuous' treatment and returned the
compliments in spades, denouncing National Review's 'foreign interventionism' and
'authoritarian tendencies' as the results of the hard core's status as the 'servant of dollar
imperialism' .13 Throughout the 1960s and beyond, radical libertarian individualism held little
significant influence within the senior ranks of Buckleyite-dominated American
10 'Big Sister is Watching You', NR, December 28,1957; Murray Rothbard to William F. Buckley, September 18,
1958, f. Roberts-Royo, box 7, William F. Buckley Jr. papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library
(hereafter WFB papers); Buckley to Rothbard, April 7, 1960, f. Rothbard, box 11, ibid. For an account of Ayn Rand's
peculiar career and difficult relation with the rest of the conservative movement, see Jennifer Bums, Goddess of the
Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
II Russell Kirk to William F. Buckley, April8, 1961, f. Russell Kirk, box 14, WFB papers.
12 William F. Buckley, 'A New Look at a Controversial Committee', NR, January 16, 1962, p. 21.
13 Murray Rothbard, 'War, Peace and the State', The Weekly Standard, April 1963, p. 2; Ronald Hamowy, 'National
Review: Criticism and Reply,' New Individualist Review, November 1961. Hanowy's article offers an overview of the
ideological tensions between 'libertarian-liberals' 'rationalists', 'traditionalists', and 'authoritarians'; see also James
O'Connell, 'The New Conservatism', ibid., spring 1962, p.17-22. It is worth noting that the New Individualist Review
was run by libertarian students of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek at the University of Chicago, and that
both men proudly figured on its masthead.
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conservatism. Yet it continued to retain a noticeable degree of influence within the
universities and the youth segment of the movement. According to National Review
correspondence, a substantial segment of the right-wing youth thought that conservatives
such as 'Old Foggy Kirk' were more attuned to 'housemothers' than to the type of student
determined to 'invest his libido where he wishes' .14 Besides the benefits of an open mind
towards the sexual revolution, another libertarian advantage in the campuses was their refusal
to accept Cold War anti-communism as a proper reason for government expansion, including
the draft." Thus, even if in the process they exacerbated the centrifugal forces within the
movement on issues such as Vietnam and Cold War strategies, libertarians at least helped to
keep conservatism alive in the campuses. Moreover, this triggered rather surprising effects
during Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House: it was Milton Friedman's neoclassical
influence and counsel over Nixon, together with the evident popularity of the initiative, that
moved the candidate to first include the ending of the draft in his programme, and to
subsequently fulfil that promise when in office.I6
In practical terms, National Review traditionalism was therefore always the dominant
ideological half of the tandem, almost to the point of asphyxiating classical liberalism - or at
least remanding it to an entirely subordinate role within the respectable American right. 17 As
William F. Buckley himself expressed, he was a partidario of classical liberalism, but he was
not 'engrossed' by it: National Review he simply defined as 'more traditionalist than
I~ Dorothy to the Editors, 'Memo on Letters', May 25, 1966, f. Interoffice Memos, box 39, WFB papers.
I) See 'Cold War Revisionism: The Major Historical Task', Left and Right, spring 1966; Nash, Conservative
Intellectual Movement, pp. 295-97.
16 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998),
pp- 377-81.
For rare examples of emphasis on this aspect of National Review-type conservatism, see David Hoeveler Jr., Watch
on the Right: Conservative Intellectuals in the Reagan Era (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), pp.
24, 32; Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment, pp. 169-70; Jerome Himmelstein has maintained the opposite hypothesis:
that classical liberalism was the dominant half of 'fusionist' conservatism, see Himmelstein, To The Right, pp. 60-62.
Interestingly enough, the same alliance between classical liberalism and traditionalism can be found outside the
United States, in political environments where the weight of cold-warrior anticommunism was substantially weaker.
For a comparative perspective see Simon Gunn, Revolution of the Right: Europe's New Conservatives (London: Pluto
Press, 1989), pp. 1-40,52-53; Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 1-60; Roger Eatwell and Noel O'Sullivan ed., The Nature of the Right:
European and American Politics and Political Thought Since 1789 (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 3-17, 99-123,167-
91; Ruth Levitas ed., The Ideology of the New Right (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 1-54.
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libertarian' .18 Certainly, some libertarians remained irritating - as in 1969 when the split
between traditionalists and libertarians nearly caused the youth organisation Young
Americans for Freedom to implode - and occasionally able to embarrass the Buckleyites - as
when their exploits reached the press - but this remained largely restricted to campus antics.!"
Yet the persistence of classical liberalism in the campuses and in the outer reaches of the
conservative movement signalled a crucial aspect of classical liberalism which would have an
impact during the Nixon years. As numerous campus activists found out, libertarianism went
beyond a mere defence of free markets and could not be equated merely with 'providing the
rationale and policy recommendations that benefit big business'. 20 Throughout the 1960s,
classical liberalism's main significance derived from its emphasis on individual freedom,
rather than from its economic policy recommendations, and not least from its opposition to
the military draft as an infringement of basic liberties." From the viewpoint of the internal
dynamics of conservatism, neoliberals contributed to National Review's ambivalence, or even
paralysis, towards certain aspects of the culture wars, such as when Buckley favoured the
legalisation of marijuana and contraception, or when the journal had to resort to a public
debate in order to make up its mind on abortion.f
Yet the libertarian sub-family also included a relatively small number of economists
who opposed what they perceived as the 'overexpansion' of government activities post-New
Deal, and who put forth a strictly technical case against both Keynesian economics and the
welfare state, which would be translated into policy-making during the Nixon administration.
By the mid-1960s Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek had without doubt become the
18 Interview with William F. Buckley, July 25,2005, New York City (Spanish in the original: the young Buckley was
cared for by a Mexican nanny and was fluent in Spanish. During the interview the author and Buckley weaved in and
out of English and Spanish).
19 James Gatsby, 'Seeds of Schism on the Right' The New Republic, March 5, 1962; Interview with David Keene,
August 24, 2005, Washington DC; David Friedman to Frank Meyer, December 1, 1969, f. YAF, box 66, WFB papers;
Alan Crawford, Thunder on the Right: The 'New Right' and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980), p. 97; Diamond, Roads to Dominion, pp. 124-25.
20 Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment, p. 169; For similar stands associating classical liberalism and the interests of 'big
business', see Blyth, Great Transformations, pp. 258-59; Kim Phillips-Fein, invisible Hands: The Businessmen's
Crusade Against the New Deal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), pp. 42-52; J. Craig Jenkins and Teri Shumate,
'Cowboy Capitalists and the Rise of the "New Right": An Analysis of Contributors to Conservative Policy Formation
Organizations', Social Problems 33, no. 2 (1985), pp. 130-45; Schaller, Right Turn, p. 35.
21 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 270-71.
22 See for instance William F. Buckley to William Rusher, March 29, 1966, f. 10M, box 39, WFB papers.
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two intellectual leading lights of neoliberalism. When his The Road to Serfdom was published
in 1947, Hayek had become the first writer to successfully publicise on a large scale the anti-
statism and market-centred individualism of classical liberalism, while also emphasising the
risks that the ever expanding state posed to individual freedom. During the 1950s and 1960s
we can distinguish two academic schools within scholarly liberalism. In the first place, the
Austrian School, whose principle representative is Hayek, and in second place, the
Monetarists or Chicago School economists, whose best known advocate was Milton
Friedman.
Friedrich von Hayek was an Austrian emigre to England who had received his
education in turn-of-century Vienna, and was the brightest scion of the Austrian school of
economics family. He jumped to prominence at around the same time as Richard Nixon
launched his first blasts against California Democrats, as a consequence of the The Road to
Serfdom, in which he developed his continuing but academically cordial disputes with John
Maynard Keynes. Hayek's work has been rightly credited with providing the most impressive
moral and philosophical justification for free markets and minimal government intervention
in the economy.v' Yet, as was customary in Austrian economics at the time, Hayek moved on
towards the kind of philosophical speculation that had little immediate use for policy-makers
and most professional economists alike. He was, however, instrumental in the consolidation
of a small group of like-minded economists from Europe and the United States who first met
in 1946 in the Swiss village of Morit Pelerin. That gathering became the inaugural meeting of
the eponymous organisation, which would in turn became one the foundation stones of a
growing network of academics, policy-makers and politicians devoted to demolishing the
political and economic arrangements of the post-war world.i" At first, however, Mont Pelerin
23 On the impact of The Road to Serfdom see Theodore Rosenof, 'Freedom, Planning and Totalitarianism: The
Reception of F. A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom', Canadian Review of American Studies 5, no. 2 (1974), pp. 149-65;
George H. Nash ...Reappraising the Right: The Past and Future of American Conservatism (Wilmington DE: lSI
Books, 2009), pp. 47-49; Mark A. Smith, The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the
Economic Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 99-100. For three excellent descriptions of
Hayek's thought and career see Nick Bosanquet, After the New Right (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp.26-42; Richard
Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution (London: HarperColiins,
1994), pp. 9-121; Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
24 See Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, pp. 100-21; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp.l9-21.
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served to gather a relatively small number of academic economists who still retained faith in
the prescriptions of classical liberal economics that had dominated the profession until the
colossal worldwide economic collapse of the 1930s.
The post-war world was dominated by Keynesian <new economics'. From a domestic
perspective Keynesianism's basic proposal was to favour selective government intervention,
variously labelled as <fine-tuning' or 'stop-go', upon demand in order to prevent, or at least
cushion, downturns in the business cycle. John Maynard Keynes's initial prescription
recommended an increase in levels of public spending accompanied by stable or decreasing
taxation levels in downturns as the 'go' phase, followed by a 'stop' phase of decreasing
public spending accompanied by rising taxes in order to correct the predictable public deficit
as the economy recovered. By the 1960s, Keynesian economists had largely rejected
Keynes's fiscal prudence. Basic welfare state measures such as unemployment insurance and
old age pensions were, in Keynes's schema, 'automatic stabilisers' designed to stimulate
demand by providing liquid money to those more needy and likely to spend it.25 Yet in a
world dominated by what were by previous standards highly expanded war-states - and in the
United States one which also happened to be both victorious and in the process of engaging
in another war - the combination of Keynesianism with the increased influence of social-
democratic ideas provided even greater impetus for governments to maintain large wartime
bureaucracies, enhanced regulatory powers and ever-increasing welfare responsibilities
towards the needy.i" According to' the neoliberal critique, instead of engaging in 'stop-go'
(bad in itself as that would have been) the federal government had, since the war, engaged in
a continuous 'go' aimed at creating artificial economic prosperity, and which had climaxed
with the Great Society. In international terms, Keynes himself played a major role in setting
the tightly-regulated international monetary markets of the Bretton Woods system, which
were devised to favour international trade generally and, more specifically, to avoid the
25 Hamby, Liberalism and its Challengers, p. 204-207; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, pp. 35-36.
26 For a similar evaluation see Smith, Right Talk, pp. 102-103.
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disastrous beggar-thy-neighbour competitive devaluations that had worsened and expanded
the 1929 crisis.27
The men who met in Mont Pelerin flatly refused to accept either that the inter-war
years' crisis had been provoked by market malfunctions, or that extensive government action
could improve economic performance. As a consequence they were almost universally
regarded by the economics profession as either quaint relics of the past or as simply
reactionaries. Reflecting on the status of laissez [aire economists Milton Friedman, a
prominent attendee to the conference, thought that the Mont Pelerin Society was important
because it showed classical liberal economists working in isolation within departments
dominated by Keynesians that they 'were not alone,.28 Curiously enough, Friedman himself
was one of the attendees with less reason to complain, since he was based in the University of
Chicago's department of economics, already famous for being the cradle of Monetarism. The
quintessentially American Friedman was in very many ways the exact opposite of Viennese
Hayek. Diminutive where Hayek was portly, Friedman would also became an active
Republican partisan and the kind of vigorous debating opponent with whom 'everybody
loved to argue provided he wasn't there', while the timid Hayek was 'polite to a fault' .29
Besides his trenchant debating' skills, Friedman also happened to be endowed with enough
academic talent to receive a Nobel prize and the disseminative capacity to tum economics
into the stuff of blockbuster books, a widely read regular column in Newsweek, and a
successful TV series. By 1969 Milton Friedman had become to neoclassical liberalism what
William F. Buckley was to hard core conservatism. Unlike Buckley, however, Friedman
possessed the kind of skills and knowledge that were useful for policy-makers. Monetarism,
the school of economics led by Friedman, had by the mid-1960s constructed a ready-made
27 For a descriptive introduction of the interwar years crisis and post second world war policies see Rondo E.
Cameron, A Concise Economic History of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 350-364, 372-80,
403-406; Shepard B. Clough, European Economic History: The Economic Development of Western Civilization (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 437-46, 459-70, 489-96; Niall Fergusson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History
of the World (London: Allen Lane, 2008), pp. 100-108, 157-64,305-19.
28 Interview with Milton Friedman, May 4, 2004, San Francisco.
29 Ibid. Interview with John Blundell, April 1, 2004.
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policy model designed to fix the present (and, as it turned out, the future) ills of an advanced
economy"
According to Monetarism, instead of engaging in 'fine tuning', re-distributing wealth
and regulating markets, governments should concentrate on one basic function: to provide a
stable, predictable supply of money. Friedman's academic work had led him to believe it had
been government's failure to follow this rule that had caused the Great Depression. In
Friedman's view - which by the 1960s was increasingly accepted - in 1929 the Federal
Reserve had slashed the flow of money excessively and for too long, hence starving the
markets of liquid and provoking a severe deflation from which recession followed.3l
Friedman believed that during the 1960s the opposite was happening, and that in order to
stimulate the economy, the Fed had spent years continuously increasing the quantity of
money circulating in the economy faster than the amount of goods and services being
exchanged had expanded. Like all classical liberals, he believed that the threat to post-war
prosperity was therefore inflation.32 Unfortunately for Friedman, as the moderate, fiscally-
conservative Eisenhower was succeeded by John Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson, nobody
else seemed to be listening. As Richard Nixon moved to New York and began to prepare his
presidential run, classical liberals were regarded at best as Cassandras and at worst as
dinosaurs.
Rare exceptions to this rule were the inhabitants of National Review's offices. William
F. Buckley had been influenced since his youth by a number of maverick libertarians who
had been friends of his father: men such as Albert Jay Nock, Frank Chodorov and the editors
of the early conservative-libertarian journal The Freeman.33 This group espoused a kind of
30 Ibid.; Interview with Milton Friedman; Interview with George Shultz, May 11, 2004, Palo Alto CA. For an
overview of Monetarism and Friedman's career see Bosanquet, After the New Right, pp. 43-61; Cockett, Thinking the
Unthinkable, pp. 151-56; Hodgson, World Turned Right Side Up, pp. 197-203; Nash, Conservative Intellectual
Movement, pp, ~67-72; Blyth, Great Transformations, pp. 139-41.
31 See Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, The Great Contraction 1929-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965), particularly pp. 112-23.
32 Milton Friedman to William F. Buckley, February 13,1962, f. 12, box 37, Milton Friedman papers, Hoover
Institution, Palo Alto CA (hereafter MF papers, HI).
33 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 21-23; for a brief but useful introduction see Smith, Right Talk, pp.
96-104,114-22. .
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radical libertarianism temperamentally closer to the Austrian, philosophically-minded
tradition and quite different from that of Friedman - who only became familiar with it during
the 1960s - and his group, in the sense that it was wholly un-academic and relatively
disengaged from the technicalities of economics policy-making.i" Nevertheless, the hard
core's commitment to classical liberal dictums regarding small-government was limited. As
the editors of National Review consolidated themselves as leaders of a reconstructed,
aggressively anti-communist, conservative movement, The Freeman stopped engaging with
foreign affairs and shifted towards less polemical waters. Still, as Buckley led National
Review's readjustment of the conservative credo, this libertarian background firmly aligned
the hard core with Friedman's own stand. Both men had known of each other since at least
1962 and after a long epistolary relationship got along famously." Although Friedman never
became a regular National Review contributor, the journal occasionally carried his articles,
and in contrast with the experience of the Rothbard style anarcho-capitalists, Friedman was
eventually acknowledged as the hard core's 'economic oracle'r'" In the process, by the early
1960s the Chicago professor had also become a major conduit - although not the only one -
between the libertarian circles operating around organisations such as the Intercollegiate
Society of Individualists, the Foundation for Economic Education and the Mont Pelerin
Society, and the hard core conservatives.V A further development cementing goodwill and
friendship between Friedman and the hard core was the foundation of the Philadelphia
Society in the early 1960s. Modelled after the Mont Pelerin Society, the PA gathered all the
shades of thought deemed acceptable within the American conservative movement. 38 Equally
importantly, Friedman's first serious entree in national politics took place in support of Barry
34 Henry Regnery to Milton Friedman, January 19, 1966, f. 15, box 23, Henry Regnery papers, HI (hereafter HR
papers); Friedman to Regnery April 14, 1966, ibid. It should be noted that Friedman's awareness of the Austrian's
work also seems to have been somewhat superficial, see Friedman to Regnery, January 11, 1967, ibid.; Interview with
Milton Friedman.
35 See Milton Friedman to William F. Buckley, February 13, 1962, f. 12, box 37, MF papers; Buckley to Friedman,
February 23, 1962, ibid.; Interview with Milton Friedman; Interview with William F. Buckley.
36 James Buckley to Milton Friedman, July 19, 1972, f. 12, box 22, MF papers.
37 Russell Kirk, of all people, seems to have performed a similar role, see Milton Friedman to Don Lipsett, March 13,
1961, f. 25, box 28, ibid.; Charles Heatherly to Friedman, March 16, 1966, ibid.; Friedman to Heatherly, April 14,
1966, ibid.; Leonard Read to Friedman, September 11, 1957, f. 2, box 32, ibid.; Friedman to Read, September 18,
1957, ibid.; Bettina Bien to Friedman, September 7, 1961, ibid.
38 Lanny Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: A Biography (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 166; Friedman, Two
Lucky People, pp. 335:_37.
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Goldwater's 1964 presidential race. Friedman was drafted into the Goldwater effort by
William J. Baroody Sr., the head of the American Enterprise Institute (which was devoted to
translating free-market principles into position papers and analyses useful for politicians and
policy-makers). Baroody Sr., in tum a distant friend of Buckley, had enlisted Friedman in
1956 as a member of the AEI's Academic Advisory Board.39
Friedman had already tried to arrange an appointment between Goldwater and a group
of Chicago economists as early as 1960 (the senator initially refused), and had subsequently,
even if initially informally and intermittently, offered his advice until a full personal
relationship blossomed between the two men.40 Simultaneously, Baroody Sr. 's good offices
ensured that Friedman, together with a number of his disciples and fellow economists, would
figure prominently within Goldwater's 1964 team of economic advisors.41 Friedman and his
acolytes provided the bulk of Goldwater's economic policy prescriptions, gained political
experience and participated directly in what became the great rite of passage for almost all
members of the conservative community, bar the neoconservatives. As the political tempo
towards the 1968 election quickened, Friedman was therefore not only the informal leader of
a significant conservative family made up of classical liberal economists; he was also a
member in good standing of the conservative movement with relationships with its anarcho-
capitalist and organisational wings, as well as with the hard core.42 Moreover through
William J. Baroody Sr., the member of the conservative coalition best connected with
Washington's political life, Friedman and his fellow liberal economists also became
acquainted with a group of Republican officeholders such as Melvin Laird, Gerald Ford and
Donald Rumsfeld, all of whom would later serve in one capacity or another, under Richard
39 Ibid., p. 344.
40 Milton Friedman to Barry Goldwater, December 12, 1960, f. 24, box 27, MF papers; Goldwater to Friedman, ibid.;
Friedman to Goldwater, April 12, 1966, Milton Friedman Uncataloged papers, HI (hereafter MF papers
[uncatalogued)).
41 Friedman, Two Lucky People, pp. 367-73;
42 Seemingly, not even Erik Voegelin or Russell Kirk could resist the personal charm and professional standing of
Friedman, see Milton Friedman to Erik Voegelin, July 23,1983, f. Milton Friedman, box 13, Eric Voegelin papers, HI
(hereafter EV papers); and footnote 11 above.
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Nixon.43 Nixon's neoliberals included two distinct generations of economists: the youngest
was made up of firebrands such as Martin Anderson and Warren Nutter (Friedman's first
PhD student in Chicago), while the older included former Eisenhower staffers such as Paul
McCracken and Arthur Bums (Friedman's mentor and intellectual father figure), who
displayed the considerably more technocratic and moderate attitude commonly associated
with the general's administration. After 1966 they would not be mere occasional advisors to
the presidential candidate as they had been to Goldwater. They first staffed Richard Nixon's
economic team during the election, and subsequently moved into the White House, the
Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
By the mid 1960s, classical liberals still regarded themselves as something of a
maverick minority within both the American conservative movement and the economics
profession. Yet, as happened within conservatism, their status within the latter had distinctly
improved from the low point of the interwar and immediate post-war years to a level of
acceptance reflected by Friedman's. selection to preside over the American Economic
Association in 1966. Hayek, on his part, would become a Nobel laureate in 1974. Tellingly,
the Austrian's award was given in tandem with Swedish social-democrat economist Gunnar
Myrdal. Two years later, however, Friedman received his Nobel in solitary. In the meantime
classical liberals had also developed a constituency within the youth wing of the conservative
movement and a set of ready-made, relatively simple policy prescriptions which had become
accepted by conservatives of almost all stripes. Monetarism had therefore been added to
traditional conservative economic preferences for balanced budgets and low taxation. As
Richard Nixon prepared to enter the White House, conservatives stood ready to implement
them.
43 Friedman, Two Lucky People, pp. 344-45; Melvin Laird to Milton Friedman, March 13, 1962, f. 31, box 29, MF
papers; Friedman to Laird, March 28, 1962, ibid. Interview with Milton Friedman; Interview with Melvin Laird, May
16, 2006, telephone.
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2. NEOCONSERVATISM
If classical liberalism had always been part and parcel of the American right-wing
tradition, neoconservatism constituted the latest addition to the conservative ideological
milieu. Both neoconservatives themselves and the growing literature analysing their
evolution have tended to focus on how the rapid cultural changes unleashed during the 1960s,
and the concomitant internal struggles within the Democratic party formed the environment
within which neoconservatism emerged." According to the standard account,
neoconservatives were a group of predominately Jewish literary intellectuals such as Irving
Kristol and Normam Podhoretz; social scientists such as Nathan Glazer and James Q. Wilson;
and political operators who had belonged to the liberal intelligentsia associated with the
Democratic Party's progressive wing such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Senator Henry
'Scoop' Jackson. The 'neo' in 'neoconservative' refers therefore to individuals who ended up
as new recruits to the conservative cause during the late 1960s and 1970s. According to the
neoconservative self-image, this fracture within liberalism and the neoconservatives' own
collective road to Damascus was not triggered by their shift to the right, but by the drift of
their fellow liberal intellectuals toward the counterculture and the New Left.45 Norman
Podhoretz and Irving Kristol,' the two most prominent early neoconservatives, have been
particularly clear about this aspect of their political evolution. Kristol, often termed the
'godfather' of the neoconservatives, was keen to emphasise that neoconservative 'dissidence'
from liberalism 'accelerated' as 'a direct consequence of the counterculture and as 'the
spectrum of liberalism became even narrower', and 'even more dogmatically left-leaning' ,46
Norman Podhoretz, Kristol 's fellow-traveller-to-the-right and long-time editor of the
prestigious Jewish cultural journal Commentary, labelled himself a 'centrist', and explained
in his memoirs how American progressivism had sustained itself as a force 'against
44 John Ehrman', The Rise of Neoconservatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 24~O; Steinfels,
Neoconservatives, p. 3; Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 67.
45 Ibid., p. 67; Erman, Rise of Neoconservatism, pp. 3~O; Steinfels, Neoconservatives, pp. 3, 55-57.
46 For a (rather unfriendly, but generally accurate) biographical sketch of Kristol, see Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of
the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York: Times Books, 1986); Irving
Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. x-xi.
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radicalism' up until the 1960s, when it was 'captured' by 'radicals' .47 Be that as it may, the
sharp tum to the right of Podhoretz's positioning in the political spectrum was indeed
representative of the whole group. Within the five years between 1967 to 1972, he moved
from believing that 'as long as we still have men like' George McGovern 'in the Senate, we
may yet salvage something out of the [national] mess', to brutally eviscerating the senator
when he became the Democratic presidential candidate.48 Another member of the group,
sociologist Nathan Glazer was, as early as 1971, also particularly clear regarding his stand
towards political developments within the democratic-progressive camp. In a famous article
published in Commentary, Glazer pointed out that the cultural wars did not set conservatives
against liberals, who shared certain basic values with one another, but pitted both groups
against the 'radicals' of the New Left who 'wanted to change everything by revolutionary
means' .49
It would be a mistake however to believe that all who were associated with
neoconservatism necessarily agreed on most issues, or even that neoconservatism possessed
in any way a fixed set of principles to which all neoconservatives subscribed. 50 On the
contrary, they engaged in remarkably lively political and public policy debates, and their
individual views have varied over time. Kristol for instance, liked to say that he had been
'moving consistently to the right', and admitted to considerable inconsistencies in his views
over the long-term." Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a relatively cohesive group of
thinkers and academics coalesced between 1965 and 1968 around The Public interest, edited
by Kristol, and Commentary edited by Podhoretz, even if one of the most frequent
47 Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks. A Political Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 16; Interview with
Norman Podhoretz, June 28, 2004, telephone; Interview with William Rusher, March 21, 2006, telephone; Interview
with William F. Buckley; For an updated restatement ofPodhoretz's views see Norman Podhoretz, My Love Affair
with America: The Cautionary Tale of a Cheerful Conservative (New York: Free Press, 2000). Together with
Breaking Ranks, the best published account of the neoconservative self-perception remains Kristol, Neoconservatism;
see also Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, pp. 57-59; Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 68.
48 Normal Podhoretz to George Mcfiovern, Apri126, 1967, f. General Correspondence 1967-1968, box 1, Norman
Podhoretz papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter NP papers); McGovern to Podhoretz, April 20,
1967, ibid.; McGovern to Podhoretz, April 27, 1967, ibid.
49 Nathan Glazer, 'The Limits of Social Policy', Commentary, September 1971.
50 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 10; Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-
Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 10.
Sl Kristol, Neoconservatism, p. ix.
284
collaborators with these journals - the philosopher Sydney Hook - continued to label himself
as a 'socialist', no less, notwithstanding his active collaboration with the Nixon White
House's efforts against the student New Left.52 Similarly, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a young
Democrat until the early 1970s, recalled that she was 'puzzled' when she was first labelled a
'neoconservative', since she had never seen herself as a conservative, neither new nor of any
other sort. 53 Glazer, on his part, remained a steadfast supporter of the New Deal and,
according to an active conservative Republican activist of those years 'probably never voted
Republican"." Thus, it is no accident that Podhoretz would entitle his memoirs Breaking
Ranks. Neoconservatives, disgusted by the counterculture and the attitude of their fellow
liberals (or 'old friends' as Podhoretz put it), found themselves increasingly on the
conservative side of political debate, often after a personal catharsis which was, as in
Kirkpatrick's case, long and sometimes, as in Sydney Hook's and Nathan Glazer's cases, life-
long.55
Despite the rise of the New Left and of the new politics which it set in motion, the
emergence of neoconservatism as a cohesive political and intellectual group, their story - as
well as its parallels and links with that of the hard core's - went back to the 1940s and 1950s,
when the agonies of anticommunism, the Hiss case and the antics of Joe McCarthy convulsed
the nation long before Vietnam, civil rights and the sexual revolution. Neoconservatism's
origins were located within the New York intellectual milieu that formed in the campuses of
New York's City College and Columbia University in the midst of the sectarian struggles
between assortments of Fabian, Stalinist, Trotskyite and freelance anti-Stalinist socialist
groupings. 56 A first, and frequently obviated, point of connexion between neoconservatives
and a substantial number of National Review right-wingers was the shared intellectual
52 Joseph Baroody memorandum to Charles Colson, October 20, 1970, f. Campus Unrest, box 44 , Charles W. Colson
materials, Richard Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park ML (hereafter CC papers).
53 Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 'Neoconservatism asa Response to the Counterculture', in The Neocon Reader, ed. Irwin
Selzer (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 235. Kirkpatrick's assertion was confirmed during the interview with
conservative activist (and some time Agnew staffer) David Keene, August 24, 2005, Washington DC.
54 Interview with Jeffrey Bell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with Norman Podhoretz.
55 Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 3-17, 286-87; Interview with David Keene; Interview with Jeffrey Bell; Interview
with Morton Blackwell, August 29, 2005, Washington DC; Interview with William Rusher.
56 A crucial character of' this period was Max Shachtman, see Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, pp. 35-39.
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starting point in the far reaches of the political left, and the equally common volte-face to a
vigorous anti-communism. Thus, National Review was first a twinkle in Willi Schlamm's
eye, a German journalist who left the Communist party after some veteran cadres offered him
the offices of a prostitute and who could be found speaking at the first public meeting of the
Congress for Cultural Freedom - the anticommunist organisation run by the same then-social
democrats who would later became known as neoconservatives. 57 Other National Review
editors and collaborators such as Will Herberg, journalists Eugene Lyons, Max Eastman,
Ralph de Toledano and, above all, James Burnham, were also linked with both National
Review and the left-of-centre New York intellectual circles inhabited by the men later to be
known as neoconservatives. 58 Unsurprisingly, as the Hiss case and McCarthyism unfolded,
both the emerging hard core conservatives and the would-be neoconservative community
suffered traumatic splits and divisions that would resurface years later when the Vietnam war
became the ulcer in the nation's political and cultural landscape. 59 Podhoretz, for instance,
echoed hard core viewpoints when he emphasised how looking into New Left ranks 'one kept
coming upon scions of what could be called the First Families of American Stalinism' .60 A
further element of ideological communion was contributed by Chicago philosopher Leo
Strauss, who is rightly considered as both one of the leading influences in the creation of
neoconservatism, and was a prime member of the conservative intellectual community of the
1950s and 60s. Not accidentally, Strauss happened to be a subscriber to only one journal:
National Review.61
Throughout the entire post-war period, both the hard core and the New York
intellectuals also displayed a commonly-held vein of cultural elitism, accompanied by an
equally vigorous disdain for those members of the intellectual elites placed beyond their own
57 Sidney Hook"Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 2&" Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 263.
58 Ibid., pp. 254-56; Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), pp. 19-67; Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 49; Nash,
Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 105-106.
59 Gerson, Neoconservative Vision, pp. 53, 64-65; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 100-106.
60 Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, p. 253.
61 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, p. 26.
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circles - even if during the 1950s and early 1960s this included one another.f An identical
manifestation of such elitism was a vigorous cosmopolitan, internationalist vein and strong
anglophile tendencies, which had been buttressed by stints in British educational and cultural
institutions, and which were coloured by varying degrees of longing for a highly idealised
British past and a proportional distaste for the Fabians.63 Sharing similar outlooks, the hard
core and the neoconservatives also displayed near-analogous patterns of behaviour and
strategies for gaining influence through journals which aspired to the highbrow. Hence, by
the late 1960s to the hard core's National Review, neoconservatives opposed Kristol' s policy-
oriented Public interest and Podhoretz's literary and politically-minded Commentary." Since
both groups during the late 1960s and early 1970s were essentially made up of journalists,
writers and academic-minded policy-makers, their activities in sectarian politics - with a few
exceptions such as William Rusher and Barry Goldwater for the hard core as well as Senator
Henry 'Scoop' Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan for the neoconservatives - tended
towards the dilettante and were marked by a rather sorry record of failure. The 1964 disaster
of Barry Goldwater mirrored how the intra-Democrat struggles from 1968 to 1972 seemed to
result in the complete collapse of neoconservative influence within that party, and even
Richard Nixon's in the 1968 Republican primaries was a testament to the limits of the hard
core's (admittedly growing) strength." Thus, even if in retrospect and with the benefit of
hindsight, it is not surprising that William Buckley thought quite on the mark Milton
Friedman's dictum that both neoconservatives and hard core conservatives belonged to the
same 'New York type' of right-wing American." Yet, Friedman missed the most important
difference between the hard core and the neoconservatives, for the latter possessed
experience in both evaluating and implementing specific policy making proposals. Whereas
the hard core was temperamentally opposed to most forms of government action and rarely
62 Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp.125-27; Interview with Norman Podhoretz; Kristol,
Neoconservatism, pp. 373-80.
63 All senior National Review editors had studied in British institutions, as also had Podhoretz. Kristol helped to run
the Congress of Cultural Freedom from London, where he became fast friends with journalist Peregrine Worsthorne,
also a good friend of Buckley, see William F. Buckley to Peregrime Worst home, October 17, 1961, f. Peregrine
Worsthome, boxl7, WFB papers; Worsthome to Buckley, November 8, 1961, ibid.
64 Gerson, Neoconservative Vision, pp. 5-6.
65 Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, p. 34; James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet
(New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 103-105.
66 Interview with William F. Buckley; Interview with Milton Friedman.
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engaged in policy analysis, the neoconservatives - even if adopting a highly critical posture-
specialised precisely in devising and analysing policy programmes.
The important elements of neoconservatism can be divided in two categories, the first
being a series of ethical and moral arguments aimed at preserving a range of traditional
values which were virtually indistinguishable from the traditionalist maxims of National
Review. From the foregoing analysis stemmed the second aspect - a set of technocratic
recipes aimed at correcting the perceived mistakes of the Great Society in areas ranging from
civil rights to welfare assistance and education. The former placed neoconservatives on the
same wavelength as their traditionalist-minded and right-wing Catholic hard core
counterparts such as 'old foggy' Russell Kirk and Will Herberg. Needless to say, it also put
them at loggerheads with both National Review libertarians and the Rothbard types.
Neoconservatives also shared with the Buckleyites a strong vein of anticommunism, in itself
a continuation of the Democratic Cold War stance that had guided presidents Truman,
Kennedy and Johnson, and which would be maintained during the early 1970s by figures
such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Democratic Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson.i" At first,
neoconservatives took pains to emphasise that despite the pro-Soviet activities of a few such
as Alger Hiss, and the perhaps 'excessive, for American standards, left-wing impulses of very
many liberals such as former Vice-President Henry Wallace, progressivism from the late
1940s up to the 1960s had, contrary to hard core denunciations, remained firmly within the
vigorous anti-communist consenstis. However, virtually all neoconservatives reacted against
the subsequent Vietnam-induced New Left critique of American society, and in this they
found themselves in full alignment with the National Review conservatives. After the Tet
offensive of 1968, individuals like Podhoretz and Kristol freely admitted (as, at least
privately, did men such as James Burnham and William Rusher), that the war in South East
Asia 'didn't work', had been a terrible mistake, and was quite possibly irremediably lost. Yet
they flatly refused to admit that, as the counterculture claimed, the horrors of Vietnam were a
67 Interview with Howard Phillips; Seltzer, Neocon Reader, pp. 22-23; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium:
Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 38-39.
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symptom of the nation's moral bankruptcy." It was post-McGovern Democrats,
neoconservatives argued (and Buckleyites agreed with them), who were reproducing the
behaviour of the fellow travellers of yore, reverting to isolationism as a consequence of their
lack of faith in American (or Western) civilisation. As Norman Podhoretz asserted,
neoconservatives were not in favour of the war, but' against the movement against the war'. 69
Much as anticommunism was the hard core's proxy for attacking liberalism, the matter
agitating these intellectuals was actually 'not the Soviet Union' or any other foreign
adversary, but 'the United States' itself, or rather the forces of the left operating within the
nation." That is, echoing Whittaker Chambers' remarks about the 'jagged fissure' opening
between the liberal establishment and the rest of the nation a generation earlier,
neoconservatives bemoaned both the New Left and the inability of the liberal establishment
in general to vigorously defend itself. As had happened with Hiss and McCarthy, according
to the neocons the liberal intelligentsia had again proved itself unable to provide an adequate
moral framework to legitimate what Kristol called the 'capitalist-bourgeois' American
system." Thus, Kristol, Podhoretz and all the other neoconservatives had reached a
conclusion similar to that of Buckley, Willmoore Kendall and the rest of the hard core in the
aftermath of McCarthyism: notwithstanding the threat presented by Communism and the
New Left, the real issue and the real problem was the liberal consensus itself. Liberal
ideological tolerance and liberalism's implicit readiness to engage with the ideological
premises of it adversaries represented, for conservatives new and old, a fatal built-in
weakness viz-a-vis Communism in the 1950s and the New Left in the 1960s. William F.
Buckley was perhaps clearest among the National Review conservatives when, in 1962, he
wrote that 'the profound question at issue is whether the open society can tolerate an
unassimilable political minority if it is in league with great and powerful foreign forces,.72
68 See for instance, Nathan Glazer, 'Vietnam, the Case for Immediate Withdrawal', Commentary, May 1971;
Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, pp. 186--87, 190.
69 Interview with Norman Podhoretz.
70 Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, p. 190.
71 Kristol, Neoconservatism, pp. 106-108; Podhoretz, My Love Affair, pp.118-24.
72 William F. Buckley, 'A New Look at a Controversial Committee', NR, January 16, 1962, p. 21.
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Buckley was referring to 'communists-at-large', but his critique was directed principally
towards 'woolly headed' or 'starry eyed' liberals. As the 1960s moved on, the statement
might have referred to Black Power or student violence, but the actual object of derision
would still have been mainstream liberals and their tolerance of dissent.
Increasingly, neoconservatives came to ask similar questions. According to both
Buckleyites and neoconservatives, liberal toleration of dissent led towards increasing
acceptance of left-wing arguments, whether of a Soviet or Stokeley Carmichael variety, and a
consequent deterioration of the nation's moral fibre. By the late 1960s, Norman Podhoretz
was reproducing almost verbatim the same views that Willmoore Kendall, James Burnham
and the other National Review editors had been hammering out for some 30 years when he
declared that 'even if we were safe from Soviet military domination, we would be extremely
vulnerable to the pull of their political culture ... ' According to Podhoretz, there were signs
that this was already taking place, 'the main one being a new tendency to dismiss liberty ... as
unimportant in comparison with rival values like equality and community.' 73 In 1967 Irving
Kristol was also clear to point out who, exactly, was to blame for such a state of affairs.
\
Echoing National Review's attacks on the intellectual community who opposed, for instance,
the candidacy of Barry Goldwater (including a number of later-to-be neoconservatives),
Kristol noted that it was 'among the intellectuals' that 'extreme dissatisfaction, sometimes
extremist dissatisfaction, is rife'. As the Buckleyites had tirelessly remarked since the days of
Whittaker Chambers, Kristol also believed that the repudiation of American values 'affects
only a minority', but was 'nevertheless a most serious matter'. 74 This massive traison des
clercs had the obvious and straightforward effect of 'enfeebling the determination of our
statesmen and undermining our policies', as for instance would happen with the Vietnam
War, a war that, for Kristol, the general public had, unlike the educated elites, 'borne with
greater patience than might have been expected' .75 In 1962, long before Kent State, William
73 Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, p. 348.
74 Kristol, Neoconservatism, p.86.
75 Ibid" p. 86. .
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F. Buckley had bluntly denounced the 'criminal delinquency of the intellectuals' and 'the
academic profession, which has failed to put its enormous intellectual resources to work on
the problem of how to craft sensitive answers' to radical dissent. As 1968 approached,
neoconservative restlessness increasingly lent ideological weight to the most powerful right-
wing populist arguments since McCarthy. It is not strange that Richard Nixon's sensitive
political antennae would pick up on the growing electoral pull of juxtaposing what one could
call the 'silent majority' against the intellectuals, journalists and academics blasted by the
right.
However, for all the similarities between neoconservatism and the stance of the
National Review conservatives, there remained a number of distinctive characteristics that set
the former apart from the hard core. As happened with all right-wing subfamilies,
neoconservatism and Buckleyite conservatism were as much a matter of personal affectio~
and social networks as they were of ideology. It is not surprising, then, that the main crisis
between neoconservatives and their National Review counterparts was triggered by the race
between incumbent New York senator James Buckley (brother of William F. Buckley) and
,
neoconservative champion Daniel Patrick Moynihan - a scenario almost impossible to
imagine between say Goldwater and Reagan, or Scoop Jackson and Moynihan.i" Similarly
Frank Meyer once famously stormed out of Philadelphia Society paper being delivered by
Kristol while shouting 'you are nothing but a Tory socialist', again a scenario difficult to
imagine, at least in public, between Meyer and his less libertarian-minded National Review
editors.f On ideologically substantive terms, perhaps the most important difference was the
neocons' remarkable ability to produce specific policy ideas: the first publication clearly
identifiable as neoconservative, Kristol's The Public Interest, was exclusively devoted to the
analysis and proposal of domestic. policy initiatives. Its pages gathered the work of men such
as politician Moynihan, sociologist Nathan Glazer and public-policy-wonk-cum-scholar
76 Interview with Norman Podhoretz; Interview with William F. Buckley.
77 Interview with Norman Podhoretz; Interview with William F. Buckley.
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James Q. Wilson. The personal trajectories of Moynihan and Wilson are both good examples
of technocratic neoconservatism. Both men had left academic life to work within Johnson's
Great Society, Wilson in crime prevention and Moynihan in race-related issues and the fight
against poverty; both suffered a similar disenchantment with the apparent lack of
improvements and the violent fashion in which the poor, and particularly blacks, seemed to
be venting their frustration (Moynihan's own home was attacked by radicals); and both
wound up working for Richard Nixon, espousing proposals highly critical of liberal 'softness'
towards delinquency and favouring a greater emphasis on 'individual responsibility' and
'self-reliance"." The path followed by these two men also reflects quite nicely
neoconservatives' taste for proximity to power, and the crucial part played by the decade
between 1963 and 1973.
Their experiences as managers of the Great Society also drove these men toward the
basic conclusions that would distinguish neoconservatives from liberal-progressives, classical
liberals and the Buckleyites. At first, by the late 1960's neoconservatives, like the hard core,
had adopted certain theses developed by neoclassical liberals such as Milton Friedman,
Friedrich von Hayek and Henry Hazlitt. Thus, they accepted that state action could not solve
all problems, and that in some 'cases public policy actually worsened the situation, but unlike
the neoliberals, neoconservatives always remained stubborn supporters of the New Deal
(which they opposed to the excesses of the Great Society), and they continued to grant a
relatively large role to the state in' assisting the needy." Race relations were a case in point
during the late 1960's. During his years within the Johnson administration, Moynihan had
used Labor Department statistics to demonstrate that one of the main obstacles to the
emergence of a black middle-class was, of all things, government assistance to mono-parental
78 Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentlemanfrom New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Biography (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 2000), pp. 123-26, 150-51; James Q. Wilson, 'Crime and the Liberal Audience', Commentary, January 1970,
~p. 71-78. .,
9Interview with Norman Podhoretz; Stelzer, Neocon Reader, p. 19. One of the most recent examples has been the
confrontation between the neoconservative-leaning 'compassionate conservatism' adopted by the Bush Jr.
administration and neoliberalism, illustrated in the political memoir of George W. Bush staffer Michael Gerson,
Heroic Conservatism: Why Republicans Need to Embrace America's Ideals (And Why They Deserve to Fail If They
Don't) (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
292
families. According to Moynihan, financial subsidies to single mothers had the 'unintended
effect' of stimulating the break up of the family unit, because they favoured the 'expulsion of
the man' .80 Hence a measure designed to provide short-term support for the poor actually
contributed to the creation of long-term damage by trapping poor blacks in a cycle of broken
families.
A second 'unexpected effect' was the emergence of a 'new class' made up of the
bureaucrats necessary to design and manage government policy. According to the
neoconservative critique, indistinguishable from the views expressed by Friedman in his
Capitalism and Freedom, this new bureaucracy, however well-meaning, would soon become
more concerned with protecting its own interests than those of its protegees. Not only that:
like the Buckleyites before them, neoconservatives were also quick to note that civil servants
working for the welfare state were mostly white and middle class graduates from the same
universities." It was no accident, neoconservatives claimed, that the main bastions of social
democracy were also the places that produced the personnel that manned the large
bureaucracies that the welfare state produced and needed. As Kristol argued, the American
working class was actually 'far less consumed with egalitarian bitterness or envy than are
college professors or affluent' journalists' .82 Along similar lines thinker Seymour Martin
Lipset also emphasised how the 'ideological slope' of American academia was consistently
toward radicalism, to a point where college professors were 'well to the left' of even 'the
main body of college graduates'. 83 If race and poverty were the issues of the day,
neoconservatives applied the same analysis to virtually every aspect of the welfare state, from
health care to crime and the environment, and have ever since insisted on the need to channel
public funds through 'private, group, voluntary and non state' organisations, which they
80 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case For National Action (Washington DC: Office of Policy
Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor, 1965).
81 Kristol, Neoconservatism, pp. 45-48; see also Nathan Glazer, 'The Limits of Social Policy', Commentary,
September 1971.
82 Kristol, Neoconservatism, p. 173
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believe are closer to the actual beneficiary and therefore more efficient and less prone to
generate negative unintended effects.84
It is however important to emphasise that neoconservative hostility towards the negative
aspects of the Great Society never quite provoked a conversion to hard core conservatism.
National Review conservatives such as writers Russell Kirk and James Burnham abhorred
'modernity' to the point of denouncing the emergence of sociology (Kirk also thought the
radio and the electric light bulb suspect contraptions), and instead hankered after an idealised
image of a rural, pre-modem past. Neoconservatives however, far from attacking the social
sciences or technological advances per se, were professionally engaged in 'public service'
sciences and had a more guarded take on scientific progress.f Furthermore, neoconservatives
always, and with some grounds, blamed the relatively narrow appeal of Buckleyite
conservatism on its 'aristocratic' and 'foreign' to the American tradition (more specifically as
too 'British' or 'European') tendencies. They therefore self-consciously aimed at generating
arguments more closely attuned to the American public: instead of looking back to an
idealised Middle Age, neoconservatives defended a revival of the considerably more familiar
1950' s, a decade described in Commentary as 'an oasis of stability and rationality in Western
affairs'i'" Similarly, unlike libertarians and neoclassical liberals, neoconservatives never
seriously contemplated the 'minimal state' nor disputed the need for public assistance as
such. In fact, neoconservatives proposed a relatively paternalistic and authoritarian state
ready to provide the needy with assistance and willing to actively protect certain traditional
values. As Kristol expressed it in one of his famous dictums, they were only willing to
proclaim 'two cheers' for capitalism" In more pragmatic terms, neoconservatives also
recognised very early on, and were willing to state publicly, that any proposal to dismantle
84 An early example of the neoconservative stand on domestic policy matters may be found in Nathan Glazer,
'Paradoxes of American Poverty', ibid" fall 1965, pp. 71-82, here p. 82; see also Irving Kristol, Two Cheersfor
Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 30.
85 Leon R. Kass, 'Making Babies - The New Technology and the "Old" Morality', PI, winter 1972, pp. 18-27; for a
biographical sketch of Russell Kirk, see Garry Wills, Confessionss of a Conservative (New Garden City NY:
Doubleday, 1979), pp 46-48; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, pp. 176-83.
86 John Mander, 'In Defence of the 50s', Commentary, September 1969, pp. 63-68, here p. 64; Interview with Norman
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the welfare state was tantamount to political suicide. And politicians, they knew, were vital to
the exercise of power and influence.88 Thus, in response to the collapse of Keynesian
economics neoconservatives did not offer the recipes of monetarism and across-the-board
contraction of domestic state action sponsored by most neoliberal economists.f" They instead
sought to reconstruct the liberal welfare state according to an alternative conservative-leaning
philosophical framework.
3. NIXON'S MEN
Despite their differing evolution, neoconservatives and neoliberals gravitated towards
the Nixon presidential bandwagon at around the same time, and in a somewhat similar
fashion: relatively late in the campaign and in a technocratic capacity. Unlike Southern
Republican conservatives and those Buckleyites who had been with Nixon since 1966, the
neoconservative alignment with the candidate began considerably later, and was altogether
divorced from direct political campaigning. Nevertheless, neoconservatives and neoliberals
turned out to be the two driving forces behind the crucial domestic policy initiatives taken by
the Nixon White House. The' following pages are focused on two of them; the Family
Assistance Plan and the cluster of measures that surrounded the breaking of the gold window.
The earliest contact between' neoconservatives and the Nixon campaign took place in
September 1967, when a speech by Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Americans for Democratic
Action captured the attention of Leonard Garment, a liberal-leaning Nixon campaign staffer
and workmate in the Wall Street law firm that had been the candidate's lair since 1963.
Garment in tum passed the speech on to Richard Whalen (a National Review-type
conservative), and both took it to it to Nixon himself." At around the same time, two other
88 Kristol, Neoconservatism, pp. 212, 282; Interview with Norman Podhoretz.
89 Interview with Jude Wanniski August 14-15,2005, email; Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making of
Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1994), pp. 237-49.
90 Hodgson, Gentlemanfrom New York, pp. 141-42; Leonard Garment, Crazy Rhythm: My Journey/rom Brooklyn,
Jazz and Wall Streetto Nixon's White House, Watergate and Beyond ... (New York: Times Books, 1997), pp. 123-24;
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Nixon aides - Raymond Price and Martin Anderson - were also recommending Moynihan."
Nixon on his part claimed that he had by then read 'several' of Moynihan's articles, and that
he thought his thinking 'refreshing and stimulatingY Nixon's claim is plausible. Moynihan
had first jumped to public prominence early in 1965 when, while working as assistant
secretary of labor for the Johnson administration, fragments of what was later known as the
'Moynihan Report' 0 which pinpointed enhanced assistance to mono-parental families as a
structural malfunction in welfare provision that encouraged male family abandonment.
According to Moynihan's neoconservative viewpoint, federal policy was therefore actually
detrimental to the stability of black families and hence to the achievement of black socio-
economic equality.
Although Moynihan still remained an advocate of the Great Society, civil rights
activists and most of his fellow liberals interpreted the report as 'blaming the victim' while,
to Moynihan's own astonishment, National Review was about the only opinion journal
openly supporting his conclusions.f The ADA speech that caught the attention of the Nixon
men was another manifestation of Moynihan's slow evolution towards the right, and was
welcomed by William F. Buckley as a 'Magna Carta for liberals' .94 Like virtually all
neoconservatives at the time, 'Moynihan still broadly supported public assistance for the
needy, but he also fully concurred with certain National Review mores. The nation was,
according to Moynihan, exhibiting 'the qualities of an individual going through a nervous
breakdown', and he proceeded 'to explain such a deplorable fact by developing on
conservative themes such as bureaucratic inefficiency, disaffected educated classes and rising
expectations that men such as Buckley or Friedman had been repeating for a generation.f
Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag. A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972),
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Most importantly, Moynihan concluded that liberalism's main interest lay in 'the stability of
the social order', and he therefore advocated 'a much more effective alliance with political
conservatives'i'" Never one to miss an opportunity to hurt his Democratic adversaries,
Nixon's reaction to the speech was not dissimilar from that of his right-wing Buckleyite
supporters: he happily obliged. Throughout the rest of the campaign Moynihan maintained a
regular stream of written advice to the candidate.
Less flamboyant neoconservative and classical liberal characters also found their way
into the Nixon camp through the campaign's efforts to enlist academic and intellectual
support headed by Alan Greenspan. Greenspan was the campaign's domestic policy
coordinator charged with organising around a dozen task forces meant 'to focus sharply on
legislative and executive actions of 1969', and deal with a range of issues that went from the
'budget' to 'education' through 'international economic policy' and 'manpower policy'. Two
patterns that later continued emerged from the reports produced by these committees."
Firstly, the campaign held a sincere but limited commitment to pluralism: hence 'support of
the Republican Party or of Mr. Nixon' was 'not to be a requirement' for members of the task
forces.98 In practice, the effort translated into a roster which included virtually all the sub-
families of the conservative community. After Nixon's victory in the Republican National
Convention, a number of men who Raymond Price still called 'new liberals' and would later
be re-labelled 'neoconservatives' such as Irving Kristol and James Q. Wilson found their way
into the various task forces and advisory committees organised by Nixon's men, and others
such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Ben Wattenberg joined up, even if informally, later on.99
The task forces also included a fair share of classical liberal economists such as Greenspan
himself- a close friend and disciple of no less than Ayn Rand - as well as Mont Pelerin
Society founding members Fritz Matchlup, George Stigler and Karl Brandt.loo Given the
96 Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, p. 37'-
97 ....
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genuine variety of opinion, squabbles inevitably broke out. At this early stage the most telling
difference was not however between men belonging to different philosophical families -
although a ferocious struggle between Moynihan's 'new liberals' and the administration's
classical liberal economists would ignite as soon as Nixon took office - but within the
neoliberals, who engaged in a two-front debate that turned out to have determinant effects
upon the future of the administration.
First, the report of the Commission for Economic Policy revealed a rift between the
majority opinion defended by those economists, led by Milton Friedman, who advocated the
United States' unilateral withdrawal from the Bretton Woods international monetary system-
specifically, a suspension of the commitment to sell gold at the price of $35 an ounce while
removing 'all restrictions on the use of dollars to buy foreign goods or currencies' - and a
minority led by Nixon's old friend and Friedman mentor Arthur Bums, who advocated
working within the existing system.l'" Nixon at this early stage remained non-committal, but
leaned towards a progressive liberalisation of capital flows that went right against the spirit
and practice of Bretton Woods. Most importantly, the economic language employed by the
candidate took on a distinctly Friedmanesque rhetorical style, with frequent reference to the
need for 're-establishing the integrity of our fiscal and monetary policies', and a promises to
end 'self defeating controls' on economic (and monetary) activities.l'f The second matter of
early disputation among classical liberals was Friedman's vigorous advocacy of an overhaul
of Great Society welfare programmes, and their substitution by a negative income tax which,
in short, would replace most welfare provisions with direct cash transfers to the pOOr.I03
Friedman's negative income tax was first discussed when Friedman who, together with
another six economists led by Arthur Bums had accepted membership of Nixon's advisory
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group, delivered a paper with his proposal. Unlike the task forces, the advisory group enjoyed
more direct access to the candidate and was meant to provide advice 'primarily based on
political considerations' .104 On May 19 1968, the group met in the New York Metropolitan
Club and Friedman developed upon his welfare plans. lOS Martin Anderson, a fellow classical
liberal economist thought the idea, in a foretaste of things to come, tantamount to 'giving
money gratis from someone else who has earned it to a person who hasn't been doing a
damned thing'. Arthur Bums was more specifically horrified by the prospect of 'hippies' who
'get their support from their middle class-families' being instead 'supported by Uncle
Sam' .106 Peter Flanigan, who was present at the meeting in his capacity as Nixon's deputy
campaign manager, and hence as 'political' representative, saw things differently: he was
'fascinated' by the proposal.l'"
As Nixon took office he became quite fascinated himself, although this time the idea
was not proposed by Friedman, who remained outside the administration, but by Moynihan.
As the campaign went on, Moynihan's ADA speech had continued to propel its author
towards Republican circles. Like Friedman, Moynihan became an informal Nixon advisor
and was recruited by Representative Melvin Laird - Nixon's future secretary of defence - to
contribute a chapter to an edited book exploring the GOP's main philosophical tenets, which
also included a chapter by Friedman on the Negative Income Tax as an alternative to the
constellation of Great Society programmes.i'" Moynihan took the proposals to his
neoconservative friends around the Public Interest, who in tum reacted with enthusiasm.
Friedman's realistic expectations about the plan's potential effects did not extend to a
Johnson-like eradication of poverty, but a reduction in hardship to a level 'at which it can
best be taken care of by private charitable agreements', while the curtailing of inefficient
104 Peter Flanigan to Milton Friedman, May 9, 1968, MF papers (uncatalogued); Nixon for President Committee Press
Release, May 2,3, 1968, ibid.; Flanigan to friedman, July 31, 1968, ibid. The other members of the group were Pierre
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bureaucracies was bound to appeal to likes of Irving Krisol.I09 Unlike Friedman, Moynihan
eventually became a fully-fledged and rather prominent member of the administration. In
January 1969 Nixon appointed him head of the newly-created Urban Affairs Council from
which position he would be able, the president led him to believe, to reshape the collapsing
Great Society welfare system. What Nixon neglected to mention was the creation of another
new position, that of counsellor to the president, to which he appointed Arthur Bums with the
specific aim of balancing Moynihan's 'liberalism' with a conservative economist's input.'!"
As happened in the task forces during the campaign, Nixon seems to have genuinely
desired the exposition of contending ideas - hence the Bums-Moynihan balance.
Unfortunately for the president, the actual result proved to be no-end of squabbles between
two men coming, according to an insider, 'from irreconcilably opposed positions' .111 The
story of the Bums-Moynihan policy warfare is amply documented and well-known.Y
Moynihan appears to have taken up Friedman's original Negative Income Tax plan in
collaboration with Robert Finch - a liberal-leaning California Republican and old Nixon
associate then about to start a thoroughly miserable stint as secretary of housing, education
and welfare. Bums, for his part, was meant to occupy his special counsellor position only as a
temporary placement until his' appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Given the
determination of sitting chairman William McChesney Martin to see through his term, that
opening kept being delayed. Moynihan continued to press upon the president a plan that
Bums had been dead-set against during the campaign, with a resultant turf-war between these
two experienced Washington operatives soon unfolding. To the irritation of White House
Chief-of-Staff Bob Haldeman, Nixon's informal domestic policy supremo John Ehrlichman
and, eventually, the president himself, between Nixon's swearing in in January 1969 and
Easter of that same year, both Moynihan and Bums developed parallel staffs and engaged in a
109MiltonFriedman to Arthur Seldon, January 7, f. American Correspondence, box 330, Institute of Economic Affairs
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turf war of manoeuvres and counter-maneouvres to compete for presidential attention and
block one another's moves.ll3 The situation degenerated to a degree that, when black radicals
threatened to bum Moynihan's house down after yet another incendiary leak - this time
recommending a period of 'benign neglect' on civil rights matters - his wife believed the leak
to have originated within Bums's staffl14
Yet arson aside, by mid-1969 Moynihan seemed to have carried the day over Bums
when, at a meeting in San Clemente, the president decided to override most of the latter's
objections and adopt Moynihan's proposal- originally known as the Family Security System,
by then as the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) - with the addendum that it include a substantial
work requirement from the recipients. liS At a very basic level, Moynihan's success can and
should be explained as a consequence of the actors' characters and personalities. The
president proved to be bored and occasionally irritated by Bums' professorial, near-
condescending style.i!" Moynihan, au contraire, enjoyed one of those honeymoons that
Nixon periodically engaged in with certain members of his staff - the most prominent
example being the one with future Secretary of the Treasury John Connally - buttressed, this
time, by the charms of flamboyance, competence and, not least, willingness to administer
flattery where necessary. i 17
At deeper level, however, Moynihan satisfied a number of the president's political and
ideological needs, which were in tum also reflected in the grand pack of welfare financing
reforms dubbed 'new federalism' by speechwriter William Safire."8 According to
Moynihan's neoconservative viewpoint, the FAP would reduce the number of civil servants
113 William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House «Garden City NY: Doubleday,
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administering welfare provisions and, perhaps more importantly, their capacity to interfere
with the lives of the poor. Hence it would also diminish the damage to recipients' self-esteem
and the possibility of unintended negative effects. The FAP was therefore squarely based on
the type of classical liberal assumptions deeply ingrained in the president's own beliefs. Since
the plan aimed at replacing welfare services provided by the federal government and the
states with direct cash transfers, it was therefore designed to remove or at least to bypass red-
tape, while eliminating what was deemed by Nixon's men to be the ballooning and inefficient
welfare bureaucracy.l!" Of course, these were also the reasons that Milton Friedman had
proposed it in the first place and, ironically enough, why conservatives such as Martin
Anderson and Bums opposed it. For as the former explicitly acknowledged, an FAP-type
project was bound to be more efficient that the existing array of measures, but then again, the
Great Society's cumbersome inefficiency was, according to Anderson, the most powerful
obstacle in the way of further welfare cxpansion.F'' In other words, given its comparative
simplicity, the cost of FAP would be more difficult to keep under control in the face of the
predictable pressures for expansion likely to arise in the future. Friedman had already
acknowledged that this was a problem with his idea. Later on, Moynihan would toO.121
Derived from and complementarily to the preceding, from a political viewpoint FAP allowed
the president to present himself as a bold reformer, yet one anchored to firmly conservative
principles. This was perhaps the aspect of the program where Moynihan's and his
neoconservative circle's minds were closer to Nixon's heart. Once the programme
incorporated a work requirement from the recipients, Nixon could go to the electorate - and,
he hoped, the history books - and claim to have provided voters with enhanced public
services that still respected what Garry Wills perceptively described as the president's
'Horatio Alger ethics' .122Moynihan seems to have sensed and exploited Nixon's yearnings,
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and to have introduced the idea of Nixon as a new and all-American Disraeli, capable of re-
adjusting right-wing mores to a modem world.123
Unfortunately for Moynihan, the impulses of Richard Nixon's heart rarely interfered
with the dictates of his political brain. Nixon chose to override the concerns of his classical
liberal advisors regarding the cost of FAP; but as soon as the plan sank amidst sectarian
politicking in Congress, the president lost both interest and the will to invest political capital
in a costly battle which, by any measure, had descended into a farcical and politically
unproductive spectacle as soon as it had arrived to Capitol Hill. Legislative liberals thought
the FAP insufficiently generous and the work requirements too draconian; conservatives
reproduced Bums's and Anderson's objections. All saw the programme as an excellent
opportunity for pork-barrelling.V" Nixon eventually realised that his Disraelian daydreams
would not came to fruition in the face of both liberal and conservative opposition. He thus
chose to let the plan die a quiet death in the Senate, and Moynihan resigned in
consternation.v" Interestingly, however, in his own account of the FAP drama, the latter
exonerated Nixon's wavering behaviour from much of the responsibility for the plan's
ultimate failure, and went beyond blaming congressional sectarianism, torpor or lack of
foresight. He blamed, quite specifically, liberalism itself.126
In the case of the FAP, Arthur Bums and the administration's classical liberals lost an
internal battle which they went on to win, by accident, on the Hill. As 1971 approached, they
became entangled in yet another struggle, and one with certainly more lasting consequences,
among themselves. After January 1969, the economic performance of the nation had led
towards progressive increases in both inflation and unemployment. These twin enemies
threatened to destroy the president's electoral chances in 1972 just as, according to Nixon, the
economy had defeated him in his 1960 presidential race. The administration's way of
123 Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, p. 55.
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confronting economic troubles was identical to its strategy towards welfare provision on two
accounts. Firstly, it was dominated by a sense of 'lack of knowledge', as had been the case
with Moynihan and the neoconservatives, who by the second half of the 1960s were ready to
admit that they knew 'almost nothing' about the effects of government action. Economists, or
certainly the type of right-of-centre economist working for Richard Nixon, were about to
confront the uncomfortable fact that the economics of the 1970s were, as Nixon's CEA
chairman Paul McCracken put it, enveloped in 'a good deal of mystery' .127 Arthur Bums,
Nixon's chairman of the Fed was a bit more straightforward when, as the president moved to
destroy the international monetary system in 1971, he openly admitted that 'the rules of
economics are not working the way they used to' .128
Secondly, the FAP had been Nixon's attempt to maximise satisfaction across the
ideological spectrum through a right-of-centre inspired welfare reform. The programme
ultimately failed when the president realised that the proposal was actually achieving the
opposite effect of triggering maximum dissatisfaction from both liberals and conservatives.
Nixon's most important economic policy decision - the combined suspension of gold
convertibility and imposition of wage and price controls in the summer of 1971 - was yet
another attempt at a simi'lar strategy. Like FAP and Nixon's school desegregation policy, his
economics were not so much a succession of ideological zigs to the left and zags to the right,
but the implementation of both at the same time and in the same place.129 Moynihan's
Disraeli flattery was successful because, as Garry Wills correctly realised, it truly responded
to Nixon's genuine desire to re-structure liberal policies according to conservative mores and
principles. With the FAP, Nixon tried to improve welfare provisions - a liberal notion -
while reducing inefficiency and the weight of the welfare bureaucracy through increasing the
autonomy of the recipient - a most conservative set of objectives. Similarly, in the school
desegregation matter he tried to defuse the issue through a combination of right-wing rhetoric
127 Paul W. McCracken, 'Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker: A Review Article', Journal of Economic
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with a genuine push for desegregation, even if one generally handled according to the needs
of the Southern white community. In economics too, Nixon combined a drastic liberal-
progressive solution - wage and price controls - bound to horrify conservatives, with a
neoliberal-leaning decision - breaking the gold window - so radical that it was even firmly
opposed by some members of his own right-of-centre economic team. To compound it, after
the 1972 election Nixon also took pains to put the same neoliberal economists - such as
Milton Friedman's friend George Shultz and Shultz's protegee William Simon - who
happened to be dead-set against government intervention in the economic arena, in charge of
both planning the workings of the controls and heading the bureaucracy meant to implement
them.!30
Initially, the most significant of those two characteristics was lack of knowledge.
During the 1968 election, Nixon had surrounded himself with a relatively small coterie of
typical Republican economists who had gained executive experience during the Eisenhower
administration and who, bar a few exceptions such as the youngsters Alan Greenspan and
Martin Anderson, tended to continue to display the same broadly cautious conservatism that
had dominated the general's policies.!3! Being professional economists, these men - unlike
the general public - were aware of the financial stresses generated by the combination of a
large military presence overseas (the Vietnam War in particular) combined with expansive
domestic policies.!32 In 1968 federal profligacy had translated into inflation indexes in the
region of five per cent - thehighest since the Korean War, but far from critical and certainly
nothing that would lead one to imagine the then-unthinkable double digits of the 1970s. Most
importantly, relatively high inflation was matched, as conventional wisdom dictated it should
be, with record low-levels of unemployment running at just over three per cent of the
workforce.l "
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The main problem faced by Nixon as he took over the economic reins had been to fine
tune the economy, Keynesian style, in order to push inflation down by perhaps a percentile
and a half, while preventing unemployment from rising by more than a percentile. Moreover,
coinciding with Moynihan and the neoconservatives, Nixon's economists believed the
president could actually finish off the expensive quagmire in South East Asia. The resulting
'peace dividend' could therefore by used to finance neoconservative welfare experiments
such as the FAP or for relieving, as neoliberals argued, a main source of pressure on both the
price index and the federal budget - other considerations such as what to do with former
servicemen joining the ranks of job-seekers were then put aside.134 The debate within the
White House during the first half of 1969 was whether the expected mild recession necessary
to cool-off the economy would last long enough to hurt Republican politicians in the 1970
mid-terms. However, unfortunately for Nixon and his advisors, the known tools for economic
management and forecasting had by then become outmoded. The financial savings of the
slow disengagement from Vietnam presided over by Nixon and Kissinger were swallowed -
became 'evanescent' according to a horrified Moynihan - by larger increases in welfare
entitlements than had been calculated.l " Inflation on its part kept creeping up at a pace with
unemployment and economic stagnation. Since inflation and stagnation were supposed to
cancel each other out, they were not meant to occur at the same time.136Hence McCracken's
'mysteries' .
Yet, in early 1969 the broadly optimistic White House consensus leaned towards
believing that inflation could be tamed without triggering the feared hike in unemployment
levels, and the predictable collapse of political support for the president.F" Optimism was led
by no less than Milton Friedman, and supported by a recently resuscitated brand of economic
analysis: Monetarism. According to Friedman, fiscal prudence was certainly highly
134 Satire, Before the Fall, p.l16; Moynihan, Politics of a Guaranteed Income, pp. 79-80.
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advisable, but it was neither the root cause of inflation, nor the key to staving off rising
prices. In one of his famous sentences, he maintained that 'inflation was always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon' or, in other words, a problem caused by increases in
the supply of money substantially above the actual increase of goods and services being
produced and exchanged. According to this view, deficit spending was a deplorable habit that
helped the federal government to print and put into circulation more money than it should,
but the ultimate lever for controlling inflation (and deflation) was neither the White House
nor Congress but, as he took care to inform Nixon, the agency which governed the influx of
money into the banking system: the Federal Reserve.138
Once that assumption was accepted, the monetarist remedy seemed reasonably simple
enough: ensure that the Fed continue increasing the money supply by the correct fixed
amount and all should be well. Since that rate was inferior to those of the Johnson-Kennedy
years, the first effect of a mild withdrawal of available liquid would inevitably be an equally
-
mild recession, followed by a stabilisation of inflation rates, followed by economic recovery.
Unemployment ought also to follow a similar pattern. During the first phase it should have
increased above desirable rates, followed by a drop and then stabilisation around what
Friedman called its 'natural rate', or in other words, the rate of unemployment triggered by
normal market malfunctions, such as lack of information on the part of job seekers, or simple
plain facts of life such as the unwillingness or inability of some people to get a job - which
White House economists mistakenly put as only slightly above the abnormally low
unemployment rate of 1968.139 Given the growing prestige of Friedman's scholarly work, it
was perhaps not surprising that Nixon's men, who also happened to be Friedman's mentors,
sympathisers or protegees, were willing to go along with Monetarism. Since Nixon's instincts
were naturally receptive to Friedman's classical liberal views and Nixon's personal interests
were about as far removed from economics as they possibly could be, the president went
along with his advisors' counsel.l''" Of course, this is not to say that the administration
138 Hoover, Conservative Capitalism, pp. 24-26; Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 248.
139 Stein, Presidential Economics, pp. 142-43, 149-54; Matusow, Nixon's Economy, pp. 57-78.
140 Ambrose, Triumph. of a Politician, p. 431.
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implemented a revolution in financial policy-making. Not quite. As McCracken famously put
it, the administration had not become 'Friedmanite', it was instead 'Friedmanesque'. In other
words, Monetarism did not replace the accepted rules of combating inflation through fiscal
constraint and public spending reductions: it was added to that conventional wisdom.l"'
In practical terms from early 1969 to 1971 the Nixon White House tried to implement a
policy variously known as 'gradualism' or 'steady as you go', which consisted of both
continuous monetary constraint and a balanced federal budget, with the hope that the remedy
would take effect with minimum damage to the political fortunes of the president. 142 The
main supporters of this approach within the White House were George Shultz, then secretary
of labor, and Friedman himself, who regularly visited and wrote to the president. 143 Other
members of Nixon's economic staff such as McCracken, Bums and even Herbert Stein (yet
another Mont Pelerin attendee-cum-CEA member) also went along with the plan, but with
thinly-disguised trepidation.!" The first problem for advocates of the 'Friedmanesque'
-
approach was their complete lack of control over the precise lever they needed to implement
'steady as you go', for the Fed was chaired by William McChesney Martin, a Truman
appointee whom Nixon blamed for, perhaps deliberately, causing the 1960 recession that the
president believed had caused his razor-thin defeat at the hands of Kennedy. By no means a
'reckless' Keynesian, the trouble with Martin was the opposite of what could be expected
from the caricature tax-and-spend Democrat of the conservatives' imagination. To Friedman
and Nixon's despair, the Fed reacted - or more accurately overreacted - to inflation by
reducing the outflow of money to zero. To make matters worse, Martin refused to resign his
chairmanship until the end of his tenure and the markets refused to believe that, as long as he
remained chairman, the Fed would actually follow through with the policy of monetary
tightness. Expecting an ease, market actors continued to maintain the rate of borrowing,
141 W" K 0lC er, ne of Us, pp. 548-49; Matusow, Nixon's Economy, p. 12.
142 George Shultz Address to the Economic Club of Chicago, 'Prescription for Economic Policy: Steady As You Go',
April 22, 1971, f. 15, box 33, MF papers; Satire, Before the Fall, p. 512.
14 Mason, Quest for a New Majority, p. 122.
144 Stein, Presidential Economics, pp. 133-35, 139-40; List of Invitees for the incoming gathering of the Mont Pelerin
Society, f. 7, box 86, MF papers.
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spending and price increases, leading Friedman to fear a sudden shock and a more severe
recession than was necessary once the full effects of liquid starvation were actually felt in the
marketplace.i"
In February 1970, Martin finally relinquished his post, but a new problem subsequently
emerged. Nixon's new chairman Arthur Bums, never too convinced of the effectiveness of
Monetarism, turned out to be only slightly more amenable to White House pressure and,
worse still, began to lean progressively towards alternative forms of action. During the
following year and half the chairman of the Fed lobbied, with increasing vigour, for the one
policy which was anathema to both classical liberalism and Richard Nixon: the imposition of
controls over prices and wages as a means of curtailing inflation.146 To his credit, the
president became 'very distressed' (enough to order the leaking of false, embarrassing stories
about Bums) and stubbornly resisted a policy that he genuinely did not believe in.147As the
effects of inflation began to be felt and the public joined the Fed in demanding executive
action congressional Democrats, in the full knowledge of Nixon's economic instincts and not
expecting a reversal, increased the pressure on the White House by granting special powers to
the president to impose wage and price controls. Nixon rightly saw the move that as 'a ploy'
designed to 'put the ball politically in my court,.148 By early 1971, Nixon faced in the
economic realm a problem similar to that which he had confronted regarding the Family
Assistance Plan. A comparatively bold and innovative policy with strong conservative
undertones was under attack from both the liberal left (in the form of congressional
Democrats) and the conservative right personified by no less than his own classical-liberal
chairman of the Federal Reserve - with the Council of Economic Advisors wavering, if at
least discreetly, in the same direction.149 As with the FAP, the ubiquitous Friedman seemed to
145 Milton Friedman to Richard Nixon, March 13, 1970, MF papers (uncatalogued); Matusow, Nixon's Economy, pp.
24-27.
146 Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, pp. 250-53,256; Satire, Before the Fall, p. 490.
147 • •Jonathan AItken, Charles W. Colson: A Life Redeemed (New York: Waterbook Press, 2005), pp. 222-23.
148 Nixon, RN, pp. 516-17.
149 Wicker, One of Us, p. 552; Satire, Before the Fall, p. 512.
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be about the only knowledgeable economic voice defending the White House during the early
months of 1971.
While Richard Nixon agonised over the twin troubles of inflation and nsmg
unemployment, the American economy suffered another sourced of distress from overseas.
According to the Bretton Woods system, the US dollar, and the willingness of the US
government to exchange dollars for gold on demand and at fixed price, was the anchor for all
other major international currencies. The arrangement had worked for 30 years of steady,
sometimes spectacular growth, to the extent that European governments had happily
accumulated large dollar reserves instead of gold. By 1971 however, international bankers
could see the problems of the US economy about as clearly as the president himself.
Furthermore, they also recognised that that a devaluation of the dollar was both a relatively
easy way of stimulating the export-oriented sectors of the American economy, and of
reducing the kinds of imports that threatened less competitive American companies such as
those textiles manufacturers situated in Strom Thurmond's South Carolina. ISO Of course, a
significant devaluation also implied a downwards adjustment of the dollar gold value, and
hence a potentially drastic reduction of the value of the national reserves of those countries
that had accumulated dollars in place of gold. Theoretically speaking the solution for national
bankers was easy enough: force the Fed to honour its Bretton Woods commitments and
exchange all those greenbacks for metal before devaluation. Except that the memories of the
1930s still endured. As a British scholar presciently put it, the entire Bretton Woods system
was supposed to be designed precisely to withstand crises like the one developing in early
1971. Faith in the dollar and international coordination between bankers was intended to
prevent a descent into the chaotic competitive devaluations that had worsened and extended
the 1929 crash. lSI
ISO Maurice H. Stans, One of The President's Men: Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Nixon (Washington DC:
Brassey's, 1995), pp. 152-54, 162-63.
IS I
Blyth, Great Transformations, pp. 127-29.
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However, as the summer of 1971 approached Richard Nixon came to see things
differently. Milton Friedman, again, offered the president a way out of the conundrums of
international finance. In pure libertarian fashion the Chicago economist advised a unilateral
suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold, an elimination of the myriad of controls
over international monetary exchanges that maintained its exchange rate, and a policy of
permitting the greenback's value to be established by market mechanisms. As with the FAP
and inflation, the reception of Friedman's advice within the White House was mixed. Nixon's
other economists, mirroring the views of most bankers and financiers elsewhere, objected in
principle to government controls and restrictions over monetary exchanges. Those with living
memories of the Great Depression such as Arthur Bums had, however, even stronger
objections to the vacuum that ending the Bretton Woods system would leave in international
finance. Yet, as the British government began to press for a 'guarantee' of American gold for
British-held dollars, Paul Volker, the treasury under-secretary who most strongly advised
closing the gold window, modified his previously cautious views. 'All my life I have
defended [fixed] exchange rates' he stated, but a jump into the unknown was what was
'needed,.,s2
And thus did Richard Nixon effectively kill the Bretton Woods international monetary
system. After an agonising, week-long series of meetings with senior economic staff, the
president announced to the nation a 'New Economic Policy', which consisted of the
suspension of gold convertibility and the imposition of price and wage controls to stave off
inflation. As with the Family Assistance Plan and school desegregation, Nixon opted for a
simultaneous move to the right and the left, but one cloaked in conservative populist rhetoric,
and accompanied with a pyrotechnical bang of presidential boldness. In his 'The Challenge of
Peace' address, he first established the administration's economic priorities, linking together
two unrelated issues: unemployment/inflation and the dollar exchange rate.1S3 Nixon called
152 Joseph B. Treaster, Paul Volker: The Making of a Financial Legend (Hoboken NJ: Wiley, 2004), pp. 43--44; Stein,
Presidential Economics, pp. 165-65; Safire, Before the Fall, p. 514, 518; Nixon, RN, pp. 518-19.
1>3 Richard Nixon, 'The Challenge of Peace', August 15, 1971, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/,?pid=3115, viewed July 31, 2010.
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congressional Democrats' bluff and emphasised how breaking the gold window and imposing
controls were the actions of a president who was' going to take action - not timidly, not half-
heartedly, not in piecemeal fashion'. Subsequently, in true Nixonian style, he located an
enemy arrayed against 'American workers': this time around the 'pinks' of yesteryear had
become 'international money speculators' and 'international money traders'. Nixon's
message was undoubtedly aimed towards the blue-collar and suburban middle-class voter that
he had identified as his constituent between 1968 and 1970, yet it should also be noted that,
since the bogeyman was both unnamed and 'international', the American worker employed
by Wall Street financial firms presumably belonged to the same category as, say, the average
New York hard-hat. Moreover, once the point was made, the president did not get carried
away and also took pains to exonerate the, also unnamed, 'responsible members of the
international banking community' .154
If rhetoric was finely tuned in order to avoid offending any member of the Nixonian
'new majority', policy was both aimed in the same direction and constituted a masterful
combination of Keynesian interventionism and classical liberal economics. On the Keynesian
front the administration created a brand new Cost of Living Council to monitor a 90-day
freeze on prices and wages, to which Nixon's men added a 10 % across the board surtax on
imports. Both were aimed, according to the president, to 'improve our balance of payments'
and 'increase jobs for Americans'. Neoliberal Nixon on his part, was also careful to create a
toothless council which was supposed to rely on 'voluntary cooperation' on the part of both
workers and employers. Indeed, it should be noticed that the main rationale for breaking the
gold window had been Paul Volker's scepticism about the chances of international bankers
voluntarily cooperating; thus Nixon seemed to think George Meany more likely to self-
sacrifice on behalf of American business profits than would international government
economists on behalf of one another. ISS The surtax, the president emphasised, was
'temporary' because 'to put the strong, vigorous American economy into a permanent
154 Ibid.
155 Treaster, Volker, p. 44.
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straitjacket' would 'stifle the expansion of our free enterprise'. The very breaking of the gold
window had of course long been a Friedman goal.I56 Nixon's Keynesianism not only
remained sceptical and un-committed, but was also accompanied by further tax cuts, as well
as a 4.7 billion reduction in federal spending, which included a five per cent cutback in
government personnel and the official postponement of the administration's welfare reforms,
including the FAP. Nixon may have declared himself a Keynesian and may have been forced
to adopt the ultimate Keynesian tool for economic management, but still he was determined,
like all classical liberals, to 'welcome competition,' to 'nurture and stimulate competitive
spirit' in economic affairs, and to slash welfare spending.l "
In policy-making terms, Nixon's strategy was, as he well knew, bound to fail over the
mid-term, even though nobody could have predicted the hyperinflation of the early 1970s. As
ever, Nixon's objective was neither located in the realm of policy-making, and nor did it
extend much beyond election night, November 1972. And as far as electoral politicking went,
this time the combination of conservative-leaning, tepid Keynesianism with vigorous
neoliberal and populist rhetoric worked wonders. At first, even controls seemed to function,
and the White House engaged in an unpublicised expansion of public spending that helped to
keep unemployment from skyrocketing.J" The neoliberals led by Friedman had always
maintained that moderation in price increases was the predictable result of previous
monetarist policies, and vigorously deplored the existence of controls (which Friedman
considered to be useless), but they were forced to celebrate the end of the Bretton Woods,
hence blunting criticism to a point where Friedman was even willing to defend Nixon's
financial intentions to his influential overseas friends. 159 The Buckleyites on their part were at
first equally stunned. Predictably, the controls included in the NEP (correctly dubbed by
National Review as Nixon's 'New Electoral Policy') eventually triggered as much irritation
156 Milton Friedman to Bryce Harlow, December 5, 1968, MF papers (uncatalogued); Friedman to Maurice Stans,
March '3, 1969, f. 29, box 33, MF papers; Stans to Friedman, March 7, 1969, ibid.
157 N' hixon, 'T e Challenge of Peace'.
158 Matusow, Nixon's Economy, pp. 184-86, 198.
159 Milton Friedman to Alan Greenspan, October 2 1972, MF papers (uncatalogued); Friedman to Greenspan, October
12, 1972, ibid.; Friedman to Sam Brittan, October 8, 1971, f. 33, box 21, MF papers; Friedman to George Shultz,
September 25, 1971, ibid.
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as the FAP and Detente, but in the end, as the president anticipated the shadow of Nixon's
Democratic rival forced them to come to terms.160 The New Economic Policy marked
therefore the high point of the kind of political funambulism around which Nixon had based
his entire first term in office, and indeed much of his political career. Between August 1971
and the presidential election, the economy gave the president a respite and, even if it could
not be used as an electoral badge of honour, the administration's economic team had at least
succeeded in neutralising the issue. For the following months Nixon's economists designed
three subsequent 'phases' which failed to facilitate a painless disengagement from price and
wage controls, but succeeded in consolidating support for the president on the part of the
unionised working voter then gravitating away from the Democratic party.
In the last instance, Richard Nixon's White House had become the bully-pulpit from
which a new generation of policy-makers and right-wing technocrats first tried to change (if
not reverse) the course of domestic and international economic management in issues ranging
from welfare provision to fiscal and monetary measures. As conservatives of all stripes were
aware, Nixon himself was neither a brave politician nor their ideological champion.
Circumstances, however, together with the president's undeniably classical liberal-leaning
instincts and anti-bureaucratic phobias, provided neoconservatives and neoliberals with their
first opportunity to actually engage in substantial reform. Of course, monetarism was
abandoned, as was the Family Assistance Plan. Yet as Paul McCracken and Arthur Bums
openly admitted, and even' the ever-confident Friedman had to acknowledge, the troubles
faced by the administration were 'beyond' the economics profession's 'present capacity' .161
The failure of Nixon's monetarist economics was therefore as much due to the economists'
lack of knowledge - as happened with FAP and Moynihan - as to Nixon's lack of ideological
backbone. Even if Nixon had actually listened to Friedman's advice as he pretended to do,
between 1969 and 1971 even monetarists themselves could not agree on which definition of
'money' should be employed to measure the rate of supply.162Similarly, after announcing the
160 Sarah Katherine Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 95-101.
161 Milton Friedman to Richard Nixon December 21,1971, MF papers (uncatalogued).
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suspension of gold convertibility, Nixon's economists could not tell the president what to do
subsequently, or whether the suspension should be temporary or permanent - provoking a
nervous Friedman to warn Secretary Connally against being 'misled by the pressures of
foreign bankers' apparently bent on 'desperately keeping' their 'undue influence over our
policy' .163 Moreover, failure is not necessarily a bad thing for the committed ideologue. As
Ralph Harris, a close British friend of Friedman, 'rationalised' when Ted Heath replicated
Nixon's economic u-turn, 'our economic policy is so much on the wrong lines that only a
major crisis brings any prospect' of change. The events of 1971 were very much the ignition
of such a crisis in the United States.164 For after Nixon's fall, the blame for his
administration's economic troubles was not laid on monetarism, but on the failed experiment
with wage and price controls - hence, Friedman's continuing advisory role with President
Ford.165During the presidency of Richard Nixon, the age of Keynesian 'new economics' was
indeed drawing to a close, and with its end came the dawn of a new, neoliberal-Ieaning
consensus in policy-making.
Richard Nixon's role in that transformation was not merely reactive. As the acid of
Watergate slowly dissolved the administration, classical liberals and neoconservatives went
through the same catharsis as all other members of the conservative community. Arthur
Shenfield, yet another British acquaintance of Friedman, put it in particularly clear terms:
'How do you explain the character of our defenders against the disrupters of the left', he
pondered, 'first McCarthy and now the scoundrels of Watergate?'. Along with most
conservatives, Shenfield could not help wondering 'why are our good men confined to the
world of ideas and out of the world of action?,166 Right-wingers should be excused for
despairing of Richard Nixon's leadership, and of the shame his administration brought upon
the conservative community - shame that drove Daniel Patrick Moynihan to sorrowfully
admit that neoconservatives had been 'willing to be used' by Nixon in exchange for access to
::: Milton Friedman to John Connally, September 30, 1971, f. 15, box 33, MF papers.
165 R~lph Ha:ris to Milton Friedman, January 31, 1974, f. 2, box 87, MF papers.
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executive power.i'" Yet even if at the time it was difficult to discern, the actions of his
administration were as decisive as circumstances in the shift to the right in policy-making
initiated under Nixon's watch. As campaign memoranda show, Nixon's men began to plan a
move towards significantly more conservative forms of government action than had been the
norm during the post-1933 era. And they did so before knowing the full extent and depth of
the crisis they faced. The disappearance of the 'peace dividend', the persistence of inflation
and the sharp increase of unemployment were, quite simply, entirely unanticipated in 1968
and 1969. A few classical liberals, like Friedman and Hayek, as well as Buckleyites Henry
Hazzlit and Roger Freeman, had been fretting about inflation and government inefficiency for
the entire post-war period. As the Goldwater campaign had painfully showed them, these
men were both perceived as right-wing Cassandras and rejected for their pains. After 1968,
thanks to Richard Nixon, they had the opportunity to re-enter the political and policy-making
battlefield. After 1973, regardless of Watergate, no serious political actor could dismiss their
claim to national leadership.
CONCLUSION
With regards to the inner workings of the conservative movement, neoconservatives
and neoliberals emerged from the Nixon years both fortified and better equipped to operate
independently from the Buckleyites. Although a number of neoconservatives (including
future New York democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan) still tried to remain within the
post-McGovern Democratic party and rallied around senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson and the
Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the failure of the CDM ultimately propelled most of
them into the arms of the GOP and the conservative movement.i'" In organisational terms
both neoconservatives and neoliberals found refuge throughout the 1970s and early 1980s in
the American Enterprise Institute, a small think tank in 1968 that had become, thanks in part
167 Hodgson, Gentlemanfrom New York, p. 186.
168 Halper, America Alone, p. 55; Ehrman, Rise of Neoconservatism, pp. 57-59; Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were
Right, pp. 114--43.
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to the efforts of the Nixon administration, the main locus of right-wing policy-making. It was
in the AEI that both neoliberals and neoconservatives gained a platform that was entirely
independent from and more powerful than National Review. Moreover, as economic
problems began to seriously hurt the interests of the business community, neoliberal and
neoconservative thought gained greater credence (and henceforth funding) from a previously
sceptical audience.l'" The AEI became a well-funded operation and a base from which
neoconservatives and neoliberals continued to influence and battle one other. In economic
terms, it was in the AEI that neoconservatives managed to generate an alternative form of
economic management which, although partially inspired in classical liberal thought, was
frontally opposed by virtually all classical liberal economists. The neocons adopted the
formula defended by Nixon's appointee and Shultz protegee, Arthur Laffer, and popularised
(thanks to a year-long AEI scholarship) by Jude Wanniski: supply-side economics.l/'' Free
from the constraints of actual professional econormcs, Kristol and his fellow
neoconservatives managed to produce an economic formula that allowed politicians to defend
a freer, more market-oriented economy without the politically inconvenient downsides -
deflation and unemployment - inherent in monetarism and fiscal prudence.l " Friedman
always remained 'skeptical' of supply-side 'calculations', and most his fellow classical
liberals opposed supply-side economics with about as much vigour as Arthur Bums and
Martin Anderson had opposed the FAP. 172
If neoconservatives managed to produce a brand new, politically palatable form of free-
market economics, they also became more closely attuned to the incoming culture wars than
the Buckleyites were. An article written by neoconservative Jeanne Kirkpatrick after the 1972
presidential campaign abstracted quite graphically the main moral tenets that guided
traditionalist-leaning conservatives of all stripes. According to Kirkpatrick, the 1960's had
unleashed a 'cultural revolution' which would ultimately come to a head in the 1972 clash
169 See Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, pp. 150-56, 163--64.
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between Richard Nixon, who was by then running under a conservative, or at least explicitly
anti-New Left banner, and George McGovern, who, according to Kirkpatrick, had captured
the Democratic nomination with an anti-war, New Left-leaning platform. McGovern was, in
Kirkpatrick's eyes, the 'candidate of the counterculture' and of the 'Triple A: Acid, Amnesty
and Abortion'. 173 The Democratic candidate certainly became the bite noire of an
increasingly restless group of still-Democratic stalwarts: if Richard Nixon's victory in 1968
marked the beginning of a consistent shift to the right in presidential politics, McGovern's
nomination in 1972 highlighted, at least according to neoconservatives, the corrosion of the
Democratic party which had begun with the maverick candidacy of Eugene McCarthy in
1968. According to Irving Kristol, McGovern's candidacy 'sent us a message that we were
now off the liberal spectrum'. 174
Kirkpatrick's' Acid' and' Abortion' represented the neoconservatives' hostility towards
what they saw as the rampant 'hedonism' of the 1960's, reflected in the expansion of the
recreational use of drugs such as marijuana and LSD. To neoconservatives, that hedonism
had its roots in the 'shallow, escapist' and 'simplistic' attitude of the 'new sensibility'
manifested during the decade by some of their fellow intellectuals.l f Still worse, according
to the neoconservatives the cultural zeitgeist of intellectuals' irresponsibility eventually
translated itself into a widespread challenge to any form of established authority, ranging
from basic norms of courtesy to the collapse of academic standards and repeated instances of
public disorders. As early as 1968, Nathan Glazer described student protesters as 'Iuddite
machine smashers' bent on a 'scorched earth' policy against the universities'. 176 Hedonism
was also closely related to the demise of 'Victorian values' which had resulted from the
'sexual liberation movement' - a phenomenon equally deplored by neoconservatives.Y' In
1972, when Kirkpatrick was writing, the Roe decision was yet to legalise abortion, but
neoconservatives were already convinced that the counterculture, aided by medical
173 Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 'The Revolt of the Masses', Commentary, February 1973, pp. 58-62.
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developments such as the pill, was in the process of destroying the norms that had
traditionally regulated family life and sexual practices. According to this view, 'free love',
and some radical forms of feminism, had posited the family as an oppressive institution
designed to repress individual freedom, in particular that of women and the young. Against
the traditional family, the counterculture offered alternative models which went from hippie
communes to, at least since the Stonewall Riots of 1969, a defence of gay family models.
Under the epigraph of 'abortion', Kirkpatrick gathered a vigorous defence of traditional
values regarding sex and the family, both of which were regarded by neoconservatives as the
roots of 'Western civilisation', and which would subsequently lead them to propose
increasingly drastic measures such a censorship of pornography and the return of women to
the 'true freedom' of the domestic sphere snatched from them by radical feminism.178
Free from the libertarian influences still present with the National Review camp,
neoconservatives moved to the right in cultural and sexual matters earlier and less
equivocally than the Buckleyites, while at the same time constructing a new form of free-
market economics that provided them with a way out of discredited Keynesianism without
falling on hard, politically unpopular Monetarism. They also acquired an operational base in
the American Enterprise Institute, which was added to their already influential Public Interest
and Commentary journals. As was the case with classical liberals and the New Right Young
Turks, they were after 1973 part and parcel of a new expanded conservative movement, a
movement ready to leave behind the past dominance of the National Review hard core and to
move on towards an assault on the political soul of the nation. And yet, peculiarly enough,
the most radical departure from the status quo ante Nixon - the breaking of the gold window
- had not been adopted as part of a strategy to liberalise the economy, but rather as a panicky
response to external pressures which was more influenced by Nixon's short-term political
interests than by his classical liberal advisors attachment to the free flow of money.
178 John Thompson, 'Pornography and Propaganda', Commentary, August 1969, pp. 54-58, here p. 58; Doubtlessly,
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Nevertheless, as with National Review's blasts against liberalism and the Southern
conservatives' post-1968 resistance to civil rights legislation, neither neoconservatives nor
neoliberals actually tried to overturn the existing consensus. Instead, as the experience with
the Family Assistance Plan clearly shows, most members of both conservative subfamilies
attempted to implement incremental reforms to bring the existing policy-making framework
closer to their ideal views.
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CONCLUSION
Henry Kissinger once famously wondered how great a man Richard Nixon would have
been if someone had 'shown him some love'.' Conservatives could have asked a similar
question regarding what would have happened had Nixon been possessed by the sort of self-
confident valour that normally marks the kind of political leader determined to implement
truly trans formative change. Given Nixon's unquestionable intellectual gifts and truly
remarkable skill for reading and anticipating the changes in the political wind, he could have
belonged, as he certainly aspired, to the same category as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ronald
Reagan and, after his own fashion, Lyndon B. Johnson. Instead Nixon, the arguments of
revisionist historians notwithstanding, occupies the position of the ultimate political
bogeyman in the collective American psyche.' For Richard 'I am not a crook' Nixon still
embodies today all that is wrong and can go wrong with politicians and in the modem
political system of the United States.
Yet for nearly three decades Nixon remained a fixture of national political life, and a
hero for the significant sector of the electorate which was never entirely comfortable with
New Deal economics and which became increasingly alarmed by rapid cultural changes
during the 1960s. Nixon sensed and located very early on in his career where the soft,
vulnerable belly of the Democratic-led consensus lay. He mercilessly proceeded to stab his
adversaries using what have since become the standard shibboleths of the American right for
well over half a century. Weak, aloof liberal intellectuals; meddling, faceless, self-interested
bureaucrats; arrogant, out-of-touch pressmen and academics populated the Nixonian bestiary
of bad Americans. By 1968, young Nixon's class-based resentments and evident social
insecurities would blossom into thinly-disguised fear and loathing of what the more mature
Nixon believed to be 0 with the full concurrence of most American conservatives 0 a
I Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 1184.
2 The two best known example of scholars who have re-evaluated Nixon as Roosevelt's last heir are Joan Hoff, Nixon
Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994) and Dean 1. Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principle and
Policy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); see also David Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow: The History of
an Image (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 304::37.
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hostile, contemptible cultural and political class that had set the zeitgeist of mid-century
America.' During the late 1940s and early 1950s, at the same time as he identified a set of
enemies which would accompany him throughout the rest of his career, Nixon also
articulated the conservative intellectuals' new, internationalist, and vigorously anti-liberal
canon in a language understood by the average voter. He did so better than conservatives
themselves, and that even before the then-infant conservative movement had consolidated
itself as a coherent organisational and political force. In the process, Nixon's careful
balancing of right-wing populism and political respectability - which mirrored the
conservative leadership's own behaviour - also helped to solidify the firm association
between the conservative movement and the Republican party." Nixon had been firmly
attached to the fortunes of the American right since his very first political campaigns. After
his narrow 1960 defeat at the hands of John Kennedy, and his insincere but nevertheless
enthusiastic campaigning for conservative hero Barry Goldwater in 1964, he became about
the only senior Republican politician firmly connected with the expanding, increasingly well-
organised corps of right-wing grassroots activists that soon came to control the middle and
lower segments of the national Republican party structure.?
Nevertheless, as toe conservative intellectual leadership fully realised, Nixon refused to
become the political champion of conservatism." Aware of the weakness of the conservative
3 The expression is, of course, borrowed from Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72
(London: HarperCcllins, 1973). Others have, however. described more precisely Nixon's inner demons and their
effects, see Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1991), pp.
9, 205; Richard 1. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican '.I' Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1972), pp. 210, 212. For typical examples of conservatives bemoaning the liberal establishment, see Frank
Meyer, 'What Consensus?', National Review, October 20, 1964, p. 912, and William F. Buckley Jr., 'Introduction' in
idem. ed., Did YOli Ever See a Dream Walking? American Conservative Thought in the 20'h Century (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1970) pp. xv, xvi.
4 The strenuous efforts of National Review conservatives to put as much distance as possible between their own brand
of conservatism and the right's more colourful representatives has been noted before in George H. Nash, The
Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (Wilmington DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998)
pp. 98-99 and John B. Judis, William F. Buckley: Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1988)pp.103, 112, 173-74. .
5 John S. Saloma, Ominous Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), pp. 95 95;
Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1995), p.135; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, p. 125; Stephen C. Shadegg, Winning's a Lot More
Fun (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 63.
6 William Rusher to William F. Buckley, May 23, 1968, f. 10M (April-June 1968), box 50, William F. Buckley Jr.
papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
322
wing of the GOP and of the electorate's general aversion to drastic political change, the man
from Yorba Linda opted instead to skilfully employ his own appeal to right-wing voters to
make himself useful to the still dominant Eastern-liberal wing of the party that had sustained
the moderate Eisenhower candidacy and presidency. Nixon thereby avoided the fracas that
had befallen all conservative Republicans in presidential politics from Taft to Reagan (until
1979) through Goldwater and Senator William Knowland. Yet the leadership of the
conservative movement fully recognised his strategy and reciprocated the lack of political
and philosophical commitment. 7 Amidst much agony and disputation, between 1952 and
1968 the Buckleyite conservatives who led the movement from the pages of National Review
lambasted every instance of what they regarded as Nixon's ideological wavering - from the
conscious defence of the Ike's most un-conservative initiatives to the spectacular 1960
bowing to Eastern Republicans known to conservatives as the 'American Munich,.8 Yet,
Ideological fireworks aside, conservatives also used Nixon about as much as the latter had
used them. In 1960, 1968 and, under different circumstances in 1972, the Californian became
the acceptable vehicle for fortifying conservatives' shaky credentials as a respectable
intellectual and political force. In all those instances, Nixon's acceptability within the
conservative community helped the more pragmatic conservative leaders such as Reagan, F.
Clifton White and, in 'practice, the bulk of the Buckleyite faction, to keep the movement
within the GOP and, hence, away from the options favoured by the most radical elements
such as Robert Welch and the John Birch Society.
Most other conservative sub-families followed a similar pattern of moderation in then
pursuit of influence. Of these, Southern Republican conservatives constituted the most
influential and best organised political faction within the conservative movement. As was the
case with the Buckleyites, pragmatism was the main reason why between 1966 and 1968
these Southerners led the rest of the movement towards a quid pro quo with Richard Nixon.
7 It is worth noting that Nixon's manipulative tactics were so transparent that they drove conservative and progressive
observers to identical conclusions, see Thompson, Fear and Loathing, pp. 324.,27, 330~.'31; Joe McGinniss, The
Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), pp. 12225; Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, p. 270;
~illiam Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), pp. 209 ...10.
Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man Who Made the Revolution (Washington DC: Regnery, 1993), pp. 134 35.
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Defeated by the national Democratic party and sensing the growing dissatisfaction with
public disorder and civil rights advancements beyond strict de jure issues, Southerners shifted
from frontal opposition to civil rights legislation to a less confrontational strategy. In keeping
with their new-found flexibility, the Southern Republicans chose to support a non-member of
the conservative movement like Nixon, whom they also allowed to pursue relatively liberal
initiatives outside the areas of foreign policy and racial integration. The short-term effect of
the Southerners' strategy was to allow Nixon, unlike Goldwater, to harness right-wing
grassroots energy without triggering outright rejection on the part of either moderate voters or
the still-important senior liberal Republicans. In exchange, as Harry Dent openly concluded,
Southern conservatives regained their waning influence over federal policy, and were able to
adjust with greater ease to new electoral realities such as the expansion of the black electorate
and the increasing reluctance of white voters to countenance racial stridency."
The Nixon's administration handling of the race matter was, needless to say, the latest
example of Nixon's funambulism between the populist radicalism of the right and political
respectability. For the first time, the president of the United States openly used the language
of conservatives regarding racial integration in order to de-legitimate affirmative action
efforts to put an end to defacto segregation. The administration, as a comparison between the
utterances of senior officials and the correspondence sent to the White House from white
conservative cadres clearly shows, fully colluded with the new strategy of ostensibly non-
race based and strictly legal obfuscation combined with manipulation of local resources to
maintain the existing status quo in Southern schools. To be sure, the administration's
deliberate soft-pedalling of federally-sponsored efforts for further integration successfully
decreased racial tensions both on a national scale and within the conservative community.
Nixon's careful use of classical liberal arguments such as shielding segregated schools behind
defences of 'quality education' and opposing forceful enforcement as an instance of
deplorable 'federal interference' with local responsibilities fully reflected (and reinforced) the
9
Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power (New York: Wiley, 1978), p. 8.
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conservative shift away from ostensible racism and towards more respectable arguments." A
significant sector of the academic literature has interpreted these developments as a symptom
of Nixon's liberal leanings. Yet even if racial tension did decrease and most Southern
children no longer attended technically 'segregated' schools, both developments took place
on terms that reflected the needs of conservative white Southerners. civil rights activists,
Southern conservatives and senior federal staffers of every political stripe all agreed in
identifying Nixon's policies and their effects as being at the service of the conservative white
South. II With President Nixon, openly opposing racial integration ceased to be outside the
realm of respectable politics to become, if articulated through the right rhetorical devices,
part and parcel of mainstream national political discussion.
The Southern wing of the conservative movement was not the only right-wing sub-
community to rally behind Richard Nixon. Despite his evident manipulative tendencies,
between 1966 and 1968 Nixon attracted a considerable number of Buckleyite conservatives
to his ranks. Some - including Buckley himself - followed a pragmatic reasoning net far
removed the Southerners': Nixon could win. Others responded to the same old emotional ties
that Nixon had built during his early campaigns and the Hiss case. As ever, a third group -
conspicuously led by William Rusher - could still not bring themselves to stomach him.12As
has been amply documented, the moderate elements within the movement successfully reined
in the rebellious impetus and the latent (and growing) dissatisfaction of the less
accommodating conservatives during the 1968 primaries and the first two years of the
administration. After the 1970 mid-terms however, once Nixon's reasonably conservative
policies and rhetoric became increasingly overshadowed by a marked shift to the centre, a
significant sector of the right erupted. Yet the conservative dissatisfaction that coalesced
IO~r~ftspeech attached to L. Patrick Gray to John Ehrlichman, June 25, 1969, f. Desegregation Memoranda, box 76,
~Ilham Satire papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.
12 See Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, pp. 88-89.
Judis, Buckley, p. 280; Charles Colson handwritten notes of meeting with conservatives, undated [c. June-
Sept~mber 1971], f. Conservatives, box Contested Documents boxes 3I to 59, Charles Colson papers, Nixon
PresIdential Materials, National Archives, College Park MD (hereafter, CC papers, NA).
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behind John Ashbrook's maverick pnmary challenge merely served to dramatise the
debilitating divisions that Nixon provoked among the different elements of the conservative
community. Its political wing, led by Ronald Reagan, Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond's
Southerners and the significant number of conservatives within the administration miserably
failed to follow their more hot-headed National Review brethren and remained - at least
formally - behind the president. In the end the Democrats' sharp shift to the left helped
conservatives to again reunite in support of Nixon during the 1972 election. Yet the events
that divided the movement between the 1970 mid-term elections and the 1972 Democratic
national convention served also to highlight the early symptoms of National Review's
weakening position within the movement, and the concomitant raise of the younger, more
aggressive generation of conservatives such as Howard Phillips, Richard Viguerie and David
Keene who would eventually form the 'New Right.' These 'Young Turks' shared little of
their elders' desire to gain acceptance on the part of the liberal establishment. Moreover,
neither Nixon nor the established conservative leadership grasped the extraordinary political
potency of the nascent cultural wars. In a shift as important and significant for the
conservative movement as that led by the Buckleyites during the 1950s, after (in part because
of) the Nixon presidency it would be the new righters who would adjust more quickly and
more aggressively to these new fields of national controversy. Doubtlessly, the peculiar
dynamics between the Nixon administration and the established conservative leadership
helped the Young Turks in their way towards eventually leading a revamped conservative
movement.
In the meantime, the assistance lent by Richard Nixon towards the advancement of
conservatism did not cease with racial matters, but also included welfare provision and
economic management. As the Californian approached the White House, the economic
affairs of the nation threatened to collapse in the face of three simultaneous and interrelated,
but independent pressures: the uncontrollable, unprecedentedly sharp increase in inflation;
the crumbling of the Bretton Woods international monetary system that had sustained post-
war prosperity for nearly three decades; and the burden of an evidently malfunctioning and
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expensive welfare system. Firstly, in the domestic sphere the Great Society's swathe of
social-democratic measures designed to redistributed wealth, reduce poverty and increase
economic equity and prosperity according to Keynesian mores unravelled. The skyrocketing
costs of these measures, coupled with the long-term strains of ever-expanding Cold War and
Vietnam expenditures at a time of economic stagnation, created unprecedented inflationary
pressures which in tum defied the economics profession's established wisdom.13 Economists
had traditionally contemplated inflation and unemployment as inversely proportional
phenomena but Nixon's advisors were, for the first time, faced with 'stagflation', or the
coexistence of rising inflation and increasing unemployment against a background of
economic stagnation. Nixon became the first president to openly repudiate Keynesian
economics and to embrace the prescriptions of classical liberalism. Nixonomics lent renewed
weight to a group of economists who, led by Milton Friedman, had been part and parcel of
the conservative movement since its inception and who, accordingly, had endured thirty years
of marginalisation by their Keynesian counterparts. Nixon's economists advocated typically
Republican economic prescriptions in favour of balanced budgets and the contraction of
federal economic activities (particularly in the area of welfare). Yet most importantly, the
president openly went beyond those recipes and also experimented with the more innovative
brand of neoliberal ~conomics defended by the monetarist or 'Chicago School' economists."
The subsequent (and predictable) fiasco of the wage and price controls adopted during
Nixon's 1971 'U-turn' became the last proof of Keynesian inefficiency, and opened the door
for the unstoppable ascendancy of classical liberal economics that would subsequently
characterise academic economics and public policy.
As the administration's economists tried to ascertain how best to deal with inflation
without provoking a politically calamitous rise in unemployment, they also confronted the
13 .
, See Paul W. McCracken, 'Reflections of an Economic Policy Maker: A Review Article', Journal of Economic
Literature 18, no. 2 (1980), p. 581; William Satire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House
f?arden City NY: Doubleday, 1975), p. 491.
An excellent example of monetarist-leaning Nixonian rhetoric can be found in Richard Nixon, 'The Challenge of
Peace', August 15, 1971, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws!?pid=3115, viewed
july 3L 2010.
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first severe strains upon the international monetary system set up after 1945. The Bretton
Woods system was designed to foster cooperation between all major national bankers so as to
achieve the monetary stability necessary for freer international trade and prosperity. The
system, based on Keynesian principles, anchored all major international currencies into fixed
exchange rates against each other and the dollar, with the latter as reference currency freely
convertible into gold. To maintain those artificial values frozen called in tum for heavy
government interference with international flows of money. At heart, the whole system
sprung out of, and was designed to avoid a repetition of, the catastrophic competitive
devaluations and rising protectionism of the 1930s. Bretton Woods worked smoothly for 25
years of unparalleled growth in the United States. As Nixon reached the White House, he
faced both stagflation and stocks of greenbacks being held by America's partners that
surpassed US gold reserves. Inevitably, the market value of the dollar (or rather, estimations
of such value) sharply decreased vis-a-vis the official rate. Since the system was based on
mutual trust, the situation called for a round of conversations between the Federal Reserve
and its counterparts so as to re-adjust the dollar exchange rate. Nixon instead opted to follow
the classical liberal instincts of some of his advisors, devalued unilaterally, suspended the
dollar's convertibility into gold, and prepared to free up international monetary exchanges.
Although little appreciated by public opinion at the time, Nixon's decisions in international
economics were the most fundamental change in this area since 1945. As his classical liberal
advisors fully understood, freeing up monetary flows from government 'interference' meant
the death, sooner or later, of the entire Keynesian system and the dawn of new age in
economic management.
While the president's neoliberal-leaning economic advisors struggled to understand the
changing dynamics of the American and international economies, another set of conservative
aides developed a parallel attempt to adjust federal welfare provision to the new realities.
Unlike classical liberals and Southern conservatives, this group was made up of newcomers
to the conservative movement. Led by men such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Irving Kristol
and Norman Podhoretz, these neoconservatives had emerged from the ranks of the liberal
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Democratic progressive elite which the conservative movement (and Richard Nixon) had
excoriated and been excoriated by ever since the early 1950s. As Nixon entered the White
House, however, these men were in the process of abandoning the ranks of liberalism to
become a new family within the conservative community. Neoconservatism resulted from
disillusionment with the Great Society, growing hostility towards civil rights activism and
deepening dissatisfaction with the New Left that briefly dominated both the Democratic party
and a significant segment of the nation's intellectual life. However, unlike the Buckleyites,
the Southerners and the neoliberals, neoconservatives had been associated with and had
defended the post-war liberal consensus, and could not therefore be dismissed as
reactionaries or eccentrics. Neoconservatives, in short, forced liberals to confront the
conservative critique because it was not peddled by conservatives. By the same token, as
neoconservatives increasingly adopted conservative criticisms of liberalism, they served to
lend weight to some of the basic tenets of the right-wing canon which had been developed by
the hard core during the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Some but not all: neoconservatives also infused the conservative movement (at least
initially) with an explicit, if partial, acceptance of the existing policy making status quo. In
1968 conservatives rejected welfare provision on principle, while neoconservatives merely
rejected certain/orms of federal assistance to the needy on the grounds of what they regarded
to be the deleterious practical consequences. The latter provided the American conservative
movement with a way out of flat nay-saying, in much the same way that Nixon's civil rights
policy provided Southern conservatives with a dignified way out their race-induced political
cUl-de-sac. Neoconservatives also bequeathed to American conservatism a corps of
experienced technocrats accustomed to holding public office and experienced in the dark arts
of designing, implementing and evaluating policy. On the whole the hitherto marginalised
American right had conspicuously lacked such skills. The neoconservatives' activities and
neoconservative journals such as The Public Interest added the muscle of policy-making
expertise and of specific proposals to National Review's relatively abstract lucubration and
ideologically-driven philosophising.
329
The one partial exception to the foregoing was of course the neoliberals. Nevertheless,
even if in policy-making terms the neoliberals had mostly circumscribed themselves to
economic affairs - ending the draft was the conspicuous exception to that rule only because it
had across-the-board support from the right and the left- the clash with the neoconservatives
swiftly followed Nixon's accession to office and signalled the beginning of a never-ending
quarrel that, during the Californian's tenure in office, led to mutual negation and paralysis.
For in the end, as the sorry fate of the Family Assistance Plan clearly shows, the continuous
infighting between neoliberals and neoconservatives by default strengthened the liberal status
quo. Yet, if Nixon's conservatives were unable to effect significant alterations in actual
policy, their critique of the Great Society and their attempts at welfare reform did succeed in
altering the regnant policy discourse. After Nixon, accepted assumptions and the direction of
policy inertia switched from the expansionist impetus of Lyndon Johnson's day towards
cutting and limiting federal assistance.
Both Richard Nixon and the conservative movement were well aware that changing the
dominant climate of opinion required more than short-term tinkering with the activities of the
federal government. rs As George McGovern's Democrats threatened to, a new administration
could revive affirmative action, replace military spending with expansions in welfare
provision, and perhaps even resuscitate Bretton Woods. The American right-wing had
invested most of the post-war years bemoaning the existence of a powerful class of
intellectuals, senior civil servants, university professors and journalists responsible for the
hegemonic dominance of liberal assumptions. By 1968 conservatism's adversaries were,
according to Nixon, his own to-the-death enemies. Therefore, as president he set out to
change what he and conservatives regarded as a deplorable state of affairs. The main
beneficiaries of Nixon's longer-term plans were the conservatives gathered around the
American Enterprise Institute. Between 1969 and 1972 the administration set up remarkably
15
See Richard Nixon to William 1. Baroody Sr., November 17, 1968, f. American Enterprise Institute, box 32, CC
papers.
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secretive and immensely successful arrangements to channel funds, provide gravitas and
enhance the influence of the only conservative organisation devoted to connecting
conservative advisors and analysts with serving federal office holders. Nixon's inner demons
drove the president to personally sponsor an all-out effort to transform a previously half-
dormant, rather inefficient outfit into an organisation capable of rivalling the Brookings
Institution - which had long obsessed both Nixon and conservatives.l" Initially the
administration's efforts focused on persuading the existing stable of conservative donors
towards supporting the AEI and away from rival outfits, and this effort subsequently
expanded to include other non-ideological corporate donors. To be sure, the administration's
efforts greatly benefited from the sudden interest in the proposals of American conservatism
on the part of the business community, which had hitherto exhibited bland contentment with
liberal arrangements. As Nixon navigated through stagflation and civil unrest, businessmen
and corporate mangers began to feel the pain of both economic contraction and the
intensification of attacks from the left: as a consequence corporate America turned to the
right.17
As well as business's disquiet, the success of Nixon's initiatives was notably helped by
the Institute's own ~tand and style. As was the case with all the established conservative sub-
families and the neoconservatives, AEI's objectives and strategy had steered well away from
conservatism's usual stridency and outspokenness. The marginalisation of conservative
mores and AEI's own 'relatively modest scale had nearly led to its dissolution as Dwight
Eisenhower reached the White House in 1952. The Goldwater debacle of 1964, with which
the Institute was intimately associated, resulted in considerable discredit and, still worse,
threatened AEI's very existence once again by placing it on the receiving end of tax
investigations. In 1969 AEI opted to rehabilitate the placidly technocratic imprimatur that its
director, William J. Baroody Sr., had desperately tried to acquire before Goldwater's
16
L.eonard Silk and Mark Silk, The American Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1980) p. 174-75; James A.
~mlth, The Ideas Brokers: Think-Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 197.
For an excellent recent survey see Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New
Deal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).
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intoxicating success in the 1964 primaries. Baroody's combination of sectarian loyalty and
emphasis on the appearance of technical, non-ideological policy analysis suited both the
Nixon administration and potential non-conservative business donors. By Nixon's downfall
the AEI's activities had ballooned into assisting more federal officers and elected officials
than it could initially cater for, as well as into nationwide out-reach activities. The Institute
also flourished as the acknowledged Republican 'government-in-exile' and, at long last,
could rival Brookings in influence, gravitas and resources. In national terms, as Baroody
expressed it, Nixon's initiatives certainly succeeded in widening the terms of public policy
debate to include conservative proposals. As far as the conservative movement was
concerned, AEI became the pioneer institution in a growing network of conservative think-
tanks that helped to translate the conservative canon into policy and 'scientific' critiques of
liberal proposals.
A collateral effect of AEI's rise upon the development of the American con~ervative
movement was the Institute's new-found capacity to act as a right-wing centre of gravity. Up
until 1968 the sages at National Review had consciously acted as the acknowledged leaders of
respectable conservatism, but as AEI obtained new sources of funding it also acquired the
\
capacity to attract conservative activists and to produce its own set of conservative proposals.
By the mid-1970s the Institute had moved from being a relatively modest pro-business
organisation to a rather omnivorous outfit capable of accommodating neoliberal, traditionalist
and neoconservative activists who, in turn, moved quite beyond defending the narrow short-
term interests of the corporate community. The phenomenon was particularly relevant in the
case of the neoconservative faction. Neoconservatives and AEI staffers shared a rather
distant, cool relationship with the Buckleyites, who tended to consider the neocons as
interlopers with suspect sympathies for New Deal style government interventionism, and
never quite forgave Baroody Sr. for snatching away the running of the 1964 Goldwater
campaign. With the assistance of the Nixon (and later Ford) administrations, AEI and the
neoconservatives mutually reinforced their relative weight vis-a-vis other conservative sub-
families; and managed to break National Review's monopoly as spokesman for conservatism.
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Tellinglyenough, supply-side economics - which merged the neo-classical liberals' taste for
business-friendly regulation and tax reductions with neoconservative preference for selective
government welfare spending, and which would became the basis for 'Reaganomics' -
emerged in the AEI with virtually no participation from Buckleyite circle."
While National Review conservatives slowly faded from leading the movement and into
the, otherwise magnificently rewarding, position of heroic elders, Richard Nixon fell into
disrepute and universal repudiation. Needless to say, the Watergate scandal was not so much
an explanation of Nixon's fall as another symptom of the Californian's shortcomings. Nixon
endured a generation-long political career punctuated by remarkable upheavals and dark
periods in the wilderness, during which he read his political obituaries before bouncing back
to political prominence and triumph. His remarkable capacity for rancour and even greater
capacity to generate contempt eventually killed him as a public person. Nonetheless, his role
as a midwife in conservatism's ascendancy should not be underestimated. It was the Nixon
administration that first opened the doors of power to conservatives, and it was under
President Nixon that conservatives threw the first shovels of sand which would bury the post-
war liberal consensus. Richard Nixon, who was possessed by the kind of all-consuming
\
ambition and thirst for what he called 'the arena' that are pre-requisites for truly successful
politicians, was also endowed with the political intelligence and skill necessary to resurrect
himself from the political graveyard to become the elected leader of the nation in the thick of
a momentous crisis. And yet, Richard Nixon, as William Rusher cleverly, if indirectly,
realised, did not want to lead. He wished to reach a leadership role following, rather than
setting, the dominant political currents. He thus reflected voters' New Deal fatigue and Cold
War anxieties during the 1940s and 1950s. He again followed the voter's mild contentment
during the Eisenhower administration and the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1968 Nixon
successfully reined in the forces propelling the nation to the right, so as to serve his own
short-term political objectives. He sought to manipulate and accommodate conservatives and
liberals throughout his entire career. Only at the very end, on the verge of the precipice, was
18 Interview with Jude Wannisky, August 14-15,2005, email.
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Richard Nixon willing to follow his deeply-held conservative instincts, do away with party
loyalty and attempt to re-shape the national political landscape. Where biographers and the
beaux arts may see a tragic tormented Hamlet, conservatives rightly identify a Falstaff. For
three decades Richard Nixon remained the unwelcome companion of the American right. He
translated conservatism into the kind of common-folk populist rhetoric that made it an
electable language first and a presidential discourse later. But he lacked the political bravery
to turn those tremendous achievements into anything beyond piling up a few more votes. It
was left to Reagan to lead the forces that Nixon had merely played with.
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